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A TRG President's

special

Foreword

The Air Transport
Research
Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched
as a
interest group at the 7 th Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our

membership
researchers,

base has expanded
rapidly, and
policy- makers, industry executives,

28 countries.
Our broad membership
forward, to continuously
initiate new
research communities
worldwide.
It became

a tradition

now includes
over 400 active
major corporations
and research

transportation
institutes from

base and its strong enthusiasm
have pushed the group
events and projects that benefit the aviation industry and

that the ATRG would

hold an international

conference

at least once

a year. As you know, the 1997 conference
was held in Vancouver,
Canada.
Over 90 papers,
panel discussions
and invited speeches
were presented.
In 1998, the ATRG
organized
a
consecutive
stream of 14 aviation sessions at the 8th Triennial WCTR Conference
(July 12-17:
Antwerp). Again, on 19-21
successfully
by Dr. Aisling

July, 1998, the ATRG Symposium
was organized and executed
Reynolcls-Feighan
of the University
College of Dublin.

As in the past, the Aviation
Bowen,

Director

of the Institute)

Institute

at the University

has kindly agreed

of Nebraska

to publish

the Proceedings

at Omaha

every

(Dr. Brent

of the I998 ATRO

Dublin Symposium
(being
co-edited
by Dr. Aisling
Reynolds-Feighan
and Professor
Brent
Bowen),
and the Proceedings
of the 1998 WCTR-ATRG
Conference
(being
co-edited
by
Professors
Tae H. Oum and Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG members,
I would like to
express

my

sincere

appreciation

to Professor

Brent

Bowen

and

to the

staff

at the

Aviation

Institute of UNO for their efforts in publishing these ATRG proceedings.
Also, I would like to
thank and congratulate
all the authors of the papers, for their f'me contribution
to the conferences
and the Proceedings.
Finally,
website

I would

like to draw your attention

(www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrgO

to the ATRG

newsletter

which will keep you informed

and the ATRG

of the ATRG operations

and forthcoming
events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking
Committee,
I would also appreciate
it very much if you would encourage
others in the field, to sign up for ATRG membership.
Thank

you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President,
ATRG
Faculty

ATRG
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Abstract
Strategic alliances have occurred in a broad spectrum of industries including the airline
industry. This paper presents a model that examines the effects on market outcome and welfare
of two types of strategic airline alliances: complementary vs. parallel alliances. It is identified
that the two alliances have different effects on total output and consumer surplus.
The
complementary alliance is likely to increase total output, While the parallel alliance is likely to
decrease it. Consequently, the former increases consumer surplus, while the latter is likely to
decrease it. We find sufficient conditions under which each type of alliance improves total
welfare.
The empirical test results from the trans-Atlantic
alliance routes for the 1990-94
period, confirm the theoretical predictions on partners' outputs and total output.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Strategic alliances have occurred in a broad spectrum
of industries
including the automobile,
commercial
aircraft, electronic
equipment, robotics, steel, and telecommunications
industries
(Business
airline

Week July 27,

industry

1992; Economist

has had a large

number

September
of alliances

11, 1993).
which

Among

these

have been spurred

markets,
their

t Some

domestic

global

network,

have tried to expand

cities.
with

Since

bilateral

alliances

allow

carriers

overseas

this approach
restrictions

international
services,
most international
existing
networks
through
international
Strategic

limits
1994).

on foreign

more passengers
in an increasingly
competitive
environment,
major
have been seeking to extend the range of their network and access new

carriers
hub

the

on by regulatory

barriers such as the lack of access to domestic
markets
by foreign carriers,
ownership,
or simply the fear of being left behind (Gallacher
and Odell,
In order
to attract
international
airlines

industries,

services

requires
sometimes

limiting

carriers
have focused
airline alliances.

to expand

the reach of their

parts of the world where it may not be economical
be a lack of authority
to operate their own flights.
by-route
alliances
to broad commercial
alliances,

by adding

enormous

foreign

funding
their

ability

on integrating

networks

spokes

to build
to

two or more

and services

to many

to do so on their own or where there may
These alliances
range from simple routeand to equity alliances. 2

may provide
opportunities
for partners
involved
to reduce costs by coordinating
in some fields: joint use of ground
facilities
such as lounges,
gates and check-in

counters;

codesharing

block

a

expand

Alliances
activities

3 or joint operation;

to

such

space

sales; 4joint

advertising

and promotion;

' In airline markets, there are demand forces such that consumers prefer airlines which serve a large number
of points over ones which serve a smaller number of points, with all other factors such as prices held constant
(Tretheway and Oum (1992)).
2 We analyzed 46 international alliances being formed between the world's top-30 airlines in order to
identify the areas of joint activities between alliance partners and measure the extent of coordination.
Based on
the extent of coordination, 28 cases were classified as simple route-by-route alliances, 9 cases as broad
commercial alliances, and 9 cases as equity alliances. The equity alliance is the most advanced and durable
form of alliances. It involves strategic linkage between both partners' flight network. One example is the
KLM/Northwest alliance signed in January 1993. KLM invested in 25% of Northwest's voting shares and 49%
of its equity as of March 1993, and they received antitrust immunity from the U.S. government in November
1992. Although each carrier's management remains separable due to foreign ownership limit, they can closely
coordinate.
They are able to achieve a high level of integration without fear of legal challenges from
competitors and are able to discuss market strategy and pricing.
3 A codesharing agreement is a marketing arrangement between two airlines whereby one airline's
designator code is shown on flights operated by its partner airline.
For example, Lufthansa has been
codesharing on United Airlines' flight between Frankfurt and 25 U.S. interior cities via two of United's hubs
(Chicago O'Hare and Washington Dulles). For the effects of codeshariag, see Hadrovic (1990) and Gellman
Research Associates (1994).
4 If two carriers make a block space sale agreement, each carrier can buy a block of seats in the other
carrier's flights and resell them to passengers. For example, Air Canada and Korean Air have signed on such
an agreement on the Seoul-Vancouver-Toronto
route, under which each buys 48 seats from the other's flights

exchange of flight attendants; and so on. As a result, the partners
effective and increase their competitiveness.

may become more cost-

Alliances also produce several benefits for consumers.
Alliance partners can better
coordinate
flight schedules to minimize travellers'
waiting time between flights while
providing sufficient time for connections.
Joint baggage handling eliminates the need to
retrieve and re-check baggage at connecting places, and thus reduces the risk associated with
interline handling in which no one carrier has the sole responsibility
for the baggage.
Consumers'.choices
can increase due to alliances.
For example, consider a passenger who
wants to fly from Indianapolis to Lyon.
She could fly Indianapolis-Washington,
D.C.Frankfurt-Lyon
on United-Lufthansa
partners' flights.
She could also fly IndianapolisPittsburgh-London-Lyon
on British Airways-USAir alliance flights. Alternatively, she could
fly Indianapolis-Detroit-Amsterdam-Lyon
on KLM-Northwest
alliance flights. Without the
alliances, she would have to interline on several different carriers with great inconvenience.
Although alliances generate benefits for both partners involved and consumers, it may reduce
the number of competitors and thus increase the combined market power of alliance partners.
As a result, the partners may increase air fares if they behave collusively and abuse their
strengthened market power. On the other hand, it is also possible for air fares to decrease
since alliances between non-market-leaders
can increase their competitiveness
against the
market leader. By focusing on "complementary"
alliances in the tram-Pacific markets, Oum,
Park and Zhang (1996) empirically show that the alliances between non-leaders reduce the
leader's

equilibrium

price.

Despite the growing importance of international
airline alliances, few researchers
have
devoted effort to constructing formal models of the alliances. 5 This paper constructs a formal
model to examine the effects on market outcome and economic welfare of different types of
alliances: "complementary"
and "parallel" alliances.
The "complementary"
alliance refers
to the case where two firms link up their existing networks and build a new complementary
network
in order to feed traffic to each other.
Major strategic alliances such as
KLM/Northwest
can be regarded as this type of alliance. For example, KLM and Northwest
signed the "complementary"
alliance by which they were able to connect 88 U.S. cities to 30
European and Middle Eastern cities via Northwest's hubs (Boston, Detroit, and Minneapolis)
and KLM's Amsterdam hub, as of December 1994 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995).
The "parallel" alliance refers to collaboration between
routes.
Two types of parallel alliances are considered:

two firms competing on the same
"no shut-down" and "shut-down"

parallel alliances.
The difference between the two is that each partner continues to
individually provide services on the route in the first type, while two partners integrate their

on the route.
5 The international airlinei._'ueshave been investigated by researcher's. The effects on pricingof bilateral
agreements were investigated by, among others, Abbott and Thompson (1991), and Maillebian and Hansen
(1995). The effects of alliances have been empirically investigated by, among others, Youssef and Hansen
(1994), Gellman Research Associates (1994), and Oum, Park and Zhang (1996).
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services
in thesecondtype.Forexample,
Air Canada
andKoreanAir implemented
the"no
shut-down"parallelallianceon the Vancouver-Seoul route. Delta and Sabena formed the
"shut-down" parallel alliance on the New York-Brussels
and purchased a block of seats from Sabena.

route on which Delta stopped flying

More specifically,
this study investigates the following questions:
After alliance partners
make a particular type of alliance in a specific market, what happens to the partners' and nonaligned competitors'
outputs in that market as well as in other markets? What happens to
profit for the partners and the competitors due to the alliance? What happens to total output
and air fare in that market as well as in other markets?
Under which conditions do the
alliances improve economic welfare?
In the next section, the Basic Model is considered to compare pre-alliance, complementary
alliance, and parallel alliances situations.
Section 3 examines the effects of complementary
alliance on market outcome and total welfare. Section 4 investigates the effects of two types
of parallel alliances on the partners' outputs and total welfare. Section 5 provides the Extend
Model by relaxing some conditions assumed in the Basic Model.
Section 6 tests some
testable predictions associated with the effects on firms' output and total output. Section 7
concludes.

2. THE BASIC MODEL
2.1 Pre-alliance
Situation
Inordertoanalyzetheeffects
ofalliances
on marketoutcome and economicwelfare,
we need
toconstruct
a pre-alliancc
situation
first
where none of airlines
have yetto make any typeof
alliance.
As depictedinFigureI,a network isconsidered,
consisting
of threegatewaycities
locatedindifferent
countries:
A, B and H. There arcthreeoriginand destination
markets,
AH, BH and AB, and threefirms(orcarriers)
arcoperatingin thenetwork. Firm I is
assumed to serveallthreemarkets (AH, BH and AB) using itshub-and-spokenetwork.
Firms 2 and 3 areassumed toserveAH and BH markets,respectively.
6
If travellers want to fly from city A and arrive at city B by firm l's airplanes, they must
change airplanes at the hub airport H. Or, they can use two segment flights, separately
provided by firms 2 and 3, in order to arrive at their final destination.
However,
it is
assumed that in the pre-allianee situation, travellers do not use multiple carriers' interline
connecting services because of poor connections between firms 2 and 3. _

6 Notethat
twonational
carriers
areassumed
tooperate
on eachroute
ofthenetwork.
Sinceinternational
airservices
between
twocities
aremainly
decided
by bilatcrai
agreements
between
thetwocountries
involving
thetwocities,
this
assumption
seemstobereasonable.
7 If connections must be made at connecting airports or hubs, less of the traveller's time will be required
with a single airline than when the trip involves switching airlines, because a single airline's connecting flights
are more likely to reduce waiting time at the connectingairports and lower probabilityof baggage being lost
than multiple airlines' interline connecting flights.

2.2 Complementary
AllianceSituation
Considera situationwherefirms2 and3 make

a "complementary"
alliance. Both firms
jointly provide connecting services for passengers travelling between cities A and B, while
continuing to provide local services as before. In order to compete with firm l's connecting
services, the partners enhance quality of their connecting services. For example, the partners
can adjust arrival and departure flights to minimize waiting time between flights while
providing sufficient time for connections.
They can also re-locate departure gates for
connecting flights close to arrival gates, coordinate baggage transfer, and cooperate other
joint activities at the connecting airport. They agree to share revenues and costs arising from
the connecting services.
To examine the effects of this alliance, we need to consider demands and costs. Consider
demands ftrst. The "full" price demand model is considered from the viewpoint that each
fLnu's demand in each market depends not only on its air fare, but also its service quality (De
Vany, 1974; Panzar, 1979). Assuming that consumers can place a dollar value on service
quality, each firm's demand in each market in the complementary alliance situation may be
written as
I

Ot all

I

t . t
= D sutPmu,
i

d u) for i=t,2, i.j
!Pnu) .

I

Q_m=D_j(p,ta,_j)

where

fori=l,3,

i*j

for t=I, 2+3, i,_j

p_ is the full price of using carrier i's service in market k, which is the sum of air

fare, denoted by p_, and value of service quality.
yield the following

Solving the demand functions for P_ may

inverse demand functions:
t

t

t

p,--a,(Q,,Q/,) for

i,:.

We assume that outputs of rival carriers are substitutes in each city-pair market:
m<0,

for k =AH, BH,AB,

i*j.

aQ/

O)

The value of service quality can be regarded as cost of service quality from the viewpoint of
carriers.
Two different costs of service quality are considered: (i) schedule delay cost on
each route, and (ii) inconvenient connecting cost at the connecting airport.
The schedule delay cost is a passenger's

schedule delay time arising

from the difference

between the passenger's desired departure and actual departure time. Research has found that
the schedule delay cost depends largely on the carrier's flight frequency, which in turn
depends on its total traffic (e.g., Douglas and Miller, 1974)i
Thus, if Q is the total

passengers
carriedby carrieri onroutek, thentheschedule
g_(Q).

It is assumed that g/(.)<0,

its traffic on the route.

delay cost may be written

l

t

The schedule delay cost for the non-stop services is gt(Qk +QJm) for

k = AH and BH, while the schedule delay cost for the connecting
schedule

as

that is, the schedule delay cost of an airline declines with

(

delay cost on each of two local routes,

i

g,4H(QaH

service is the sum of the

t

l

i

I

+ Q,4D) +gmH(QBll

+ QaB)"

The second component of the cost of service quality is a passenger's inconvenience cost due
to connections.
Carlton, Landes and Posner (1980) estimate that travellers place an extra cost
of $13-17 (in 1978 dollars) for a single carrier's one-stop connecting services, as compared
to its non-stop services.
This extra cost for alliance partners' connecting services will be
even larger, if the partners' connecting service is inferior to the single carrier's connecting
service.
For convenience of analysis, without loss of generality, we assume that the
inconvenient
connecting cost for the single carrier's connections is zero, but that for the
partners' connections, denoted by y, is positive. However, the partners' connecting cost will
decrease as the level of their coordination increases at the airport H.
Carrier

i's production cost function

on route k may be expressed

as C_(Q),

implying

its

ronnd-trip
passengers

cost of carrying Q passengers on the route.
Note that Q represents
total
carried by the airline on the route.
This production cost function reflects

economies

of traffic density, satisfying

iI

U, (Q)>0

Given these demand and cost specifications,
aligned partners can be expressed as:
I

d I

1

+Qa

2

1

III

and C k (Q)<0.

profit function

l

for the non-aligned carrier

3

a(QJs, ldAn ) -g_ntk_H +Q,_a) -gmH(QaH

-

i

1

1

I

l

1

and

1

(2)

I

* g_...)- Ci.(g.. ÷

(3)

' Caves, Chtistensen andTretheway(1984) distinguishbetweeneconomies of traffic density and economies
of firm size. Economiesof traffic density mean thatoutputis expanded by increasingflight frequency within
a given network. Economi_ of firm size imply that outputis expanded by addingpointsto the network. Many
studies reacha common conclusion: roughly constant returnsto ftrm size exist, while sizeable economies of
traffic densityexist up to fairly largevolumes of traffic(See, for example, Caves, Christeusen, Tretheway and
Windle (1987)).

where superscript

c stands for complementary

It can be shown

that _

complementarities

between local services.

c_

=-2g,

t'

aQ,la0Qau

(-)-g,

t"

alliance.

= 0.

This

implies

that

there

are no network

We can also show that

(-)-(Q,t+Q_n)-C

dI
, (-),

k=AH,

BH.

a'a'
Q,

(4)

In (4),thefastterm ispositive
becausean airline's
scheduledelaycostdecreaseswith its
traffic.
The secondterm ispositive
ifg islinear
or concave.The thirdterm isalsopositive
because of economies of traffic
density.(4)can be positive
even ifg isconvex. More
generally,
we assume that(4)ispositive,
implyingthatthereexist
networkcomplcrnentaritics
between localand connectingservices.In otherwords, a carrier's
marginalprofitfrom a
localserviceincreases
as itsconnectingpassengersincrease.
In (1), outputs of rival carriers are assumed to be substitutes in each city-pair market. We
further
assume thatineachmarketa carrier's
marginalprofitdecreases
as theoutputof the
competitorincreases:
_w<0,

aQloQ

k=.dH, BH, AB, i@j,

which implies that within each market the outputs of duopolists
the terms of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
2.3

Parallel

Alliance

(s)
are "strategic

substitutes"

in

Situation

Next, consider another post-alliance situation where fn'ms 1 and 2 make a "parallel" alliance
ina sensethattheywere competitors
intheAH segment of thenetworkbeforethealliance,
butnow theycoordinate
or integrate
theiroperations
in thatsegrncnt.For convenienceof
notation,
among theparallel
alliance
partners,
firm 1 iscalledas a hub partner,
and firm2
as a non-hub partner.Firm 3 iscalledas a non-partner.
Two typesof parallel
alliances
areconsidered.The Rrstisthateach partnercontinuesto
provide local services in the AH segment and choose their quantities to maximiTe their joint
profits.
For example,AirCanada (ahub partner)
and Korean Air (anon-hubpartner)have
implementedthisstyleofparallel
alliance
on theSeoul-Vancouver-Toronto
routesince1993.
Anothertypeisthatthepartners
integrate
servicesintheAH segment ina way thatthehub
partnercontinuesto providelocalservices,
butthenon-hub partnerstopsproducinglocal
services.For simplicity
of analysis,
itisassumed thatthepartnersequallysharerevenues
and costsarising
from thejointservices.
For example,Deltaand Sabena formedthissortof
parallel
alliance
on theNew York-Brussels
routewhere Deltastoppednon-stopservices
after
thealliance.

Since the non-hub partner shuts down its operation in the second case, the first case is
referred to as "no shut-down" parallel alliance, the second as "shut-down" parallel alliance,
hereafter. For both cases, firm 3 continues to operate alone in the BH segment as before.
For consistency of analysis, we consider the same demand and cost specifications as used in
the complementary
alliance. In particular, by using the "full" price demand specification,
the inverse demand functions for the parallel alliance may be written as
/

I

l

l

I

1

p.. =a;,.(Q.u,_.)
p.. = ai.(Qu,

for,'=1,2,

i,j

£J..) /o. ,'=I, 3, i,,j
a =ar._m(QAJ)

where

Q,_

is positive for the "no shut-down" case;

We still assume that conditions

3. EFFECTS

Q,j_ is zero for the "shut-down" case.

(I), (4) and (5) hold.

OF COMPLEMENTARY

ALLIANCE

3.1 Effects on Firms' Outputs and Profits
Let us first analyze the effects of the complementary
alliance. We consider an equilibrium
that arises when the non-aligned carrier (i.e., firm 1) and the aligned partners (i.e., firms
2+3) play a Coumot game in each market of the network. 9 By using vectors Qt and QZ, (2)
and (3) can be simplified as

max Ht, =ill,( Q I,
Qt
Q_)

(6)

max

where

Q -

at, QsmQ

replaced by 2. Assume

p.,

112"=IP'CQ '. Q 2; r)

fori

= 1, 2. For convenience

(7)

of notation,

that there exists a "stable" Coumot-Nash

which satisfies the following

first-order

conditions

superscript 2+3

equilibrium

for maximization

is

_Q t(y), Q 2(y))

of (6) and (7): to

9The Coumot assumption is notcrucial in the duopoly market. Branderand Zhang (1990) and Oum, Zhang
and Zhang (1993), using conjecaa'alvariations,findsome evidence that airlines in duopoly marketsbehave like
Coumot competitors.
,o This stability assumption is important. If an equilibriumis not stable, then a slight deviation by one
player does not cause the equilibriumto returnto thatpoint. The stability of CournobNash equilibrium has been
studied by, among others, Seade (1980), Dixit (1986), Slade (1994), and Zhang and Zhang (1996). In
particular, Zhang and Zhang (1996) extends single-market conditions for stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria
to multinmrketconditions.
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(8)
_(Q

Assume
matrices

_(Y), Q 2('Z); Y) _ o

(9)

that the second-order conditions arc also satisfied,
are negative definite for i = 1, 2:

i.e.,

the following

Hessian

i

With the present specifications, it can be shown that as compared to the pry-alliance situation,
firm 1 (the partners, respectively) produces less (more, respectively) output not only in the
market where the complementary
alliance occurs, but also in the other markets.
Proposition 3-1. Under the complementary alliance conditions, fu-m 1 produces less output
inmarketsAH, BH and AB, butthealliance
partners
producemore outputinboththeklocal
market and theAB market thanunder thepre-alliance
conditions.
Proof. Differentiating
(8)and (9)withrespectto Y yields
iil_ dQ i + HI_dQ _
]_ dQ 1 + rrl¢ dQ '_

where I_-=[0, 0, -I ]r.Solving(10)and (11)for(dQ1/dy,dQ'/dy),we have
l¢-l

1,"

I#-I

._¢

I

1¢-l

I¢

I¢'I

I¢

(12)

dy
dQ 2

2¢

-I

2¢

1¢ -1

1¢

!

2¢

-1

2c

(13)

Differentiating
(8)with respectto Q 2 yieldsthefollowing3-by-3"derivative"
matrixof
carrier l's reaction functions:

R:¢=-ORI¢(Q

2

2 ==

)/OQ --(IIn)

l's reaction function for the aligned partners' outputs.
the
partners'
reaction
functions
for
firm
l's
2¢

-1

2¢

8

1¢ -I

Ic

H12 where

R 1¢(Q"(. )) is carrier

Similarly, a "derivative" matrix of
outputs
can be
defined
as

In what follows, we show that every element of R_ c, R_ c matrices
out that both Hessian inverse
['[|C

,r[[@
_nu:au_.'AalAal

matrices are negative matrices,
--_'"

BU_Aa_

I

"11"1"
_AU:Anj_aU:Aa_

_,rl-le

_AHIAHI--ABtAB

-i-i.lc

rile

_A_._Uj_BU_SU,

By the second-order

conditions

element of (I111)
|*-l.
m negative.

I -

--

Similarly,

(]_)-'is

as

_""
- T'['"
--AUcAB a_nu:an_

_

.sHIAB

I]

.1-T1¢

__AHIAHj.,.J.ABIBII!

and the network

First, it turns

(If'c)
u "' can be expressed

"WT'"

--ABtAHI_RHIAR!

jn::l

is negative:

complementarities

alSOnegative matrix.

-

_AHIAH|_BitIAB

.i-l-it

|

.[-i.ic

--AIIIAllI_Bil|BH

condition
Secondly,

!

(4), every
If',; and I_

are negative diagonal matrices because of the strategic substitutes condition (3). Thus, both R_ c
and R_ c are negative matrices.
By using R_ c and R_ c , (12) and (13) can be rewritten
le R:2c

2

2¢

I

lc

1¢

I

as

2#-1

2c -1

(14)

2c

dy

The stability
of Cournot-Nashequilibrium
impliesthatthemagnitudeof theeigenvaluesof

matric_
_R: andR:R_,must
bel_ than
one(Zhang
andZh_g,1996).
Hence,
bythe

Since R/_R/* is a posidve matrix,

then/--'-'_-It_R[_} ": is also a posidve matrix.

Therefore,aQ'/dy>o andaQ'/a,t<osince,_* is a neg_ivematrixandI_ is a negative
vector.

Q.E.D.

The intuitive
explanations
forProposition
3-I areas follows:Ifthepartners
providebetter
quality
of connecting
services
in marketAB, inconvenience
cost(y) willdecrease,which in
turnincreases
connectingtraffic
forthepartners,
thatis,dQ.,_3/dy
<0. This connecting
traffic
increaseimpliesthatthepartnerscan feedmore traffic
to each other. As a result,

s_ Neumann lemma is thatif R is a real square matrix and the magnitude of eigenvalues of R is less than
one, then (I-R) -_ exists and (/-R) -L=_ R _. See, for example, Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970, p.45).
t-0

schedule delay cost for local non=stop services will decrease (i.e., service quality for the local
services increases) and average operating costs on the AH and BH routes will decrease due
to economies

of traffic density.

Consequently,

increases

-- 2*3

in fd,(,

lead to decreases

the

partners' air fares in the AH and BH markets, which in turn increases AH and BH traffic as
well. Therefore, it is possible that increasing qualities of service and decreasing operating
cost are jointly achievable if the partners collaborate very well.
2_3

On the other hand, increases in IdAs due to the better coordination

decrease

QJj, resulting

in increased carrier l's unit cost on the AH and BH routes and increased schedule delay cost
for its local services. As a result of the complementary
alliance, carrier I decreases output
not only in the AB market, but also in the other market,
AlthoughfirmI reducesitsoutput
inmarketsAH, BH and AB, itdoesnotnecessarily
imply
thatitdecreasesitsprofit,
because itsprofitisaffectednot only by itsoutputin these
markets,butalsoby corresponding
airfares.Thus, itisworthwhileto investigate
whcthcr
each firm'sprofitincreases
or decreasesdue to thecomplementaryalliance.
Proposition 3-2. Under the complementary alliance conditions, firm 1 earns less profit, but
the aUiance partners cam more profit, as compared to the pre-alliance conditions.
Proof.
Substituting the Coumot-Nash
equilibrium (Q _(y), Q 2(y)) into (6) and (7), and
differentiating

these with respect to ¥, we have

d '
ay

t-aS

0 Qt t

dy

d '
t=,_u

OQ:

d7

0d, dQ:
t-An

0 Qt x dy

By thefirst-order
conditions,
thefirst
termofthefight-hand
sideof thefirst
equations
of(16)

(zT)

and (17) disappears.
3.2

Effects

on Market

By condition (1), 0IIt'/0y>0
Outcome

and Economic

and 0iP*/0"t <0.

Q.E.D.

Welfare

According to Proposition 3-1, it is not clear whether total output in each market increases or
decreasesdue tothecomplementaryalliance
sincefirm I decreases
outputineach market,
while the alignedpartnersincrease.Thus, in thissection,
wc examine theeffects
of the
alliances
on total
outputand consumer surplusin eachmarket,and total
welfare.
In order toexamine changesintotaloutput
due tothecomplementaryalliance,
we further
assume thatthealignedpartners
and non-aligned
competitors
arcsymmetricand thepartners
can provideconnectingservices
atthesame quality
as thenon-partner's
(i.e.,
y =0 ).
Proposition

3-3.

For the symmetric case, the complementary alliance results in (i) increased
10

total output and (ii) decreased "fulr' price in markets AH, BH, and AB. Therefore,
consumers in these markets are better off due to the complementary
alliance.
Proof.
Let Q be total output vector and p(Q) be corresponding
"full" price vector. By
definition of Q,

a_kQ
=
d'{

Rearranging

(18)
d'},

(10) and using R_ #=
- -4(II l¢l-lr[Ic
11/ _la,
dQ t
dy

Substituting

+
dy

we can have

1#dQ l
-R2 _
dy

(19)

(15) and (19) into (18) yields
(20)

._:__+_t,lf._a,_t,l-t,.,,.2,,-,.,.,_

2¢

-1

2o

By using the symmetric condition and R_ c- -(I_2 ) ]_1, (20) can he rewritten as
(21)

Using the result (AB) "_ = ,8 -*A -_, we can further
+

Notice
negative

that both I_;

and I_ matrices

clef'mite matrix.

2c

simplify (2i) as follows:
1

are negative

Its inverse matrix,

2c

(22)

definite.

_I_;+ I_;)-'can

Consequently,
be expressed

/_2¢

_,l#

TT
_ _u
:':

where subscripts A, B and, C represent A/I, BH, and AB, respectively.

I_vector
consumer

implies,
surplus

we have

ap./avl.,.,<o.

in each market increases

Thus,

v,r:c

'l

.TT:* I
_..2u

_2¢

Since every element

ap(Q)/a_tlT.,>o.

due to the complementary

is a

as
wa¢

T'[A_ ]'1.2*
zcz_c_z

I_; + [I_

Consequendy,

alliance.

Q.E.D.

In order to analyze changes in total welfare due to the complementary
alliance, we assume
a partial equilibrium framework in which consumer demand for air travel in each market is
11

derivedfroma utility functionwhichcanbeapproximated
by theform
AB
U

t
_(Q,,
Q2)

÷

z

-AH

where

Z is expenditure

on a competitively

supplied

numeraire

good, and OU_/OQ_ = PJk.

Recall that p_ is the full price of nsing carrier rs service in market k, i.e.,
Then consumer

1

I

1..

P_=Pk +g_(').

surplus in each market can be written as
2 2
cs, = U ,(Qk,i Q_) - PkQt
i I - PtQk,

(23)

and total surplus can be written as
AB

w= }2

CS,+( ri'l + ]:P)

(24)

k =AH

where W may be interpreted
different countries.
Substitution

as "World Welfare"

if the markets under consideration

of (2) and (3) into (24) can yield the following

w = Ev, c_',Q:) =
k=A_¢

expression

involves

for W:

'.(g_ ' +gAn)"
' (g_' +Q_a) +ga.(QsH
' ' + QAa)"
' (QaH
' +Q_a)
#=I

(25)

2

, ,

]

'

+CaH(Qa.+P.Ja)- _Q.Aa
Ill

where again, for simplicity,
Proposition
alliance.
Proof.

3-4.

For the symmetric case, total welfare rises due to the complementary

Differentiating

d,,

superscript 2 +3 is replaced by 2.

(25) with respect to y and using Or./"0L/ g_ _: Pkt :Pk i +gt,, we can show

r,

,,._,

aY"7"
-Z.,r.lk-aa/''_k -g* "tgk +g'liP

'
kJdY
(26)

2 [

su /

,

.ld-

t

2

Notice the first and second bracketed terms of (26) are positive by the first-order conditions.
Since dQ_/dy > 0 and dO_/dy < 0 for each market k, the overall effect of the complementary
alliance on total welfare is not clear.
However,

under the symmetric

condition and y : O, (26)can be reduced to
12

awl
=E i
dr v-o t-An

"'-'

'

" dr ÷ drJ
By the first-order

conditions

Proposition 3-4 provides sufficient conditions for the complementary
However,
welfare can increase even for a small positive r.
dW/d r [r-* < 0 if the partners'
r.(dQ]aldr)

Q.E.D.

and Proposition 3-3, dW/dr[, t ., <0.

alliance to raise welfare.
For example,
in (26),

markup in each market is greater than firm 1' s markup and the

term is sufficiently

small.

4. EFFECTS OF PARALLEL ALLIANCE
4.1 Effects of No Shut-down Parallel Alliance
Let us turn to the effect of the parallel alliances. We first analyze the effect of the "no shutdown" parallel alliance where two partners continue to individually provide local services
after their alliance. However, it is hard to directly sign the "overall" effect of the no shutdown parallel alliance since the effect involves switching from one situation (i.e., individual
profit maximization) to another (i.e., joint profit maximization).
Farrel and Shapiro (1990)
use differential techniques in order to avoid similar difficulties faced in the analysis of
horizontal merger effects.
To use the differential
pre-alliance.

techniques,

we define 0 as: 0 = I for post-parallel

We then treat 0 as continuous

i's output in market

k, Q_(0),

is continuous

alliance;

0 =0 for

in the range 0 < 0 < 1, and assume that carrier
and differentiable

in 0 in the entire range.

By

these assumptions, the overall effect of switching from the pre-alliance to the "no shut-down"
parallel alliance can be calculated as the integral of the infinitesimal effect as follows:
t

a

It turns out to be easy to sign the infinitesimal
effect, AQ_(0),
•unchanged

can be determined

in the range,

effect, dQtk(O)ld O. Consequently,

as well if the sign of the infinitesimal

the overall

effect

remains

which can be verified.

Based on the demand and cost specifications
function can be expressed as

in Section

max

Q, II'p(Qt,

Q2, Q';0)

,,W +flip
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2, each ftrm's

post-alliance

profit

max

Q' ; 6) • _ * 0.1"1"1

max
0 3 _.,,(Q I, R3). _

where superscript
I=

I

p stands for parallel alliance;

I

l

I

I

Q '=_t

I

I

t
I

'a) Q'I

l

2

Q_=

I

We will show that unlike the complementary
alliance, parallel alliance partners
likely to decrease their total output in market AH after their alliance.

,
I

are more

Proposition 4-1. If the non-hub parmer (i.e., firm 2) produces the same amount of output
after the "no shut-down" parallel alliance, then the hub partner (i.e., firm 1) produces less
output in all three markets, and the non-parmer (i.e., firm 3) produces more output in market
BH than under the pre-alliance.
Proof. Since the non-hub partner does not clmage its output in the parallel alliance, the firstorder conditions for firms 1 and 3 may be respectively written as
IIt_P =0, IL_' =0.

Assuming

that there exists a "stable"

order conditions

equilibrium,

(Q '(0), Q'(0)),

which satisfies the first-

for trams 1 and 3, that is,

nl'(e,(o),e'(o);o)---o

(27)

e'(o)), o
Differentiating

(28)

(27) and (28) with respect to 0 yields
lllp

dQ

I +

lllp

dQ

)

Ip

(29)

+rr,o= o,

(30)

where II,o-[Q_d(Od_'_lOQ_u)
,p
2
,
l , 0,0 ]r, the first element of which is negative by condition (1).

Since both (I_)-*and

I_

are negative matrices,
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dQ lldO and dQ'/dO

have opposite

signs

(seeequation

(30)).

Now,

we

show

dQ

Solving (29) and (30) for dQ t/dO, we

rid0<0.

have

dQ l _ L o Ipo,p]-qr:pl-l_l,
- -L' -"3 "'t J _"u/ _'-te

where

R_ p- -(II, t) II,, and

respectively)

reaction

function

-=

derivative

for firm 3's (firm l's,

on

(31)

matrices

respectively)

yio *

of firm l's (firm 3's,
output.

Imposing

vo i vo

the

howo

Ip -1.

in Proposition 3-1, every element of (Iiu)
and the network complementarities

is negative because of the second-order

condition (4).

Therefore,

conditions

dQ t/dO < 0 and dQ 31dO> O.

Next, we show that the signs of dQ '/dO < 0 and dQ 3dO > 0 remain unchanged in the entire
range of interest.
element

of I'PI_ is always negative regardless

arguments,
Notice

In (31), the third term, lIl_, remains as negative in the range since the first
of any value of 0 in the range.

By similar

the signs of the first and second terms remain unchanged in the region.
ip

that the condition which IIlo<0

plays

a crucial role in Proportion 4-1.

Q.E.D.
In fact,

rl-_p=
rr2 ' thus implying that firm 2's profit decreases as fa-m 1 produces more output in
10 - '_'1
marketAH. Thus, theintuition
behindProportion
4-1 isthatby formingthe"noshut-down"
parallel
alliance
and maximizing thejointprofit,
thehub partnerchooses Q t with taking
account of thenegativeexternalities
of thehub partner's
outputon thenon-hub partner's
profit.Thisleadstodecreases
inthehub partner's
outputinmarketAH. Consequently,
the
hub partnerdecreasesitsBH and AB traffic
due to thenetwork complementarities.
Similarly, we can show
Proposition 4-2. If the hub partner (i.e., firm 1) produces the same amount of output after
the parallel alliance, then the non-hub partner (i.e., firm 2) decreases its output, and the nonpartner (i.e., firm 3) produces
situation.
The next question naturally

the same amount of output,

Proof.
first-order

4-3.

Denoting

dQ lldO and dQ :/dO cannot
a "stable" equilibrium

conditions

to the pre-alliance

arises: what if both Q rand Q 2 are chosen endogenously?

two partners endogenously decides their outputs,
in market AH after the parallel alliance.
Proposition

as compared

they cannot simultaneously

If the

increase output

both be positive.

by (Q 1(0), Q :(0), Q _(0)), and differentiating

the

with respect to O, we have
_lt, dQ 1 + Fflp dQ 2 . _tp dQ 3

tp

"-76- -':76- " " :76- ÷n,o --o,
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(32)

I_dQ

2p

where_.Again,

I

I

t + rr=P
dQ 2

II_ = o,

(33)

2

Q,,_(a<_#aQ,,,,)<o.

from (34), it can be easily verified

that dO, _/dO and dQ J/dO have opposite

Equations (32) and (33) show that dQ t/dO and dQ 2dO are interdependent
Solving

(32)-(34)

signs.

with each other.

for dQ t/dO and dQ =dO yields

aQ'

_,,_,:-,/.-,.,,_-,(
_.,,.,._,, aQ' /

(35)

or

(36)

Sinc.cII,2<0
'p
and II_<0 due to the strategic
substitutes
condition,
both do.'/dO and
do.'/dO cannotbe positive
in(35)and (36).

Q.E.D.

Nodce that if dQ=/dO=O,

Similarly,

then (35) reduces to (31) and Proportion 4.1 follows.

if dQ t/dO = 0, then (36) can be used to show Proposition

4-2.

Although both dQ t/dO and dO.21dO cannotsimultaneously
be positivein (35)-(36),
itis
possible that both dQ t/dO and dQ
the following

Assume

numerical

example.

dk(Q:,Q/)

= (z -(Q:

a/dO

are

negative in (35)-(36).

Assume that demand
+ g/)

,

for

k=AH,

This can be illustrated

by

is linear as follows:
BH,

AB.

further that schedule delay cost, gk(" ), is also linear and that operating

cost,

Ck(. ),

is concave:

=
where

tt represents

, c'(o.b
the extent

, ,

_t(.Q,_

of increasing

for k =AH. BH.AB

returns

to traffic

density.

(38)

Given

these

specifications,
the explicit expressions of equilibrium output can be obtained for each firm
• under the pre-alliance and the "no shut-down" parallel alliance situations. In particular, when
(x = 4, 8 = 0.03,
tt = 0.04, both of the partners decrease their outputs, while the non-
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partnerincreases

its output.

shut-down"

alliance

are

A02= -AQ,_,2

= -0.1404;

More accurately,
AQ ! _

changes

QJu, AQ_,,

and AQa_AQ_

QA

= 0.0009,

in each firm's output due to the "no
ffi (-0.2142,

-0.0009,

-0.0119);

respectively.

To sum up the effects of the "no shut-down" parallel alliance on each fhTn's output,
the partners' total output is likely to decrease, while the non-partuer output may increase Coy
Proposition

4-1), remain

unchanged

Proposition 4-3). Thus, consumer
of parallel alliance.
4.2

Effects of Shut-down

Parallel

(by Proposition

4-2), or decrease

(by dO l/d0>0

in

surplus in market AH is likely to decrease due to this type

Alliance

We now analyze the effects of the second style of parallel alliance where the partners
integrate local services in the AH segment in a way that the hub panner continues to provide
the local services, but the-non-hub partner stops producing the local services.
However, it
is intractable to compare the pre-alliance and shut-down parallel alliance by using general
functions since the number of the first-order conditions for the former is not the same as that
for the latter. For tractability of analysis, we impose more structures on the model. First,
demands and schedule delay costs for all three markets are assumed to be symmetric.
Secondly, in order to use a common cost function, we assume that the distances between
cities A and H, and between B and H are the same. Thirdly, we use special functions (37)(38) for demand, schedule delay cost, and operating cost. 12
Comparing
the solution of the pre-alliance situation to that of the "shut-down"
parallel
alliance, we Rrst examine the effects of the "shut-down" parallel alliance on each firm's
output.
Proposition 4-4. Under the "shut-down" parallel alliance conditions, the partners produce
less output in market AH, but produce more output in markets BH and AB, and firm 3
produces less output in its local market BH than under the pre-alliance conditions.
The proofs of the "shut-down" parallel alliance are provided in the Appendix. The intuitive
reasons for Proposition 4-4 axe as follows: First of all, since the AH market is now serviced
only by the name of the hub partner, this market becomes a monopoly market. The hubpartner produces more than its pre-alliance output in this market, but less than total prealliance
output, i.e.,

,b < ,_Au_-_u
r_ lP{fr_t'+2_'l,_/- rJ
ib +_
OAU
_A.
=Au- Secondly,thehub partnerincreases

itsBH and AB traffic
due to thenetworkcomplementarities.
Thirdly,thenon-partner
will
decreaseitsBH traffic
sinceitsreaction
functiontothehub partner's
outputinmarket BH
isdownward sloping.
Next, the effects on each firm's profit are examined. In general, the post-alliance profit of
thenon-hubpartner(i.e.,
firm2) increases
when thesizeof markets(a) issufficiently
large
for a given economies

of traffic density (t_).

Joining the "shut-down"

parallel alliance,

the

12 The linear demandand concaveoperatingcost functionsare also used in Brueckner and Spiller (1991),
Brueckner,Dyer and Spiller (1992), and Nero (1996).
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non-hub parmer decreasesrevenue from market AH since totaloutputin thismarket
decreasesdue to thealliance.But, thenon-hub parmcr becomes more cost-effective
by
jointlyproducingthehub parmcr'sconnectingserviceson theAH route. Ifthesizeof
marketsislargeenough fortheparmcrstoproducea greatvolume oftraffic
on thcAH routc,
firm2'sgainsfrom thecost-cffcctivcness
dominateitslossesfrom thedecreasedrcvcnuc.
Proposition

4-5.

Under the "shut-down"

parallel alliance conditions,

the hub partner earns

morc profit than under the prc-alliancc conditions. Given the economies of traffic density,
the non-hub partner cams more (less, respectively) profit when the size of markcts is
sufficiently large (small, respectively)
than under the pre-alliancc situations.
less profit, as compared to the pre-alliance conditions.

Firm 3 earns

We nextexaminetheeffects
ofthe"shut-down"parallel
alliance
on total
outputand consumer
surplusineachmarket. Accordingto Proposition
4-4,passengersinmarketAH arcworse
offsincetotal
outputinthismarketdecreases
whilethecorresponding
"full"
priccincreases.
Thus, consumersurplusinmarketAH decreases
duc totheparallel
aUiancc.However, itis
notobviouswhetheror notconsumers inmarketBH arebetteroffdue to thealliance.
Proposia'on 4-6. The "shut-down"
parallel alliance results in (i) increased (decreased,
respectively) total output and (ii) decreased (increased, respectively) "full" price in markets
BH and AB (market AH, respectively). Therefore, consumers in these markets (this market,
respectively) are better off (worse off, respectively) due to the parallel alliance.
Although Proposition
4-6 shows increases
inconsumer surplusinmarketsBH and AB due
to theparallel
aUiancc,itcan be verified
thatdecreasesin consumer surplusinmarket AH
dominatetheincreases
in market BH and AB.
To summarize theeffects
of the"shut-down"parallel
alliance
on each firm'soutput,
thepartners'
outputdecreases
inmarketAH and increases
inmarketsBH and AB, whilethe
non-partner's
outputdecreases.Like the"no shut-down"parallel
alliance,
consumer surplus
inmarketAH decreasesduc to the"shut-down"parallel
alliance.

5. THE

EXTENDED

MODEL

The Basic Model have analyzedthe effects
of threetypesof alliances
on thebasisof an
assumptionthatthereareno demand shifts
due to thealliances.
We now extendtheBasic
Model by takingintoaccountthepotential
codesharingeffecton demand shiR. Under a
codesharingagreement,one airline's
designator
code isshown on flights
operatedby its
partner. The codesharingallows the partnersto offera higher frequencyserviceto
consumersshouldthepartners
maintainor increase
their
respective
frequency.For example,
before the alliance,LH and UA provided one daily non-stop service between
Washington,D.C.and Frankfurt,
respectively.
ARer thealliance,
theywere abletooffertwo
dailynon-stopserviceson theroutethankstothccode.sharing.
Itistherefore
possiblethat
demand functions
forthepartnersarcshifted
up by thccodesharingeffect.
5.1 Complementary alliance
Assuming thatthepartners'
"full"
pricedemand functions
in eachmarketareshifted
up duc
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to the partners'
written as

codesharing,

the partners'

=di(Qt,Qt)+_,
2
I
2

p:

where

post-alliance

(inverse)

max
Q2

In the Basic Model,

Differentiating

effect.

profit function (6) and (7) can be rewritten as
max
Qt

equilibrium,

shifts may be

for k=AH, BH, AB

[ is an exogenous demand shift due to the codesharing

The post-alliance

demand

iIt, =IP'cQ 1

, Q _)

(39)
(40)

IP'--n_(g

_ is set to zero.

t, Q2; ?, _) •

Assume

fi2 t(y, _), Q 2(y, _)), satisfying

that there exists a "stable"

the first-order

conditions

Cournot-Nash

for (39) and (40).

the FOCs with respect to _ and solving for dQ z/(3_ and dQ z/a_, we have
aQ 1

[r _ 1,R =,'l'iR l,[_lc_'l_.2c
=-t,-K=
, J : _Lt2=] tt2_

(41)

(42)

where I_-=[1,

1,

1 ]r. Since

-R_R:

t>O, R_'<0,

aQ 2/c_> O. This implies that the codesharing
change the propositions

derived

and _,]

effect on the partners'

from the Basic Model.

<0, then c3Q'/c3_<0 and
demand shifts does not

In particular, for a given y, under

the demand shift situation, (i) the partners (non-partner,
respectively) produce more output
(less output, respectively) in the three markets, and (ii) total output in each market increases
more than under the Basic Model situation.
What ifthenon-partner's
demand function
isalsoshifted
up due tothepartners'
codesharing
effect?Iftheparmcrscannotfullycapturedemands createdby thecodesharingeffect,
some
of thedemands may be left
overtothenon-partner.
We shallassume thatthenon-partner's
"full"pricedemand functionisslightly
shifted
up, as compared to thepartners'
demand
shifts.Wc alsoassume thatthenon-partner's
post-alliance
(inverse)
demand shiR may bc
expressedas
1
1
1
pk=dt(Qt,Qt)

2

+

Then, it is straight forward to show that
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(Z_, O<Ct<l.

8Q l

F. _ ic_ lll-ir[r.¢icl-l,-,.l<

_ ic_,-rlc_-i.-,.lc_

(43)

a_

,,, n.<}

+

where

lc

-

IIl_=[a,

a,

al r.

2c

lc

-1

Ic

lc

Notice that if II_ is a zero vector,

(44)

then (43)-(44) reduce to (41)-

(42), respectively.
Notice that the sign of the second bracketed term of the right-hand side
of (43)-(44) is indeterminate. If demand functions for both the partners and non-partner are
simultaneously shifted up, the effects of the complementary
total output are no longer clear.

alliance on each firm's output and

However, if we assume that the partners and non-partner are symmetric and the partners can
provide connecting service at the same quality as the non-partner's,
then we have
Proposia'on 5-1. In case where demand functions for the partners and non-parmer
are
simultaneously shifted up by the complementary
alliance, both competitors can increase
output under the symmetric and y = 0 conditions.

(44) can be rewritten as
aQ,

1

r_

I_ c_ll]-lr[,,.,,tcl-I_l¢

c

1

|c

-1

lc -1

__

2.,"

l#

-I

i¢

lc

(40")

a_
According

to the stability condition, the magnitude of the eigenvaines

be less than one, and so does R c
is negative.
5.2

Thus, 0Q2./0_>0

It is also possible that aQ _/a_>0,

Paralld

of matrix,

(R c_, must

since the second bracket term of (46)

depending

on _.

Q.E.D.

alliance

We will focus on the analysis of the "no shut-down" case here since the same results can be
obtained for the "shut-down" case by the same analysis. Assuming that the partners' "full"
price demand functions in AH market are shifted up, the partners' post-aUiance (inverse)
demand shifts may be written as
I
1
i
paHfd_x(Q'au,
QIAs) + _; for i,j

Denoting
first-order

a "stable"
conditions

= 1,2;

i*j.

equilibrium by _ I(0, _), Q 2(0, _), Q )(0, _)), and differentiating

the

with respect to _, we have
Hit OQ l + iiIp OQ 2. . trip OQ _

2O

ip

(47)

(48)

II:'
aQ'

where

.,,aQ'

=0

(49)

r/,_lp_=[i t o, o ]r and I_[-= I .

From (49), it can be easily verified
(47)-(48)

that OQ t/c3_ and aQ '/a_

have opposite

signs.

Solving

for OQ _/0_ and aQ 2/a_ yields
(50)

aQ '

,, ,,,

,,)-,( ,, +rr,, OO: l

or

aQ:

l...,eV,( .,-.2, ,,-.2paQ' 1

(51)

Notice that the sign of the last term of (50)-(51) can be either positive or negative, depending
on the difference between the positive direct effects of the demand shift on each partner's
1,
marginal profit (i.e., H,_ and I_[) and the negative indirect effects due to strategic
substitutes condition (i.e.,
simultaneously

][',_.(aQ:IO_)

and

dominate the indirect effects

_,.(oQ'/o_)).

in (50)-(51)

(i.e.,

If

the direct

effects

lp

ITS,_I
> Irr:_'-(aQ_/aOI

andl1_[l > ll_[.(aQ'za_)l), then aQ'la_>o andaQ'/a_,>o. Therefore,
Proposition 5-2. If the parallel alliance shifts both partners' demand functions upward and
the direct effects of the demand shifts dominate the indirect effects, it is possible for both
partners to simultaneously increase output in market AH. It is therefore
output in market AH increases and thus consumer surplus increases.

possible

that total

6. EMPIRICAL
TEST
This section carries on an empirical test for some propositions regarding the effects of the
alliances on each firm's output and total output.
Previous sections have shown that
complementary and parallel alliances have different effects on each firm's output and total
output. After the complementary alliance, the partners increase local traffic (see Propositions
3-1 and 5-1). The non-partner can increase (see Proposition 3-1) or decrease (see Proposition
5-1) local traffic, depending on the degree of demand shift. Consequently, total output
increases in the local markets (see Proposition 3-3).
On the other hand,

from the analysis of the parallel
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alliances,

the partners

are likely

to

decrease
local

traffic on the AH segment under both the "no shut-clown" and "shut-down"
cases (see Propositions
4-1, 4-2, 4-4 and 5-I). Changes in the non-partners'
outputs are
uncertain under the "no shut-down" case, but the non-partner decreases local traffic on the
BH segment under the "shut-down" case (see Propositions 4-4). Consequently, total output
on the AH segment is likely to decrease in market AH (see Propositions 4-3 and 4-6).
In order to test those predictions,
wc selected seventeen trans-Atlantic
routes where either
complementary or parallel alliance occurred between US and European carriers. Since major
alliances in the North Atlantic markets were formed in the early 1990's, annual data for twoways of the seventeen routes (e.g., Atlanta to Amsterdam, and Amsterdam to Atlanta) were
collected for the 1990-94 period. Observations were collected for alliance partuers and their
strongest competitor 13 for each of the seventeen routes. The total numbers of observations
available for the alliance partners and the largest non-aligned carriers are 151 and 97,
respectively.
Data associated with strategic alliances were mainly taken from the Offidal Airline Guides:
Worldwide Edition.
To classify the data into pre-, post-complementary,
and post-parallel
alliance situations, we used a variety of data sources including Airline Business (1994),
GeUman Research Associates (1994), and U.S. General Accounting Office (1995). Thirty-six
observations
were classified into the complementary
alliance situation, while sixteen were
categorized into the parallel alliance situation. Four cases were classified as a mixture of the
two types (Lufthansa/United
on Chicago-Frankfurt
and Washington, D.C.-Frankfurt
routes).
The aligned-partners'
traffic, non-partners' traffic, and total traffic data on the seventeen
routes were gathered from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) publication,
Traffic By Hight Stage. The mean value for the aligned-partner's
passenger volume during
the period is 108,200 people, while the mean value for the total traffic is 247,770 people.
The number of carriers on each route was also obtained from the ICAO publication.
The aligned-partners'
traffic, non-partners' traffic, and total traffic, respectively, are treated
as a dependent variable on each set of regression.
As explanatory variables, presence of
complementary
alliance (CA), presence of parallel aUiaace (PA), the number of airlines on
each route (NUM), year-specific characteristics (YR), and route-specific characteristics are
considered.
Route Atlanta-Amsterdam
and year 1990 is used as a base route and year in the
regression.
For robustness of analysis, we test the hypotheses by using four different
specifications
for each set of regression.
Table 1 shows test results.
The test results generally confirm the theoretical predictions.
First, as shown in the first column of Table 1, the test result on alliance partners' outputs is
consistent with the corresponding propositions.
As excepted, all coefficients of CA are
estimated as positive, regardless of specifications.
More importantly, the coefficients of CA
are estimated as highly sigm'ficant under the specifications (1) and (2). This result conf,'ms

la In order to control a fa'm size effect, we restrict our attentionto the strongest non-aligned f'u'm, the
largest firm other than alliance parmers on each of the alliancemutes. Not every non-aligned firm on the route
may reactto the alliance. Presumably,small finns are not likely to do so.
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that eachof

complementary

alliance partners

increases

its traffic after the alliance.

For

parallel alliance partners' outputs, all coefficients are estimated as negative, implying that
demand shift effects on the partners' outputs are weak. The coefficients of PA under the
specifications
(3) and (4) are estimated as negative and significant.
Second, the last column of Table I shows that test result on total output is highly consistent
with the corresponding predictions.
The coefficients of CA and PA are estimated as properly
and s!gnificanfly, regardless of specifications.
Following the complementary alliance, total
traffic increases by an average of 11-17 per cent of the average total traffic. In' contrast, total
traffic decreases by an average of 11-15 per cent of the average total traffic, due to the
parallel alliance.
Notice that total passenger volumes of years 1993 and 1994 are not
significandy different from that of year 1990.
Third, the second column of Table I indicates that the test result on non-partners' outputs is
partly consistent with the corresponding propositions.
In general, the signs of the coefficients
are consistent with the propositions,
but statistically insignificant.
In three out of the four
specifications, the coefficients of CA are estimated as positive. As shown in the Extended
Model, the complementary
alliances in the North Atlantic markets may generate new
demands, some of which cannot be served by the alliance partners and can be left over to
non-aligned competitors.
The signs of the coefficients of PA are consistent with the theory,
although the coefficients are estimated as insignificant.

7. CONCLUDING

REMARKS

This study analyzes the effects on market outcome and welfare of two types of alliances:
complementary
vs. parallel alliances.
To recapitulate major findings of this study,
First, the complementary
alliance in a specific market has indirect positive effects on the
partners'
outputs in the other markets.
Coordination
in connecting markets allows the
partners to increase service quality and decrease average operating costs in local markets.
This is because muldple products are serviced through the same network and thus the alliance
in a specific market has indirect impacts on each firm's output in the other markets within the
same network.
Second, the two types of alliances have different effects on total output and consumer surplus.
Given the symmetry, the complementary
alliance increases total output, and decreases "full"
price. Thus, consumer surplus increases as a result of the complementary
alliance.
On the
other hand, both the "no shut-down" and "shnt-down" parallel alliances are likely to decrease
total output on the alliance route. Consequently,
consumer surplus is likely to decrease due
to the parallel alliance.
Third, we find sufficient conditions under which complementary alliance improves total
welfare.
Total welfare can rise if the partners and non-partners
are symmetric and if the
partners can coordinate to the extent that they are able to provide the same level of connecting
services as finn 1's.
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Four, the Extended Model finds that demand shifts due to strategic alliances play a crucial
role on changes in firms' outputs under certain conditions.
For the complementary alliance
case, it is possible for both alliance partners and non-partner to simultaneously increase their
outputs in cases where there are some created demands being spilled over to the non-partner.
The Extended Model identifies sufficient conditions under which parallel alliance partners
simultaneously increase their outputs on the alliance route, resulting in increasing total output
in the market.
Finally, the empirical test results generally confirm the theoretical predictions on alliance
partners' outputs and total output. The test results indicate that the partners' traffic increases
due to the complementary
alliance, while the parmers' traffic decreases due to the parallel
alliance. The results also show that total traffic increases by an average of 11-17 per cent of
the average total traffic due to the complementary
alliance, while total traffic decreases by
an average of 11-15 per cent of the average due to the parallel alliance.
These findings have some important policy implications. Government agents should be very
careful to allow would-be parallel alliance partners to have antitrust immunity.
Since the
partners are significant competitors in the same markets, competition may be reduced if they
are able to integrate operation with the protection of antitrust immunity.
As a result, the
parallel alliance reduces consumer surplus and is more likely to decrease total welfare.
However, under certain conditions, allowing more complementary
alliances may have the
potential of creating a more competitive environment and improving welfare.
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APPENDIX
This part provides the proofs of Propositions
profit function can be expressed as

4-4, 4-5, and 4-6.

Each firm's pre-alliance

BH

II_= _

Qk

(Qk,Qk)-z(Qit

It=AH

It" AH

: d

_

:

2

- (Q,4.).

where superscript b stands for before-alliance.
first-order conditions, we have the following

Q2 -'

It= AH

3 d

'

3

,

Using specifications (37)-(38) and solving the
pre-alliance quantities

(42-24

(A1)

2(342-74+3)

Q,_ = (! -4)[(3 +4)a - 12]
2 (3 42 -7 _ +3)

(A2)

QA_ = Q.J._- (2 -s 4)_ - 40 -34)
2(3 42 -7 4 +3)

where

_ -=.25 + tt.

maximization

(A3)

It can be shown that the second-order

problem

reduce

to t

< 2/3.

conditions

Since outputs

for each firms' profit

and marginal

shouldbe positive,
_ isconstrained
suchthat6/(_+3)<a<16(I

revenues

-A)]/I_(5-4A)]

(costs)

for0<L<2/5.

The shut-downparallel-alliance
profits
forthefn'mscan be expressedas

BR"

-

3 d

t

3

-

(Qsn)

It =AH

where superscript p stands for parallel alliance.
Solving the first-order conditions
shut-down parallel alliance yields the following parallel alliance solutions:

for the

" t3 (t .2_ _ (43 - 5 12 + 11 4 - 6) a + 2(42 - 8 4 + 6)
6 43 -2742
+34 4 - 12

(A4)

Q81t_
= (4_-542 +6 4-4)tX +2(42-21+4)
6_ 3 -2712 +34t - 12

(A5)

29

Q_

= (t -/,)
[(;_2
_6)a - 2(53.- 12)]

(A6)

6/)-273. z +343. -12

(A7)

Qs'_,
= (2- 3.)
[(53.-2)a -2(63.-2)]
613 -273. 2 +343.-12

Again, itcan be shown thatthesecond-0rd.er
conditions
reduceto /, < 2/3. From the
positive
outputsand marginalrevenuesconstraints,
6--!..,<
a< 2_'e-167"'n for_.<2_..
_*3

Proof of Proposition 4-4. Using (A1)-(A6),
due to the shut-down parallel alliance:
t3 (,*a_,

AQ_, ,2_- _.

tb

2b

- [Q_ + +24.]--

_.(4_,017_L÷ 12)

5

we can calculate changes in the partners'

(3. - I)(512

- 14l

+6)[(2

- 51)(x + 12l -4]

output

(AS)

(613 -273.2 +343. - 12)(33.2-71 +3)

=_ 3.CI-3.)[(5X2-171+6)a-2(63.

aQj =_ -

2-201

+6)]

(Ag)

2 (6 3.' -27 3.2 +34 3. - 12)(3 3.2 -7 3. +3)

12 (2 - 3.) [(2 - 5 3.) a + 2(6 3. - 2)]

(A10)

2 (6 3.' -27 3.2 +34 3. - 12) (3 3.2 -7 3. +3)

Since the denominator

of (A8)-(A10)

is negative

for 3. < 2/5, the sign of these equations

depends on the numerator.
It can be shown that the numerator of (A8) is negative, while
those of (A9) and (A10) are positive for the feasible a and 3.. Similarly, we can calculate,
using (A3) and (A7), changes

:,Q,:,

_

in firm 3's output

=

3.2[(2-sx)a +2(63.-2)]
2(63.3-273.2+343.-12)(33.2-73.+3)

which

is negative for the feasible

Proof of Proposition
and changes

4-5.

range.

Using (A1)-(A7),

Q.E.D.
we can compute changes in the partners'

profit

in fn'rn 3's profit

A]'[Ip = ]"lip
_ ]'[Ib
=

I¢X2 +Ja
4(6_. 3 -27X 2 +343.

A IT_ ,. I_P - I_b =

(All)

+K

- 12)2(33. 2 -71

+3) 2

L a 2 +M a +N
8 (6 3.3_ 27 3.2+ 34 3. - 12) 2(3 3.2_ 7 3. + 3)2
30

(A12)

AyI'3p - I'Pp - I'Pb =

(A13)

_L2(_.
-2)(12_L3 -53 ;L2 +68_L -24)[(5 _.-2)(x +2 -6_,]
8(6_) -27_,2 +34_. - 12)2(3_2 -7,_ +3) 2

where

I=90_. 10-942_? +3949). t -8041 _: ,6312). t ,5352_. s - 16539 _/+ 15333)) -6794_? + 1344_.

172,

J = - 2(144 _? + 1302).* + 4768 _._ - 8614_. _ + 5640)- s ÷ 7522) 4 - 19480_) + 17324_. z - 7176). ÷ 1152),
K = - 4(324 _.M_4302 _.X+23973 _.b- 74128 _.=+ 141439 _.K_174420 _) + 140005 _.1- 70648 _.e÷20292 _. - 2520),
L = 180_._- 1344_" 1592_.X÷ 14019_.^- 63462_. _+ 120822_. K- 124872_) +71846_ I -20996_.e +2064_. + 144,
M ffi-2(2016_.M-22620_. x+ 104444_.A-256128_.K +357312_.K-276612_.L ÷96936 j_.l+5912_. e- 14160_.+2880),
N = 4(648 _.M-6300 _.X+22218 _.A-27160 _._ -30210_" K+136392_) - 180338 _.! + 119176_.e-39768
It can be numerically
and _..

shown

The sign of (AI2)

Proof

of Proposition

(A9),

APx_ < 0.

4-6.
Thus,

;

that (All)
varies

depending

From
AC$_

-P.,,
=

is positive

(A8),

> 0.

;1.2
(I -_)

(A13)

is negative

> 0.
(A1),

Thus,
(A3),

ACS_.

(A5),

_. ÷5328).

for the feasible

on value of _x and _..

AP_.

Using

while

c_

Q.E.D.

< 0.

and (A7),

Similarly,

from

we can calculate

[(2 -5 _.)a +2(6 _. -2)]

2(6_) -27_? +34_, - 12)(3 _.2-7_ +3)

which isnegativeforthe feasiblerange. Consequently, AQ_. > 0 and ACS:_. > O.
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INTRODUCTION

Globalisation

has resulted in international

finished

products.

engages

in global

Specialisation
sourcing

trade progressing

beyond

now occurs in the production

(Frank,

1995).

Improvements

the stage where national

of components

firms

specialise

in

and the modern trading enterprise

in communications

and transport

have

made

this

possible,
but competition,
rising customer expectations
and the need to expand markets beyond national
boundaries leave many businesses with no alternative but to "go global". Growth ambitions can be accommodated
through merger and acquisitions, but the imperative to seek out the most efficient ways to serve markets is leading
to new forms

of organisation

afal relationships

among

organisation.

Collaborative

relationships

have

made

it

possible to serve a global market, to achieve economies
in production, to employ the latest technology and to gain
access to markets. As a result, the strategic alliance has been integral to the globalisation
process in a diverse set
of sectors
Against

ranging from clothing
this background,

and footwear

researchers

have

to aeronautics
paid

increasing

(Ohmae,
attention

1989; Lorange et aL, 1992).
to the attempts

in the airline

industry

to

globalise
(Gialloreto,
1988; Doganis,
1994). While it is true that the larger international
carriers compete
simultaneously
in several inter-continental
markets, restrictions on foreign investment and commercial operating
rights generally
deny airlines the opportunity to become global businesses in their own r_ghts. Airlines do not
have free access to markets, nor do they have the freedom to invest and operate wherever they want. The
principles of comparative advantage do not prevail in the trade in airline services and consequently,
airlines are
prevented from developing efficient global networks. Alliances allow airlines to circumvent restrictions
on market
access while simultaneously
permitting
them to co-ordinate
schedules and to pursue other practices designed to
reduce costs and improve customer service. The strategic alliance has become the key instrument for global
expansion.
The regulatory
accepting

response

alliances

so far has been

that operate within

relatively

competitive

tolerant.

The United

States

markets. When an alliance

policy

has had the clearest

results

in dominance

of

of a market,

the US approach has been to reduce any barriers to entry entrenched through route allocations
and control over
landing slots at hub airports. Other governments
have tended to deal with individual cases on their own merits.
Airlines have justified the alliances on the basis of better service and lower costs. However, the regulators and the
industry

they oversee

both share concerns

about where the alliances

are leading and the ability of the regulatory

system to respond to evolving conditions (Burton and Hanlon, 1994; Aiamdari and Morrell, 1997). Furthermore,
the problems are becoming increasingly complex as coalitions among key airlines fluctuate and as it becomes
more and more difficult to define the relevant market for the purposes of analysing concentration.
While airlines
are developing

network strategies,

the regulatory

framework

tends to focus attention on point-to-point

services.

The proposed alliance between American Airlines and British Airways has brought matters to a head in transAtlantic relations when the regulatory bodies in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European
Commission
each proposed different requirements.
Australia has been reluctant to approve an extension of the
code-share
agreement between British Airways and Qantas Airways (Findlay e: al., 1997). Airlines are under
increasing pressure to demonstrate that alliances are not anti-competitive
and that they deliver long-term benefits
to consumers. The initial focus of researchers was on the formation of alliances
and their role in globalisation
(Pustay, 1992; Burton and Hanlon,
1995; Park eta/.,
1995). Code-sharing has been a key instrument used in
airline alliances and there is considerable
interest in the way this device is used in competition
and its value to
consumers (Humphreys,
1995; Hannegnn and Mulvey,
1996). A particular theme is how alliances,
especially
code-sharing,
have an impact on market shares and on the performance
and strategic positioning
of the carriers
(Oum et aL, 1993; Park, 1997). Further contributions have examined the process
conditions that favour success (Flanagan and Marcus 1993; Park and Cho, 1997).

of alliance

formation

A common

of equity

(Tretheway,

theme is that strength

This results in the airlines becoming

and permanency

are achieved

"mutual hostages"

through exchanges

and minimises

the risks of partners pursuing

and the

1991).

opportunistic

actions. Merger and acquisition can be used to address these problems, but restrictions on foreign ownership in
the international
airline industry
favour the strategic
alliance.
However,
the role of equity
has been
overemphasised.
We argue that this has diverted attention away from contributions
in management
theory that
explain how contracts, constructs and property rights are being used to forge new types of relationships
within

2

strategic
alliances.

It is common for partners to enter into a series of alliances
this organisational form in a dynamic setting (Gulati, 1995).

consider

and therefore,

it is necessary

to

While we do not deny there is a strong .basis for the presumption that alliances among international airlines are
largely the result of regulatory conditions,
we believe it is useful to explore the question "would alliances persist
in competitive world markets?". On the basis of experiences in other forms of business and our understanding
of
the economics
of airline operations we consider globalisation
and alliance formation to be a natural condition
in
the airline sector. By investigating
the likely form of alliances
under competitive
conditions we aim to shed
insights

into the benefits

that alliances

are capable

about the nature of airlines as organisations
pressures in the globalisation
process.

2

GLOBALISATION,

of delivering.

However,

this raises

and about the way they arc likely to evolve

STRATEGIC

ALLIANCES

fundamental

in response

questions

to competitive

AND AIRLINES

Cooperative
behaviour
in the international airline industry has been evident ever since pioneering
cax_ers began
to develop their networks and airlines do compete simultaneously
in several continental
markets. However, this
does not mean that airlines have been forming "strategic alliances"
and "globalising"
throughout their history.
These terms have particular meanings in organisational
theory, and we commence
with an explicit discussion
about these topics before considering
their implications for contemporary
behaviour in the airline industry.
In the post-war period, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATI')
a set of rules and principles that were non-discriminatory
and it sought to w

promoted free trade by establishing
impediments
to trade through

govemn_nt
regulation.
Nevertheless,
the dominant model for a successful business was to develop a profitable
domestic
market and exporting
played a relatively
minor role. During the 1970s and 1980s, multinational
corporations came to the fore, but the approach was to replicate production processes with strong control from the
centre of the organisation. Often the multinational
production
and output, especially
in developing
evolution

in response

The emergence

to a set of environmental

of a large middle

corporation
countries.

invested abroad to take advantage of lower costs of
The global enterprise represents a higher order of

conditions.

class, most notably

in Asia,

has expanded

markets at the same time, increasing

the power of the consumer. Markets tend now to be "pulled"
by consumers rather than being "pushed" by
suppliers. Barriers to competition
have been reduced within and between economies so that businesses are under
pressure

to deliver

better

quality

with higher levels

of customer

service

at lower

costs. Many businesses

have

found that their growth ambitions cannot be realised unless they expand out of their home markets, especially
those firms that serve niche markets with highly specialised
products and services. Harmonisation
of product
standards also has widened the scope for global competition.
In some industries, the invesunent
required to
research and develop new products has escalated, and global expansion
allows businesses to tap a wider pool of
expertise as well as making it possible to spread the costs and risks.
Taking advantage
of lower costs of production remains a powerful incentive to invest abroad, but the approach
now is to source components
and services from the most competitive
suppliers. Developments
in communication
and information technology have made it possible to coordinate
diverse activities more easily while delivering a
greater amount of information to consumers.
wide basis and even small to medium-sized
distinctive
marketing.

features of global

businesses

Is it true then that the international

airline

Under these conditions,
intra-indnstry
trade has boomed
enterprises
have become important
within global supply

are in the ways they plan and organise

industry is an example

sourcing

of globalisation?

on a worldchains. The

and in the scope

Deregulation

of domestic

of their

travel

markets has increased
competitive
pressures and in many economies
has resulted in greater integration
of
domestic
and international operations
(Hooper, 1997). In the United States, at least, the major carriers have
pursued growth abroad as it appeared the domestic market was approaching maturity during the early 1990s
(Pilarski and Thomas,
1995). Information technology, especially
in the form of computer
made it possible to expand the scope of distribution systems and to compete effectively
Competitive

strategies

built upon hub-and-spoke

operations,

frequent

flyer

programs,

reservation systems, has
in more distant markets.
and code-sharing

have

increased
themarketing
strengths
of the

large carriers. As travel markets have expanded with rising incomes,
have come into direct competition with each other. Some of the traditional destination regions also

destinations

have become important
sources of travellers. There has been a convergence
of "domestic
" and "international"
tourism markets and most of the world's largest airlines in the 1990s have developed
complementary
domestic
and international
networks as well as distribution systems.
All of these
competition

factors suggest that the "globalisation"
is a natural state for the airlines. It also is true that increasing
has forced airlines to reduce their cos_. In some notable cases, airlines have responded to this by

adopting global sourcing practices. Cathay Pacific, for example, was reported to have saved US$25
when it began employing its air crews from bases in the USA, UK and Australia in 1996 (Hewitt,
already located
was considering

its data processing in Australia. £mflhansa has suffered from high labour
how an alliance with a US carrier would allow it to reduce overheads

America (McMullan,
1992a). BA Engineering
operations /or other airlines. Atlas Air is another

million a year
1996), having

costs in Germany and
by sourcing in North

and Lufthansa
Technik specialise
in performing
overhaul
to take advantage of outsourcing
initiatives by developing
a

strength in air cargo operations.
However,

airlines are not free to mobilise

their skilled

workforces

on a world-wide

basis due to varying

industrial

legislation
and restrictions on "doing business". There are limits on how much aircraft maintenance,
catering,
refuelling,
administration and training can be provided by suppliers in other economies.
Problems associated
with
coordinating
crew rostering led to Cathay Pacific abandoning its attempt to establish a crew base in Bangkok for
short-haul mutes in 1997 (13allantyne, 1997). The opportunities to reduce costs and improve
mostly in network development and the optimal use of aircraft within those networks.

customer

In situations

and acquisitions

where

airline

markets

have

been

deregulated,

carriers

have

used

mergers

service

lie

to

rationalise networks and to pursue growth and diversification strategies. The primary motivation for a merger is to
increase
the combined
wealth of the enterprises
involved,
increase the wealth of shareholders
and create
opportunities
for improved operations. Mergers are highly visible and represent lumpy investment decisions in
which the buyers and sellers consider they will be better off because
of the synergies
between
the two
organisations

and the efficiencies

that can be achieved

under a single management.

Competitive

strength

increases

through combined marketing, production and distribution in addition to improved financial economies
in the form
of lower transaction
costs and better coverage by financial
analysts and media. The merged entity is able to
eliminate

excess

capacity

and perhaps is able to exert increased

market power.

However, s_rategic alliances can be used to pursue these benefits and they can give competitors a low-cost route
to gain new technology
and access to markets. High fixed costs can be shared and complementary
resources can
be brought

together.

require complex

The sharing

integration

of technology

and information

can be linked

and large capital costs. The .joint venture

to long-term

commitments

is one option for managing

that

this integration.

but strategic alliances rely on a more co-operative arrangement. Given that many strategic alliances involve equity
swaps to reduce risks of dissolution and opportunistic behaviour, it is necessary to be clear about what
distinguishes an alliance from a merger or joint venture.
Definitions
about what constitutes
a "strategic alliance" abound in the literature, but there are two essential
characteristics that need to be considered. Firstly, the emphasis on "strategy'; one business chooses to cooperate
to a greater or lesser extent with another
opportunities/threats
arising in the external

in order to pursue its corporate objectives
environment.
Secondly,
businesses
become

and/or in response
to
"allies";
each partner

maintaining
a separate
identity with scope for independent
action and dissolution.
Mergers and acquisitions
definitely are not strategic alliances and this is further elaborated
below. Joint ventures and equity swaps have
many of the necessary
alliance
through

characteristics

of alliances,

but they are difficult

includes arrangements to pool resources, to ally and
strategic alliances (Kanter, 1989). In summary, strategic
of two or more

organisations

to classify.

The scope

link systems, businesses
become
alliances are characterised
by:

*

a coalition
relationship

in an on-going

•

specific goals/objectives

•

the pursuit of mutual, though not necessarily equal, benefits

relationship,

but each

of the strategic
better

is free

"PALs"

to exit

the

•
*

sharing resources or, at least, integrating resources
sharing risks and rewards and decision making

•

covering

only part of the activities

functions

not included

•

systems

•

a concern

to improve performance

of each partner so that each maintains

a separate identity,

with some

in the agreement

that are difficult

to break down into constituent

for long-term

issues

facing

members

elements

to develop

and maintain

a sustainable

competitive

advantage
Strategies

are relevant only when there

situation the enterprise
strategy suggests there

is the potential

to create a degree of market power. In a highly competitive

has no option but to seek minimum costs and accept market prices. The adoption of a
is a choice and that the alliance will have scope to influence the market. However, the

issues of control and scope for independent

action

raise fundamental

questions

forms emerging
in response
to globalisation.
We will pursue these below,
characteristics
of airlines that make them candidates for alliance formation.

3

POTENTIAL

First and foremost,

OF

AIRLINES

the airlines

AS

CANDIDATES

have a history

of co-oper4tive

FOR
behaviour.

about the nature of organisational
but first draw attention

to some

STRATEGIC

ALLIANCE

For example,

in 1933 Qantas,

then a

small regional airline, entered into a joint venture with Imperial Airways to win a contract to carry mail from
Singapore to Anslrniia (Findlay 1995). The result was Qantas Empire Airways, and the alliance partners were able
to counter the development
of a rival service proposed by KLM. As the international
airline industry grew,
collaboration
played a vital role in fostering markets, in improving the economic positions of the carriers and in
developing
and transferring technical skills as carriers shared technical knowledge,
performed
maintenance
on
each other's aircraft, and co-operated
in training. It is common for one airline to carry out ground handling and
passenger processing on behalf of others. Also, airlines sell interline tickets as well as pooling revenue on routes
and co-ordinating
However,
common

flight scheduling.

with advanced
computer

technology

reservations

collaborative

systems

behaviour

now code-sharing,

(CRS), joint frequent flyer plans, and equity

block-booking

been interpreted
as manifestations
of strategic alliances in the formation of global airlines
Tretheway,
1991). The rush to forge alliances
in Europe and the United States in late 1992
question
isolated"

arrangements,

swaps. These practices

whether they were simply a product of financial stress in the airline industry and panic about "being
(McMullen,
1992b).
Others have observed that the process of alliance formation
has had

characteristics
of an "epidemic"
with serious doubts about the claim that they are "slrategic" (Alamdari
Morrell, 1997). The distinction between marketing alliances and genuine strategic alliances is an important
Clearly, co-operative
behaviour
is pervasive in the airline business
alliances would prosper in liberal aviation markets.
Deregulation

of the domestic

airline

industry in the United States

but it is questionable

provided

have

(Gialloreto,
1988;
led one analyst to
left
the
and
one.

that many of the current

hard evidence

that hub-and-spoke

networks allow carriers to improve productivity while ineaeasing the effectiveness
of marketing. The strategy of
consolidating
traffic at hubs requires that some mutes be considered as the line haul and others serve a feeder
role, and this hierarchy is evident in domestic markets through the distinction between major and regional airlines.
Profits in the airline industry are highly leveraged around the break-even load factor and connecting
traffic is
important for survival at all levels of the airline industry. As a result, many of the most important competitive
battles are fought in creating
"seamless"
travel for connecting
passengers,
for example, by co-ordinating
schedules and transferring
baggage. The customer is sold a single ticket with the designation
(code-sharing)
and the entire journey accrues frequent flyer points with the major carrier.
Vertical

integration

has its attractions

and there

are many cases

of the major carrier

where the major airline has acquired

the feeder

airlines, but it is possible
to achieve a great deal within broad marketing alliances (Lovin 1986; Oster and
PickreU, 1987). Despite the need to integrate regional and major carriers' operations and marketing, there are
important differences in terms of the density of markets, sector distances and the size of aircraft. Cost structures
and organisational

cultures

can differ markedly

and even when the major carrier

has acquired

the regional

airline,

separate
identities
are maintained.
The regional
airline
improvesitsmarketing
sucngththroughtheassociation
withthemajorcarrier,
butitstill
needstomaintain
itslocal
identity.
Itisimportant
inthesea_angemantstoallow
thesmaller
partner
theflexibility
tomanage ina way thatisappropriate
toitscircumstances
and notbc swamped
by thepolicies
adoptedby themanagementofthelarger
carrier.
These lessonsfrom domesticderegulation
have implications
at theinternational
level,
but thereare some
differences
to consider.
The broadening
and incrensing
integration
of domesticand international
travel
markets
results
insimilar
hierarchies
offeederand trunkcarriers,
although
itisnotclear
thatthis
willbc expressed
tothe
same extentindominanthubs.Some of themajorhubs arccongestedand therearcconstraints
thatprevent
expansion of capacity. Also, high frequencies arc not as important in long-distance travel and there is a greater
incentive to open direct mutes versus consolidating traffic through hubs. F._hnoccntric behaviour is strong in the
travel market and international airlines arc very reluctant to abandon their national identifies. More significantly,
the cultural differences that would nccd to bc accommodated within the one organisation pose a major challenge
for the global airline.
In the absence of any restrictions on foreign invesuncnt in the airline sector, it is likely that mergers and
acquisitions would occur and that networks with feeder and trunk services would develop to some degree.
However, mergers and acquisitions would encounter major problems in terms of strategic and cultural fit as they
attempt to mesh incompatible strategies, values and leadership styles. Alliances offer advantages in this context.
Globalising airlines can use alliances to gain access to marknts with less commiunent of resources and a means to
acconunodatc these problems. Strategic alliances go funhea than cooperation to link services. Through
organisational change, strategic alliances make it possible to reap the full benefits of globalisation. The global
alliance makes it possible to cnstomisc products to the needs of national markets while simultaneously, optimising
operations and sourcing.
It follows from the review above that the overriding motive for the formation of strategic alliances is the urgency
to manage a persistently, changeable environment (Qulnn, 1992). With this in mind, the uncertainty regarding the
future of an alliance is ever-present. It can be concluded from the review above that airline alliances arc 'hollow'
networks with little genuine organisational integration amongst members. The key defining feature of the strategic
alliance is the degree of integration required to share decision making and resources as well as the willingness to
pursue long-term competitive advantage. On this basis, wc first examine this latest concept of organisation, most
importantly focusing on the nature of the relationship between partners and conclude with a set of propositions
nssociated with the development of strategic alliances.

4

STRATEGIC

ALLIANCE

AS NEW

CONCEPT

OF ORGANISATION

4.1 Intelligent enterprises
As previously stated, strategic alliances primarily are an aggregation of autonomous organisations that essentially
retain their own identity and governance. The purpose of forming strategic alliances focuses on commercial
objectives, strategic vision and leadership and ways of gaining a competitive advantage in volatile markets. More
specifically, strategic alliances seek to acquire a form of organisational flexibility to adjust to change, to develop
the organisational capacity (skills and resources) to develop successful products and services and to achieve
operating economies and efficiencies (Powell, 1987).
In understanding this new concept of organisation, Qulan (1992) referred to strategic alliances as 'intelligent
enterprises' that comprise complex, global information and decision support systems superseding many of the
control and operational functions of their conventional counterparts. These issues in turn lead to a new concept of
organising in terms of recreating a 'flatter' hierarchy with a membership-orientated culture concentrating on
shared values, new learning and knowledge, and integration (Webster, 1992). The manner in which this is
achieved varies from one organisational context to another (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) and will be elaborated
on below.

Transformational
leadership is an important aspect in forming strategic alliances
them. The pressure to align enteap_
brought about by new market muctures
boundaries
beyond national ones is redefining the future organisational
increased pressure for enterprise leaders to understand the organisational
such as a well-developed
infrastructure of culture,
achieveintegration
amongst alliance
partners.

4.2

Membership

process

and nmnaging change within
and the extension of market

form in the airline industr 7. There is
prerequisites for successful alliances

of organisational

learning

and rewarding

ways

to

culture

In a sWategic alliance,
each enterpriserepresentsa culture that has a varying degree of influenceover its
member'

beliefs

and behaviour.

some coherent value system.,
appropriate and inappropriate

Enterprises

' ..like persons,

have values

and these

values are integrated

into

in any [enterprise],
the members generally have a set of beliefs about what is
organisational
behaviour'
(Ooodetein,
1983, pp. 203-4). In the same way that

personality
is not a direct explanation for a person's actions, enterprise culture is only one factor contributing to
the performance of an alliance. Culture is related to the concept of 'strategic fit' as well as to the question as to
the extent of similarity and diversity that exists between potential
assumption is the greater the similarity between the value systems
find accord.

Enterprises

more timely
1985).

and successfully

4.3

New

learning

An important
members

over the extent

whose cultures are more similar to than different

and

aspect

engage

enterprise members in a strategic alliance. One
of potential memben,
the more likely they will

(Harrison,

1988),

from each other will develop

and have greater

financial

alliances

success

(Porter,

knowledge

of developing

in jointly

1972; Malekzadeh,

membership

and separately

to which alliances

culture

(Arygris,

can "learn' jointly.

1977).

is the process
Incre_ing

One pe_tive

of organisational

competitive

pre._ures

is that strategic

learning

that alliance

are fuelling

concern

aHiancns are less likely to

.foster learning when exposed
to competition,
instead levering their market position
to obtain competitive
advantage (Barnett and Burgelman, 1996). The fundamental dilemma for any strategic alliance is how to maintain
its enterprise
identity while simultaneously
developing
the alliance. Alliance development
generally calls for
substantial
Strategic

shifts in maintenance
alliances

strategies

require that members

to effect the active support and contribution
convey

their learning

to one another, develop

of alliance

members.

shared understandings

and

externalise
what they have learnt (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992). Organisational learning occurs when the actions of
one party, in this case an enterprise member, contests the values of another and there is pressure to replace 'their'
ideas with 'different' ones. A high level of cultural synergy may inhibit organisational
learning where enterprise
members 'think' in a similar way. In other words, too much similarity may conslraln the potential benefits of the
alliance because too little in tem_ of added-value and innovation is being contributed by enterprise members to
the alfiance. Others have arguad, for example Parkh¢ (1991) that inter*firm cultural and organisational
diversity
adversely
similarity.
1977).

affects performance.
However there is another perspective,
cultural synergy may not equal cultm'_
Two dissimilar cultures may reach synergy through the process of 'double-loop'
learning (Arygris,

Members do not agree upon clearboundaries,cannot identify
shared solutionsand do not reconcilebeliefsand
multipleidentities,
let,thesemembers contend they belong toa culture.They share a common orientationand
ovemrching purpose,face sinu'lar
problems, and comparable experiences.However, these shared orientations
and purpos_ accommodate different
beliefsand incommensurable technologies,
theseproblems imply different
solutions,and these experienceshave multiplemeanings... Thus, for at lenstsome culturesto dismiss the
ambiguitiesinfavour of what isclear and shared isto excludesome of the most centralaspectsof members'
culturalexperienceand toignore theessenceoftheirculturalcommunity. (Meyerson elaL, 199 I,pp 13I-2)

In other words, learning jointly

allows

'culture'

to be 'unbundled'

into its important components

in a way that

might not occur within a single enterprise. Yet. learning is often a slow process simply because, as enterprises are
currently
structured,
they retard the uansfemng
of information,
ideas and expertise
amongst
partners.
Organisational
learning is instrumental to collective efficacy defined as the belief of enterprise members about
whether they can perform successfully
or not within a strategic alliance (Bandura, 1977). Alliances that have a
low sense of efficacy are more inclined to respond negatively
to organisational
efficacy (Beehr and Newman, 1978). How is high efficacy achieved'?.
Cousensns-building

with interactions

Strategic

provide

alliances

amongst members

"blurred boundaries'

plays a significant

for learning

to occur.

change

than those

part in developing
The

process

collective

of developing

with high

efficacy.
collective

efficacy in alliances is assisted by 'skilled organisers' who span the enterprise
boundaries
of each member and
transfer learning (Brown and Hosking,
1986). Innovations by one member need to lranslate into alliance-wide
innovation. The alliance needs to be structured in a way that facilitates the emergence
and action of these types of
liaison roles for organisational

5

ORGANISATIONAL

5.1

Organisational

success.

PREREQUISITES

performance

FOR SUCCESSFUL

and organisational

ALLIANCES

outcomes

In practice, alliances
have had a high failure rate and this has been no less the case in the airline business
(Flanagan and Marcus, 1993). This has led to a focus on the factors that contributed
to the formation of the
alliance,
but these may have little do a failed outcome. Success
of a strategic alliance is predicated
on
organisational
organisational

performance
(OP) and organisational
outcomes (OC). OP is a function of actions congruent to
goals. Action takes the form of establishing a shared vision, communicating
clearly, building inter-

member

mast. collaborating

impelling

business

Performing

strategy

successfully

and sharing
are essential

in a strategic

knowledge

and decision

from the outset of alliance
alliance

not only

involves

making.

formation
capability

These
(Kanter,
but also

processes

grounded

in an

1994).
choices,

for example,

the

choice to expend effort and to what degree as well as the choice to commit resomr_
including
knowledge
and
trust. Organisational ou_
include the degree to which enterprise members have met the goals and the extent
to which they are satisfied with the suategic alliance. If one of the members perceives the alliance to be unfair the
choice about their potential investment will be modified. The relationship
between OP and OC is best understood
in terms of the concept
A strategic

alliance

of organisational

rests on the premise

integration.
that each member

brings unique commitments

to the alliance,

requiring

a

process of integration. To integrate member commitments, each constituency
in the alliance needs to understand
and share in a collective mission. Success has to be grounded in the integration of human resources which leads to
a greater
probability
of strategic and operational attainmenL However, ff the interrelationship
between
the
partners is based largely on self-interest,
competition and overt conflict, the members'
attachment to the alliance
is loose. Conversely,
when the relationship
between the constituencies
is collaborative,
partners become engaged
in an alliance characterised by collective interest and equality. One of the difficulties in integrating the separate
goals of various members
in an alliance is the fundamental conflict
over their individual
control of scarce
resources. Sources of conflict include information (technical expertise,
quality); capital, physical resources, time
(to learn) and intangible assets (industry reputation
(Barney, 1986; Hill, 1990). The relative control of these
resources is reflected in each transaction within the alliance. Conflict over resources
also mirrors the degree of
trust amongst

members.

5.2

Alliances

based

on exchange

To explain this point in more detail, a relationship
of exchange is compared to that based on integration. Strategic
alliances are firmly established
on a relationship
of exchange
highlighting
the interdependence
between the
enterprise members.
An alliance based on 'exchange' is founded on a reciprocal relationship,
with the members'
contributions
each linked to the other basc.d on fair exchange
of contributions,
and outcomes proportional
to
investment. Trust is also an important part of an exchange relationship
in terms the extent to which each members
believes that the other(s) will meet their commitments to the alliance. Exchange sets up a competitive context, the
nature of which is characterised
by each members in the alliance declaring 'If I give you something,
I want
something
in return'. The outcome subsequently leads to 'winners' and 'losers', depending on which member is
best able to maximise their control over scarce resources. 'Losers' are more likely to resort to threat as a form of
reprisal.

Su'ong competition

and fear of reprisal

through structuring the alliance

can be minimised

along equitable

lines. This is achieved by, for example, ensuring that each party has equal access to resources and opportunity to
control them. In an alliance based on exchange,
there is an element of uncertainty that is reduced with each
transaction. Under these conditions, the culture of the alliance
network as we witness amongst carriers at presenL

5.3

Alliances

Alliances

based

is at best 'co-operative'

but remains a 'hollow'

on integration

that go beyond exchange

and slrive for an integration of interests,

goals, resources

and values take on a

different 'rationality' from those based pttrely on self-inmest.
A number of reseaz_ers
(Johanson and Mattson,
1988; Malekzedeh,
1988) have stressed the significance of integration
as an ideal process for strategic alliances.
Consultants
Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1985) reported that cultural integration was the most important factor,
ahead of financial

and strategic

factors, in the success

of acquisitions.

A strategy of integration
establishes
common
interests amongst members
through a process
of ongoing
negotiation.
With the understanding that not all alliances are founded totally on conflict or calculative
action,
integration is the approach most likely to lead to the initiation, development
and maintenance
of a strategic
alliance.

An integrative

strategy

U_refore

encourages

at the maximisation

a 'negotiated

of equitable

outcomes

order' within

the alliance

constituency
contribution
characterised

not only to preserve a cohesive social relationship but also to dissent without fear of reprisal about
and outcomes in the alliance. Members experience
a sense of working towards a *commonality'
by 'what is good for us is good for the alliance'. Integration
is associated
with enhanced
efficacy

Walter

(1985)

found culture

is a significant

factor

Strategic

alliances

in the performance

based

Negotiation

on integration

of hybrid organisations.

allows

1978).

is aimed

and ultimately
organisational
capacity of the alliance.
adding-value for customers and shareholders.

for all members.

(Strauss,

Negotiation

each

are genuinely

A strategy

of

integration involves
a major 'jelling' of distinct cultures, woridorces
and orientations.
Integration
requires a
collective
orientation to strategic
purpose implying a mutual understanding
and acceptance
of the goals and
strategies by various members. An integrative
strategy addresses four main factors that affect the performance
outcomes
of alliances:
breadth of purpose, boundary
determination,
value creation
process and stability
mechanisms
(Borys & Jemison 1989). The purpose of the alliance is dynamic and varies over time as markets
fluctnatc,

technologies

change,

legislation

is modified

and work structures are redesigned.
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Sowhatdosuccessful
strategic
alliances
require?
If themeans
allianc_'..s, mergers and acquisitions),
enterprise
members who are located
people essentially
successful when:

'divided'

loyalties

and ambiguous

commitment.

•

new ways of thinking

•
•

underlying conflicts
there is an emphasis

•
•

people engage in genuine problem solving
tensions between dominant and weak logics and between

•

stakeholders

•

it is predetermined
without

•

6

have

sharing

psychological

AIRLINE

and doing emerge, and blockages
are identified and addressed
on the interactive processes

who possess

to the end have

changed

(as evidenced

by

new strategies are called for, requiring a renewed
'responsiveness'
from
either at the 'centre' or its boundaries. Strategic alliances often mean that

the most appropriate

under what conditions

Alliances

will

be less

'hollow'

and

are 'unfrozen'

among people
old and new ones are overcome

organisational

it is appropriate

knowledge

are identified

for the dominant

member

to possess

information

it
contracts

support

ALLIANCES

and reinforce

innovative

behaviour

IN A COMPETITIVE,

GLOBAL

MARKET

,

In a recent survey by Airline Business, it was revealed that there are more than 360 alliances
carriers (Gallacber. 1997). Few of these display any strong commitment
to organisational

among international
integration and it is

more appropriate to regard them as competitive actions to pursue relatively short-term objectives.
We consider
them to be "hollow organisations rather than genuine attempts to develop new organisational relationships
as pan
of a globalisation
strategy. In the long-term, coalitions would continue to be formed, but specific memberships
would vary depending
upon the set of competitive
conditions
at any time. There can be no doubt that the
existence of regulatory barriers to entering markets and to investment favour alliance formation. In the absence of
the regulations,

it is probable

that genuine

strategic

alliances

would continue

to develop

as an alternative

to

strategies based on mergers and acquisitions. We believe the key reason for this is that globalisation
in the airline
industry requires a network of services operating in regions with widely differing cultural conditions.
Attempts to
co-ordinate actions through merger and acquisitions will be confronted with problems of cultural fit and they will
need to tailor services

to local demands.

Strategic

alliances,

and operational
alliances.
Alliances
allow greater
success addresses
the fundamental issues directly.
The benefits

from these

strategic

needs. The formation of swategic
and to intervene more effectively

alliances

though,

flexibility

potentially

are markedly different than simpler marketing

and added-value.

accrue in improved

More

performance

alliances allows carriers to question more actively,
in change. Strategic alliances force each enterprise

important,

and responses

the model

for

to consumer

to overturn existing logics
address the nature of their

contribution to hybrid organisation by identifying their core competency, expertise, resources and where they will
add value. Strategic alliances present _hallenges to the airline industry that are not entirely novel, but they need to
be reconsidered
as a potential solution to many of the difficult questions facing it such as out and in-sourcing,
downsizing

and business

failure.

Implicit in the pursuit of competitive
advantage
strategies seek to establish and defend positions

is the assumption that there is scope for market power. Business
in the market. The fundamental question for regulators
is whether

competition
in the airline industry is a sufficiently strong enough force to produce outcomes
what can be achieved under regulated conditions.
The issues of concentration
of market
through mergers and acquisitions
structures that emerge in strategic
individual

governments

affect the development

that are "better"
power, whether

or through alliances,
still need to be confronted.
However,
alliances are more complex and it will become progressively

to influence

their

of genuine strategic

behaviour.
alliances

Moreover,

regulators

need

to consider

that have the potential to deliver long-term

10

than
it be

the organisational
more difficult for
how

their

actions

benefits.

*

7

CONCLUDING

COMMENTS

We believe it is inappropriate to label most of the arrangements among the world's airlines as "strategic
formed as part of a "globalisation
process". It is better to regard them as competitive
responses

alliances"
to current

conditions,
that is 'hollow' networks based on a relationship of exchange and not integration. To a large extent,
the alliances are a by-product of the regulatory system. The key questions from a regulatory perspective
are
whether increasing concentration
of market power is likely to occur in liberal market conditions and how this
would have an impact on performance.
The current

set of regulations

restrict access

to markets

and prevent

airlines

from investing

in each

other. We

believe that the regulations
also inhibit the development
of genuine strategic alliances because they impose issues
of national sovereignty on a process where genuine integration that is, co-operation and a commitment to decision
and resource-

sharing

is required.

We have argued that alliances would survive
organisational
form with a stronger commitment
t'h'ms that see global expansion

8

as simple

extensions

of their networks.
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Abstract
Aviation is becoming
increasingly
internationalized
not only because
international traffic is itself growing rapidly but also because airlines are
themselves beginning to lose their national identity as cross-equity holdings
expand and as airline a/Hances grow in number. These changes affect the
commercial and the regulatory environment in which aviation services are
provided but they also have potential implications for air transport safety.
Although air transport safety is often treated as part of public policy, it is
also influenced by the commercial interests of the airlines themselves. While
there has been a recognition of the need for a public policy response to the
new world of giobalization and strategic alliances that are now part of the air
transport
market,thispolicyresponseneeds to be made in the contextof
changingprivate
incentives
affecting
airlines'
own attitudes
to safety.
This
paperfocuseson thechangesin private
incentives
thatthegrowth in airline
alliances
inparticular
may have on safety.

Introduction
The number of major aircraft accidents in 1996, combined with concerns expressed by the
aircraft manufacturer Boeing, that, while in statistical terms civil aviation may be slowly
getting
saferor,atworst,no more dangerous,thesheergrowth of aircraft
movements in
future years will result in a rise in the absolute number of accidents, has brought forth a
response from the aviation sector (THEECONOMIS'r,1997). In the US, for instance, there
has been the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
Thishasalsohappenedata timewhen theairtransport
marketisexperiencing
considerable
change. As with many othersectors,airtransport
servicesuppliersareresponding to
commercialpressures
forincreased
internationalization
toreapbenefits
on boththecostand
demand sides.The growth of international
airline
alliances
is the most transparent
manifestation
of thisalthoughtherehas been an even more rapidgrowthin pointspecific
alliances.
Alliances
are seen by carriers
as a means of exploiting
economies of scale,
densityand scope in theprovisionof servicesand as a means to exploit
economies of
marketpresence in terms of patronage.
The growth in number and thenatureof modem alliances
have raiseda seriesof policy
issuesconcernedmainly with anti-trust
issues.The concernof thispaper is to look at
anotheraspectof the globalization
of the airline
industryand of thegrowth of various
forms of air_e alliances and thatisthepotenfml effea of these developmentson a£rline
safety.In particular,
itlooks at the way market forceschange and can influencethe
comn_rcialincentive
forairline
operatorsto offersafeservices.
Publicpolicyregarding
safetyhasbeen reacting
tochangingconditions
inaviation
marketsbutsuchreaction
should
be in the contextof the new commercial environmentin which airlines
provide their
services.

The paper initially outlines some of the broad trends in globalization that are influencing
and being influenced
by developmentsin commercialaviation.
It then turnsto look at
ex_.flywhat istakingplaceregarding
airline
alliances,
and particularly
thoseof a strategic
nature.An important
pointhereisthatconceptually
thedetails
of any a_rline
alliance
may
have specific
safetyimplications.
A model of how airline
safetyisincorporated
in both
corporate
andpublicpolicyisthendevelopedand subsequently
theimplications
of strategic
alliances am set within this context. The discussion is entirely concerned with aviation
marla_ts in what might be termed the industrial wodd. Strategic airline alliance.s do exist in
many parts of the world but here we content ourselves with considering those involving
partnerships between carriers based in the major, economically developed countries. The
arguments may be somewhat different for other parts of the world.
Globalization
and aviation
Globalization and internationalization am two of tic major industrial trcnds of the late
twentieth
century('rlCJROW,
1996).part of thesetrendsam reflected
in the significant
growth of tradethathas taken place in the 1990s with realexportgrowth in the
industrialized
countries
thatmake up the Organisation
forEconomic Cooperationand
Development(OECT)) runningat over 7% per annum. Put anotherway, from 1964 to
1992, first
world productionwas up by 9%, but exportswere up by 12%, and crossborderlendingwas up 23%. Equally,thcrehasbeen a significant
rise
in foreignowncrship
of assets
thatarcnow estimated
tototal
about$1.7trillion.
Whether these trends are passing fads or represent genuine long term adjustments to the
way that production and trade is conducted it is perhaps premature to judge. The
preliminary indications are, though, that they are more than transient trends.
This has also been taking place at a time when the institutional structure in which air
transport services are provided has seen significant developments. The US deregulation of
its domestic markets for air freight from 1977 and for passengers from 1978, combined
with its subsequent commitment to an 'Open Skies' approach to international aviation the
following year, have been instrumental in changing the way not only US policy is
conducted but also, through both demonstration effects and direct knock-on effects, the
ways in which many other air transport markets are now regulated (BtrrroN, 1990; Btrrr_
and SWANN, 1989).
The intra-European market, in particular, is moving rapidly towards a situation akin to that
found within the United States. Many European countries have unilaterally liberalized their
own domesticmarkets while the European Union (ELI)
l has since 1988 through a
successionof 'packages'moved to a positionthatby themiddleof 1997 willleaveair
transport
withintheUnion largely
freefrom economicregulation
('BtrrroN,
1996a).These
measuresinitially
opened up regulated
fareand capacity
bands withintheEU, but then
went on tolimit
fareand entrycontrols
onlyto instances
where governmentsatboth ends
of a route agreed to them. The creation of a Single European Market from 1993 means that
international air transport within Europe is essentially deregulated with full cabotage within
member states being allowed from 1997 (BtrrroN and SwAr_, 1992).

t
The title
European Union (ELI)is a comparatively
new one and terms such as
EuropeanCommunity orEuropeanCommunitiesprecededit.For simplicity
of exposition,
however, itwillbe used throughoutthispaper.Currentlythe EU consistsof Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France,Finland,Germany, Great Britain,
Greece, I.rcland,
Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal,
Spain,Sweden. Otherstatessuch as Norway and
Switzerland
do have important
agreementswiththeEU, forinstance,
regardingaviation,
thatticthem tothelattcr's
overall
policy.
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Lntra-European
mad_tliberaliz_onhas alsobeen accompaniedby

liberalization
of many
bilateral
agr_ments involvingEuropean statesand the USA. The fu'stsuch agreement
involvedtheNetherlandsand theUS in 1992 butsincethattimea significant
number of
smaller
Europeancountries
havemade similar
liberal
agreementswiththeUS and in1996 a
major Opens Sky agr_ment was alsoreachedwithGermany.
Outside of Europe and North America, the majority of national markets in South America
have been liberalized with extensive privatization programs of different types. The markets
in Australia and New Zealand have also been deregulated. Additionally, the establishment
of the World Trade Organization has also brought into play, albeit in an exu'emely small
role,a new and geographically
wider policymaking institution
to supplementthe roles
alreadyplayedby bodiessuch as theInternational
Civil'
AviationOrganization
and the
International
AirTransportAssociation
(IATA).Aviationissuesarealsoon theagenda of
new regional
groupingssuch as theAsian-Pacific
Economic Council.There is continued
pressure,
therefore,
forthisinternational
liberalization
processto continue(ORGANISATION
FORECONOMIC_TION
AND DEVELOPMEtcr,
1997)
Thiscombinationofmarkettrendsand institutional
reforms,
combined with risingincomes
and increased
leisure
time,havecontributed
tothesteadygrowth in demand thathas taken
placein aviation
markets.Additionally,
technologyadvances have meant thataircraft
efficiency
has risenand airtraffic
controlsystems,despitetheircontinuedinadequacies,
canhandlegreater
volumes of trafflc.
This has exerted
positive
effects
on thecostsideof
theinternational
airtransport
equation.
As a resultof thesetrends,since1960 airpassengertraffic
has grown world wide at an
averagerateof 9% a year and freightand mail traffic
by some II.0% and 7.0%
respectively.
This means thatin 1995, forexample,some 1.3 billion
passengerswere
carriedby the world'sairlines.
Civilaviation
is,therefore,
a major serviceindustry
contributing
to both domesticand international
transport
systems. It facilitates
wider
businesscommunicationsand has been a key component in thegrowth of tourismthatis
now one of theworld'smajor employment sectors.In additionto passengertransport,
aviation is also an important form of freight transport and some estimates suggest that it
carries up to 60% of world trade by value.
Further, all the indications are that as a sector it will continue to expand into tim foreseeable
future albeit at differential rates in various geographical sub-markets. While forecasting of
aviation markets, as with many other activities remains an art rather than a science, it seems
likely that passenger traffic will grow at a ram of between 5.0% and 7.0% into tim
foreseeable future with much of this growth in the Asian-Pacific region (up to 9.0% a
year). The forecasts arc also for slower growth in tim more mature US-European markets
where North Atlantic traffic grew at an annual ram of 8% between 1982 and 1992 and by
5.0% for mid Atlantic routes over the same period. Nevertheless, the absolute size of the
trans-Atlantic traffic flows, some 38.0 million passengers (about 13.9% of the world
aviation market) in 1992, makes it quantitatively a very important aviation market. Further,
taken together,
the intra-European,
US domesticand transatlantic
markets currently
account for some 60% of world air traffic.
Strategic
airline
alliances
In line with many other sectors, aviation has experienced significant moves towards
globalization and internationalization
in terms of its market structure. Indce.d, it is tim smmd
objective
of themajor UK carrier,
British
Airways thatitintendsto become a 'global
carrier'.
In pursuit
ofwider marketcoverage,
and in an effort
toenhance their
own internal

:
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efficiency, airlines have followed a number of courses. The recent development of various
forms of airline alliances is perhaps currently the most controversial of these (BuTtoN,
1997).
The exact definition of what constitutes an a_rline alliance is a vague one especially given
that the institutional arrangements linking airline activities is continually changing. The
notion of airline alliances is, however, one that has recently come under public scrutiny in
the wake of several much publicized efforts by number of major international airlines to
link their operations. The nature of the ties differ between groupings and so has the success
of airline partners in gaining both official ratification and in the subsequent way partners
have been able to operate and manage their alliances.
Historically,
international
alliances
in aviation
can be tracedback as faras 1945 when the
IATA was established
primarily
to coordinate
international
airfares.
The bilateral
structure
of agreementsthatemerged followingtheinability
of the 1994 Chicago Convention to
initiate
freeinternational
aviation
marketsregulated
fares,
routings,
schedules,
designated
carriers
and oftenembraced revenuepooling.The primaryaim of theimmediatepost-war
structure
was to protect
non-US carriers
ata timewhen, as a result
of theSecond World
War, the US had built up a dominant fleet of aircraft that could be transferred to commercial
uses. Subsequently,
the regime was often used to protect economically inefficient state
owned carriers from the rigors of market competition.
The late1980sand early1990s saw thegrowthof new forms of international
alliances that
have embracedsomewhat different
characteristics
and thatservedifferent
purposes.They
have beenlessinstitutionalized
inthattheyhavegenerally
been formed by privately
owned
commercialairlines
outsideof any governmentalor inter-governmental
agency initiative.
The main growth has also been in international
alliances.
The first
of these,between
American Airlines
and Qantas,was signedin 1985.The number of alliances
involvingUS
carriers
thengrew rapidly
until
by 1992 therewere 61.
Alliances
arealsoina continual
state
offlux.AccordingtotheAirline
Buaines_survey,for
instance,
theSpanishcarrierIberiareduceditsalliances
from 27 in 1995 to 13 by May
1996.Over thesame periodAustrianAirlines
canceledsixagreementsand added fournew
ones,Swissalradded sixagreementsand dropped threewhileUnitedAirlines
canceledsix
but added two. These changes generally
arepartof a tidying-up
processesas carriers
formulatemore coherentnetworkstrategies.
The exact number of airline atliances that now exists is unclear, not only because of the
dynamic nature of the arrangements that make it almost impossible to keep abreast of
changes but, also because the term 'alliance' is a generic one with no precise definition.
It
can, in a strict legal sense, mean some degree of equity ownership of one carder by another
but it is more often interpreted in looser terms to embrace such things as code-sharing
agreements, interchangeable
frequent flier programs and coordinated scheduling
of
services.
Equally, airlines are often involved in a large number of different alliances,
sometimes embracing a single partner but may involve several others carriers. A more
recentfcaun_isthatincreasingly
severalmajor carriers
are[inkingtheiractivities
in socalled'galaxies'.
An annual survey by Airline Business a_mpted to track alliances involving the major
carders and to report changes in the main features of the alliances (Table 1). The growth in
strategic
airline
alliances
isimmediatelyobviousas isboth therelatively
smallquantitative
importanceof alliances
involving
an equitystakeand theslow growth in theirnumbers.
The datapresented
isnot,however,definitive
and one finds,forinstance,
The Economist
in 1995 producing slightly different figures and claiming that there were then 401 alliances,

doublethenumberit estimated

four years earlier. The overwhelming,
is that the number of alliances is large and increasing.

conclusion,

though,

Table 1, Airline alliances 1994-1996
I

,

I

I

,,

Numberof

aliances

_th equity stakes
_thout
equly stakes
New allbnces
Nuffberof
m-lhes
NotR: New alimCeS

1996

1995

1_94

389

324

280

38.9

62
327
71
171

58
266
50
153

58
222
136

6.9
47.3
25.7

m'e those enteeed

into alnce emund

%¢ha_qe

May of the pre_ous

year and not Olen

ibte0 asplanned. Al|iances ms_cted
to frequent fler co-operation were included
e30_uded in 1995-6. The actual number of allmncesin 1994, _e 5rst year
compied
However,
ex_uded

in 1994, but

inforrnation, was ma_inallyhigher
than staled as some al|ances went unreported.
some domas_cregional
operalorsowned
by mejorswere included in 1994, but
in 1995.6.

The North Atlantic market embraces a number of major strategic alliances that involve the
airlines code-sharing and cooperating in other ways across a large number of routes so as
to strategically link their networks.
This type of strategic alliance dates back to the
formation of the Global Excellence alliance formed by Swissair, Singapore International
Airlines and Delta in 1989.
Other alliances, such as that between Continental and Alitalia and United and British
Midland, ate regional in their orientation involving code sharing between specific regions.
The vast majority of alliances, 'point-specific'
alliances, are, however, relatively minor,
targeted affairs that usually generate few controversies. Blocked-space agreements are often
a feature of point-specific affiances with airlines purchasing and reselling blocks of seats on
each others flights.
Point specific alliances, in their various guises, may in some cases lead fears
prospect of monopoly domination of an individual route. The mnitifaceted,
alliances in which the large international carders are increasing becoming engaged
seen as potentially posing challenges of a somewhat greater magnitude (US
ACCOUNT_G Oi_C_ 1994).
In detail, alliance an'angements may take a number of different forms 03trrr_,

of to the
strategic
are now
GENERAL

1997).

Full mergers of domestic airlines were a feature of the US domestic market following
deregulation under the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act as the initial period of instability
moved into one of consolidation
and rationalization. For example, of the 34 new jet
scheduledcarriers
toentertheUS marketbetween 1978 and 1992 only2 remainoperating
withthevastmajorityof theothersbeingmerged with incumbents.Mergersofthistypeare
themost extremeform of alliance
and have been a traditional
way in which carriers
can
coordinate
their
operations
and otheractivities.
They areclaimedtoenjoytheadvantagethat
completecona'olof a carrier
isin thehands of a singleboard and thatresourcescan,
therefore,
be allocated
more effectively.
In practice, though, mergers are not always successful.
As a generalization,
mergers
lin_/ng
overlapping
networksinanytransport
industrytendtoofferfewer economies than
thosethatcombine interfacing
networks(either
ingeographical
termsor with respectto the
typesof serviceoffered).
In some instances
problems alsoarisebecausethoseinvolved
have miscalculated
thecostsof transition.

Mergers generally involve the need to obtain institutional approval from various authorities.
Tradidonally, in virmaUy all cases cross-border mergers are not possible because of
regulations limiting the degree of permitted foreign ownership in an airline. A notable
exception to this being the joint ownership of SAS. Cross-border
mergers also pose
problems in terms of the implications for international air transport agreements since the
nationality of a carrier can become blurred in these circumstances.
Even within countries mergers are often controlled by national governments although the
degree of control can vary. In the US, for instance, the Department of Transportation took
a very passive stance on mergers following deregulation
of the domestic market.
Individually, European countries have taken a variety of positions as has the EU in recent
years. In many cases mergers, such as those between British Airways and British
Caledonia and Air France and LITA, have only gained approval by the airlines reIinqnishing
routes or slots.
The strongest form of airline alliance short of direct mergers or rake-overs involves either
unidirectional (as with the USAir/British Airways and Northwest/KLM
alliances) or crossequity holdings. While mergers still take place, more recendy there has been a tendency for
the level of equity holdings to fall short of a full merger (Table 2). This is particularly so
when airlines from two countries are involved and national laws limit the extent of foreign
ownership. What the table does not show, however, is the degree of control thai equity
holdings can affordan airline and, in particular, voting rights are often less than the relative
amount of capital involvement.
Table 2.
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The relative
importanceof airline
alliances
involvingequitystakestendsto be declining
withAirline
Businessrecording
lessthan16% of agreementsin May 1996 involving
equity
investments
compared with 18% in 1995 and 21% in 1994. This,nevertheless,
does not
mean thattherehas not been a largeincrease
in theirabsolute
numbers and othersurveys
indicate
thatfrom 1992 ownershipstakesof above 20% havepredominated.
Potential travelers have traditionally suffered from a dearth of information regarding the air
transport opdons open to them. The problem was compounded from the late !970s as fare
deregulation and the widespread adoption of yield management techniques by airlines
introduced a massive array of continually changing fare options. The use of computer
reservation systems (CRSs) provides the interface between the carriers and the potential
travelers. Airlines combine to make use of the information channels provided by CRS
systems to stimulate their joint traffic flows. This involves code-sharing. Code-sharing is

now often seen as the main feature of any airline alliance and the number
has grown considerably in recent years.

of code-shares

TeChnically, a code-share is a marketing arrangement between two carriers that allows them
to sell seats on each other's flights under their own designator code. In the ease of
connecting flights of two or more code-sharing carriers the whole flight is displayed as a
single carrier service on a CRS. From the customers' perspective what it does is to give the
impression of an on-line service or, at the least, offer some features of an on-line service
such as single check-in, common frequent flier program and coordinated flight schedule.
Code-shares can be across a wide range of services, as with the major strategic alliances
but more often just involve a single service or a small network of services, A stronger form
of code sharing involves blocked space arrangements. In this case one carrier buys space
on another airline's aircraft that it then seLls in its own right and using its own designator
code.
Hub-and-spoke operations, and in particular the "banking' of flights, that are a concomitant
of effective hub-and-spoke operations, can be more efficient ff carriers coordinate their
flight schedules. Hub-and-spoke operations, by allowing traffic to be consolidated and
transshipped
between flights can enhance load factors and allow airlines to reap any
economic benefits of economies of scope and scale that exist, By agreeing to coordinate
schedules two allied airlines can increase the potential amount of traffic that on-lines across
their combined networks.
Franchising has been almost a tradition in sectors such as fast food and clothing. Its appeal
in aviation is that it allows a major carrier to spread its brand name and generate revenues
on thin routes without the necessary commitment major capital investments. It is now a
form of alliance thatis growing in popularity in international markets and especially in
Europe where British Airways has been particularly successful in developing franchising
activities. Some other carriers have been less enthusiastic about franchising arrangements
and have been slower to adopt them.
The aviation
safety
equation
The incentive for any airline to provide safe services is the potential for lost business that it
would suffer ff its accident rate or, more strictly, its perceived accident rate, exceeded the
net benefits that passengers enjoy from making use of its services. Safety is one of the
attributes
of an airlines'
characteristics
that potential
customers, and subsequently
investors,
look at in making decisions
2. This inherentmarket pressureis boosted by
regulations
and codes of conductimposed on theindustryby government.Government
involvementis usuallyjustified
because of imperfections
in the market thatmake it
impossibleforpotential
passengers
tounderstand
fully
therisksconfrontingthem or,even
ifinformation
isadequate,have insufficient
marketpower to ensurelevelsof safetyare
optimized.
One simple way of looking at air transport safety from an analytical point of view is to
think in terms of theincentives that influence
theactions
of thoseprovidingairtransport
services. Essentially, the incentive function takes the general form:

Safety is a very general term for which there is no strict definition. This is because
accidents can take a variety of forms and be of differing intensity. Also the actuarial
probability of an accident may differ from an individual's perception of the chance of being
in an accident (MOSES and SAVAGE, 1990). No attempt at a strict definition of safety is
offered here but rather the subject is treated in general terms.

S- f(E, G, I) + ¢
where:
• S reflects

(I)

the safety standard level adopted by an airline,

•

E reflects
premiums,

the private economic incentive to be safe (e.g. reputation,
lost business, share price and the interest of flight personnel);

insurance

•

G represent the government safety codes and policies (e.g. regarding aircraft
features, maintenance standards and crews working hours and conditions);

•

I represents infrasm_cture

safety

considerations (e.g. airport design and air traffic control).

There is an additional random element in the function,
else, such as a missile or bomb, causing the accident 3.
With respect to safety levels pursued

_, indicating

the risk of someone

by a carrier, there is no reason to assume that it is

socially desirable for an airline to be 100% safe. There are o_p,
portunity costs associated
with devoting resources to safety and it is clear from individuals decisions on such things
as the speed they drive at or the choices they make regarding car travel over air travel that
factors such as drnc savings or cost saving often over-ride safety considerations.
Indeed,
many argue that aviation is excessively safe and with better information about relative
safety records society would put less resources into aviation safety (KAHN, 1988).
R_garding the items on the right hand side of the equation, while these may be expressed as
independent
factors they will, in practice almost certainly exhibit some degree of
correlation. The nature of infrastructure provision, for instance, is inevitably linked to the
safety regulatory re,me
adopted by the authorities.
Equally, the internal economic
incentives influencing an airlines pursuit of safety cannot be completely separated from the
institutional regime within which the carder operates. Nevertheless,
the three-way division
is helpful in tying together the implications of globalization and strategic alliances with
aviation safety considerations.
Strategic
airline
alliances
and the safety
equation
If we consider equation 1 then there are a number of ways in which changes in the
institutional structure of the airline industry, including the creation of strategic alliances, can
have a bearing. These are both in terms of the internal structure of the airlines' operations
and in the ways in which the authorities may respond to them.
What we do not have at present is a very large body of rigorous empirical evidence linking
strategic airline alliances to safety questions. Alliances are too new for detailed statistical
analysis of the type required; short term fluctuations in airline accidents rates involving a
very small number of incidents does not make for easy econometric work. What one,
therefore, must generally rely on in looking at the safety implications of alliances are
parallel experiences of aviation developments that have also influenced the structure of the
sector and on anecdotal evidence gleaned from the experiences of alliances to-date..
• Aggregate
air travel demand
The creation of strategic alliances is claimed in a number of studies to generate, when
controlled within an appropriate economic regulatory regime, significant consumer benefits
(e.g. US GENERALAO_UNTn_G O_'l_CE, 1995; UK CIVn. AV_TION AUTHORrrY,1994). In
3
The issueof terrorism
and thegrowth of strategic
airline
alliances
isoutsideof the
domain of thispaper.

particular, the various economies enjoyed by carriers combined with service enhancements
and lower fares for users have lead to more travel by air;, the latter being a reflection of
enhanced consmucr surplus. This, however,
only occurs provided carriers do not
excessively expolit any monopoly powers associated with the market strngth that alliances
couldpotentially
generate.
More airtravel
beyond theincrease
thatwould occurwithoutthegrowthof alliances
would
of it.serf
leadto more aviation
accidents
accordingto theargumentspresentby Boeing in
1996. The added economic efficiency
thatalliance,
s bring about and the accompanying
additional
traffic
will inevitably
increasethe potential
aggregatenumber of aviation
incidents.
Publicpolicy(G inequationI)isinevitably
goingtorespondto this.In theUS,
for example,the FederalAviationAuthority(FAA) has alreadybegan releasing
more
information
on safetyin an effortto keep the publicbeuer informed,althoughthe
complexityof aviation
safe_ issuessuggeststhatsuch informationwillin practice
not
really
offerany grc_ insights.
Equally,in terms of I in equationI, tbe provisionof and use made of aviation
infrastructure
may be changed.At present
many airports
and airtraffic
systemsarcworking
at, or above theirdesign capacityand are also, in many cases, using out-dated
technologies.
There willbe enhancedpressures
bothfrom a purelyairtransport
perspective
and from a safetystandpinttoensurethatexisting
infrastructure
isused betterand new
infrastructure
providedwhere justified.
There is,though,anotherway oflookingatthisaspectofthesafetyissue.
What ismissing
from many calculations
on the implications
of increaseddemand for airtravelis the
opportunity
costelement.
Ifindividuals
were nottraveling
by airtheywould be engaged in
some otheractivity
thatof itself
has a safetyaspectattached
to it.In thissense,itis not
altogether
clearthatmore airtravel
willresult
inmore deathsand injuries
inaggregate.
Little empirical work has been conducted into this aspect of airline safety. What evidence
there is mainly relates to experiences with domestic airline liberalization in the US after the
enacuncnt of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act (RosE, 1989; MORmSONand WINSTON,
1988; OSTER, and ZORN, 1989). The limited amount of analysis undertaken here indicates
that on many routes where US airlines could compete with automobile travel then the
diversion effect from car to plane as the result of improved services offered by airlines
reduced the number of road deaths. The calculations am made difficult, however, because
of the inhe,rent problems in defining counterfactuals, but BYLOW and SAVAGE (1991)
estimate
some 275 highway fatalities
were avoidedby themodal switchestoairtravel.
Not onlyarctheUS estimates
very tentative
fortechnical
reasons,butextrapolation
to the
effectof su'ategic
airline
alliances
poses particular
difficulties.
While the alliances
do
involvesituations
where new structures
of fares,servicesand routescan inducemodal
transfers,
many of there.ally
important
alliances
focuson long distance
travel,
oftenover
oceans,where commercialaviation
istbeonlyviatransport
option
5.What thealliances
do

4
MosEs and SAVAGE (1990)make theargumentthatafter
any institutional
change,the
safetyauthorities
may adjusttheir
preferred
levelof safety-essentially
recognizingthatthe
economicbenefits
associated
with thenew regime areworth tradingforpossiblylower
safetycriteria.
Thisdoesnot,however,mean thatno safetyreformsarcneededto meet this
new safetystandard;
put simplyalltheparametershave shiftedand adjustnmntsmay be
needed tosafetyregulations
etc.toallowforthiseven ata new safetylevel.
5
There still remains the broader issue of what induced travelers would have done
with their thne even they would not have been traveling by an alternative mode of transport.
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seem todo withinthenarrowconfines
of transport
istoinducetravelers
away from carriers
outsideof alliances.
This,forinstances,
isseenvery clearly
in theanalysis
thathas been
completed on the strategic
alliances
affecting
the North Atlanticmarket where the
KLM/Northwest and BritishAirways/USAir alliances
demonstrablytook traff'ic
from
competitors(Gn.LMAN RF.SEARCHASSOCL_TES,1994; US GENERAL ACCOUNT_G OFFICE,
1995). From the safetyperspective,
the issuethen becomes one predominantlyof
discovering
whetherthealliance
carriers
aresaferthantheir
non-alliance
counterparts.
This
issueisaddressedseparately
later.

• Consumer information
Airline
alliances
affectthetype of information,
thattravelers
enjoy regardingthe actual
carrier
theyflywith.As can be seen from FigureI, thatprovidesa simpleschema of the
linksinvolvedforSwissairin theGlobalQualityalliance
in 1994, alliance
structures
can
become verycomplex,k isnotdifflcult
to see,inthiscase,why, forinstance,
someone
bookinga multi-segment
flight
withSwissalrcouldbe p,Tzledatbeingcarried
on a Delta
aircraft.
Blockedspaceagreementsarepotentially
even more confusing.

-

i
I

2.7%

5%
Equity _dllamco
.....

Ma_e_ing

agmm_nt

Figure 1.Swissairand theGlobalQualityalliance
1994.

In termsof safety,
consumerinformation
raises
two importantquestions;
theseconcernthe
identity
of thecarrier
actually
takingthepassengerand thetype of aircraft
used forthe

Althoughthevariations
arevery small,airlines
do have differing
historic
safetyrecords.
This isnotonlyintermsof thenumber of accidents
theyhave experienced
but alsorelates
to thedegreeto which theyhave been heldnegligent
for accidents.
Airlinesalso offer
different,
frequencies,
qualities
of serviceand fares.In a perfectworld, potential
passengersshouldbe ableto make theirchoicesand trade-off
the variousattributes
of
carriers
when selecting
the airline
they wish to fly.In thecase of alliances,
itis often

Allhuman activities
have risksofaccidents
associated
withthem and many of thoseexceed
thoseriskstodo with flying.
6
There is also the supplementaryissue of who is responsiblefor an accident
involving passengers from several airlineson an allianceflightand how
is
compensensation to be extracted. This is not dealt with here.

10

difficult to know exactly what are the various portfolios that are available because the actual
carrier providing the flight is not immediately transparent.
There have been public policy efforts to ensure that alliance code-sharing arrangements are
not used to misinform or disadvantage passengers. This involves not just direct issues
revolving around individuals having information on the exact airline they will travel on but
extends to such things as responsibility for missed connections, direction to connecting
flights and ensuring appropriate information systems are available at airports. To prevent
screen padding on CRS systems the European Union now limits codeshared flights to
being displayed twice. The United States has no such limit on displays in this way. What
the US rules do require is that passengers are informed by US airlines of the actual carrier
with which they travel. The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) has a similar
•code for disclosure but is not legally binding on member states.
It is not just airlines that have differing safety records, aircraft also do 7. There are
arguments that that potential travelers' perception of the safety of different aircraft types can
affect their decisions and that information on plane types should be transparent. Airline
alliances could hide or make it more difficult for passenger to have information regarding
aircraft type.
The most documented case of the commercial impact of an aircraft crash on its producer
relates to the McDonnell Douglas 13(2-10 after two major crashes (one in 1979 and the other
in 1989). Here there was evidence of significant falls in the producer's share prices
immediately after the 1979 incident that could only be accounted for in terms of lower
anticipated sales (Crt_a.K, 1986). Fo.rtm.s (1989) extended this analysis to look at the share
prices of airlines such as American that flew DC-10s and found that their share prices were
also adversely affected after the accident s. In contrast to this the 1989 DC-10 crash seemed
to have no long term adverse effects on the McDonnell Douglas' share prices. There is also
no evidence that the share prices of Boeing or Lockheed have fallen significantly affect an
accident suggesting the impact of the 1979 DC-10 crash was atypical (CH_a.K, 1986).
• Alliances
versus non-alliance
carriers
One very vocal concern expressed at the time of the liberalization of the US domestic air
transport market in 1978 was that free markets would force some carriers to cut comers
with regard to safe operations to keep their fares competitive. The argument was
resurrected after a series of accidents in the mid-1980s and the fining of a number of
carriers for violating maintenance
and safety regulations
(N_CE,
1986). In fact the
evidence seem to be that in this case market changes seem to have had little effect on the
overall level and trend of accidents in the US market (Mop.Rtsot_ and W_s'roN, 1988).
What the experience has shown, though is that there does seem to be variations in the
inputs airline put into safety. The US National Transportation
Safety Board, for example,
expressed concern about budget constraints restricting maintenance although this may well
have reflected the actual safety regulations in place for such operations (US CONO_.ss,
7
In general, jet aircraft have a better safety record than turboprop aircraft but there
are also difference within these two broad categories. For example, Boeing 747 (100, 200,
330 series) aircraft have about 1.6 crashes per million departures; Airbus A300-600 aircraft
have about 1.4 per million departures while Boeing 737 (300, 400, 500 series) aircraft
have about 0.5 per million departures.
s
Focusing on patronage rather than financial performance,
however, BAm,tETrand
LoF_o (1983) found that the crash had no impact on the market shares of routes where
DC- 10s were flown.
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COMMrrrm
oN Go_
OPERATIONS,
1977).Followingderegulation
in the US
domesticmarket, a number of studies produced evidence of reduced expenditure on
potentiaUy safety related activities, such as maintenance and training, in some segn_nts of
the'market (L.e)mm ANDF,t_e_,S, 1989). Even ff this did not produce more incidents
immediately, there is an argument that in the longer term a legacy effect would result in
accidents. Assessing
the validity of this argument is not easy. Technical advances,
especiatly in jet engines, has reduced maintenance needs and isolating this shift in the
maintenance cost function from the impact of institutional changes is not easy.
There is also another set of findings of importance, namely linkages between the actual
financial position of an airline and an airline's accident record. Rose (1989; 1990) finds in
analysis of US domestic carriers, that there was a one year lagged positive effect on
accidents rates of higher operating profits although the effect is negligible amongst the
largest carriers.
Where does this lead with regard to the growth in strategic alliances? From the evidence
obtained on North Atlantic routes, alliances tend to attract passengers from non-alliance
carders. One consideration relates to the financial pressures on alliance carriers; are the
market pressures to cut comers on such things as maintenance and to employ cheaper, less
experienced crew greater for alliance carders. In general, the evidence is that alliance
carriers, especially when there are mergers or equity holdings involved, have a larger
resource base and are, therefore, less prone to liquidity difficulties. Indeed, in the case of
many alliances (e.g. British Airways/USAir;
KLlVl/Northwest and American/Canadian)
significant financial injections were made by one partner into the other to bolster a flagging
f'mancial position. This suggest, a priori, that many alliance airlines are in stronger financial
positions than they would be operating in isolation. This in itself, though, may not mean
overall improved safety even if it were true that a strong financial performance correlates
with less accidents. This is because the non-alliance carders on these routes would be the
subject of greater financial pressures.
Comparisons between alliance carriers and
different elements into consideration.

non-alliance

carders

also bring two

other

First,blockedspace alliance
arrangements,
whereby a carrier
buys capacityon another
plane,and coordinated
schedulingby code-sharing
partners
can leadto theuse of larger
aircraft
on theroutesinvolved.
The evidencethatisavailable
isthatlarger
aircraft
tendtobe
saferthansmallerones (OST_ andZoRN, 1989).
Second, and to complicate the situation, where alliances do in some way rationalize the use
of the partners' capacity this can free up the market to allow new entry. This may come
about for purely commercial reasons or it may be driven by institutional factors. For
instance,
in severalmergers involvingEuropean carriers
slotwere relinquished
by the
partners to meet anti-u'ast requirements. Similar arrangements seem important in the efforts
of British Airways and American to form a strategic code-sharin_g alliance. This raises
questions as to Whether the new entrants arc safer than incumbents'.
The evidence, which
again is mainly from US experiences, is that there is little difference in the safety record of
9
One of the problems with the work that has been completed in this area is that many
new entrants into scheduled aviation arc not new to airline operations per se. In many cases
they am charter carriers that have extended their operations _
1989). This may not
have been a problem in the past, after all where the newcomers
originate from is not
relevant to the safety equation which is merely concerned with the implications of a change
in supply on accidents, but in many markets there are now more genuinely new airlines and
their potential safety characteristics are now important.
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established carriers and incumbents
1989; ROSE; 1989) )°.

measured

in terms of accidents (Os'mR,

and ZORN,

Tl_ airline
switcheffects
of strategic
alliance
on safetyare,therefore,
farfrom clear.It
does notseem, however,thattherearestrongforceslikely
to leadto reducedsafetyas a
resultof theway traffic
may switch between airlines
once an alliance
is formed in a
particular
market.Indeed,therecouldbe made a casethatffanythingthechangeswould,
on balance,
have a positive
effect
on safety.
• Managerial
incentives
There are also a number of other ways in which the E component in equation 1 may change
as a result of alliances being create& Does the establishment of an airline alliance, for
example, influence the management incentive of the partner carders to change their
approach to safety? The available evidence is not altogether conclusive as to the
implications for airlines of accidents. Much depends on the circumstances involved and on
how the airline manages the crisis.
One argumentisthataccidents
willdiscouragepeoplefrom using thecarrier
concerned
evenafter
theimmediateimpacthaspassed(BORENSTeN andS,
1988).While this
may ormay notbe true,
measurementof this
effect
ismade difficult
by thenaturalresponse
of anycarrier
which isadversely
affected
inthisway tolowerfaresso astokeep itsmarket
share(ROSE,1990;1992).The airline
ina senseisloweringitspricetocompensate forany
publicperception
of a lowergeneralised
quality
ofservice.
An alternative
way of lookingatthetopicistheimpactof accidents
directly
on thefinancial
statusof an airline.
Simply eye-bailing
thesharepricesof ValuJetand TWA (Figure2)
shows significant
declines
intheir
respective
shareprices(bothactualand againsta moving
average)followingcrashes involvingtheiraircraft
m May 1996 and July 1996
respectively
I:.The contrast
is particularly
clearwhen compared to American Airlines
t2.
American did,though,experiencea major crashduringthisdam period,the loss of a
Boeing 757 inColumbiaduringDecember 1995,butthisdoes notseem tohave adversely
affected
thesmoothedsharevalueindex.The difference
would seem tolieinthelocationof
thecrash,theAmericanincident
being outsideof theUS, and in theperception
of whole
was atfault.
Thisratherunevenpattern
of stockmarketimplications
isinconformitywithmore rigorous
studiesthathave been completedlookingatthe financial
implications
for an airline
of
crashes.
In thiscontexttherehasbeen work on a number of themes,much of itconcerned
withUS experiences
|3.
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Incidents
involving
new entrants,
otherthingsbeingequal,however,tendto result
inmore fatalities
possiblydue tothelesser
experience
ofpilots.
H
The Valu.let case is complicated by the temporary closure of the airline by the FAA
for violation of safety and maintenance cedes just after one of the airline's DC9s crashed in
FIorisda.
12
Thislackof any apparentimmediatelinkbetween airline
safetyrecordsand profits
isalsoconsisten
withthefindings
of GOLBE (1986).
_
Outside of the US, the Edwards Report
in the UK concluded in 1969 that
independent operators were less safe than regularly licenced carriers for the period 1955to
1966 and that smaller carriers and chareter operators were more susceptable to accidents.
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An.accident seldom costs an airline in terms of immediate payments because all carders
tend to be extensively, and frequently excessively, insured. What it may do, however, is to
affect an airline's image and to impact on future insurance premiums it must pay. Mrrcl.m_
and MALONEY(1989), for instance, looked at insurance rate adjustments after crashes and
'brand name effects' and found that share price fails can be attributed both to the projected
fuv.u'e costs of higher insurance and to a brand name effect associated at-fault attribution. In
contrast to this, CHANCE and FERIUS (1987) find an immediate dip in share price of an
airline involved in an incident, although it is exu'emely short lived, but no impact on the
industry in general. GOLaE (1986) in his study of the early years of US domestic
deregulation concluded, "There does not seem to be a statistically significant relationship
between safety and profits". BOR_SmIN and _
(1988), in contrast found that
airlines suffered an equity loss of about 1.0% as a result of an accident. The picture is not,
therefore, very clear on this topic.
"Where does the establishment of alliances fit into this picture? Much depends upon the
nature of an alliance. If the structure is extremely loose then there would seem to be litlle
reason or pressure for the managemnt of any carder to changes its behavior patxems with
regard to safety. Where there is, however, a closer relationship, especially involving equity
holdings, there may be grounds for expecting airlines to closely monitor each other's safety
performance,
especially
ifeachfears
thatany diminutionin reputation
of one airtine
would
adverselyaffect
theother.Empirical
evidenceon thisissimplynotcurrently
available
at,
thestrategic
airline
aUiancesarcsimplytoo new and thei_structures
toovariable
to allow
any sortofdetailed
testing.
• Lobbying power
As wellaslookingattheimplications
ofalliances
fortheinternal
effects
theymay have on
airlines'
attitudes
towards safetyand managements' reactions
to this,airlines
alsooften
exerciseconsiderable
political
power. In generallargesuppliersexercisemore political
power thando smalleronesand so one would expectalliances
to have mote political
sway
than individual
airlines.
Looked at in anotherway, airline
alliances
effectively
change
supply conditions,and therefore,
thiscould potentially
have implications
for the G
component of equationI.
One possibleway of lookingat thismore systematically
is to treatthose involvedin
supportingany aviation
policyas a coalition
(_,
1984).Following thisapproach
strategic
alliances
servetheinterest
of a number of different
parties.
In terms of an airline
alliance
actingtoalter
governmentpolicyon aviation
safetyone must look,inthecontextof
coaltions,
atthefactors
motivating
thoseinthe'ruling
coalition'.
There would seem to be little
reason for the users of aviationto tryto reducesafety
standards
unlesstheywere initially
felt
tobe excessive.
From a compaitiveperspective,
therewould seem to be little
reasonformember airlines
of an alliance
to compromise on
standards
since,generally,
theyarethelargercarriers
thathave solidsafetyrecordsgiving
them a comparativeadvantageovernon-alliance
rivals.
The exceptionto thisis when an
alliance
has a monopoly position
and itisto thecombined advantageof thepartners'
to
reduceoverall
safetystandards
and tosaveon their
costs.There arcfew incentives
forthe
bureaucracyresponsible
forsafetytocompromise on existing
standardssincethiswould
redacetheir
power and influence.
Equally,airline
producerswould sccm tobe little
affected
in theirattitude
to safetyand in theirlobbyingpositions
by theformationof a strategic
alliance.
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What one can concluded from these few observations is that there is unlikely to be any
significant changes in the attitudes of those concerned with alliances to manipulate public
policy in a way tha_ would be detrimental to current safety conditions.
Conclusions
Recently much debate has taken place concerned with the implications of strategic airline
alliances on the efficient internal workings of aviation markets. Much less attention has
been paid to the implications of strategic alliances for airline safety. In fact, air transport is
extremely safe and any institutional change is unlikely to have more than a marginal effect
on it. Nevertheless, in part because of the intensity of single incidents and in part because
the media fred it cost effective to cover the limited number of air crashes rather than the
much more numerous but dispersed motor accidents, the public still remains concerned
about aviation safety matters.
The strategic global airline alliances that represent the cornerstone of the internationalization
of the aviation sector are in many ways still in an embryonic state. Large numbers of
alliances fail. Contemplating their implications for safety is, consequently, far from easy.
They also take many different forms. There does not, however, seem to be any justifiable
reason to suppose that airline alliances will have any major adverse effect on aviation safety
and, in some ways, they are likely to reinforce the strength of the safety record of the
sector.
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I INTRODUCTION

Since deregulation of the U.S. airline market twenty years ago, airline competition has been
the subject of intensive research. Interest has been sustained by the ongoing evolution of
the U.S. market, deregulation in Canada in the 1980s, and the evolutionary process of
deregulation underway in Europe.
Competition between airlines occurs in various dimensions, including fares, capacity, flight
schedules, frequent flier programs, computer reservations systems, code-sharing agreements
and alliances. This paper focuses on competition in fares and flight schedules. Fare
competition has been the subject of many studies in the literature. The importance of
schedule frequency has also long been recognized; see for example Douglas and Miller
(1974), Panzar (1979), Dorman (1983), Hansen (1990) and Norman and Strandenes
(1994).
The timing of flights is clearly another important factor determining the attractiveness of an
airline because oftraveller's preferences for when they depart and/or arrive. Because flights
can be viewed as products located at points in time around the twenty-four hour clock, the
considerable literature on spatial price and location competition can be brought to bear.
However, certain features of airline markets have yet to receive a definitive treatment in this
literature, and there have been few applications to airline markets per se. One recent
contribution is Daniel (1995) who estimates a model of airline flight departure/arrival time
choice. Airlines in his model trade offqueuing time at airports and schedule delay costs.
Neither business stealing between rival airlines nor fare competition is considered. Another
recent study is Encaoua et al. (1996) who develop a model of duopolistic competition on a
simple network. The airlines engage in a two-stage game, choosing departure times for their
flights in the first stage and fares in the second. While illuminating, their model has several
restrictive features, including only one flight per airline on each route, a uniform distribution
of the traveller population in terms of desired departure time, and price-inelastic aggregate
demand.
Another focus of this paper is predation in airline markets. Predatory behaviour can take
various forms: increasing seat capacity by adding flights or using larger planes, matching
rivals' flight schedules, offering deep discount fares, etc. Descriptive evidence of such
behaviour has been documented in several markets, including British Airways against
Loganair on the Edinburgh --Manchester
route (Hanlon, 1994), Northwest Airlines against
People Express on the Minneapolis/St. Paul --Newark
route (Kahn, 1991), and Air Canada
against Canadian Airlines International on routes in Canada (Tomaszewska, 1997).
Predation has been the subject of considerable theoretical economic research, and there are
a few empirical studies of alleged predatory behaviour in terms of product location (e.g.
supermarkets by Von Hohenbalken and West (1984), andcity bus markets by Dodgson and
Newton (1992) and Dodgson et al. (1993)). There are also some insightful discussions of
predation in airline markets; e.g. Kahn (1991) and Hanlon (1994). But there has been little
formal analysis of airline predation by any means and, to the best of our knowledge, none of

predatory behaviour in departure time schedulingJ
The purpose oftlds study is to explore both nonpredatory and predatory flight schedule and
fare competition using a HoteUing-type spatial competition model. The market considered
is a single city pair served by two airlines. The airlines play a two-stage noncooperative
game, choosing the timing of their flights in the first stage, and fares in the second stage.
The numbers of flights offered by each airline and the seating capacities of flights are treated
parametrically.
Subgame perfect equilibria to the two-stage game are computed
numerically using an iterative tatonnement-like procedure.
Section 2 of the paper develops the model, including variants that incorporate flight
capacity constraints and predatory behaviour by one of the airlines. Section 3 describes
nonpredatory and predatory equilibria ofthe model for two hypothetical markets. Section 4
provides a summary, and suggests directions for further research.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 Basic specification

Consider a single city pair market served by two airlines, indexed i=1, 2. Airline i has N_
flights that it schedules for departure at times _ " (x, .... ,x m ). Departure times are
chosen on the 24 hour circle. Airline i's ./th flight is denoted _#. The airline chooses a
vector of.fares pj = _.!s ..... Pro,)., where P,s is the single fare2 for F#. For re.asons of
computational tractab/hty potential travelers are aggregated into mass points, indexed
k=-l...K. Mass k has population m, and a preferred departure time x t = (k/K)T, where
T=_24is the length of the clay in hours. Individuals incur quadratic schedule delay costs
from departing at other than their preferred times. An individual in mass k who takes flight
F,,¢ pays a generalized cost p aJ + t(x k _ x):,
where t is a parameter that measures the
_J
strength of departure time preferences.
Traveler behaviour is described by a discrete choice model. Each individual has three
decisions: whether to fly, and if so with which airline and on which of its flights. An
individual in mass k choosing F,, receives a utility U_ = aI - p, - t(x _ - x ,)z _-"_
k

_

.

¢

.

_

V

_

.

¢ ....

= V_ + e _, where a_ Is a constant that ts common to everyone, e _ ts an md_wdual-spectfic
(not mass- specific) |d,osyncrat|c uuhty for asrhne t, and V_s denotes systemauc uuhty. The
a, coefficients can differ between airlines because of differences in actual or perceived
quality (viz. in-flight service, on-time performance, baggage handling, safety and so on).
Idiosyncratic individual preferences for airlines can arise because of differences in personal
flying experience, or differences in memberships with frequent flier programs and usage of
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l Tomaszcwska(1997) tests for predatorypricingand capacity cx-pansionby Air Canada againstCa_dia_
Airlines International over the period 1988-1994.
2 The model thus abstracts frommultiplefareclasses thatairlines typically operatedarough airlineseat
managementprograms.

them:
The model thus includes
differentiation
between airlines.

elements

of both horizontal

and vertical

production

Individuals in mass k who fly with airline i choose its flight with the lowest generalized cost:
._ A_min
t
2
.t
•
•
.
=
.
p..v ÷ tCx -x..).
Let It'.
• denote the:r corresponding
systematic
utility. An
J
v"
I

j,

individu_I from any mass who chooses not to fly receives a utility U o = Vo + _ o, where V0
is a constant that is common to everyone, and e o is individual-specific
utility for money
spent on other goods.
If the e"_ and e" o are identically and independently
distributed
Gumbel variates with scale parameter/a,
then the probability that an individual in mass k
flies with airline i is given by the familiar multinomial
legit formula:
t
Q_ =

e v_'a/_
eV{*J_ ÷ eV_ I_ ÷eVo/_

Because the numbers of flights scheduled by each airline are treated
of flights are immaterial
to the analysis and are normalized
to zero.

as given,
Marginal

the fixed costs
costs of

passengers
can be deducted
from the a_ (see below) and accordingly
The variable profits of Airline i, H, then coincide with its revenues,
formula

are set to zero also.
which are given by the

i=1

where

P_

= 1 ifj

= j'7 t and

P_

= 0 otherwise.

Airlines are assumed to maximize variable profits and to play a noncooperative
two-stage
game:
In Stage 1 they simultaneously
choose their flight schedules, Xt and X 2. In Stage
they choose their
next subsection.
2.2 Computation

fares, p_ andp:.

these choices

are implemented

is described

in the

of equilibrium

Equilibria are computed

numerically

timing of each flight is constrained
.....

How

2

using an iterative
to the set

"tatonnement"

{ Ax, 2Ax, 3Ax...
0

0

T},

procedure.
where

The

Ax is a time step
•

•

•

that dmdes evenly mto 7'. Iruttal schedules
X I and X 2 are chosen for each aarhne. A grid
search is then performed
over a time interval [x *_ , x m'] within which the equilibrium

3 Idiosyncratic preferences for the flights of a given airline could also be introduced. Thiswas initially
done using a nested logit framework, but difficulties were encountered in getting the algorithm (described
below) to converge. Arguably the main differences bctxs_en flights are their departure times, and preferences for flight times are accounted for in the model.
4 Both ex'plicit and tacit collusion between airlines are ruled out. Evidence that airlines do behave
noncooperatively is reported in Brander and Zlhang (1990), Good, Roller and Sickles (I993) and Neven and
Roller (1996). In contrast, Evans and Kessides (1994) find that farts are higher on routes served by carriers
with extensive interroute contacts. Such carriers may refrain from aggressive pricing on a given route for
fear of retaliation on other routes.
Such belmvionr would be tacitly collusive.

schedules can be reasonably assumed to lieJ The grid search is first done for Airline l's
flights, then Airline 2's, then back to Airline 1's and so on. Throughout, the order in which
each airline's flights are scheduled is preserved. Thus, xn is incremented in time steps ofzlx
over the interval [x "_ , xl_ - Ax] (or [x 'm , x "_'j ifN I = 1) holding the timing of all other
flights constant. For each value of _Jl a fare equilibrium for all flights of both airlines is
computed using another tatonnement procedure similar to that described in de Paima et al.
(1994). When the rescheduling off n is completed, x n is fixed at the value that yields the
highest a"L Next, a grid search is performed for x_2 over the interval [x]z + Ax, x13 - Ax],
and so on. Sister flights are prevented from locating at the same time, but can coincide with
a rival flight. When all of Airline l's flights have been shuffled, the procedure is repeated
for Airline 2. This completes one major iteration of the search. Major iterations continue
until there is no change in either airline's schedule between successive iterations. An
exluilibdum is then deemed to have been reached. *
2.3 Capacity

constraints

The modal described in Section 2. I ignores the fact that the number of passengers that can
be accommodated on a flight cannot exceed the plane's seating capacity. One way to
incorporate capacity constraints is to treat a flight as a congestiblc facility for which utility
decreases with the number of people who use it. This approach has been taken by Panzar
(19"79), Dorman (1983), Kohlberg (1983), and Rierveld and Rouwendal (1996). A second
approach is to treat a flight as a loss system, in which each traveler is either accommodated
at a constant quality, or not accommodated at all (Powell and Winston, 1983; Inzerilli and
Jara-Diaz, 1994). In this paper flights are treated as loss systems. It is true that some
aspects of flight quality deteriorate with the load factor, such as time to board, deboard and
retrieve baggage, space in overhead luggage compartments and speed of in-flight service.
But being able to fly at all is arguably the predominant consideration for travelers.
Space constraints preclude a complete description of the approach, but the essentials are as
follows. Individual travel demands are stochastically generated during the weeks prior to
the day of travel in question. The rate of demand generation is the same for all potential
travelers; i.e. independent of both preferred departure time and idiosyncratic preferences.
Aggregate demand is deterministic (a Law of Large Numbers is at work). As demand is
generated, it is loaded onto flights according to individual preferences in the way described
in Section 2.1.) Ifa flight fills up, it is removed from travellers' choice set. Loading ends
when each prospective traveler is either hooked on a flight, chooses not to fly, or wants to
fly but can't because all flights are full. Finally, the algorithm described in Section 2.2 is

s In practiceflight times maybe congtaincd by airport ordinancesthatlimit operating hours.
(This proce.dur¢is similarto thatemployed by An.san et al. (1994)_ The scquentiai "shuffling"of
schedules is not guaranteedto re.acha global profit maximumfor eachairline in any majoriteration of the
algorithm. But the alternative of conductinga grid search over all possible scheduleconfigurationswould
bc slower,and is impractical when airlines have multipleflighLs.
The loading proc_urc is inspiredby Powcll and Winston (1983).
becauseaggregate demandis randomin their model.

Their procedure

is differenthowever

usedwithonly

minor changes to compute equilibrium.'

2.4 Predation

Predation has been a longstanding and controversial research topic in economics; see
Ordovcr and Saloner (1989) for a review. Predatory behaviour by a firm can have various
objectives, including forcing a rival to exit from the market, deterring future entry or, less
drastically, inducing a rival to withdraw capacity, raise prices, or otherwise adopt a less
aggressive posture. Typically, predation involves a loss of profits in the short run in return
for higher future profits if the strategy succeeds.
One possibility is that a rival will 'capitulate' if its profits, or perhaps cumulative profits, fall
below a predetermined threshold. Hanlon (1994) discusses this possibility in an airline
market setting. In many circumstances, however, a predator will be unsure about how long
it will take for aggressive behaviour to pay off, or indeed whether it ever will. Uncertainty
is endemic to airline markets. Demand for air travel fluctuates unpredictably with the state
of the national or world economy. Demand shocks can occur, such as the downturns that
followed the 1990-91 GulfWar and the recent Asian economic crisis. Airline costs
fluctuate with exchange rates and fuel prices. And there may be uncertainty about the depth
of a rival's financial pockets, or the possibility of government intervention or bailout?
Given these uncertainties it seems appropriate to take as the predator's objective function
its long-tun expected present discounted profits, where the probability in each time period
of a favorable change in the rival's behaviour is a decreasing function of the rival's profits.
Suppose Airline 1 is the predator and Airline 2 the rival or "victim". j° In our model, with
the numbers of'flights assumed fixed, predation can involve changes in schedules and/or
fares. The first-order condition for the fare of Airline l's jth flight will take the form

ap,,

ap,j

where _ > 0 depends, in a possibly complicatedway, on Airline I's long-tun objective
function. An analogous condition obtains for x_j. The intertemporal linkage between
Airline I's strategy in the current period and its future profits can be implemented in our
static model framework simply by adopting as Airline l's objective function _l - 8 _2-

s Recall that the algorithm preservesthe departureorderof each airline's own flights. This is inconsequential as long as the planesare identical(v/:. have the same capacity),which is assumed for the simulationsin
Section 3.
9 For e.xample,after many months of suspense about its survival, in December 1992 CanadianAirlines
Internationalsigned an investment agreement_ith AMP,Corp.,the' parent companyof American Airlines,
and obtained
loan guarantees
of$120million(Canadian)
fromthe Canadianfederalgovernment
andthe
provincialgovernmentsof Albertaand BritishColumbia.
io R is assumed thatthe victim does notengage in strategic bohaviour itself. Opposing arguments have
been made as to whetherfinns in financialdistresscompetemore or less aggressively (Borenstein and Rose,
1995).

The numerical
valueof 6 willdependon various
factors,
including
thediscount
rate,
the
relative size of the two airlines, features of their route networks, the expected growth rate
in demand, the hazard rate for a changein Airline 2's behaviour, the expected present-value
profit gain to Airline 1 from a change,and the possibilityof further evolution in market
structure-- such as entry by another airline or a changein regulation. A number of heroic
assumptionsare needed to quantify theseelements,but it seemsplausible that _ could
exceed

one.

In this framework, Airline 1 acts in a predatory fashion R'it takes into account the impact of
its actionson the future viability or behaviour of the rival. This definition is consistentwith
those recently proposed by Adams et al. (1996) and Cabral and Riordan (1997).
In particular, predation entailsbehaviour that would not be optimal if the rival's future
existenceand behaviour were treated as given.
This framework can be criticized on the grounds that it treats one route in isolation,
ignoring network aspects of competition that are important in today's aidine markets. It is
true that the scope for predation on a route may depend on an airline's ability to cover its
losses with profits earned on other routes. And predation on one route may be intended to
deter entry on an airline's other routes. Thus, a complete cost-benefit analysis of predation
from the perspective of an airline would require consideration of its route network as a
whole. However, the intenemporal tradeoffbetween
current and expected future profits
incorporated into the simple framework above re_ains valid in this bigger picture, as do the
modified objective function and first-order conditions. Our purpose is to explore the
implications of predatory behaviour on a given route, ignoring precisely what motivates the
predatory airline to act in this way.
Table 1: Predation scenarios

Scenario

XI

X:

A

Fixed

Fixed

B

Fixed

Fixed

C

P/

P2
Fixed

Fixed

D
Several predatory scenarios can be envisaged according to whether the predator adjusts its
schedule and/or fares, and how the rival or victim responds. With today's sophisticated
airline seat management programs and computer reservation systems, fares can be changed
on short notice. Changes in schedules are more costly, and generally involve lead times of
weeks or months. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that a predatory airline can change
its fares more quickly than its schedule, and that a rival can respond more quickly with fare
changes of its own than by modifying its flight schedule. For purposes of analysis the four
predation scenarios depicted in Table 1 will be considered.

Inmarkets
wherefaresareunregulated,
Scenario
A will applyonly in

the very short run
possibly a few hours. Once the rival has enough time to respond, Scenario B becomes
relevant. Scenario C applies to the longer run when the predator can adjust its schedule,
and Scenario D when the rival can respond in kind.
2.5 Existence and properties

of equilibrium

Existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium in spatial markets have been the
subject of intensive research over the years. Roughly speaking, several features of our
model are conducive to existence of a unique equilibrium, including idiosyncratic
preferences for airlines, quadratic schedule delay costs and price-elastic demand. But these
are not enough to assure either existence or uniqueness. The sufficient conditions for
existence derived by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) are violated by our assumption that the
distribution of departure time preferences is discrete rather than continuous. Bester's
(1992) conditions for existence and uniqueness are also not satisfied. Resort to mixed
strategies can restore equilibrium, but it seems doubtful whether mixed strategies are
relevant to interfirm rivalry, particularly in airline markets where fares are quickly and easily
adjusted.
Determining whether an equilibrium exists is further complicated when there are capacity
constraint-_. Kohlberg (1983) and Rietveld and Rouwendal (1996) have shown that in
location games with fixed prices, capacity constraints militate against existence of
equilibrium. By contrast, Wauthy (1996) has demonstrated that in price games with fixed
locations, capacity constraints can restore existence. Temporal peaking of demand is
another factor that can cause nonexistence of equilibrium (q(ietveld and gouwendal, 1996).
And if an equilibrium does exist, it may be asymmetric. For example, Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995) show that with a triangular consumer density on a Hotelling line market, no
symmetric duopoly location-price equilibrium exists. The only equilibria are asymmetric,
with one firm located outside the market. Similarly, Ansari et al. (1994) obtain asymmetric
equilibria when the density of consumers has a beta distribution.
A final complicating factor in our model is that a predatory airline's objective function is a
weighted sum of its own profits and the rival's profit. To the best of our knowledge, neither
the existence of equilibrium nor the characteristics of equilibrium if it exists have been
investigated for such a game.
Let us now assume that a unique equilibrium to the two-stage schedule-fare game exists,
and consider its properties. It is straightforward to show that flight times are homogeneous
of degree zero in the parameters {al,a2,t, In, Vo }. Fares and profits are homogeneous of
degree one in the same parameters. If the costs of carrying passengers were included in the
model, profits would also be homogeneous of degree zero. in at, a2, and marginal passenger
costs. Thus, the a_ parameters can be thought ofas airline-specific systematic utility net of
marginal costs.
A question of central interest in the paper is whether airlines prefer to space their flights
out over the day, or to concentrate them at certain times. Spacing flights out has the

advantage that more prospective travelers can be offered convenient flight times. It also
reduces "cannibalization" of business between sister flights. However, load factors can be
increased by scheduling flights at times of peak demand. Borenstein and Netz (1991) refer
to this as "natural crowding" of schedules.
Another question is whether airlines prefer to schedule their flights close to rival flights, or
away from them. Two competing forces are at work. On the one hand, competition for
market share encourages agglomeration, a tendency which is accentuated by natural
crowding.
On the other hand, distancing flights from rivals reduces the intensity of fare
competition. Indeed, Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988) and Bensald and de Palma (1994)
have shown that two-product duopolists competing on a circular market may choose to
locate their products at the same point in order to minimize price competition. Depending
on the relative strengths of the opposing forces of attraction and repulsion, two types of
equilibrium scheduling patterns can emerge. In one, rival flights are "interlaced". In a
duopoly this would mean that Airline 1, say, operates the first morning flight, Airline 2 the
next flight, followed by Airline 1's second flight, and so on throughout the day. The other
scheduling pattern involves "segmentation", whereby each airline schedules its flights in a
time interval or bank that does not overlap rivals' flights. Brander and Eaton (1984),
Anderson (1985) and Bensaid and de Palma (1994) have shown that both interlaced and
segmented equilibria can exist in a given spatial market. Thus, location-price equilibria with
multi-product firms need not be unique.
3 NONPREDATORY

AND PREDATORY

SCItEDULE-PRICE

EQUILIBRIA

In this section we investigate the nature of nonpredatory and predatory location-price
equilibria in an airline duopoly. Two abstract markets are considered. The first is a
prototypical market with a single demand peak. Each airline schedules one or two flights
per day. The main purpose of this example market is to explore the comparative static
properties of schedule-price equilibria. The second market features a double demand peak
that is more characteristic of airline markets. Each airline schedules three flights per day.
3.1 Market

1

Market 1 has a symmetric triangular population density function, as in Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995). The distribution is approximated with 288 consumer mass points, spaced at five
minute intervals. The density peaks between mass points 144 and 145 at two and a half
minutes past noon (12:02:30). Peak density is three times the minimum density, at mass
points 1 and 288. n The time step, zLv,between feasible flight times is also set at five
minutes. The number of potential travelers is fixed at 1,000. Other base-case parameter
values are a_ -- a2 = (7,t = 10, g = 25, and Vo = -25, measured in U.S. dollars) 2

!1In three dimensionsthe distributionlooks like a ship's funnel,with a circularbase and a rakedprofile.
t2 Adjustedfor inflationthe value oft is comparable to estimates for business travelersreportedby Morrison andWinston(1985) and Norman and Strandenes(1994). The valueofp is broadlyconsistent wiflt

3.1.1 One flight each

Equilibria for the base-case parameter values when each airline schedules one flight per day
are described in Kow I of Table 2. Airlines schedule their flights symmetrically on either
side of the demand peak. _3 Each plane carries 69.3 people ( Dt and Dz denote the airline's
respective demands) at a fare of $35.30, and cams a revenue of$2,448. _4 About 14% of
the population of 1,000 individuals chooses to fly. The proportion is small because
schedule delay costs are relatively high, and because only two flights are available to
prospective travelers throughout the day. The equilibrium price elasticity of demand is 1.22, which is within the range of estimates commonly found.
gows 2-7 of Table 2 illustrate how equilibrium is affected when either a key parameter
value, or the distribution of consumers, is changed. When the schedule delay cost
parameter, t, is halved (Row 2) flights are moved 20 minutes away from the peak. This
happens because, with lower schedule delay costs, fare competition becomes more intense
and its repulsive force outweighs the attraction of gaining market share. Fares drop only
marginally, but demand rises appreciably because the generalized cost of travel is lower.
In Row 3 the scale parameter for idiosyncratic utility, P, is quadrupled. Airlines reschedule
their flights slightly closer to the peak. _5 With the higher idiosyncratic utility, systematic
difference_ in utility become relatively less important in determining travelers' choice of
airline. This weakens fare competition, and encourages agglomeration.
In P,ow 4, utility
from the outside good is reduced. This makes traveling more attractive and increase
competition between the airlines. As a result, flights are scheduled further apart, while
fares, demand and profits rise. _6
Row 5 introduces an asymmetry between the airlines by raising ax to $25. Airline 1
reschedules its flight 40 minutes closer to the peak, while Airline 2 moves an hour further
away. Airline 1 raises its fare and its profits nearly double. In Row 6, the demand
distribution is made more peaked by reducing the minimum density to zero. This increases
the incentive for agglomeration and flights are rescheduled closer to the peak. Fares change
little, but demand and profits rise because, with a more concentrated population
distribution, the average generalized cost of travel falls. Finally, in Row 7 the population

Morrisonand Winston's (19S9)estimate of the benefitper tripfrom a frequent flier program.
13By contrastTabuchiand Thisse(1995) findthat no symmetric equilibriumexists with a triangular
demanddistribution. However,their modeldiffers in thatdemandis price-inelasticand idiosyncraticutility
is excluded,
14The fare mayseem low, butrecallthat the marginal cost of caro'ing passengersis set to zeroand no
flight capacityconstraints areimposed.
15Similarresultsare foundin de Palmaet al. (198S) and Neven (1986).
16The slight asymmetryof the equilibrium(Airline2's flight is five minutescloserto the peak)is attributable to imperfectionsin the algorithm.
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distribution
is madeuniform.Withoutanyincentive
toagglomerate,
airlines
nowschedule
theirflights twelve hours apart. Generalized costs rise, and demand and profits fall.

Table 2: Comparative

statics properties ofnonpredatory equilibrium: Market

1, N I = N2---I.

Row

Case

x,

x2

p,

P_

Dl

D2

1

Base

10:25

13:40

35.3

35.3

69.3

69.3

2448

2448

2

_5.0

10.05

14:00

35.14

35.14

93

93

3266

3266

3

p=100

10:30

13:35

122.3

122.3

81.2

81.2

9929

9929

4

Vo=-50

10:10

13:50

43.51

43.51

105

105

4565

4586

5

atffi25

11:05

14:40

43.63

35.32

111

64.8

4846

2287

6

Triangle

10:45

13:25

35.09

35.08

86.7

86.3

3045

3026

7

Uniform

6:00

18:00

35.32

35.32

53.6

53.6

1893

1893

Table 3 summarizes the predatory equilibria that result in Market 1 with the predation
"
parameter set to ¢Y_I. For ease of comparison, the nonpredatory equilibrium is reproduced
in the first row as Scenario NP. Variables that are fixed in each predation scenario are
marked in bold face.
In predation Scenario A the predator (Airline 1) reduces its fare slightly, inflicting a minor
loss on the rival of less than $6/day. The predator accomplishes this at a cost to itself,
shown by the ratio AnJAI"h in the last column, that is only half as great, iv In Scenario B the
rival responds by reducing its fare very slightly. Its own profits recover by only a few cents
per day." In Scenario C, the predator reschedules its flight nearly two hours closer to the
peak and drops its fare more sharply. Profits of both aidines now fall appreciably. Finally,
in Scenario D the rival moves its flight away from the peak, further from the predator's) 9
This weakens the impact of'the predator's attack, and it responds by pulling its flight back.

IT Since the predator is at a profit maximum
changing
rium.

fare slightly

is Again this follows

is, by the envelope

from the envelope

in the nonpredatory

theorem,

second-order

equilibrium,
small

the loss of profit from

in the neighborhood

of the equilib-

theorem.

it In ScenarioD the algorithmdoes notconverge to a location equilibrium, but enters a location
cycle:(Xtt ,X2l) = (11:55, 14:55) - (12:10, 14:55)- (12:10, 9:10) - (11:55, 9:10) .... Airline 2 attempts
to distance its flight from Airline l's by scheduling it at the oppositehalf of the day, while Airline I follows
in pursuit. To avoid tiffs_sti¢
outcomethe algorithm was rerun with Airline 2 constrainedto
schedule its flight in the afternoon. This resulted in a smaller location cycle: (12:05. 15:05) - (12:10.
15:05)- (12:10, 15:10) - (12:05. 15:10) .... Fares and profitsdiffer little across these four location pairs.
The smallest gain from rescheduling a flight is for Airline i from (12:05. 15:05) to (12: I0. 15:05). On
tiffsbasis we chose (12:05, 15:05) as the equilibrium.
10

Paradoxically,
thepredator's
profitrecovers
to a level

higher than in the nonprcdatory
equilibrium,even though its objective there was to maximize its current profits. This
happensbecauseaggressivebehaviour by the predator leads,in equilibrium, to defensive
behaviourby the prey that acts to the predator's advantage.=

Table 3: Predatory

equilibria: Market l, Nj = Nz=l, base-case parameters,

c_r=1.
ZD.II

Scenario

x,

x2

Pt

Pe

_

//_

/!/72

_rr""_.

NP

10:25

13:40

35.3

35.30

2448

2448

--

A

10.25

13:40

33.87

35.30

2445

2442

-5.6

0.50

B

10:25

13:40

33.86

35.29

2445

2442

-5.6

0.50

C

12:20

13:40

28.41

33.28

2167

2019

-428

0.66

D

12:05

15:05

33.68

35.16

25 34

2206

-242

-0.36

To test the sensitivity of the results, predatory equilibria were recomputed with 6=0.5.
Qualitatively the same pattern obtains for Scenarios A-C as in Table 3, although as expected
Airline l's predatory efforts are muted. Scenario D differs in that, rather than pulling back
when the rival moves away, Airline 1 advances its flight further from 11:05 to 11:20. This
leads to a further reduction in the rival's profits.
The impact of predatory behaviour in Market 1 may appear rather modest. But if operating
costs were netted out, the proportional effects on profits would be much greater. And the
effects would be larger with a larger _. As noted above, the value of this parameter is
determined by a number of route- and airline-specific factors.
In the base case nonpredatory equilibrium, flights carry 69 passengers each. To examine the
effects of capacity constraints it was assumed that planes can only carry 50 passengers.
Table 4: Equilibria for plane capacity 50: Market

1, N 1= N2=I, base-case

parameters, 5=1.

Scenario

xl

x_

p,

p_

/7,

_

za_

an/arz_

NP

10:40

13:35

46.69

46.4

2334

2321

--

--

C

12:00

13:35

44.92

43.6

2246

2180

-141

0.62

D

12:05

15:05

47.86

43.7

2393

2184

-137

-0.43

= More precisely,

the change

in the predator's

generaldiscussion

of tiffs effect see Bulow et al. (I985).

objective

II

function

shifts its scheduling

reaction curve.

For a

The first row of Table 4 depicts the nonpredatory equilibrium for this game. Because
excess demand is unprofitable, 2| airlines raise their fares above the equilibrium fares that
obtain with no capacity constraints until demand is reduced to capacity. They also
reschedule their flights slightly closer to the peak (compare Table 2). This happens because
capacity constraints soi_en fare competition, so that at the uncapacitated equilibrium
locations the attraction of locating closer to peak demand outweighs the repulsive force of
greater fare competition.
In all four of the predation scenarios capacity constraints bind. Predation by cutting fares
alone is completely ineffective and so exluilibda for Scenarios A and B are not reported. In
S_nario C the predator reschedules its flight to noon, closer to the prey's flight. Though
the predator's flight is now at the demand peak, both airlines have to cut fares to keep their
planes fi_ll. The reason for this is that, being closer together, the two flights are jointly less
attractive to consumers. The predator inflicts on its rival a profit reduction of $1411day
(6.0% of base-case profits) at a cost to itselfof$88/day.
Once the prey is able to react
(Scenario D) it reschedules its flight 90 minutes later. This does little to alleviate its losses,
and the predator ends up better offthan as a nonpredator. Thus, just as when capacity
constraints are absent, it is possible for predation to raise current profits as well as expected
future profits.
3.1.2 Two flights each

Equilibria when each airline operates two flights are shown in Table 5. In the nonpredatory
equilibrium, rival flights are interlaced. Each airline schedules one flight in the morning and
one in the afternoon. "Peak period" flights (those near noon) carry more passengers (65),
than "off-peak" flights (57). But fares are almost the same because the elasticity of demand
depends only on the shape of the consumer distribution and not on the density.
The pattern of predatory behaviour in Scenarios A and B is similar to the pattern when
airlines have one flight each. In Scenario C, the predator reschedules both its flights much
closer to the prey's flights. This inflicts a heavy loss in profits for both airlines. In Scenario
D, the prey moves its flights away from the predator's.
The predator responds by partially
backing offits schedule attack, and the prey recovers much of its profit loss. The
predator's profits recover too, but unlike the case with one flight each//t
remains below
the nonpredatory equilibrium level.

21Boyer andMoreaux (1988, 1989) haveshown tlmtin a Stackelbergduopoly game fl_eleadercan profit by
rationingits consumers becausethis inflales fl_efollower'sdemand curveand induces it to raiseits price.
Boyer and More,aux arguethatbargain-priceairlines may behavein this wayto curbcompetitionfrom other
airlines. Such behaviouris not profitablein ourmodel, whereairlines movesimultaneously. Furthermore,
becauserationing boosts profitsfor the followermore thanfor tile leader,rationing would no!be desirable
fora predatorthat is tryingto damage its rival.
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Table5: Equilibria: Market
Xll, XI2

X21,X=

I, N_ = N2=2, base-case parameters,

Pll, Pl2

P_l, P=

II l

11a

6=I.
All2

IIJMI

NP

7:30,13:15

10:40,16:25

35.30,35.00

34.99,35.30

4277

4285

m

A

7:30,13:15

10:40,16:25

33.74,31.02

34.99,35.30

4253

4237

-47

0.51

B

7:30,13:15

10:40,16:25

33.73,31.02

34.92,35.28

4253

4237

-47

0.52

C

10:05,15:00

10:40,16:25

25.50,28.76

32.05,33.46

3694

3533

-752

0.78

D

9:20,13:55

11:35,17:15

31.69,30.75

34.29,35.34

4187

4013

-272

0.33

3.2 Market 2

Market 2 differs from Market I in featuring a bimodal distribution of demand from Miller
(1972); see Figure 1. (Circles in Figure 1 represent flights in the nonpredatory equilibrium,
discussed below.) The first peak corresponds to early morning outbound business trips, and
the second to evening return business trips. 22 Each airline is assumed to operate three
flights per day. To limit computation time 23the number of consumer mass points was
reduced from 288 to 96, and the time interval between feasible flight times was
correspondingly increased from 5 to 15 minutes. Other parameter values are the same as
for Market 1.
The nonpredatory equilibrium is described in Row NP of Table 6. In Figure 1, flights of
Airline
l areshown by solid
circles
and flights
ofAirline
2 by hollowcircles.
As inMarket
I with N_ =N_ = 2, dvai flights are interlaced. Morning flights of each airline are paired on
either side of the morning peak. Similarly, evening flights are paired near the evening peak.
Midday flights are further apart because the time period between them has a trough in the
density function, giving airlines little incentive to locate there, u
The pattern of predatory behaviour is broadly similar to that in Market 1. In Scenario A,
the predator cuts its traffic-weighted average fare, pt, by 19% to $27.79. This reduces the

" The preciseshape of tile distributionwill
tend to be more concentrated
importance

depend on the route. For example, preferreddeparturetimes
on routes where travel times are long. Slmpe also varies with the relative

ofbesiness travel.

23Computation time fortheequilibria
describedinRows NP and D of Table 6 below ranged from 2 to2 ½
hourson a Cyrix 166 PC with 32 megabytes ofRAM.
Computation time isroughlyproportionaltothe
productofthenumber ofconsumer masses,K, and thenumber offeusible
departuretimes,T/Ax.
2( Tile comparative

statics of equilibrium

to 50 causes all three pairs of rival flights

are similar

to those of Market

to cluster.

Both morning

13

1. For example,

flights

raising

end up being scheduled

p from 25
at 8:45.

prey's profit by $354 (5%). The predator's

sacrifice of profits is half as great. The prey
responds in Scenario B with a small fare cut. zs In Scenario C, the predator reschedules each
of its flights closer to the rival's flight with which it is "paired", and the loss in prey's profits
grows to 13%. Finally, in Scenario D the prey reschedules its flights, although only its
midday flight changes much. The predator's evening flight ends up departing before the
rival's evening flight, and the arrangement of flights is no longer interlaced.
Figure 1: Departure

time preferences for Market 2
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The effects of capacity constraints on equilibrium are examined in the same way as for
Market 1 by imposing a limit of 50 passengers per flight. Again, capacity constraints bind in
all predation scenarios so that price predation alone is ineffective. Comparing Table 7 with
Table 6 it is evident that equilibrium schedules are similar.to those with no capacity
constraints. But fares rise appreciably to eliminate excess demand. And even predatory

The prcy's

profits

fall (by $I)

because

the predator's

average

14

fare fails

marginally

from

$2%79

to $2"/.77.

Table6:

Nonpredatory

and predatory equilibria: Market 2, N 1ffiN2=3, c_,=l.
m

All s

NP

9:30

15:45

19:00

8:15

12:15

18:00

34.2

34.3

6782

6962

--

A

9:30

15:45

19:00

8:15

12:15

18:00

27.8.

34.3

6603

6608

-354

0.51

B

9:30

15:45

19:00

8:15

12:15

18:00

27.8

33.9

6580

6607

-355

0.57

C

8:45

13:00

18:15

8:15

12:15

18:00

25.7

32.6

6317

6063

-899

0.52

D

8:45

12:30

18:00

8:00

11:15

18:15

26.1

32.9

6382

6027

-935

0.43

Table 7: Equilibria for plane capacity 50: Market 2, NI = N2=3 , c_l.

N

9:30

16:15

19:15

8:30

12:30

18:00

46.2

46.1

6937

6912

--

C

9:15

16:30

19:15

8:30

12:30

18:00

46.2

46

6930

6892

-20

0.32

D

8:30

12:00

18:00

9:15

16:15

19:15

45.9

46.1

6886

6914

2

-24

P

schedule adjustments are relatively ineffective. Indeed, in Scenario D the prey ends up
marginally better off than in the nonpredatory equilibrium, while the predator ends up worse
off!. Once again this illustrates how changes in a firm's objective function induce changes in
its reaction function(s) that can have counterintuitive effects on the resulting equilibrium.
4 CONCLUDING

REMARKS

This paper has explored the nature of schedule and fare competition in an isolated city-pair
market served by two airlines. Airlines play a noncooperative two-stage game: choosing
flight times in Stage One and fares in Stage Two. Numbers of flights and aircraft capacity
are treated as given. In the nonstrategic (nonpredatory) variant of the game, each airline
maximizes its current profits. In the predatory version one airline, the predator, attempts to
maximize its expected long-run profits by maximizing its current profits minus some
multiple of the rival's profits.
Equilibria for both types of game are computed numerically using a two-stage tatormement
procedure. Depending on the characteristics of the market and parameter values, an
equilibrium may or may not exist. If it exists, equilibrium may not be unique and may not be
symmetric. In most, but not all, of the simulations that have been undertaken equilibria do
exist. And no case of multiple equilibria has been encountered.
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Equilibria were computed for two hypothetical markets, one with a single demand peak and
one with a double demand peak_ Nonpredatory equilibria are characterized by interlacing of
rival flights, and moderate concentration of flights near times of peak demand.
Four predation scenarios were considered. In Scenarios A and B, the predator can change
its fares but not its flight schedule, while in Scenarios C and D, the predator can change both
its fares and its schedule. Predatory fare cutting alone is found to be relatively ineffective in
inflicting damage on the rival, whether or not the rival can respond. Indeed, cutting fares is
futile if flights are capacitated. Predatory rescheduling of flights closer to a rival's flight has
greater potential for inflicting substantial losses. The extent of damage depends on whether
flights are capacitated, and whether the prey can respond with schedule changes of its own.
When the prey can respond its profits sometimes recover, and sometimes drop further.
Similarly, the predator's profits can rise or fall. Thus, the effects of predation can be varied
and sometimes counterintuitive.
There are several directions in which the analysis of the paper could be emended.
1. Demand is assumed to be stationary from day to day, so that a given flight is always
capacitated or always uncapacitated.
In practice demand for a flight fluctuates
systematically by day of week and by season. Demand also fluctuates unpredictably.
Thus, a flight can be full on some days and relatively empty on other days. The
uncapacitated and capacitated equilibria computed here'are polar extremes that may or
may not bracket "reality". The model could be extended, at the cost of increased
computation time, to allow for both predictable and unpredictable fluctuations, perhaps
following the procedure of Powell and Winston (1983).
.

.

=

Prospective travelers are assumed to be identical in terms of their aversion to schedule
delay and their sensitivity to fares. An obvious extension would be to introduce market
segments. One possibility, as in Norman and Strandenes (1994), would be to distinguish
between business and tourist class.
In the two hypothetical markets considered, airlines scheduled at most three flights. Yet
some routes, such as Los Angeles -- San Francisco, are served by dozens of flights. With
more flights the average interval between rival flights falls, and fare competition becomes
more intense. It remains to be seen whether interlacing persists as the equilibrium
configuration, or whether segmentation develops. Predatory behaviour could also take
the form of"bracketing",
whereby the predator squeezes a rival's flight by scheduling
two flights nearby, one earlier and one later.
Finally, attention has been limited to a single market in isolation. Yet many routes are
interconnected through hub-and-spoke networks. Interconnection imposes constraints on
the timing of flights. For example, Borenstein and Netg (1991) report that flight
schedules tend to be more concentrated on routes with fewer connecting passengers, as
well as on longer routes -- which are less likely to involve connections.
Thus, the
analysis could be extended to airline networks to see how this affects departure time
competition and crowding. The work of Encaoua et al. (1996) is a step in this direction.
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The liberalization process of the air transport industry in Europe, which officially ended in
April 1997, echoes the American Air Deregulation
Act (ADA) that was passed some
twenty years earlier, in 1978. Quite logically, the European observers try to infer from the
American experience what the evolution of the industry can be on their own continent. In
particular, one of the most spectacular consequences
of the ADA was the continent-wide
development of hub-and-spoke
systems, in which all passengers, whatever their origins and
destinations,
are charmelled
to a hub airport, where they find convenient
intraline
connections to reach their final destination.
Such networks were initially developed by the
major air carriers to minimize their operating costs (owing to the flow consolidation on the
spokes); hubbing also gave them the opportunity to monopolize the hub airport's resources
(by the concentration
of incoming and outcoming flights on a short time span) and is
therefore an interesting tool to lower the contestability of the hub markets.
Although the American experience has been extensively analyzed, very little can be learnt
to help forecast the future of the European flag carriers' networks. In this purpose, a twostage duopoly model is proposed in this paper, which considers both prices and network
patterns as endogenous
variables. This model structure is suggested by the American
experience - that made it clear that a carrier's network can act as a strategic tool just like
other more classic device, such as marketing or pricesand by the industry practices
themselves: the two-period
structure is meant to more or less reproduce the fact that at
every season for the next one the carriers choose the slots they will need at the airports they
want to serve, publish their timetables, while their prices generally keep on varying until
the last ticket is sold.
The paper is organized
section II; the empirical

1. PRESENTATION

as follows: section I presents the model, which is then solved
test of the model is conducted in section III on American data.

OF THE DUOPOLY

in

MODEL

The model illustrates the situation where two airlines compete (non-cooperatively)
first in a
variable that defines their network structure and then on the price of their product. The ftrst
period decision concerns the quality of service of their flights, that can be either connecting
or direct. Note that only connecting or direct flights will be considered (no one-stop or
multi-stop flights with no change of aircraft).
More specifically, two airlines A and B compete to serve the same (given) set of n cities.
The competitive game between them is_the following two-stage game with imperfect and
complete information:
First

stage:

the carriers

On each market

simultaneously

and independently

with origin i and destination

j, carrier

choose

their network

A (respectively

B) chooses

pattern.
PATi_

(resp. PATia), with value 1 if A (B) proposes a direct flight on market i-j, to 0 otherwise.
It should be noted that the airlines' choice of PATi_ and PATi_ results from a trade-off
between their market share and their cost level: the more the network is centralized (many

............................

,-.r--_7

a,_-___

connecting flights), the lower the costs (fewer panes to operated, higher load rates) but the
higher the risk of losing market share if the rival offers direct flights t.
Second

stage:

Each

carrier

learn

about

their rival's

network

pattern

choice,

and then

A
B Vi,j= l..n,
i_j.
simultaneously
and independently
choosetheir
pricesPijand
Pij,
Each carrier
choosesitspriceand pattern
variables
tomaximize itsprofit
level.

1.1.General Hypotheses
The two airlines are symmetric and have the same profit function.
flights between two cities, the following hypotheses are made:

In the case of non direct

- non direct flights are one connection flights only;
- when for a given carrier flights are not direct, passengers can only connect on one airport
among the ns. This airport, that will be noted HA and H B according to the carrier, is
supposed

to be linked to the other cities with direct flights only:

Vi _ H A , and PATi_B = PATHBB
i = 1 Vi.
of the carrier.
- the passengers

PATi_,

H B . This airport is obviously

only have online connections

= PAT_^ i = 1

the potential

hub

(no interlining).

- each carrier offers only one routing per O-D market.
Concerning the demand: O-D traffics are exogenous and non null, equal to Qij, ij = 1..n, is
j. All demand is served by the two carriers. The O-D flows are symmetric and there is no
distinction between passenger classes (e.g. business and tourism).
Concerning the carriers' fleets: both carriers operate the same type of aircraft, the number
and type of which being given. There is no constraint from the fleet on the routing quality
decision of the airline and it is also supposed that the immobilization
cost of the aircraft
and the airport utilization cost are null. There is no aircraft capacity constraints (aircraft are
supposed to never be 100 % full).

1.2. Demand

and Yield Functions

The carrier's yield is an additive function of the yield obtained on each O-D
is of course equal to the price paid by every traveler on the market times
passengers carried. As the whole demand is served by the two carriers,
passengers on O-D market i-j can be written as the total demand on i-j, Qij,
market

share

Furthermore,

on i-j,

MS_

(or MSijB) with

MS_j+MsiB=I

to ensure that the price paid by the traveller

and 0___ MSi_,MS

will depend

B <1.

on the O-D market

t Underthe assumption that the travelers preferdirect to connectingflights, ceteris paribus.
3

market, which
the number of
the number of
times A (B) 's

length,it will be supposed
thatthe pricevariable,the valueof whichis chosenby the
carriersat the secondstageof the game,is the unit priceperkilometer.Consequently,
carrierA'syieldfunctioncanbewrittenasZ:
rl

rl

A A
_'_,Qi/'MSij-Pij-dij
i=l

j=l

j*i
where dij is the great-circle
The market
and PATij:

distance

share on market

(in km) between

i and j.

i-j is written as a logit function

of the strategic

variables,

Pij

exp(a+ b.p_+ c.FATiA)

MS (p 'pB'pAT

'PATexp(a
)=+ b.p_ + c.PATi_)+exp(a+ b.p_j+ c.PATip)

(2)

where b<0, c>0.
The travelers are supposed to prefer (ceteris paribus) direct to connecting
prices: therefore parameter c is positive and b is negative.

flights and low

1.3. Cost function
The operating cost function is equal to the sum of the operating costs born by the carrier on
each segment served by a (direct) flight. Following Pavaux (1984), the latter is a function
of the distance flown and of the number of passengers aboard:
Cij = (x + 13.dij + `/.(number of passengers),

with a, 13,Y> 0

The two first terms (ct + 13.dij) can be interpreted as the cost to bear for installing capacity
K on link i-j (where K is the seat capacity of an aircraft), bom at the first stage of the game,
while the last term, "/.(number of passengers), can be interpreted as a production cost, born
at the second stage of the game. In other respects_ the independence of the first terms from
the production cost ensures that the cost function exhibits both link economies of scale to
the number of passengers (economies of density) and economies of scope, as it is usually
the case in air transport.
The number of passengers on board, hence the cost born on a segment,
network pattern. For carrier A (for example), it equals to:
EQikMSAk.( 1 -PATik)+QiH^.MSiH^
A

A

on linkiH A, i_:H A

depends

on the

(3a)

k

and

PATi_.Qij.MS

_ on link ij, ijail A

(3b)

2 To avoid redundancy,given the symmetry between the two airlines, only carrierA's equations will be
mentioned, except when carrierB's are of interest in themselves.
4

Carrier
C h

A's total cost

=

Z
o_ +
i_eH ^

+ E

_.diH

is therefore
^

+

to:

A

y.(_Qik.MSik.(l-

A+

PATik )

A

QiHA.MSiH^)

k

a +[3.dH,

(4)

A
A
%.MSu.(1PA_A) + Q.^;MS.^)

j +y.C_

j;tH A

+ E

equal

]

Z PA_'.(_ + _.d_j+ _.Q_j.MS_)

i_H ^ j_H ^

Finally,

carrier A's maximization

Max
A

A

_A
•

=

•

n

A

Ad

_

j*H ^

,l,j=l..n

- x

X PA'r_'.(,_+I3.d_j+r.Q_;MS_)

ittH A j.H

with

is the following:

Z.,X,Q,j.Ms,j.p,j.
,j ,..^X
o+,,.A
'- x +,.^, +,czQ,j
Ms¢<,-PAT,
f)+%^jM%?
n

p,j ,PA_i

program

^

Vi d = 1..n, l#j:

(5)

(PATiA,PATi_) e {0, l}2
(Pu,,
,PijB) e

2. PRICE
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A*

EQUILIBRIA
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the
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expression

as a parameter.
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Then

is solved
as each

the

solving

hence

for the second

prices

of the

where

first

the equilibrium
deriving

variable

at least

carrier's

it first

equilibrium

by simply

in the price

so long

by solving

of the

of the PAT variables,

to be concave

Consequently,
given

PATTERN
game

(price):

The

p.2

market

share

the

stage

game

of the whole

profit

function,

for pertinent
is non

the

null,

values

stage

variable

routing

quality

produces

the

game.
since
of this

the equilibrium

it can

be "

variable.
price

is

by:

y. (2 - PATi_

Pij =

)

I
b.(l- MSijA (Pij))
A*

dij

(6)

whcrc thc starcxponcnt denotes equilibriumvalues.
The case when

MSi_ = 0 (or MS_

equal to zero when

= 0) isa limitcase, since the market share can only bc

the price become

infinite(MSA---->0 whcn

A
+oo). The
Pij''>

price

variablewill thercforcbc supposed to takc only finitepositivevalucs.
As the PAT

variablecan only take two values,the corresponding sub-gamc willbc solved

using thc normal form of the gamc, whcrc the payoffs arc the incrcmcntal profits(which is
differentfrom the profitas dcfincd abovc). Thc incremcntal profitobtaincd on amarkct

is

thc diffcrcnccbctwccn thc yicld obtained on itand the incrcmcntal cost,which isthc part
of thc opcrating cost only attributablcto the market under consideration.This notion

avoids double counts of joint costs. The hypothesis according to which iHA or HAi (ill B or
Hbi) -type markets are served by direct flights only makes it possible to write the
incremental cost (or profit) on market i-j: for any connecting flight on this market, the cost
of installing capacities on segment iH^ (for example) can be attributed to O-D market iH A,
even when it is a joint cost; it is then possible to attribute to each market the part of'the cost
that varies with the number of passengers carried. More precisely, the incremental profit
obtained

_

by carrier A on return O-D market i-j, i,j ¢ H A is noted

n_ and equals:

--2"{QijMSi_'(P_dij-T)-(a+[3dij)}

wheni-j

is served direct ( PATi_ =l)

= 2.QijMS_.(p_d_

when i-j is served via H A (PATi_ =0 )

(7a)

or

_

2.1. Solving

- 2_,)

(7b)

the PAT sub-game

As the solving of the price sub-game is quite straight-forward,
we shall pass directly to the
solving of the routing sub-game; details can be found in Molin (1997). As noted above, the
first stage game is solved using the normal form of the game with incremental profits as
pay-offs (Cf. table I). The values of the incremental
profits in table l's ceils were
computed for every possible pattern values and given the equilibrium
by the solving of the second period sub-game.

prices as produced

The analysis that follows only deals with i-j type markets (i,j_HA,HB), which does not
involve hubs, since by hypothesis the markets from or to a hub are served direct by the
hubbing carrier. The i-H A and i-H B cases appear as degenerated cases of the general subgame applying to the i-j markets; consequently the solving of the game is focusing only on
the i-j markets, as the results obtained on i-j include those that can be obtained on the i-H A
and i-H 8 markets. In practical terms, considering the i-H A market (for example) amounts to
restricting table 1 to a one line (since by hypothesis
column table.

there is no case when PATIO^ =0) - two

.............

-

-.._

:

....

Table

1 : Normal

form

of the routing

quality

game
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Carrier

i-j direct

2Qijdij
b

•

( PATif = I)
Carrier

B

( PATiB = 1 )

i-j via H a ( PA'i'i_ = 0 )

2Qijdij

MSi_

b

MSij

- 2(ct + [Mij) = Yij ;

• ZQijdij -2(c_ +13dij ) = Xij ;
b

i-j direct

2(a + 13dij)

duopoly)

2Qijdij
b

Xij

where

A

MSB
A = ZiJ
MSij
PATi_ =I=I-PATi

B

and
2Qijdij
b
i-j via H A
2Qijdij
b

( PATiA = 0)
where
MS_

The

equilibrium

values
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and Z<X'
possible

is characterised

and

- 2Qijdij
b

= X'ij

,_

MSA - 2(cc + IMij) = Yijj
in

MSijB ( MSijA <, V2< MSijB ).

profit.
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for

Omitting

Y and Z, Y and

(PATi A ,PATiB),

ij indices,

we know

according
that:

X', X and Z is unclear.

to the

X<Y,

There

X<X'
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(1) Y<X'
which

"_
X'ij'

b

B
MSij

by various

between

2Qijdij

MSB = zij ;

PATi_ = 0 = l - PATiB

for the incremental

but the order

(

MSA

""

produces

one Nash

Each
yield

carrier
will prefer
from direct service

direct

service).

equilibrium

in pure strategies:

(PATIO'

= PATi_

to offer connecting
service on market i-j rather
(the larger yield cannot compensate
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The cost factor

is the driving

force of each carrier's

pattern

= 0);
than get a larger
cost because of
decision.

(2) Z < X
which
Each
savings

produces
carrier
owing

one Nash

prefers

equilibrium

offering

to connecting

direct
service

in pure strategies:
service

on market

(the cost

savings

(PATi] _ = 1; PATi] _ = 1).
i-j rather than

benefiting

are not high enough

from

cost

to compensate

3. The case when Z < X < Y < X' is not relevant here since it can be shown that (Z < X) _ (X" < Y).

in

the lower yield stemming from connecting
each carrier's pattern decision.

flights). The yield factor

is the driving force of

(3) X < Z and X' < Y
This

twofold

condition

(PATi_ = 0;PATi_
mixed strategies,

= 1) and

two

Nash

equilibria

(PAT_A = 1;PATi] _ = 0);

_+

1
_

to

where each carrier "plays"

Y - X'
_

leads

=-+

(

in

pure

strategies:

there is one Nash equilibrium

PATij = 1 with probability

(inferior

in

to ½):

13dij
MsB(0], _

(vector

(3

indicates

the values

taken

by

tJ hi][

PATer
andPAJ inthe
computation
ofthe
co=esponding
market
sh_es)
In this case, carrier A and B's (expected)
X'-Y

-X+

X-Z

incremental
y

=

profits on market i-j equal:

2.(¢t + 13dij)

'_J
=x-z+x.-,,,
x-7.+
x.-,,,_s0(:)_s,_(o,)

(_)

Each carrier prefers avoiding head-on competition
with its rival, which explains its own
indifference between the two possible patterns. Its strategy can be viewed as an "avoiding
strategy', and is reminiscent of the maximal differentiation
strategy in the duopoly with
product differentiation,
to avoid direct price competition.

2.2. Synthetic

Representation

Each of the three equilibrium

of the Network

conditions is expressed

distance parameters and variables. The study
that can easily be represented on a graph.
Let fand

Pattern Solutions

g be as follows (omitting

as a function of the cost, demand and

of these functions

b

reduced

forms

the ij indices):

_=x.-,,= ct + 13d4 Q_Ms,,(.)-_'(o')
2

produces

MSB(_)

(9)

._

and:

x-z Q,_
_"(_)_B(o')
.
g = ""7

=

b

MSA(_)

-I,¢z +13d)= -f + Qd

{_s"(0_'%')}_
.s_(:).s.(_) (10)

The conditions for Case 1 (PAT ^ = PAT B = 0) are met when f is positive; the conditions for
Case 2 (PAT A= PAT 8 = l) are met when g is positive. Finally, when both f and g are
negative, the equilibrium situation corresponds to Case 3 (PAT A= 1-PATB).

Whenthestructuralparameters
(typeof aircraftanddemandsplit function)aregiven,the
emergence
of oneof the threepossibleNashequilibriadependson the valueof two
variables:
total O-Dtraffic,Q, andO-Ddistance,
d.In orderto determine
theportionsof
the(Q,d)planecorresponding
to eachNashequilibrium,wedefinethefunctionsQrandQg
of d,suchthatf(Qf,d) v_ 0 and g(Qg, d) = 0. As Qr is always inferior to Qg, the zone where
f> 0 is always below the Qr curve, while the portion of the plane where g > 0 is always
above the Qg curve. Easy but laborious calculations (Cf. Molin, 1997) lead to the following
graph (figure 1):
Figure 1: Synthetic

representation

CASE
k

CASE

1;

(g >0,
3:_",.,.

f<0)

(yield max. strategy)

",.,.{g < 0. f < 0)

...............

(g <0, f> O)

•

pattern strategies

2: PAT*=PAI'a=I

_
CASE

-b_

of the equilibrium

_

__.,_o=dmg

strategy)

................................................................
qf
'd

It should be noted that according to intuition, for given O-D distances, the higher the O-D
traffic levels, the more liable a carrier is to offer direct flights rather than connecting
flights. However, for given O-D traffic levels, the shorter the distance, the more the carriers
tend to offer connecting services, which is counter-intuitive.
This is due to the relative
variation with distance of BPrices and market shares when PATA=PATB=0 compared to
when PAT A= 1 = 1-PAT . When distance .decreases, the increase in carrier A's uiled
compesnates the decrease in its market share all the more when it chooses PATA=0 than
when it chooses PA'I'A=I as its rival chooses PATB=0. See Molin (1997) for more
explanations.
Figure

1 allows

a discussion

patterns at equilibrium,

2.3. Application:

on the market

and more especially

Conditions

conditions

hub-and-spoke

for Hub-and-Spoke

for such and such air network
networks.

Netnvorks at Equilibrium

In this paragraph, we analyse the conditions on total O-D passenger traffic levels (Q) and
O-D length (d) to have both carriers choose the hubbing network pattern at equilibrium. In
accordance with the European air transport industry, we only consider the case when the
potential hubs, H A and HB, are located on different airports. For the sake of simplicity, it
will be supposed that carrier A's hub, Ha, corresponds to point n and carrier B's hub, H a, to
point n-1 (H A ;e Ha).

Generalized
hub-and-spoke
networksappear
atequilibriumwhen(with H h
on markets

A*

i-j, i,j_HA,H B, we have

PAT_t^H 8 = PATB_HB = 0 (Case 1),

on markets i-H A, i#HA,H a, we have
on markets

= 1=1- PATIO*B (degenerated

case of Case 3),

i-H B, i#HA,H B, we have PATi_ _ = 0 =1- PATIO*B (degenerated

case of Case 3),

on market H A -H a, we have
The profits obtained
_A

:g: HB):

PATi_,

PATt_;Ft. = PAT_HB

= 1 (Case 2).

by carriers A and B equal:

=

-2J

,""-''"'-"
+_,_-w "-z_(.Q,._,._ox,:,[,:,(,,:..^(.)-p_.,,(:)l+_]+(_,+_d,.,.
n-2n-2t_..rl
i-lj=l

i=l

..

b

))

[
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/

/+
(

11-2

/

A*
i:l

o

_

B*

o

+

/

J

D
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lgB
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..°_ o

+
r n-_,-2,')..,-,
,_" ',.. n- '

(+/

n_.2( QiH^diHA

exp[b(PiH^(o)B*

, _PiH^(o))A*'

The two carriers have hub-and-spoke
represented on figure 2 are met:
Figure

QI

2 : Conditions
(the carriers

_

--¢_

+

networks

(QHAH_

HAH'

at equilibrium

when

for general hubbing at equilibrium
have distinct hub locations)

PA'_=PAI"e=I

.....................

.P_,_.=I._.A._....._.
i-_ links, i=1..n-2,

Qg

-I-I
8 links, i=l..n-2

...........................................

Qf

-d

I0

))}

+(Ct+I_dH^HB

the

conditions

Thecitiesservedwith connectingflights only arelow densitymarkets;the longerthe
distancebetweenthem,thethinnertheirtraffic levels.Conversely,
thecitiesservedwith
directflightsonly shouldcorrespond
to highdensitymarkets,thedensitybeinghigheras
O-Ddistanceis low. As theflightsbetweenthehubsthemselves
aresupposed
direct,the
hubairportsshouldbesuchthattheygenerate
highleveltraffic,whichis thecageof the
"natural"hubsin Europethatformthebasisof theflagcarriers.
Furthermore,
to obtain generalized
hubbingat equilibrium,theremust alsobe some
marketswherethe mixed situationprevails(PATA=I-PATB):
this situationcan be
interpretedas an unstableequilibrium,i.e. the competitivesituationwheretwo rival
carrierschoose the hub-and-spoke pattems might correspond to an unstable equilibrium.
This result (equilibrium
in mixed strategies) is a consequence
of the model's structure,
where the competing carriers are supposed to simultaneously
choose their network pattern.
The mixed strategies can be seen as reflecting each firm's uncertainty
about its rival's
choice. Consequently,
the hub-and-spoke
pattern can also appear as one of the best
equilibrium pattern of an air carrier when faced with uncertainty.
Finally a last result
empty) intermediary

of the model should be noted: because
zone (equilibrium
in mixed strategies

carriers - that were supposed
equilibrium.

III. EMPIRICAL

TEST

to be symmetric

- choose

of the existence of the (nonwhere PAT A= I-PATB), the
asymmetric

network

pattern

at

OF THE MODEL

The empirical work is currently being carried out on American data. An updated and
complete version of the paper will be provided when results are available.
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the gross valuation
exceeds
the sum of price
3We
distance
a flight
capture

preferred
departure
and schedule
delay

thus make the assumption that the utility lo_s caused by taking a flight at a time
x earlier than the preferred departure time is equal to the utility loss caused by taking
at x later than the preferred departure time. The term 'schedule delay cost' is meant to
both types of utility loss.

cost,

the

traveler

Potential

buys

a ticket.

travelers

are distributed

uniformly

with

respect

to desired

time on a circular
market
of (time) lenght
L = 1 and density
times of flights are also located
on this circle: we consider
the
flights

i and

Potential

i q- 1, t_ and

passengers

face a time

who are 'located'

distance

x with

(H - x) with respect
utilities
or consumer

Clearly,

are separated

at some preferred

to the departure

v,

=

V-p,-gx

vi+l

=

v-P_+l-O(H-x)

will

expressions
and buy
distance
Xb between
as that

respect

which

choose

the

departure

Xb+ =

H.

x E (0, H)

i and a distance
the

following

net

(2.1)

flight

vi = v1+1. This

time

derive

belonging

to the

a ticket if the net utility is positive.
ti and the boundary
between
the

x for which

departure
times of

by a headway

time t_ of flight

to t¢+1. These potential'passengers
surplus from the two options:

a consumer

flights

t_+l respectively,

departure

D. The
departure

larger

of the

above

We can now derive
market
areas of the

the
two

gives

Pi+l - Pi "1"OH
20

(2.2)

All potential
passengers
located
between
ti and xb+ will take flight i, if they fly at
all, and those located
between
Xb+ and t_+l will choose flight i + 1, again, if they
fly at all.
When
gate

potential

demand

preferred
passengers

passengers

is elastic,

departure
over

can decide

total

times

demand

later

all preferred

than

not

from

departure

times

s (Pl + 0x) is the share of potential
to arrive at total demand
for flight
passengers

of qi_ is similar
demand

for flight

with

preferred

to the

one

departure
used

i from

ti can be obtained

q,+ = D fo x*+ s(p,
where
order

to take

for flight

x between

the

trip,

i.e.,

potential
by adding
ti and

when

aggre-

passengers

with

the

number

of

xb+, giving

"+ Ox)dx

(2.3)

passengers
that
do decide
to fly. In
i, qi, we have to include
the demand
times

earlier

for qi+ outlined

than

above. 4

t_, q__. The

derivation

Therefore,

aggregate

i is
q_ (Pi,Pi-I,P_+1,

H)

=D f_b+_ 8(p,+Ox)

4In the same way, there exists a location Xb- which marks the boundary

(2.41
between the market

Clearly,the specification
of this demandfunction
2.1.1.

departures

The

airline

while

'friendly

expression

depends
for each

two

airline

we call two

for the market

are

boundary

which

of the departures.
With
for both the earlier and

neighbours

demand

faces

X b_

_-

Xb+

=

for flight

as completely

is derived

using

the

case

P_-1 -P_

of

_-

Xb+

=

of completeness,

neighbours),
flight

Xb-

i and

an

earlier

flight

_ A departure

(2.4).

We refer to this type

of a 'semi-competitive'
i - 1 and one
price of flight

flight

i ,

friendly
neighbour
i. Therefore,
this

+gH

p_ - p_ + 0H
28
that

1 at time

--

H
2

(2.6)

for a non-competitive

is derived
i -

airline.

2t_

we note

demand

q

(2.5)

equation

In the

using

function

P_+I - P_ + OH
2t_

competitive.

is derived

per flight

20

boundaries

sake

and

-'- P, + OH

type

unfriendly

by one

boundaries

neighbour
equals
the

For the

operated

as 'un-

an interlaced
configuration,
the later departure
(i_ 1 and

by a competing
market

i.e., a flight with only one unfriendly
i + 1, the price of the latter
always
of demand

flights

departures

Xb in the demand

set non-cooperatively

unfriendly

to such

neighbouring

P,-1

of flight

l; we refer

neighbours'.

on the configuration
departure
i the price

i+1 respectively)

areas

results.

equilibrium.
There are three possibilities:
del may have either two, one or zero neighbouring

by a competing

neighbours',

same

i with

the multiproduct
by an airline

offered

friendly

from

for the

Configurations

We now consider
parture
i operated

the

is crucial

from
t,_ ,,

the

market

flight
boundaries

(with
Xb-

no
=

with

P,- 1 - P_+ OH_
Xb-

=

20

SNore that in case of a duopoly the price of both competing departures
thermore, each airline sets one and the same price for all its tickets.

is the same.

Fur-

H

xb+ = ¥. We conclude
demand
is more price
For the
a monopoly
hand, there
friendly
these

market

that for any demand
specification,
completely
sensitive
than semi-competitive
demand.

as a whole,

we can now

market,
all departures
are
is the completely
interlaced

neighbours.
extremes•

Of course,

The

range

there

distinguish

between

competitive

two extremes.

In

o_dre.d by the same airline;
on the other
equilibrium,
in which all flights have unare

of configurations

many

possible

implies

petition,
monopoly
and oligopoly
become
relative
We consider
two configurations
in figure 1.

configurations

that

with

multiproduct

rather

than

absolute

between
comconcepts.

A

(la)
A symmeWi¢ completely
intedac, ed duopoly
configuration

B
A
A

B

(tb)
A slishtly asymmctriu noninterlaced
duopoly
configuration

Figure I: Multiproduct configurations
The

firstconfiguration in figure 1 is a completely interlaced duopoly. When

a duopolist analyzes the effect of a small increase in departure frequency, he

necessarily
figure
2.2.

considers

lb,
Cost

For each
c per

a 'slightly

all non-symmetric
and

asymmetric'

duopoly

configuration.

configurations

flight,

costs

consist

6 Revenue

of a (major)

fixed

per departure

part

the

total

all flights

number

of flights

for this

firm

and

a small

profit

marginal

for departure

cost
i is
(2.7)

FC

of a particular

are given

FC

is pq, so that

ri = 09_ - c)qi -

over

in

profit

passenger.

When

As is illustrated

are non-interlaced.

airline

l is fl,

aggregate

profits

by

fl

II, = _

(2.s)

[09i - c)qi - FC]

i=1

3. Market
The

model

game

analyzes

frequency

in an airline

in the

second

As usual
price

equilibria

duopoly.

stage,

in such

solution

each

airline

a model,

first

and

and

the

using

frequency
choice.
A stylized
representation
the

following

pay-off

decisions

stage,

chooses

a price

solution
this

of the

solution
first

the

symmetric
previous

the first

and

choices.

by calculating

calculation

frequency

of a two-stage
a frequency

frequency

backwards

in the

stage

outcome
chooses

of the

competition

first

the
stage

is given

by

air line 1
choice
low

outlined

in

high

2

cases
section

airline

given

is derived

high
The

as the

each

matrix.

frequency
airline

price

In the first

(l'I_ow, IIhiah)

on the
that

diagonal

aggregate

are
demand

a dividing
for airline

(nh,_h,
line.

YIh,t_h)

It has been

1 becomes

less price

elastic

6Fixed flight costs depend on aircraft capacity (type) k. Aircraft choice is mainly determined
by the distance flown. Given the stage length of the city-pair market under consideration,
k
may be assumed constant.

7

whenthis airlinehasmoreflightsthanits competitor,i.e.,whentheconfiguration
becomes
side
side

non-interlaced.

The

is that

The profit
1 are

two,

the

function

form

of each

airline

]'1 (Pl -

121

=

(fl-/'2)(p_-c)q,c+f_(pl-c)q==-f_FC

profit

is relevant

function

= f_, the
In order

distinguish

of airline

for one
two parts
to derive

between

In the

next

a ticket

3.1.

Inelastic

and

others

and

elastic

the

investigate

resulting

the question
equilibrium.
3.1.1.

Price

As has been
game

depends

7Note that
interlacing.

consists

the same

of two

that

(1994).
In the

for the

changes
parts.

Profits

f_>_f2

(3.2)

when

the first

other.

Only

when

give the same value.
to the specification
of demand.
demand

aggregate

market

at

]'1 < ]'2 (3.1)

form. 7 Clearly,

is relevant

aggregate

in the

We

following

demand

sec-

is inelastic,

In other words, the reservation
value
case of elastic demand,
some consumers

not to fly.

fly and

we thus

qi+ = D
We now

function

hand

left hand

demand

In this case, all consumers
simplifies
to

and

profit

right

on the

if

second

we assume

decide

on the

if

the

e.g. as in Bensaid
and de Palma
is so high as to be never binding.
buy

airlines'

profit function
we now turn

inelastic

pairs

for the pairs

therefore

2 has exactly

of the
results,

holds

fife

airline,

section,

same

of the

=

line

c)q0o -

the

H1

The

tions.

is the case for the frequency

For airline

implication

]'1 -- f2.
of airline

fl

This

of the diagonal.
of the diagonal.

whether

ldx

the equilibrium

equilibrium

have

a symmetric

and

in (2.3)

= Dx_.

frequency

configuration.

s (p_ + Ox) = 1. Demand

and

(3.3)
price

In particular,

interlaced

choices

of the airlines

we are

frequency

choice

interested
emerges

in
as an

equilibrium
outlined

in the previous

on the configuration

section,

the solution

of departures:

the form of the profit function

to the second

in a symmetric

is dictated

and

by the assumption

stage

price

thus

inter-

of maximal

laced

configuration,

duopoly

pricing

configuration,

We consider
to the

problem

is competitive

at least

the

two

solutions

for each

for all departures.

departures

for the

price

are
game,

In a non-symmetric

friendly

neighbours.

i.e.,

simultaneous

the

solution

airline
max

1-It (P,,P-t,

ft, f-t)

l = 1, 2

(3.4)

Pi

Like

the profit

function,

the

profit

maximizing

price

(2ft
+f2)o _"
(f_
+2f_)o
p*_
3S_(S,+f_) _
p_ = cc +
+ 312(It+12)
We define
prices

d -- fl - f2 _> 0 and

write

the

consists

of two parts:

fl > .[2

difference

(3.5)

between

the profit

=

Clearly,
that

in the

with

however,

symmetric

]'1 >- f2, the
increases

(f, - A) o

departure
profit

dO

3f2 (fl + f2)

3f2 (fl + f2)

solution,

maximizing

in ]'1. The latter

the

price

is quite

ticket

of airline

intuitive,

fares

3.1.2.

Frequency

stage

price

HI

II2
profit

=

solutions

for fl

P_,

these price solutions
choice game.

(2fl+(fi
3f2

both

Therefore,

we may

of airline

profit

+f2)f2)O (

already

a likely

-d" f2) +
3f (71:i-

+

equilibrium.

decreases

strictly

conclude

f_l+d)
+ f2

- f, FC

(3.6)

-/2FC

2 strictly

functions

the
the

_> f2.

f2 f---_-_2

function

is not

in f2.

'monopolisation'

found in the previous
section
are now used to derive
We consider the profit functions
of both airlines given

f20

thermore,
uration,

the

We note

equilibrium

The price solutions
frequency
equilibrium.
second

are equal.

2 p_ decreases

because

of the market
by firm 1 increases
in fl (for fl > f2). With
in terms of frequency
choices,
we now turn to the frequency

The

maximizing

as

that
The

(3.7)

in its own flight

increase

in the

]'1 = f2, a symmetric
equilibrium

frequency.

frequency

frequency

Fur-

difference

d.

interlaced

config-

difference

clearly

dependson
with
choice
sponse
say

the

fixed

a maximal

costs

per

frequency

flight

is a 'minimal'
frequency.
of airline 2 is to minimize

1 flight,
Airline

quency
solving

FC.

difference

If these

would

would

prevail.

be zero,

For

For each value of fl
frequency.
We refer

firm

an equilibrium

2, the

equilibrium

(with fl _> f_),
to this minimum

the best refrequency,

as fmia. s
i chooses

chosen

the

profit

by airline

maximizing

2. The

equilibrium

frequency

given

frequency

the

minimum

for airline

fre-

1 f" is found

2D (2f ° + f_,)
0 = FC
9 (f* -[- f_i_) a

by

(3.8)

The left hand side of the above expression
decreases
in f. If we let FC be the
value of FC for which f* = f_.
is the solution
to (3.8), we may conclude
the
following.
Proposition
tic demand,
have

a symmetric

equiIibrium
are

3.1.
The two-stage
exogenous
interlacing

(f',

fm_)

The
atively

equilibrium

with

f_

and

fixed

two identical
are equilibria.
The

for FC

= f_ = from.

(f_o,f')

proposition
high

equilibrium

the

the

(FC

< F---C. For FC

For

where

states
costs

firms,

game o[ [requency
and
and ma.rimal
product

f"

is the

maximal
> ]_/_)

differ

airline,
say airline
1, earns a higher
symmetric
equilibrium
both airlines

on

a classic

example

frequency

between

the

theory

the

1, each

Slf the airline further decreases

is a symmetric
equilibria

to (3.8).
difference

result:

both
two

(f*, fmin)

firms:

only

for rel-

is possible.

the

and
high

With

(f_io,

f*)

frequency

airline 2. In a
for FC < -F-C,

1 raises its own profit,
while it lowers the
of the frequency
choice game is therefore

in game

airline

with inelasdoes not

asymmetric

profit than the low frequency
earn the same profit.
However,

(Osborne
and Rubinstein,
the positive
payoffs
are

in figure

two

equilibrium

unique:

'Bach or Strawinsky'
In this case, however,
matrix

>_ -F-C, there

the

solution

is not

an increase
in the frequency
of airline
profit of airline 2. The pay-off structure
a variation

< FC,

a symmetric

equilibrium

payoffs

FC

price choice
differentiation

wants

named

'Battle

of the

to choose

'low'

when

the

frequency, it ceases to operate in the market.

10

Sexes'

or

1994) in a gender neutral
version.
not on the diagonal:
referring
to
competitor

chooses'high' andviceversa,but both wouldratherhavethe high frequency.
°
Just

as in BoS

there

pay-off.
Finally,

we note

tion

number

in the

are
the

two pure

equilibria,

each

between

the

of (maximal)

similarity

of products

(monoproduct)
differentiation.
model of two-stage
duopoly
(1979) show that
maximal.
Firms

strategy

derived

Note

In a model

of vertical

that

the

choice

product

The latter
two models
is driven by the price

In the present
occur,

frequency
ever, the
remains.
3.2.
We

Elastic
now

necessarily

model,

except
choice
result

results

asymmetric
differentia-

in two-stage

models

First of all,'using
quadratic
transport
costs
competition
in location
and price, d'Aspremont

of location

differentiation

(1982) derive a maximal
differentiation
costless
to produce);
this equilibrium

not

result

and

an

of

in the
et al.

in the unique
equilibrium,
product
(location)
differentiation
is
move away from each other's
location
in order to soften price

competition.

tical.
result

here

with

when

does

not

or quality

involve
choice,

costs

for the

Shaked

and

result too (despite
the fact that quality
is
is, however,
not unique when firms are iden-

have in common
that the (maximal)
competition
in the second stage.

maximal
fixed

costs

as the number
of differentiation

firm.

Sutton

differentiation

in the

per product

are zero.

of products,
causing

number

differentiation
of products

As we are

this assumption
an asymmetric

dealing

does
with

is not realistic.
Howfrequency
equilibrium

demand

turn

to the

buy

elastic

a ticket

and

is that,

demand

model,

investigate
even

where

how. the

using

all potential

above

is

equilibria
to confine
and then

in the above model become analytically
untractable.
Therefore,
we have
ourselves
to pointing
out some properties
of the elastic
demand
model
illustrate
the results
with numerical
solutions.

does

not

analytically,

have

this

property.

we derive

While

an expression

9In the BoS game, two people want
Their main concern, however, is to go
Tile game is now 'Bach and Stravinsky'
musical taste want to avoid seeing each

of elastic

passengers

A problem

of the
airline.

specifications

derived

affected.

One of the important
properties
frequency
derivative
for the second

simple

not

equilibrium

inelastic
model is the
The elastic demand

we cannot
for the

present

derivative

strictly
model,

the

reaction

of the

profit

demand,

negative
however,
functions
function

of

to go to a concert together, but have different tastes.
out together.
In our case, the pay-offs have shifted.
and describes the case where two people with identical
other at a concert.
11

the 'lowfrequency'airline
the first order
condition
hold at all for the second
We consider
the

profit

the

function

with respect

to frequency.

profit

function

of the

first

order

respect

'low frequency'

is then

whether

to frequency

airline.

may

For this

airline

is now
H, = f_ ((p* - c) q(p',

The

The question

for profit maximization
with
or 'low frequency'
airline.

condition

for the

airline

fL + f-,)

- Re)

(3.9)

is then

=

q+

-c/--

+

J

---

(p*-c)

(q(p*,f,q-f-t)÷

f, O_f)-FC

k

The

latter

simplification

quency

change

follows

it is evaluated

zero.
longer

vd

follows

on the

from

equilibrium
at the

the

price

profit

envelope

cancels

term

in brackets

demand

structures,

fore,

the

result

with

elastic

second

Proposition
tic demand,
frequency'

first

/.n the two-stage

exogenous

(see

order

price

p* and

of a freterm

therefore

that

equal

to

positive

for particular

for details).
choice

for profit

There-

no longer

maximization

holds
for the

equilibrium.

of frequency

maximal

condition

effect

bracketed

appendix
frequency

condition

game
and

is strictly

of the

order

the

the

the

in a symmetric

interlacing

first

for profit

and price

product

choice

with

differentiation,

maximization

with

the

elas'low

respect

to

is no longer strictly
negative
and can be satisfied
in a symmetTherefore,
a symmetric
equilibrium
may exist depending
on the
and

the values

of the demand

the profit derivative
it can be shown that

frequency

importance

of price
is relatively

increases
in the

in 0. The

utility

and

cast

parameters.

in (3.10) decreases
in the fixed flight cost
the product
of the two terms in brackets

profit
derivative
(3.10) increases
words,
the marginal
profitability

equilibrium
demand

the

3.2.

structure

Obviously,
Furthermore,
thus the
In other

while

theorem:

for the 'low frequency'
airline is no
value of FC and on the sign of the

latter

differentiation

be satisfied

airline's

The

demand

may

frequency
choice
ric equilibrium.
demand

linear

of maximal

demand

airline

in (3.10).

e.g.

(3.10)

because

maximizing

Thus,
the sign of the profit derivative
strictly
negative,
but depends
on the

second

=0

j

function

low.
12

in "the schedule
of each flight
intuition
is small

is that
and

FC.
and

inconvenience
cost 0.
increases,
so that
the
for high
thus

price

8, the

relative

elasticity

of

4. A simulation
We

illustrate

linear
has

the

demand
the

where

model
above

model.

general

by

presenting

demand

model

some

is baked

best

parameter.

ing first

the

for each

set of frequency

in the first stage
attention
to the
values

price

The

responses

frequency

equilibria

of the

duopolists

Then

we calculated

choices.

in the

parameters

- Maastricht

quantity

first

order

the

have

been

Before
used

here

and

route

frequency

conditions

cost

is a KLM

1996

First

wage')

crude
of all,

average

so that

0 ar/d the
we should
parameters

we constructed

a price

of a number

of full fare

stage

of the game
responses

paying

special

the

model

The calibrating
pro(1994).
At present,

Therefore,

observations

/ 1997 have

been

with

to price

respect

substituted
and

density

D.
the calibration

obtained

represent

for a one-way
classes.

ticket

We obtained

procedure
an order
the

average

of 20 per flight from the CBS statistics,
at a frequency
day. We did not dispose of actual
cost data.
Therefore,

imposed

an arbitrary

marginal

passenger

of demand

per flight

monopoly

situation

are respectively

cost

of Hfl 25,- and

with

respect

eq,p = -1.14

to price
and

a fixed
and

of

of Hfl 206,-

of passengers
on a typical

Hfl 2000,- .10
The elasticities

fre-

and the demand
function,
we
the intercept
c_, the schedule

say that

the

by calculat-

number
5 flights

the

a

and

frequency
while

market.
Strandenes

maximization

to the results,

is rather

as a weighted

using
(1987)

by calibrating

monopoly.

for the years

for profit

(or 'shadow

proceeding

magnitude.

best

found

quency for a monopolist.
Using these two conditions
were able to solve for the unknown
parameters,
viz.,
inconvenience

are derived

of the game to obtain
the Nash equilibrium
role of the schedule
inconvenience
cost 0.

of the model

Amsterdam

for price,

results,
et al.

in the second

using actual
data for the Amsterdam
- M_stricht
cedure
is similar
to the one used by Norman
and
the

simulation

on Greenhut

form

_ is a demand

The

results

This

flight

cost

frequency

eq,! = -0.45.11

of
we
of
for

Using

1°This fixed flight cost implies an approximate
cost of 15 dollar cent per ASM. This cost
figure is more than twice as high as the figure for US airlines using a B737-100 on average stage
lenghts of around 500 miles. The cost difference may be justified because of the much smaller
stage length of 132 miles and the smaller aircraft, viz., the BA /46 (64 seats).
11The elasticity of demand over all departures
w.r.t,
frequency is positive, 0.55, in the
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thesefiguresfor themonopolysituation,wesolveforthedemandparameters.An
overview

of the

parameters

used

in the

base simulation

is given

in the

table

below.

Table 1:
simulation
coefficients
calibrated
a

parameters
487.42

0

83.33

D

0.023

exogenous
c

parameters
25

FC
4.1.

Simulation

results

Identical

airlines

4.1.1.
Using

these

lated

airline

parameters
duopoly

in the

as indicated

above,

price

increase

relative

price

elasticity

a higher
itability
latter

also

holds

metry

both
in the

two

schedule
and

price

identical

model,

In equilibrium,
total

number

inconvenience
therefore

we have

airlines.

The

both

airlines

of flights

cost.

When

the oligopolists

simu-

frequency

and

operate
the

equi-

0 increases,

the

are able

to charge

frequency
choice).
This implies
an increase
in the
flight, and thus to higher equilibrium
frequencies.

for decreases

of equilibrium

frequency

the equilibrium

decreases

changes

stage
between

case is symmetric.
fare of Hfl 182,-.

price (for each
of the marginal

However,

two

competition

equilibrium
of this base
3 flights each at a ticket
librium

2000

in the
too.

in the

fixed

parameters

As explained

flight

0 and FC
in the

cost

FC.

may

previous

profThe

have

an effect

sections,

on the sym-

an important

fea-

ture
may

of the model
is that it allows for asymmetric
frequency
choices.
Asymmetry
occur for various
reasons:
with identical
airlines,
asymmetric
configurations

may

occur

due

price.
It may
the competitor;
monopoly

to the

depressing

effect

of extra

be more profitable
for an airline
this confers
monopoly
power

regime.
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departures

on

the

equilibrium

to choose a smaller
frequency
than
to the competitor
which raises the

equilibrium
in the
have

prices

schedule
two

of both

firms)

inconvenience

distinct

effects.

2 We therefore

cost

0 and

On the one hand,

profitability
of the marginal
flight.
At the
choices
have a depressing
effect on prices.
choice

may

be become

4.1.2.

Non-identical

When

airlines

frequency
structures
flyer

where

airline

symmetric
be higher

parameter

same time,
Therefore,

are

not

identical,

this

in itself

may

We illustrate

2 has fixed

flight

costs

for two reasons:

we analyze

two airlines.

b which
flying

This

is added
with

the

both

cases.

1 as the

the

case where

preference

to gross
preferred

of the

is asymmetric
competition.
two

original

preferred

increase

the

frequency
frequency

Firstly,

utility.

we present

of Hfl 2000.

will increase

in the

We therefore

have

price

function

as the

case
at all

increase
will
will become
because

competition,

have a preference

utility

the

Clearly,

its frequency

to temper

all consumers

is reflected

of the

for one of

by a parameter

utility

derived

we have

taken

from

airline

utility

airline

and

= (_ + b) - p_!
function.
use

In the

b =

60.

- Ox
simulation
Again,

the

frequency

airline

equilibrium

because
of both consumer
preferences
and the second stage price
The simulation
results
for the base case (identical
airlines)
and the

asymmetric

combined

FC

in asymmetry

profitability
of a frequency
the frequency
equilibrium

the low cost airline

vr,.,!
in stead

changes

cost

may be due to differing
cost
airline
(e.g. because
of fre-

of Hfl 1000 in stead

frequency
choices the marginal
for the second airline.
Therefore,

Secondly,

an increase

flight

however,
higher
the equilibrium

result

Such asymmetry
of airlines
preferences
for a particular

it has lower costs, which depresses
prices. "In order
the high cost airline decreases
departure
frequency.
the

both

fixed

airlines

programmes).

asymmetric

both

that

in the

asymmetric.

equilibrium.
or consumers

quent

conclude

a decrease

effect

cases
of cost

are

summarized

difference

and

in table
consumer

2 below.
preferences

As

a fourth

case,

the

is presented.

t2In the previous simulation, at a fixed flight cost of FC =- 1500, the equilibrium is asymmetric. Equilibrium frequency and price choices are (4,3) and (186,177) respectively. If the 'low
frequency' airline would raise its frequency, the resulting symmetric profit maximizing price
choices would be so much lower (169,169) that a symmetric configuration is not an equilibrium.
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Table

2:

Simulation

reault_

airline
Case

1: identical

1

2:FC1

= 2000, FC2

3

3

182

182

= 1000

frequency
price
Case

2

7

171

207

4

2

199

177

3: bl = 60, b2 = 0

frequency
price
Case

4:1

and

2 combined

frequency
price
4.2.

Welfare

The

above

effects
results

deregulation
analysis

market
access,
KLM monopoly
non-identical
consumer

of airline

can be applied

in the
clearly

2

airlines

frequency
price
Case

airline

case

involves

of the
a number

and

6
184

deregulation
in order

to analyze

Amsterdam

calculate

the welfare

- Maastricht

of assumptions.

entry costs are such that
turns
into a duopoly.
competitors,

3
177

effects

market.

one airline enters the market
so that
We use the above cases of identical

the
and

welfare

that

welfare
free

resulting

here

of airline
with

the

We assume

The

effects

in terms

of

surplus, profitsand external costs.

In order to include the external costs of aviation in the welfare analysis,we
make use of a simple external cost function:we take intoaccount only the costs of
emissions. As the measurement of socialcost and the valuation of environmental
goods falloutside the scope of thispaper, we relyon the resultsPerlet al. (1996).
Emission costs are calculated as
E = F(t.

v)

(4.2)

where F is the total flightfrequency (number of landings and take-offsor LTO),
t is the emission index (kilogram emitted per LTO) and v the value lossper unit
of a particular emission type. Parameter values can be found in the appendix.
In the calculationof welfare effectswe use the cases as presented in table 2,
while referringto airlineI as the incumbent
welfare resultsare presented in table 3.
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and airline2 as the entrant. The

The
the

results

type

price

show

of entry

competition

symmetric
ondly, the

ent

is affected

prices

and

competitive

from

frequency

in two

deregulation

depend

equilibrium.

ways

critically

As we have seen

by frequency

choice.

First,

consumer

benefits.

On the

other

hand,

contexts,

high

total

is countered
These effects

all of which

and

show

a substantial

on

above,

the

equilibrium,
the more intense the price competition;
frequency,
the more intense
the price competition

increases

surplus

We briefly note
almost
identical

The

changes

more
secwhich

higher

also lower schedule
inconvenience
(time) costs, which improves
too. The four simulation
cases illustrate
the above mechanisms

of consumer
an

welfare

the resulting

the frequency
higher total

depresses
quencies
welfare

that

and

improvement

fre-

consumer
for differin the

sum

profits.

a few interesting
features.
consumer
surplus
(change)

frequency

depresses

price

by the 'monopoly
power'
are at work in case 4 too,

Comparing
cases 1 and 2, we see
for two very different
equilibria.

and

lowers

time

costs,

but

this

effect

of the low cost - high frequency
entrant.
but here the effect of consumer
preference

(loyalty)
with respect
to the incumbent
makes the equilibrium
more symmetric.
This results
in higher consumer
benefits
than in case 2. In case 3 total frequency
is lower because
there is no low-cost
entry, while the equilibrium
is asymmetric:
therefore,
the increase
in consumer
welfare
cases.
The difference
between
the cases with
clearly

in the industry

industry
large

profit

after

profit

changes.

deregulation

function,
that

frequency.
we are

this

analysis

total,

while

Also,

capacity

the

able

Using

makes
allow
the

to include

only

takes

parameters
constraints

the large

improves

market
share. 13 This effect
Finally,
the market
outcomes

of departure

With

after entry
and without
because

cost

difference

the low-cost

above

simple

emission

costs

in the

welfare

emission

part

into

account

the

external

cost

aircraft

assumed

carrier

here,

captures

a

the welfare changes even more pronounced.
us to calculate
external
costs as a function

of the
and

is less than in the other
low-cost
entry shows up

choice

specification

function

may

of the
of the

require

be included

external

analysis.

external

further
in the

cost

We note
cost

research.
analysis.

In

the present
simulations,
capacity
constraints
were not binding;
however,
in cases
where
capacity
constraints
are binding,
(e.g. in Norman
and Strandenes,
1994),
the choice of aircraft
type becomes
relevant,
which will clearly have an impact
on
the

external

cost

parameters.

13Note, however, that the incumbent

incurs profit losses in all cases.
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_I_b|e

3: Wel/are

eifect_

of deregulation

Case

Case

1

Total numberof departures

2

Case

3

Case

4

6
3

9
2

6
4

9
3

3

7

2

6

incumbent
entrant

Price(% change)
incumbent
entrant

Passengers
(%change)
Consumer
Profits

surplus

-11.8

-17.1

-3.3

-14.4

-11.8
22.7

0.2
29.1

-13.3
16.2

-10.7
36.7

24.9

25.0

21.5

37.6

44.6

15.2

68.3

32.9
81.8

(% change)

(% of monopoly

profit)
incumbent
entrant

Aggregate

profit

(% change)

Profit + CS (% change)
Emission
Costs (% of welfare

44.6

122.2

22.9

-10.8

37.4

-8.7

14.7

17.1
0.07

34.9
0.09

14.2
0.07

43.5
0.08

sum)

5. Conclusion
The

model

developed

Strandenes
and

prices

in this

(1994).

A first

as a two

stage

the second
multiproduct

article

is an extension

modification
game:

is that

in the

first

we model
stage,

stage they choose prices.
As such_
oligopoly.
A second modification

non-interlaced
frequency
equilibria.
between non-identicalairlines.

The

of the

latter

model

in Norman

competition

airlines

and

in frequency

choose

frequencies,

in

the model
is similar to models
of
is that we allow for asymmetric,
allows

us to analyze

competition

The two-stage setup of the model allows airlinesto choose frequency equilibria
such that price competition isavoided. This featureismost pronounced in the case
of inelasticdemand,

for which we have derived a maximal

differentiationresult.

The latter result does not hold in the case of elastic(linear)demand.
in the elasticdemand

case asymmetric

However,

equilibriado frequently occur.

When

competing airlinesairlinesare not identical,
asymmetric equilibriaare particularly
relevant.
The
various
external
on the

model
types
costs.
type

allows

us to analyze

of post-deregulation
The

of entry.

size and
Low

cost

the

welfare

entry,

in terms

distribution

of the

entry

results
18

effects

of airline

of consumer

in the

welfare
highest

deregulation

surplus,

effects
welfare

prove

profits

for
and

to depend

gains,

both

as

a resultof

price

decreases

and

of frequency

rise to higher external
costs.
Therefore,
parameters
in the external
cost function
in order

6.

to arrive

at a complete

increases.

The

the specification
is an important

welfare

analysis

latter,

however,

give

of technical
and value
extension
of the paper

of airline

deregulation.

Multiproduct

Oligopoly.
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Appendix

A.1.

Sign

of the

metric
We consider
Given that
airline

of

the

low

frequency

the profit derivative
of the 'low frequency'
airline
price is above marginal
cost in all equilibria
(in

profits

is positive,

profit-derivative

airline

in

sym-

equilibrium

are not negative),

we have

to show

that

the second

as given in (3.10).
other words,
that
term in brackets

i.e.
o_

0

q(P*,ft + f-,)+ f,_'_ >
We show

this

Greenhut

et al.,

for the

linear

demand

where a isa demand
i.e.

which

can

be written

as

(see

e.g.

1987)

q=TfDL
of flights,

function

(A.1)

(

"

OL)

(A.2)

parameter. Note that both airlineshave the same number

f = _F,

in a symmetric

equilibrium.

Therefore,

we have

; 2F-'-i-- - (" - f)

(,.3)

Substituting (A.2) and (A.3) in (A.I),we findthat in symmetric equilbrium

q(p, f, + f_,)
The

+ ft0_

_-- 6._D_DF
(_

latterholds because a is the demand

sumers

p') > 0

interceptor the maximum

(A.4)

price con-

are willing to pay. Therefore, the term in brackets on the RHS

of the

equality sign is positive and we may conclude that the profit-derivativeis not
strictlynegative;rather,it'ssign depends on the value of the fixed flightcost FC.

2O

A.2.

Emission

costs

In the calculations,
• Emission
- NOx

the following parameter

index t (kilogrammes

values

have been used.

per LTO):

: 4.85

-

HC : 1.52

-

S02

-

CO : 12.03

-

C02 : 1855.08

: 0.32

• Value estimates
(1996).

v are the "Urban/potential"
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values

reported

in Perl et al.
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THE USE OF MARKET

POWER IN INTERNATIONAL
AND TOURISM

AVIATION

Abstract

In order to make international trips, visitors must use some form of transport, such as
aviafioz_ Countries possess a degree of market power over tourism within their borders,
and they often seek to use this. This market power also transfers over to aviation; they
control air routes jointly with their trading partners, and they oRen restrict supply,
sometimes with the intention of generating profits. However, they must share tra_c and
profits with their partners. Governments also levy taxes on tourism, but these affect
domestic tourists and residents. A model is developed which combines all these features.
It is possible to use it to characterise the best possible combination of aviation and
tourism policies fi'om the perspective of an individual country. A country typically does
not have full control over aviation policies, and this can be allowed for. What is desirable
from the perspective of an individua[ country is not desirable from a world perspective. In
tourism, and to a lesser extent, countries are able to levy optimum tariffs, which benefit
themselves
but lessen overall world welfare. There is evidence that countries
are
becoming more aware of their market power, as international
increasingly liberalised, countries are imposing more taxes on tourism.

aviation

becomes

1.

Introduction

In recent years countries have been explicitly recognising that they possess market power
in international aviation to their borders. They share this power with other countries on
the routes they control. Granted this, they have been questioning what policies are best
from their own viewpoint. Even countries predisposed to take a liberal view are noting
that their airlines may be profiting from regulation on some routes, and that it may be
travellers from other countries who are paying the higher prices which enable these
profits. In effect they may be able to levy an optimum tariff on aviation, though their
ability to do so depends on their partner's policies. While individual countries may gain
from imposing restrictive policies, from a world perspective, a liberal environment would
he more efficient. Part of the unwillingness of some countries to liberalise may be
explained by this; it may not be simply a matter of them being protectionist towards their
airlines.
International aviation is linked to international tourism; they are close complements. If
there are no distortions at the tourism level, it will be sufficient to examine international
aviation on its own. This is unlikely to be the case, since even if tourism is not specifically
taxed, the goods and services purchased by tourists will normally be subject to general
taxation, such as VAT, which creates a divergence between what tourists pay and the cost
of provision. Further, tourism is often seen by countries as a generator of positive or
negative externalities. Tourism is sometimes taxed for revenue raising reasons. Taxes such
as accommodation taxes are intended to be passed on to the tourist, who is often from
another country. If this is so, it is necessary to consider international aviation policy
together with tourism policy: they cannot be analysed in isolation form one another.
From a worldwide efficiency perspective, tourism taxes pose even more difficulties than
aviation regulation. It is easier for countries to increase this taxation, as the taxes are
spread over tourists from across a range of countries, and no one country is likely to find
it in its interest to retaliate to a country's tourism taxes. The countries whose nationals
pay the tax have less countervailing power than they do in aviation. Tourism taxes are a
trade distortion which will be very difficult to negotiate away, since it is in some
countries' individual interest to levy them. Indeed, as countries are under more pressure
to liberalise their international aviation, they may be relying more heavily on taxation of
tourism instead. Trade liberalisation
at the airline level has been very difficult to
accomplish; liberalisation

at the tourism level may be even more difficult.

For many countries, such as Australia, most tourists come by air. Thus, policies which
affect costs and prices of international aviation affect the gains fi'om tourism. This link is
perceived, though not oRen ¢xan_ed.
(For some discussion, see Findlay and Forsyth,
1988, and some recognition, Productivity Commission, 1998). Thus tourism interests
always support low ak fares, and ah-lines claim they are creating externalities by bringing
tourists; there is little guidance as to where the best mix of policies might lie. The
question of how the benefits from tourism and international aviation can be maximised is
considered in this paper.

ThePolicyEnvironment
A government
whichseeks
to maximise
thebenefits
fromaviationandtourismfor itsown
citizensmustoperatein an environment
whichconstrains it. It can raise prices for
tourism services, but residents touring at home will be affected as well as foreigners. It is
often all, cult to discriminate between them. Residents also make international trips - it
can be difficult to distinguish between residents and foreigners on international aviation
(though ways exist and are used).
When tourists come to a country, they create
externalities, positive and negative.
These could be significant, yet difficult to correct
fore.
On international
routes, traffic and profits are normally shared by airlines of
different countries. A route is jointly regulated by govermnents at either end, and no one
government can obtain its preferred from and level of regulation.
Subject to their
partner's preferences, governments do have some freedom to choose international
aviation policies.
It should be apparent from the list of factors above that there are no simple policy
prescriptions for tourism and aviation from an individual country's perspective.
The best
set of policies depends on the balance of forces that applies in a particular case. The ways
these interact can best be shown by setting out a formal model, and this is done in this
paper. The purposes are to characterise the key relationships, and thereby elucidate the
policy choices available to a government. No empirical data are examined - this can be
readily done, as the model is quite adaptable to empirical application.
The paper thus
cannot come to firm policy conclusions, though some suggestions are made.
In section 2, the model is outlined, and in section 3 it is analysed.
Several different
variants of the model (e.g. corresponding
to different constraints
on the home
government) are considered.
The model supposes a simple market structure for
international air routes - this is subjected to scrutiny in section 4. It is recognised that any
country must operate within the bounds set by the policies of others - the consequences of.
this are considered in section 5. In section 6, the application to Australia is discussed,and
in section 7, some problems posed for efficiency at the worldwide level are considered.
2.

A Model of Tourism and International

Aviation

The key aspect of this model is that tourism and international
aviation are jointly
consumed services. Tourists come to a country by using international aviation services.
It is taken that there are no alternatives - this is effectively true of countries such as
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. It is less true of the U.K. and not true at all of many
European nations. It would be possible to generadise the model to allow for non-aviation
means of transport, but this is not allowed for here. It is also assumed that the services
are consumed in fixed proportions.
Again this need not be the case - international visits
can be of varying durations, and it is likely that duration would depend partly on relative
prices of the travel and tourism components.
This could be allowed for at the cost of
additional complexity.
Another key feature of the model is that both home and overseas tourists use tourist
facilities in the home country, and home and overseas tourists use international aviation.
Total tourism in the home country is given by h, the sum of domestic (d) and overseas (v)

4
tourists.

Overseas visitors v are the sum of visitors fi'om all other countries,

(Consider

the home country as country 0.) Thus:

i = 1 ...n.

n

h = d + _"_v,

(2.1)

|=1

The total number of residents travelling

overseas, a, is equal to the sum of those visiting

n

other countries,

_a,

The number of persons travelling between 0 and i is given by mi.

ia, l

ml = ai + v1

(2.2)

Tourism is assumed to include all travel, whether for business, leisure, or other purposes.
Tourism services in the home country are supplied at constant marginal cost, ck. Aviation
services between the home country and country i are supplied at constant marginal cost si.
Finagy, the price to residents who travel abroad of tourism services in country i is given
by ct. This may or may not equal marginal cost, but from the home country point of view,
it is fixed.
The prices charged for home tourism and aviation services need not equal marginal costs.
It is assumed that tourism services are "taxed" at a rate th, so that the price of tourism in
the home country, p,, is given by
p, = ch + t,

(2.3)

Aviation services may be taxed, at a rate r,, such that the price of a trip to/from i, P_, is
given by
p, = sl + rt
(2.4)
The overall price of a trip, including the tourism component,

for a resident visiting :,p,
" i is

given by
p_o = ci + s1 + r_

(2.5)

and the overall price to a visitor _om i, p_, is given by:
p/=

c. + t. + s_ + r_

(2.6)

These "taxes' can be interpreted in several ways. Basically they represent divergences
between prices and marginal social costs.
In the case of tourism, it could be that a
general tax is levied (e.g. a VAT) on services which tourists purchase. Specific tourism
taxes, such as accommodation
taxes, could be levied. Alternatively, it may be the case that
there are externalities associated with tourism, and ch represents the marginal social cost
of tourism services and th is interpreted as a divergence between price and marginal social
cost. It could be negative - tourism may create negative externalities. It could be that
some of the resources used to provide tourism services are priced above or below their
shadow prices - for example, if there is unemployment, the wages of labour may exceed
its shadow price. Finally, there may be monopoly in parts of the tourism industry, and

prices may be above marginal cost. For most purposes, it does not matter which of these
explanations of divergence of price from marginal cost is operative.
However, in one
case, it is necessary to be more explicit: this is the case of a shadow price of government
revenue differing
from itsnominal value. In such a case,it matterswhether the
government gains can amount, th, through taxation, or whether individuals gain it, e.g. in
the form of an externality.
With the 'tax' on aviation services, the same points can be made.
However, the
interpretation
is most likely to be in terms of firms setting prices above marginal costs.
Direct taxation of international
aviation is not likely to be significant.
Governments,
however, regulate aviation, and this regulation helps determine prices.
For example,
capacity may be restricted, and airlines may raise prices. Sometimes governments own
the airlines serving international routes, and profits accrue to them. Again, if special
attention is to be given to the shadow price of government revenue, the model needs to be
adjusted to make this explicit.
Few countries have airlines which possess a monopoly of traffic on the international
routes. In some cases, countries at either end of a route, and perhaps others as well, can
compete for traffic. More common is the situation of where countries allocate a share of
traffic between each other. Either this takes place explicitly in bilateral air services
agreements, or implicitly (if a country's share becomes too smaU, things axe changed to
increase it). In this model, it is assumed that the home country has a share of traffic to
country i of" U. Thus, the profits on route i gained by the home country would be

#/m

=

(d+

(2.7)

In practice, pooling agreements often exist between airlines, and profits are not
proportional to traffic. The payoff to greater detail here is unlikely to be worth the cost.
Residents have a utility
functionsuchas
u = u(c_aj, a2, at ...an. x)
where x refers to all other goods.

(2.8)
They maximise utility subject to

p_.2 + p..x + _'_pai. d = y

wherey

is home income.

This gives rise to demand functions

h = hO, p,,
a_

(2.9)

p'.,

a,fph, p,. p l o pa_, ...p i _...p Io...p a ,. y).

The demand for tourism to the home country from country i is given by:

g = v,

...p',...p',, g)

(2.12)

These functions are deh3_rately written with scope for considerable substitution.
Thus
(10) a/lows for the 0ikdy) effect that changes in home tourism prices will affect demand

for overseas tourism. Destn_fions
discussed in Section 3.

can be substitutes for one another, this possibility is

In this model, the government of the home country can be taken as maximising benefits
for its residents. It values consumers surplus of residents, and producers surplus from
production, along with net tax revenues.
It does not value the consumers
surplus of
foreign visitors - it only values profits and taxes generated by their spending.
It cannot
price discriminate between the two, however. Problems similar to this one have been
analysed by Peston, Katz and Gravelle (1976) and Auquier and Caves (1979).
The
problem of making the most from foreign tourism has been considered by Tisdell (1984).
3.

The Working

of the Model

The home country can be taken to be ma_'irni._ing an expression of the form of(3.1).
W=

B(d(p h,p°,Px),)
-a_ (,Ph,Po
,P,,
),...,
a_(Ph, P°,P,, ),...,

a"(ph,p.,p=),X(ph,p°,p=)--d()c_-_..a'

()p'o -p:x
1

+ (Px'%)x

+_v'

(ph,p.)th

+ _

i

O_r,(a'(php.)+v'(php.)

)

(3.1)

i

where po and p, are vectors of trip costs to residents and foreign visitors, respectively,
over the n destinations/origins.
The country is assumed to be maximis'mg the benefits to
residents making home and overseas trips and consuming other goods, x, less the cost of
home tourism and the cost of overseas tourism to residents and the cost to residents of
other goods px x. To this is added the producers surplus or tax on sale of other goods,
the surplus/tax from selling tourism services to foreign visitors, plus the country's share of
airline profits. This is maximised subject to a resource constraint which allows for the fact
that taxes on foreign tourists augment resources available.
The inclusion
of "othergoods' in 3.1 is to highlight the possibility that there can be
interactions between travel and other goods. They may be substitutes or complements.
If
these other goods are not priced at marginal cost, changes in travel prices can affect tax
receipts from sale of the goods. To make the model less cumbersome, it will be assumed
that these interactions are not important
- either travel is not closely related to other
goods, or prices approximate marginal cost and a more partial framework will be used.
The term B( ) will be taken to be a money metric indicator of consumer's
benefits,
dependent only on travel and tourism prices. The maximand can then be reduced to W 1 in
3.2.
B(d(.ps,
po,),
a1(ps,
p,;),
...,
d(ps,
p,,)
....
a_(p_p4))

- dO ch-

0 p', +
i

(p pOt.
i

(3.2)
i

This is similar to a consumers surplus plus producers surplus maximand. The government
chooses the tax/profit rates th and r _ so as to maximise 3.2 This results in first order
conditions.

J

i

t

t

_) = o
./,,,I

(3.3a)

j=l

0trl ( _,

j-i

+ _)

It is assumed that the second order conditions
plausible.
terms

The terms

_-,

"_-_',,A'vand _

_

_

+ O_.(d () + v_O) = O (3.3a)
for a maximum are satisfied - this is

can be replaced by a_

can be replaced by _,

'_
,_

_-,_,,and _

-__, respectively,

and the

can be replaced by -_,_,, -__,

and _-, respectively.
The equation (3.3a) can be interpreted as balancing the changes in consumers surplus on
ove,'seas and domestic travel by residents plus tax/surplus on domestic tourism resulting
from a rise in domestic tourism prices (lst four terms) with the change in tax/surplus on
foreign tourism plus the change in the share of profits in aviation. The equations (3.3b)
balance the consumers surplus changes with producers surplus changes brought about by
a change in the profit margin/tax in aviation on route i, r _. These terms are too general to
provide much insight into the workings of the model. Simplification is called for, and it is
probably best to start with the simplest model, and add additional complexities.
The Two Country

Model

Suppose that there are only two countries, the home and foreign
that, for residents, domestic and overseas travel are unrelated

countries.

Suppose also

(.==o,, =o).
Suppose

that consumers

Foreign tourists

maximise such that _

are indifferent

_ = po.

between a change in trip cost caused by a rise in tourism

prices, Ph and an equal rise in air fares, i.e. _-The first order conditions

=p,,

_.

now reduce to

-aO + _ t_+ (_ + _) + o(ao + vO) -'- o

(3.4)

To simplify matters further, suppose the country obtains all the profits from aviation (0 =
1). On rearranging these conditions we get
,_'-;th =-(r

-

_
_-_
+ th _+
_,

r =-(r_

Given that -_ = _
ar

at ,

(3.5)

+th _
it can be shown that

t_/_p.
(tO,9" = (eden)
where

v)

(3.6)

(a/d)

¢o is the elasticity of demand for overseas trips by residents

by ea is the elasticity

of demand for home tourism by residents. Equation (3.6) states that the relative weights
put on tourism and aviation taxes depends on the elasticities of demand for overseas and
home trips by residents, and the levels of overseas and home tourism (foreign visitors do
not affect the balance between these because they are equally affected by tourism or
aviation taxes, and all taxes accrue to the home government).
To determine how the
taxes should be levied, it is a matter of balancing marginal distortions to home and
overseas tourisms by residents.
Equations

3.5 can also be expressed in the form

gad _

v ,.t.

ffi-

v

r+tj

(3.7)

£aa A. ffi*'.V (-X-)- V

where t, is the dasfidty of demand for tourism by foreign residents. These equations
indicate that the level of taxes depends on the elasticities of demand and the ratio of
foreign to domestic tourism (the higher the foreign relates to domestic tourism, the higher
the tax). These equations balance distortions to residents as against revenue from foreign
tourists.
Few countries are able to appropriate all the surplus earned in aviation - normally they
must share them with other countries.
An alternative, extreme, assumption is that a
country enjoys no surplus from aviation (0 =0). If this were so, the home country would
seek as low an r as possible (to increase demand for tourism and take its profit on
tourism). For a given r, it would balance the revenues for tourism with the distortionary
costs to residents consuming local tourism services.
The most plausible case is where 0 < 0 < 1. As 0 varies, the balance between tourism
and aviation taxes will alter. Normally, as 0 falls (and the home country gains a reduced
share of airline profits), the reliance on tourism taxes will increase.
(_o)-1.

Let Z stand for t,/_p,

Then it can be shown that
= (v+a)

e.

_ d+

_

"

(3.8)
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The second term is normally positive, but probably much less than unity. The first term is
negative, and (r+a)/d

could be less or greater than unity, )/_

and P'/, well above unity. Thus, _

is likely to be negative.

about unity and negative

As 0 fails, it is possible that

the optimal choice of r will become negative. Since the other country is enjoying most of
the airline "profits", it could be in the home country's interest to have aviation subsidised,
so that it can reap more through tourism taxes.
It is possible that one or other of the "tax' rates will be set exogenously.
For example, a
country's aviation parmer may insist on having a tax or profit rate on aviation of a certain
level. If so, it can be shown that as r, the constrained aviation tax rate, falls, the tourism
tax will normally rise to compensate it. The rise will be larger the greater is 0. This result
may not hold when the possib'dity of home tourism prices affecting overseas travel by
residents, and overseas trip prices affecting home tourism prices affecting overseas travel
by residents, and overseas trip prices affecting home tourism, are allowed for. An
alternative constraint may be where it is difficult for the government to alter the "tax' on
home tourism. It may be difficult to levy a tax on the many services which constitute
'tourism'.
If so, the government can only work through aviation taxes or profits.
Normally, the higher the price/marginal
cost ratio in tourism, the lower the desired
tax/profit rate in aviation.
The Three Country

Model

Additional possibilities are opened up when it is supposed that the home country has links
with two different overseas countries. To simplify matters, suppose that Ot ffi O_ ffi 1 - i.e.
the home country gains all airline profits. After rearranging, the first order conditions can
be written as
_dgh-"A'dg_
p,

+_,a2
Pi

p l

_ffi.,_y_
p_.

_

y._e .
_d

_,t

d

,,:d

a:

a

.y._
2d
0.9)

o_d

The first equation is the equivalent of 0.6),
only
international aviation markets are being considered.
correspond to 3.7. there are two price/marginal cost
routes, to be determined. They depend on elasticities
one would not expect that the elasticities

this time the distortions in two
The second and third equations
ratios, corresponding
to the two
and shares of traffic. In general,

¢_ and s_ or s_ and _'_ would differ by much

- estimates of elasticities for international aviation are not very reliable either. However,
the ratio v/a, is the proportion of foreign to resident traffic on particular routes can vary
widely. Thus, differential pricing on air mutes is likely to be warranted not so much by
elasticity differences (the standard price discrimination case), but rather by differences in
traffic flow. Countries might well seek to have high prices and profits on routes for which
they have a higher share of the profits, but a low share of the passengers.
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Generalising

the Model

The extension from 2 to n countries will not produce results which are qualitatively very
different from those discussed. There can be quantitative differences, however, and these,
in practical terms, can be important. Suppose that th and re have been set for a large
number of countries, and that a particular route is being considered (perhaps it is to be
opened up). The solution to the optimisation problem will involve new values for all ri
and for ta. Unless the route is very large (and new routes are unlikely to be), changes will
be small. Thus, for purposes of analysis, th can be taken as given. The rate of tourism
tax/profit, tu, will only be changed in a many country world when aviation policy towards
all countries and tourism policy is being considered.
For the new route, j, rJ is optimised
with th taken as given - the profit/tax on substimteYcomplement routes, i, r_, could well
vary substantially when riis changed however.
Another aspect worth considering in practice are the demand interactions
between
different services.
Domestic tourism prices affect overseas travel by residents, and
overseas trip prices affect domestic tourism. This can have a considerable bearing on the
actual relationship of tourism and aviation prices. It is probable that domestic tourism is
much larger than overseas tourism, (i.e. d > a) and that the cross elasticity of overseas
tourism with respect to domestic prices is quite high. If currently the price/marginal cost
ratio in domestic tourism is high, and the aviation tax is low (or the home country's share
is low), raising domestic tourism prices may be an ineffective way of gaining a greater
profit from foreign tourists - it simply induces the locals to go overseas.
Another interaction which can prove important is that between traffic, or residents and
foreign tourists, on international air routes.
There are ot_en several ways of travelling
from country A to country B - directly, or via country C, country D and so on. Prices
charged on indirect routes affect the prices that can be charged on direct routes.
Thus,
Sydney-Singapore (and then to London) is a substitute for Sydney-London.
This means
that for a particular route, the choice of price and profit/tax level can be tightly
constrained by prices on other routes. Another consequence is that the indirect effects on
other routes of a choice of price or profit/tax for a particular route can be large relative to
the direct effects.
It is a straightforward matter to generalise this model to allow for the possibility that
government revenue is valued at above its nominal value (because, to raise revenue, it is
necessary to impose taxes) (see Findlay and Jones, 1982, and Browning, 1987). It would
involve multiplying government revenue changes by the appropriate shadow price. To
estimate the effects, it would be necessary to specify effectively what proportion of the
difference between prices and marginal social costs of home tourism services was due to
taxes/subsidies, and what due to profits and externalities. It would also be necessary to
specify what proportion of the difference between prices and marginal costs in aviation
accrue to the government in the form of taxes or shares of airline profits.
Allowance for this would not make the results very different qualitatively. It could affect
the balance of policies, however, especially if the shadow price of government revenue
were considerably higher than the nominal value. If, for example, the government's share
of aviation profits were small in relation to its share of tourism profits, the balance of
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taxes would shiR towards tourism. Demand interaction, especially between domestic and
overseas tourism for residents, would become more important.
Another possibility that can be allowed for is that the shadow price of foreign exchange
differs from its market price. This difference is unlikely to be large for most developed
countries, but it could be significant for many developing countries, and the foreign
exchange aspects of tourism could be important for them.
It would be necessary to
identify the foreign exchange flows arising from the various expenditures - or domestic
tourism, and residents' trips overseas - and the flows which arise at the airline level.
If the shadow price of foreign exchange were significantly higher than the market price,
this could result in quantitatively different results. The country would have an incentive
to shift the balance of taxation towards airlines and away from domestic tourism - in order
to dissuade its residents from taking overseas trips and using up foreign exchange.
It
would also wish to lower the overall level of taxation of tourism and aviation. This would
encourage more tourism by foreigners,
generate more foreign exchange.
4.

which would have the advantage that it would

Airline Poficy

In the preceding Sections, little has been said about the ownership and market structure of"
airlines- they are taken to provide services that tourists use, and the difference between
their marginal costs and prices is assumed to be taxes. It is necessary to be more explicit
about them, and investigate whether ownership or market structure may be a constraint
on aviation policy.
The simplest case is one where there is a government owned airline, and capacity or fares
are regulated. Given a level of costs, these determine the profits earned by the airline, all
of which accrue to the government.
It is equivalent to the govcumnent setting a tax on
airline services.
This situation used often be the case- governments
oRen wholly owned
airlines, and they regulate capacities or fares on routes. Overall, government airlines were
not notably profitable, perhaps because they cross-subsidise loss making routes, from
profitable routes. The airlines may not be profit maximising firms; if the government gave
incentives for its firms to maximise profits, the result might be very similar to the case
outlined in the model above. Regulation was often for protection rather than profit.
If the sole airline were privately owned, it might be more oriented towards profit (though
it need not be, and as a regulated firm it may be required to offer unprofitable services).
The main difference is that the profits would accrue to the owners, not the government.
ff all that matters is which _
receives the profits, this case would equally well fit the
model. A possible complication is that the value of revenue to the government may
exceed its nominal value - if so, this would need to be allowed for in the model, and it
would be necessary to specify who owns the airline.
The approach as characterised in the model in Sections 2 and 3, whereby the government
levies a tax on international aviation services, was probably a reasonable approximation
for many airline routes. However, it should not be taken too literally. Governments
rarely actually impose significant taxes on international aviation services - it would be too
difficult to do so with other countries' airlines operating them and other countries'
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governments
sharing the task of regulation
Sometimes minor taxes, such as airport or
departure taxes are levied, but in the main, if a country wishes to levy a "tax" on
international aviation, it does so through regulation which has the effect of raising prices
and profits.
Competition

for the Market

A system such as that outlines may have little in the way of incentives for efficient
performance.
These can be enhanced within the same fi'amework of capacity or price
controls by allowing competition for the market. A country would negotiate the rights to
offer a certain amount of capacity to another, or operate worth at a specified fare. The
government could then award the route to the airline which bid the most for it: this would
provide an incentive for minimum cost production, and profits would go the government.
The successful bidder might be drawn from one of the country's airlines, public or private.
If the government were minded to allow trade in airline services, airlines from any country
might be permitted to bit, subject to this being acceptable to the other country on the
route. If capacity, not price, is controlled, a minimum, not maximum,, price will be set. It
is possible that profit oriented airlines would set prices above the level that would ensure
full use of the permissible capacity. This price would be above the level regarded by the
government as optimal given the tourism implications.
Apart from this, the main
proposition will hold - it is possible for the country to secure minimum cost production,
and maximisation of the rents from aviation, within the context of an aviation/tourism
pricing policy. It is also possible for it to import airline services if it chooses.
Competition
If competition in the market is allowed, the government loses control over price. As the
market becomes more competitive, airlines tend to set prices closet to marginal cost:
prices may approximate marginal cost. If the government wishes the country to obtain
rents fi'om the industry, it will need to impose a tax - and as mentioned above, this may be
difficult. In addition, as the market is opened up to more foreign competition, the share
of the home airlines will tend to fall, and so will the share of rents.
This will mean that the government will now need to determine the level of competition,
not the _ax rate' as a controlled variable. As competition from overseas increases, (i.e.
the route becomes more open), the share of traffic and rents going to the home country,
8, falls. The government is faced with a trade-offas 0 falls the country loses rents, but
at the same time p, falls too, and residents obtain lower cost travel. This is a dilemma
ellen faced by governments. In addition, as 0 and p_ fall, benefits from tourism increase.
On many routes, additional competition from foreign airlines is an option. This can be
modelled by supposing that the government chooses 0, and through it p,, IX,, and not r
(which becomes a function of O).
This case gives rise to the poss_ility of a discontinuity,
since r can be bounded f_om
below by zero if competition is present. If there are low cost airlines willing to enter the
market) the country can ensure that po and p, fall to below that level which would enable
the home airline(s) to cover its (their) costs. The country becomes a complete importer of

13

airline services on the route, and has an interest in ensuring the lowest possible price. The
trado-offbetween
airline rents and low prices for residents no longer exists.
This is shown in Figure 1.

Curve A shows how airfine profits accruing to the country

vary as the price of airlines services, P, varies. At P, profits are zero. Curve B shows
benefits to residents travelling overseas and from home sales to foreign visitors - it is
monotonically declining as P rises. Total benefits are shown as Curve C. These reach a
maximum at P*. It is possible that P* ties to the lei_ of P: this would be the case if
benefits from tourism were very high, and the only way to have low airline prices involves
subsidies to the home airline. (This possibility was considered in Section 3.) If foreign
airlines are prepared to compete down prices, such subsidy is not necessary, and the total
benefits are shown by curve B up to price P, and then by Curve C beyond. There is a
minimum price, }3, below which airlines will not offer service.

It is possible, as shown in

Figure 1, that benefits at this price exceed those at P*. If so, the country can do best by
not having an airline and by relying on foreign competition.
The diagram suggests that it is possible to have a quantum jump in aviation policy.

It is

possible that }3 may be below P*, yet the country prefers restrictive regulation because it
gains profits at the expense of visitors. If P falls, it may be worthwhile giving up these
profits to get more tourists and the benefits fi-om them. It then switches to a competitive
policy and reliance on foreign airlines. Thus Spain realised that it could gain more by
having large numbers of tourists carried by cheap foreign charter airlines than it could
from profits for ks airline, and it allowed easy access to them. Several other countries
undoubtedly face this dilemma.
5.

The Response

Framework

Individual countries cannot simply determine, independently, what prices are to be
charged for aviation on routes to other countries. At the least, aviation prices can only be
set with the approval of other countries. The analysis so far only indicates the policies
countries would like to implement. Countries normally have greater discretion over their
tourism tax policies, but if others are perceptive, they may take account of tourism prices
in the home country when they determine aviation policies.
Nevertheless, there are
normally a range of options that a country can choose from when considering
its
aviation/tourism
policy.
Countries do have international
aviation policies (though
sometimes, even the strongest like the US, cannot get their way).
(For the Australian
Case, see Findlay, 1985.)
Countries' aviation policies exhibit different degrees of'rationality".
Sometimes a country
will be apparently putting sole or dominant weight on to profits earned by its airline
(especially if these profits accrue to the government). In other cases, countries may treat
aviation and tourism separately, and maximise net benefits, to consumers and producers,
in aviation, but ignore the impacts on tourism. Finally, they may be completely rational,
and take account of prices at all levels, and evaluate how they affect net benefits.
A
country's ability to obtain benefits from aviation and tourism depends on the policies
followed by its partner countries.
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fully determinate
unattainable. At the
seek to increase their
and shares in place).
of bargaining models

model of aviation and tourism between two or more countries is
heart of the problem lies a bargaining situation - two countries both
share of the benefits available (and the total depends on the policies
Thus, a good deal ofwhat happens might best be explained in terms
it should be noted that there is no uniquely appropriate model.

It is unrealistic to assume that each country is face with a unique solution on each route.
A typical country will find that it has room to move on many or most routes - the question
that arises is then one of whether it is maximising its benefits granted the flexibility that it
does have. A few possibilities can be considered here.
a)
The Constraint Model
A country may find that it can choose the airline profit/tax rate r, or its tourism tax rate th,
or the overall price to foreign visitors, subject to a constraint. This constraint could be a
maximum or minimum. For example, a foreign country may impose a minimum r such
that its airline covers costs - it may be willing to a11ow higher levels of r and 0 .
Alternatively it may seek to protect it consumers through setting an upper limit on r. If it
is rational, it will look to the overall price of tourism, not just the airline price, and the
constraint it imposes will be on a combination of th, r and O. One possible level of the
constraint is that represented by the status quo. A foreign country may countenance
reductions in airline prices or overall trip costs, though not increases.
Constraints can
easily be handled in the model of Section 3 - the home country maximises subject to the
constraints imposed by its partners.
There need be no presumption that current policies
conform to the constrained optimum.
b)
Discrete Options and Continuous Trade-Offs
The foreign country may be willing to agree to a range of policies under which it
considers itself equally well off. These policies would involve combinations of the control
variables. They might involve a discrete number of combinations, or a continuous tradeoff between the variables.
Consider a case of two countries determining an aviation policy. The foreign country may
be concerned to achieve a given level of profit for its airline. There are various ways in
which it achieves this - as the profit margin, r, falls, a rise in its share (1-0) will
compensate.
The home country is fixed with a trade-off between r and 0- it can
maximise subject to this. Effectively, choice of r or 0 determines the other, and in the
model in Section 3, this can be handled by making one a function of the other.
(Analytically, this is identical to the increasing competition model discussed in Section 4).
The foreign country is being myopic by looking only at airline profits. If it were 'rational'
would look at overall benefits, and the trade-off faced by the home countD, would involve
th as well as Q and r. The choice of control variables by the home country to achieve a
maximum will result in a Pareto optimum, based on either myopic or 'rational' behaviour
of the foreign partner. This approach can be generalised for a number of foreign partners,
each of whom, i, insists on particular trade-offbetween
th, _ and r_.
c)
International Cooperation
A third possibility is that countries

cooperate

to maximise benefits

_om

aviation. Prices would then be set equal to marginal costs in each industry,

tourism and
at least under
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some world social welfare run.ions.
A simple approach might involve maximisation of
the sum of net benefits, perhaps weighted, of the two countries.
In the case of
cooperation between two countries, the solution may need to be a second-best one.
because the policies ok and towards, other countries affect the solution.
For example,
both countries may tax tourism to gain rents from visitors _om other countries. Granted
this, the best solution for tourism and aviation between them may be to subsidise aviation
(to compensate for the tourism tax which will remain in place).
Such cooperation is not often observed, for a very good reason. It is very likely that the
solution does not correspond to the individual maximum for each country.
The two
countries are cooperating and a Coumot solution will not come about. However each has
a monopoly over one of the outputs into trips-tourism services within its borders. R is
quite likely that one will be a net exporter and the other a net importer. The former will
seek high prices (r, t=) and the other low prices; they would not both want zero taxes.
The analogy is one of a cooperative duopoly for which different prices maximise profits
for the different firms.
To achieve the optimum, side payments must be introduced.
These rarely take place
explicitly, and publicly. H_owever, implicit payments frequently take place. Countries are
unable to agree on aviation policies - they resolve the difficulties by making tradc-offs in
other trade disputes. Thus one country liberalises its approach to aviation when the other
allows freer access for the first's agricultural products.
Such trade in aviation and nonaviation rights is often regarded with suspicion. However, it may well be, in cases where
there is an imbalance between flows of tourism, the only way to achieve an efficient
solution is through cooperation.
Overall, a country will be choosing its aviation/tourism policies subject to those of other
countries.
These will differ, par0y because countries differ in the weight they put on
different aspects of beaefits - airline profits, benefits to home travell=,s, and benefits from
tourism.
They differ also because the circumstances of countries
differ - the degree of
market power they possess in supplying counUy-specific tourism services, and in the
flows of tourism from and to the various parmers. A rational country will have different
policies for different mutes, depending on the circunmtances.
Thus Britain has a low
price policy for UK/Spain routes, on which many British tourists travel, and a higher price
policy for UK/Sweden routes, on which relatively few British tourists travel.
6.

An Appfication

to Australia

Australia is a country which fits the characteristics of the modal - for example, most
international travel to and from Australia takes place by air. It is experiencing a tourism
boom, several issues related to tourism and aviation are being raised and international
aviation policies are being questioned.
Before any policy conclusions can be drawn, it is necessary to quantify the model. This
cannot be done here, but for a country such as Australia, it is possible to obtain sufficient
information to come to some conclusions as to the relative magnitudes
of the key
variables, and some policy directions.
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The central problem is to work out the benefits and costs of tourism. While much is said
about the importance of tourism in Australia, there is little concrete about its benefits or
costs (for a theoretical discussion, see Dwyer and Forsyth, 1993a).
The problem is to
determine what the costs and benefitsof
an additional tourist (for a period such as a
week) are, or what the value to Australia of an additional $1 spend by a tourist is. To do
this, it is necessary to estimate what the impact on tax receipts, government expenditures,
private profits and foreign exchange are. This can be done using computable general
equilibrium models (see Adams and Parmenter, 1992) The next stage is that of converting
effects into measures of benefits. In Dwyer and Forsyth (1993b) a rough attempt is made
to measure the benefits of additional tourism in the context of an evaluation of tourism
promotion.
The main difficulty in this area lies in measuring and valuing externalities
which may come about through tourism. This difficulty is not unique to tourism.
R is a relatively straightforward
matter to obtain estimates of prices and profits on air
routes.
While route by route data cost are not available, it is possible to develop
estimates which are probably sufficiently accurate for the purposes here. (See Findiay,
1985, Ch. 6.) Estimates exist of tourism and air fare elasticities for various major
destinations and sources of tourists.
(Bureau of Transport and Communication
Economics, 1988.) Cross-elasticities
are harder to come by. The problem with elasticity
estimates is that they are, of their nature, not highly reliable. Data on tourism flows are
readily available.
While simple characteristics of the aviation/tourism
policies of other
countries are not easy to develop, in analysing the options for Australia it is possible to
outline the policies for the major trading partners (eg, NZ, the US and Japan). It is then
possible to specify the options open to Australia. Models of the aviation sector have been
developed; see Centre for International Economics, 1988 and Productivity Commission,
1998 for Australia and Gillen et al, 1997, for a Canadian model.
The information is available to make the model operational for Australia; indeed the
aviation side has been modelled. Estimates for the first part - what Australia gains from
tourism - would be interesting on their own. They could be used to examine how aviation
policies towards particular countries should be framed. General policies towards tourism
and aviation could be evaluated in the light of the model. There are many questions that
might be examined, but some of particular interest are as follows:

a)

How liberal should Australian aviation policy be? Should it accept a lessened role
for the national carrier, in return for lower fares and more tourists.'? This would
involve a lessened opportunity to profit from aviation,
but an increased
opportunity to gain from tourism, and it would mean greater benefits for residents
who travel overseas. For nearly two decades Australia has faced this question, as
competition
from Asian carriers grew, as charter airlines sought to enter the
market, and as the US sought to increase competition on the Pacific route.

b)

What would be the implications of liberal aviation agreements with particular
countries?
Suppose Australia and Japan were to form a unified market for air
transport.
Would a deregulated market be the best solution, granted any
distortions and externalities present in their tourism sectors? How might the
implications for other routes be assessed?
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c)

Should Australia have a unified aviation policy, whether restrictive or liberal, to be
applied to all countries, or should it tailor its approach to particular countries?
Thus it can have a restrictive approach to Japan, but a liberal approach to the UK,
as it does, more or less, at present. It is possible to use the model to examine this
question by looking at the flows of visitors to and from Australia, the benefits
from tourism, and thus the approach to airline pricing which most advances
Austrafia's interest - this determines how liberal it should be.
In principle,
discrimination is desirable if it is possible, but it may turn out that the benefits do
not justify the effort.

d)

Does _
gain from current aviation pricing arrangements? On major routes,
prices are set by the airlines on trips from Australia,
but often by other
governments on trips to Australia. Trip prices can differ substantially. When fares
to Australia are high, tourism to Australia is discouraged, though Australian
residents enjoy lower fares. Would it be in Australia's interest to pursue more
equal fares?

c)

To what extend should Australia encourage international tourism? Currently it
has an explicit policy of promoting tourism, and currently it spends a lot to this
end. State governments also spend on tourism promotion. Tourism can also be
encouraged by differential tax treatment.
Tourism may generate positive
externalities, profits and taxes.
In addition, aviation policies with particular
countries (eg with Japan) may be regarded as too restrictive to generate maximum
benefit to Australia.
If so, tourism might well be worth promoting and
subsidising. Currently, Australia does not know if its interests are best served by
taxing or subsidising tourism, or neither of these.

0

Changes in tax stru_
affect tourism and aviation.
A move from direct
towards indirect taxes, eg towards a VAT, would result in tourists paying higher
prices. The benefit for Australia of an additional $1 spent by foreign tourists
would increase. Aviation prices and profits might be reduced if overall benefits to
Australia are to be maximised. Alternatively, would it be in Australia's interest to
grant exemptions from a VAT for foreign tourists?

g)

State governments have seen the tourism boom, and have sought to gain from this
boom. NSW recently imposed an accommodation tax in Sydney, the main visitor
destination. Would the country as a whole gain from higher tourism taxation?

7.

Concluding

Remarks:

Market Power

and World Welfare

This paper concentrates on the links between tourism and international aviation. The two
are viewed as jointly consumed services.
The question is raised of how an individual
country might be about making the most of its participation in tom
and aviation. A
country will possess a degree of market power over the attractions it encompasses,
and it
can use this power to extract profits or taxes at either or both the levels of tourism and
aviation_ It is constrained,
and whatever level it chooses to tax at, there will be
undesirable consequences,
residents travelling abroad.

such as losses of benefits incurred by home tourists or
The model shows how it might choose taxes (or policies)
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which make the most of its possibilities,
distortions present.

and which take

account

of the linkages and

Actual results, such as prices of international aviation, do not depend solely on one
country; they are the result of the interaction of many. As a first stage, it is necessary to
show how an individual country might make its choices. It is possible to allow for some
patterns of response by other countries, and while a country does not have complete
fi'eedom over what it does, it will often have some latitude. The question of what are the
best tourism and aviation policies often to a country are important practical ones which
have not often been rigorously analysed together..
A model such as this suggests what should be looked for when policies are being
formulated. As a first step, it is essential to put some measure on the benefits and costs of
tourism. It is not di_cult to derive approximate orders of magnitude, but this is rarely
done. It is more difiScult to come across reliable estimates of other relevant parameters,
such as own and cross price elasticities of tourism demand. Once this is one, it is possible
to put the pieces together, to come to some quantitative conclusions as to what policies
might make the most out of tourism and aviation.
Until now most the policy activity has been at the aviation level. Aviation policy is often
analysed quite separately from tourism.
Under special circumstances,
this will be
sufficient, but it is much more likely that the tourism consequences of aviation policy will
be important, and it is quite conceivable that any gains or losses through tourism of an
aviation policy change will outweigh the direct gains and losses at the aviation level.
Even if there is to be no explicit policy towards tourism, if an efficient policy is to be
formulated, it is necessary that views about the costs and benefits of tourism, and the
various links between the two industries, be made explicit and incorporated.
The models

discussed

indicate

the interest

of individual

countries

in exercising

their

market power. They are constrained to an extent by their partners in the case of aviation,
but are rather less constrained with tourism taxation. Countries are able to extract rents
from aviation if their partners acquiesce. This is possible because not all countries have
the same maximand, and some wish to protect their airlines. Overall world welfare would
be maximised by a move to a more liberal environment, with prices at cost and a reliance
on trade to ensure that services are provided at minimum cost. In many trading situations,
a move towards liberalisation involves countries removing protection which creates costs
that primarily fall on themselves. In the case of aviation and tourism, countries possess
market power, and have got used to using it. Some countries will resist a move towards
liberalisation because they gain from a more restricted environment. Their airlines profit
fi-om higher fares charged to non residents. Thus purely aviation negotiations will be
insufficient to achieve a liberal environment, to achieve liberalisation, non aviation trade
offs will need to be included.
With aviation, there can be pressures from a country's partners to liberalise; with tourism
there is rather less pressure, because no one country suffers much from another's tourism
policies. For the most part, countries are price takers of tourism goods and services. Any
taxes are spread amongst tourists from many countries and it is not worth any one
country retaliating. Countries are able to gain from essentially levying optimal tariffs on
tourism. AS aviation liberalisation proceeds, and tourism grows, countries are showing
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more imerestinincreasing
theirrcn_ a_thetourismlevel,
forexample,by levyingspecific
tourism taxes.While currently
lessofa distortion
th_ airlines
regulation,
thesedistortions
appear to be growing. It has been dif_cultenough to lessen distortions
at the aviation
level;itwillbe even more dif_cultto remove distortionsat the tourism level,and enable
free trade intourism as well as aviatiov_
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1 INTRODUCTION
While trade in most goods and services between the United States and Canada is generally
open, such was not the case for transborder airline services for most oftbe post-war period.
Indeed, for almost three decades the accord governing Canada-U.S. airline services was
among the most restrictive of all such pacts entered into by the United States. At the 1985
Shamrock Summit, Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan recognized the
inappropriateness of that state of affairs and that promotion of transborder air travel should be
encouraged. Yet it took the two nations a decade to remedy the problem; only in February
1995 did they sign a new all"services agreement (ASA) that significantly liberalized trade in
airline services between them.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the February 1995 ASA on the market for
transborder airline services. This issue is of particular importance because past regulatory
policies have affected the ability of individual carriers to benefit from the new ASK As a
result, the likelihood that competition in certain markets could be hindered is a real concern.
To assess these effects, the paper begins by reviewing the domestic, international, and
transborder aviation policies of the two countries. After discussing the provisions of the new
ASA, it then examines its impact on competition and concentration in transborder air services
market.

2 AVIATION POLICES
OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
The ability of Canadian and U.S. carriers to respond to the new opportunities created by the
February 1995 air services agreement h_. been shaped by their countries' prior aviation
policies. Consider first the domestic aviation policies of the two countries. The modem era of
U.S. domestic aviation began in 1938 with the creation ofthe Civil Aeronautics Board. For the
next forty years the CAB maintained tight controls over entry, exit, and pricing in domestic
markets. Most of the industry's output was supplied by twenty or so carriers. On most major
domestic routes two or three carriers typically provided service. In 1978, the regulatory regime
underwent substantial modification with the passage oftbe Airline Deregulation Act, and the
CAB itself ceased to exist after 1984. As a result of domestic deregulation, carriers are now
free to enter and exit markets and to price their services as they see fit. The experience has
generally been a positive one: new carriers have entered the industry, inflation-adjusted prices
have fallen, and flight frequencies and passenger traffic have risen. Although industry
concentration
(measured by the four-firm concentration ratio) has risen above its prederegulation level, concentration on individual routes has fallen. The number of major players
in the U.S. airline industry remains large by Canadian standards" American, United, Delta,
Northwest, US Air, Continental, TWA, and Southwest have extensive systems and compete
with one another on a nation-wide basis. With the exception of Southwest, all of these carriers
have developed large, complex hub-and-spoke operations which serve both domestic and
international markets. A seemingly constant flow of new entrants, most of which have focused
on providing low-cost service, have pressured the larger players to keep their costs and prices
under control.
Canadian domestic aviation policy has undergone a similar transformation. Federal regulation
of domestic air services commenced in Canada with the passage of the Transport Act of 1938.
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ASA governing
transborder air services was signed in 1966, although it has subsequently
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several times. As amended,
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carriers, either government was allowed to reject proposed fares on transborder

The United States allocated its transborder rights resulting from the 1966 pact among a
handful of firms. These route allocations reflected the then existing state of the U.S. airline
industry. Delta, for example, obtained transborder fights between Toronto and Pittsburgh but
not between Toronto and Atlanta. Air Canada possessed a Canadian-flag monopoly on all
transborder mutes until 1967, when CP Air received its first U.S.-Canada route, between San
Francisco and Vancouver. However, most of the routes authorized by the 1966 ASA as
amended were allocated to Air Canada. Thus CP Air, and its corporate successor, Canadian
Airlines, had little oppommity to expand its transborder service under the 1966 ASK
As part of the Shamrock Summit Declaration in March 1985, both countries promised to
examine the possibility of creating free trade in transborder aviation services. Neither side
liked the 1966 ASA, for its anti-competitive
philosophy ran contrary to the aviation policies of
both countries. Both sides agreed that it was suppressing transborder travel and economic
activities between the two nations. For example, between 1980 and 1993, transborder air
travel grew only 1.8 percent annually, well below growth rates experienced in country-pairs
involving their other leading trading partners. Community groups on each side of the borderparticularly representatives of local airports, the United States Airports for Better International
Air Service (USA-BIAS) coalition and Association of Canadian Airport Communities
(ACAC)-complained
bitterly that the existing ASA was hindering economic development of
their areas (Ir,aduck, 1996).
While both stood to gain opportunities to enter new transborder markets, the interests of
Canada's two primary flag carriers in the creation of a new, liberal ASA were asymmetric. Air
Canada had a strong position in the transborder market under the old ASA, while Canadian
Airlines had a very weak one. Should a liberal ASA be signed, Canadian Airlines had little
existing market share to lose; the reverse was true for Air Canada. The flip side of this
asymmetrical
position was that when the new ASA was signed in February 1995, Canadian
Airlines was in a far weaker position to exploit the agreement than Air Canada. It was but a
minor player in the transborder market, serving a handful of U.S. west coast cities (San
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu). Air Canada had a far greater physical presence (i.e.,
gates, cbeck-in terminals, etc.) and brand name recognition in most U.S. cities than Canadian
Airlines.

3 THE 1995 TRANSBORDER
AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT
As a result of these pressures, the United States and Canada agreed to a new, much liberalized
ASA in February 1995. The new ASA allows each country to designate as many carriers as it
wishes to provide transborder services. Neither country may unilaterally limit the capacity
offered by any ofthese carriers. Carders are free to charge any prices they wish; such prices
remain in effect unless both governments disapprove of them. The grounds for disapproval are
limited to preventing unreasonable discrimination or exploitation of a dominant position (fares
too high) and protecting carders from competing against low fares resulting from government
subsidies or from low fares designed to eliminate competition. Canadian carriers were given
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1997; however,

carrier, American,
at Toronto
its _

the old ASK
from 38 percent

in January

Although

it added

in January 1995

24 weekly

fell to
to

all of the
As a result of the
service, from 326

1997. Air Canada
to 36 percent

at

fell from 86.9

rose from 2461

As was the case with Toronto,

to 414 flights

to Toronto,

share of the flights offered

reported in this table are to a single airport (Dorval).
has experienced
a 27 percent increase in transborder

fell slightly,

flights.

with 122, or 20 percent of the flights. Both Canadian Airlines and Air
of the temporary constraints
imposed on new services to Toronto by

carriers. By January

while

competition

nonstop transborder flights offered by individual
all of these flights served Pearson Airport. As the table

carrier in the market, offering

carrier was American,
Canada took advantage

has affected

offered

flights,

the most

its flight share in

in January 1997. Delta

6

Airlines, the second largest carrier in the market under the old ASA, retained this position. It
expanded its services to Montreal more than any other carrier except Air Canada, although its
flight share has also declined modestly (from 28 percent to 27 percent). Accordingly, while
Montreal has had a significant increase in new service subsequent to the implementation of the
new ASh,, concentration of service at that city has declined. The four-firm concentration ratio
for transborder flights serving Montreal fell from 89.6 percent in January 1995 to 85.7 percent
in January 1997, while the I-IHI fell from 2633 to 2385 during this span oftime.
The third of the MTV cities, Vancouver, presents a picture similar to Montreal, as is shown in
Table 4. New services to Vancouver increased 70 percent from January 1995 to January 1997.
Canadian Airlines maintained its status as the largest provider of service at the city, although
its service rose only modestly, from 61 weekly flights in January 1995 to 72 weekly flights in
January 1997. Its share of flights fell from 37 percent in January 1995 to 26 percent in January
1997. United retained its position as the second largest provider oftransborder services to
Vancouver, although its share oftransborder flights also fell during this period. Vancouver,
however, is unique in two regards. First, it is the only airport where the presence of both
Canadian flag carriers is somewhat in balance. This is due Air Canada's taking advantage of
the new ASA to add services freely, while Canadian Airlines failed to aggressively exploit its
first-mover advantages at Vancouver, no doubt due to its extremely weak financial state in the
1990s. Second, the cumulative addition of new services by small U.S. carriers is quite
noticeable, accounting for 55 flights in January 1997, which is almost half of the total increase
in new services from January 1995 to January 1997. Accordingly, at this airport concentration
has declined as is indicated by a decrease in the four-firm concentration ratio (from 91.6
percent to 65.5 percent) and in the ttHI (from 2471 to 1552) during the two year period
depicted in the table. Services at other Canadian cities, including Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg,
Ottawa, Halifax, and Saskatoon have increased more modestly than at Vancouver, although in
the interest of space we will not provide comparable tables for these cities.
We next consider the third market definition, transborder service in individual city-pair
markets. Table 5 reports the number of carriers serving the twenty most important transborder
markets, as well as their HHI for the three study dates. In only a few of these markets has there
been new entry; in those markets where entry has occurred, the HHI remained quite high. This
lack of entry is attributable to two institutional factors. First, 19 of these 20 city-pairs involve
the MTV cities, the ability of U.S. carriers to enter MTV transborder markets was restricted
during the time period under study. Second, most of the limited rights granted to U.S. carriers
to enter MTV markets were allocated to brand new services from their hubs, not to these Top
Twenty markets.

$ CONCLUSIONS
Despite the dramatic changes wrought by the 1995 ASA, levels of concentration remain quite
high in the transborder market, regardless of the market definition or the measure of
concentration used. There has been some diminution of concentration
in several markets, most
noticeably those involving Vancouver. Despite the high levels of concentration observed in
Tables 1 through 5, one must remember the starting point. Competition under the transborder
agreement in existence prior to February 1995 was extremely limited. The number of city-

pairs provided service reflected the patterns of commerce between Canada and the United
States circa 1966, and only a handful ofthese city-pairs received any competitive service. At
the key transborder airport of Tomnto, Air Canada aggressively took advantage of the phasein period to strengthen its position there. However, Air Canada's domination of Toronto is no
higher than that of many U.S. carriers at their domestic hubs. In short, despite the high levels
of observed concentration
two years aider the signing of the new transborder air services
agreement, transborder travelers are still better offwith this agreement than without it, given
the paucity oftransborder services in many important North American city-pairs prior to
February 1995.
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Table1
Total Weekly

Transborder

Total flights

Flights,

by Carder

Share of Transborder
(in percentage

Flights

points)

Jan-95

Jan-96

Jan-97

Jan-95

Jan-96

Jan-97

464

772

811

33.7

40.2

40.0

66

177

145

4.8

9.2

7.1

205

241

236

14.9

12.5

11.6

91

119

98

6.6

6.2

4.8

Delta

258

203

290

18.8

10.6

14.3

Northwest

110

145

187

8.0

7.5

9.2

US Air

181

169

145

13.2

8.8

7.1

Continental

14

28

0.0

0.7

1.4

Alaska

54

48

0.0

2.8

2.4

All other

27

40

0.0

1.4

2.0

Air Canada
Canadian

Airlines

American
United

Total
Canadian
US flag
Four firm

flag

1375

1921

2028

100.0

100.0

100.0.

530

949

956

38.5

49.4

47.1

845

972

1072

61.5

50.6

52.9

80.6%

72.5%

75.1%

2017

2152

2161

conc ratio

Table2
Total Weekly Transborder
to Toronto

Air Canada

Flights

Jan-95

Jan-96

Jan-97

251

434

531

Canadian

Airlines

5

86

69

American

Airlines

122

123

124

42

35

42

83

21

96

34

0

41

83

81

70

0

0

14

0

13

26

793

1013

United
Delta

Airlines
Airlines

Northwest

Airlines

US Air
Continental
Alaska

Airlines

Airlines

All other
Total

620

Four firm
concentration

I-]_Index

86.9%

91.2%

81.0%

2461.

3487

3124

ratio

Table 3
Total Weekly

Transborder

Flights

to Montreal

Jan-95
Air Canada
Canadian

Airlines

American

Airlines

United
Delta

Jan-97

167

149

34

41

42

91

112

110

34

34

48

42

47

48

14

14

Airlines
Airlines

Northwest

Airlines

US Air
Continental
Alaska

Jan-96

125

Airlines

Airlines

All other

3

Total

326

Four firm
concentration
HHI

415

414

89.6%

88.4%

85.7%

2633

2652

2385

ratio.

Table4
Total WeeklyTransborderFlights
to Vancouver

Jan-95
Air Canada
CanadianAirlines
American
United
Delta

Airlines

Airlines
Airlines

Northwest

Airlines

Jan-96

Jan-97

49

35

61

78

72

21

14

28

35

63

42

35

49

35

14

14

14

US Air
Continental
Alaska

Airlines

Airlines

All other
Total

166

Four firm
con_ntration

HHI

14

14

14

41

295

281

91.6%

81.0%

2471

1797

65.5%

ratio

1552

Table5
Characteristics

Number
Jan-95

of Twenty

of Competitors
Jan-96
Jan-97

Largest

Transborder

I-Ih'schman-Herfindahl
Jan-95
Jan-96

Market

Index
Jan-97

2

3

3

5008

4482

4329

Chicago

3

3

4

3363

3378

2662

New

2

4

4

5284

3879

3928

1

1

1

10000

10000

10000

Toronto

New

Toronto
Montreal

York

York

Toronto
Toronto

Los Angeles
l_fiami

2

3

2

6867

5083

5346

Vancouv

Los Angeles

2

3

5

5102

3795

2395

Toronto

Boston

2

2

2

5184

5184

6574

Toronto

Tamps/St.

2

3

2

5000

3600

6800

Toronto

San Francisco

2

2

2

6250

6250

6250

Montreal

_/fiami

2

0

2

5022

Vancouv

San Francisco

2

4

3

6159

Calgary

Los Angeles

2

2

2

Montreal

Chicago

2

2

2

Montreal

Los Angeles

1

1

Toronto

Philadelphia

1

Montreal

Boston

Toronto

Dallas/FW

Toronto

Pet

n.a

5000

2649

3333

5555

5000

5000

5400

5095

5439

1

10000

10000

10000

2

2

10000

5007

5016

2

2

2

5002

5555

5312

1

1

1

10000

10000

10000

Atlanta

0

I

2

10000

5398

Toronto

Honolulu

1

2

2

10000

6701

7812

Toronto

Detroit

1

1

1

10000

10000

10000

n.a
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ABSTRACT: Airline profitability
depends on airlines'
cost competitiveness
and their ability to price above costs. And the ability to set prices above cost
depends on market power and the firm's ability to make use of innovative
pricing techniques and market information.
In the past, some carriers have
been profitable without being cost competitive
because they were able to
charge exorbitant
prices to consumers.
Increased
competition
in the
international
air transport markets have put pressures on carriers' ability to
raise prices.
At the same time, input prices have been increasing
continuously.
To counter-act
such trends, airlines have made tremendous
efforts to improve e_ciency
and productivity in order to cut cost. Using a
yearly panel of 22 major airlines over the 1986-95 period, this paper
exan_ines
airlines'
profitability
changes
by examining
changes
in
productivity
and their ability to price above cost. The study found that
European and Asian carriers consistently improved productivity
throughout
the period even during the time of rising profitability,
achieving
higher
productivity
growth than North American carriers. However, European and
Asian carriers exgerienced
much faster decline in price recovery ability than
North American carriers, because their input prices have increased rapidly
and airfares have declined under the pressures
of. increased competition.
Overall, airline profitability
have improved during the 1990s.
INTRODUCTION

International
skies have been substantially
liberalized
since the
early 1980s. Like many other industries, the international airline industry
is becoming increasingly
exposed to the pressures of the market-place
as
deregulation
and liberalization
generally
has two conflicting
pressures
on output prices,

processes advance.
Increased competition
effects on the firms: it creates downward
and it creates incentives
for improving
1
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productivity and efficiency (Spence, 1986). In the international
air transport
marke;, the increased competition
(together with increasing
input pri_s)
has in many cases led to decline in firm profits, as carrier,s' monopoly
positions are challenged.
Profitability
is an important factor contributing
to airlines'
survival.
Many airlines have been forced to undertake
major
restructuring
in order to reverse the declining
profit by improving
productivity
and efficiency.
A number of studies, such as Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985),
Morrison and Winston (1986, 1995), Bruiting and Hu (1988), and Antoniou
(1992), have addressed the issue of airline profitability,.
These studies
either posit possible relationships
between profitability
and a number of
potential
pertinent variables, or test such relationships
analysis.
In this study, we take a somewhat different
the underlying
dimensions
of airline profitability.

through regreszlon
approach to examine
In particular,
the

American Productivity
Center (APC) model is used to decompose changes
in airline
profitability
into two components
capturing
changes
in
productivity
and price recovery ability ('Miller, 1984, Banker, Chang, and
Majumdar,
1993, 1996).
The A,PC model is gross-profit
oriented and
focuses on total factor productivity.
Profitability is defined as the function
of productivity
and price recovery.
The paper is organized
as follows:
Section 2 describe the A.PC
model; Section 3 briefly describes the sampleairlines
and the data; the APC
model is applied to explain changes in the performance
of the world's 22
major airlines in Section 4; Section. 5 contains a summary and concluding
remarks.
TH_. APC

MODEL
The APC model is based on actual quantities

and prices of outputs

and inputs over a period of time. Changes in profitability are defined as the
product of changes in productivity and changes in price recovery. The total
dollar effects of both productivity and price recoy.ery are used to explain
changes in profitability from one period to another. For ou"tputs and inputs,
dollar values are determined
by multiplying
a physical quantity by unit
price. Change in profitability is m_ed
by the comparison
between
relative changes in values of outputs and inputs.
A profitability
change ratio is defined as the ra.tio of profitability
for period t to profitability for base period 0. It can be ¢xpr_
as:
I_ t

lity(PFTBLT)/

xo

.

ptyt/wtxt'"

pOyO/wO
2

xO

(1)
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where
y' is the output quantity at period t, t = 0, I, 2 .... T
p' is the price per unit of output at period t, t = 0,1,2 ..... T
x t is the input quantity at period t, t = 0, 1, 2 ..... T
w' is the price per unit of input at period t, t = _,,1,2 ..... T.
t = 0 is the base period.
Tiffs profitability change ratio can be decomposed
into changes ia
productivity, and changes in price recovery. The APC productivity
change
ratio (APRDT) is the ratio of the values of cttrrent period outputs to base
period outputs, divided by the ratio of the values of current period inputs to
base period inputs. It is expressed:

APRDT-

pOy,/poyo
w,x,/w,x o

Equation
(2) holds output prices constant
at base period levels while
capturing changes in output quantifies, and holds input prices con.s'tant at
current period levels while capturing changes ia input quantities.
The APC price recovery" ratio (APRCR) is the ratio of value of
outputs at current period prices to the value at base period prices, divided
by the ratio of the value of inputs at current period prices to the value at
base period prices. It is expressed:

p,y,/pOy,

APRCR

= w, xO/wOx o

(3)

Equation
(3) holds output constant
at current period level while output
prices are allowed to vary, and inputs are held constant at base period level
while input prices vary.
Equation (I) is the product of equations (2) and (3). Improvement
in productivity
performance
and/or price recovery
ability will lead to
improvement
in profitability.
This decomposition
is usegul for identifying
to what extent the change in profitability is irffluenced by changes in output
and input prices and by changes

in productivity.

SM_IPLE AIRLINES AND THE DATA
Sample

A Mines
The selected

significant

involvement

airlines

are

all international,

in scheduled

passenger

carriers,
services.

and
Some

have
of the

airlines are 100 percent state owned, some are private companies,
while
others have mixed ownerstfip.
For example,
Air France, Iberia and Thai
3
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International
companies.
airlines

are government

owned, while

the US carriers

Exhibit
1 provides
some recent descriptive
t. The size of the airlines, as measured by revenue

(lq.TK) in 1995, ranges from 2.2 billion RTK for
Systems
(SAS), to 19.6 billion R'rK for United
number of passengers
carried in 1995, it ranges
million in 1996) for Canadian Airlines International
(97 million in 1996) for Delta.
Aside from US carriers, most of the sample
international
services, some do not provide domestic

are all private

statistics of the
torme-kilometres

Scandinavian
Airlines
Airlines.
In terms of
fro,n 8.3 million (8.6
(CA/), to 87 million
airlines provide mainly
services
at all. Qantas,

Singapore
Airlines (SIA), Cathay Pacific and Japan Airlines (JAL) serve
mostly inter-continental
traffic, while US Air and SAS have a large
proportion

of their business in domestic or intra-continental
traffic.
Profitability performance varies greatly anlong the sample airlines.
British Airways, SIA and Northwest Airlines were the most profitable in
1995, with net income of US$"/40 million, US$622 million (US$624 million
in 1996), and US$ 506 million (U_536
million in 1996), respectively.
Air
France suffered the biggest loss, a net loss of US$581 million, in 1995.
Iberia and Canadian
Airlines International
(CA.I) also suffered losses in
1995, at a net loss ofUS$361
million and US$143 trdllion (US$137 million
in 1996), respectively.
CA/is the only airline in our sample that incurred
an operating loss z in 1995. All of the Asian carriers were able to achieve a
positive net income in 1995.
Data

Sources
A panel of 22 airlines over the 1986-1995 period forms the primary
data base for this study.
The annual data were compiled mainly from
Digest
of
Organization

Statistics
(ICAO),

published
by the International
Civil Aviation.
in particular, the annual series on Traffic,
Fleet-

Personnel,
and Financial
Data.
Additional
dat_ were obtained directly
from airline companies,
airlines'
annual reports, the Airline
Monitor,
IATA publications,
Statistics
Canada publications,
and other sources.
Outputs
Five categories
of airline outputs
are considered:
scheduled
passenger
service
(measured
in revenue tome. kilometres
or RTK),
scheduled
freight service (measured
in P,TK), mail, service (measured
in
R.TK), non scheduled
services (measured in KTK), and incidental services
(non airline businessas).
Incidental services include a wide variety of non
airline businesses
such as catering
services, ground handling,
aircraft
4
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maintenance
and reservation services for other airlines, sales of technology,
co_ulting
services, and hotel business.
A quantity index is constructed
for the incidental output in order
to include the incidental services in our analysis. The index is computed by
deflating the incidental revenues by a general price index constructed
using
the Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) index for GDP obtained from the Penn
World Table (Summers and Heston, 1991) and U.S. GDP deflator. The PPP
index adjusts for changes
in market exchange rates and changes in real
price levels of various countries relative to the U.S., and the US GDP
deflator ensures that the quandty index is comparable over time.
A multilateral
output index was formed by aggregating the five
categories
of outputs using the multilateral
index procedure proposed by
Caves, Christen,sen,
and Diewert (1982). Output price was then computed
by dividing

total revenues

by the aggregate

output index.

Inputs
We distinguish
five categories of input: labour, fuel, materials,
flight equipment,
and ground property and equipment (GPE). Labour input
is. measured
by total number of employees.
Fuel input is me.a_;ured in
gallons of fuel consumed.
For flight equipment,
a fleet quantity index is
constructed by aggregating
different types of aircraft using the translog
multilateral
index procedure proposed by Caves, Christen.sen, and Diewert
(1982).
The leasing price series 3 for these aircraft types are used as the
weights for aggregation.
The annual cost for each aircraft type is estimated
by the product of the lease price and the number of airplanes.
Total
annualized
aircraft cost is then computed as the sum across all categories
of aircraft.
The real stock of ground properties
and equipment (GPE) is
estimated using the perpetual inventory method. Under the assumption that
the flow of capital service is proportional
to the capital stock, the annual
cost of using GPE is computed by multiplying
the real GPE stock by a
GPE service price. The GPE service price is coustructed
using the method
proposed by Christensen and Jorgenson (1969) which accounts for interest,
depreciation,
corporate income and property taxes, and capital gains or
losses.
Since. the GPE costs are small relative to the costs of flight
equipment,

these two categories

of capital inputs are further aggregated

into

a single capital stock series using the translog multilateral
".index procedure.
The materials input contains all other inputs, not included in any of the
input categories
disc_
above (labour,
fuel, and capital).
As such,
materials cost is the catch-all cost category, and _us includes numerous
items including airport fees, sales commissions,
passenger meals, employee
travel, consultants,
non-labour repair and maintenance expenses, stationery,
5
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and other purchased goods and services. The materials cost is computed by
subtracting labour, fuel and capital input costs from the total operating cost
reported in ICAO's Financial
Data. As in the case of incidental output,
it is n_.,es._ary
to construct a materials quantity index in order to include the
materials
input in our analysis.
Since the materials cost also includes
numerous
items and activities,
the same general price index is used to
deflate the materials cost to compute the materials quantity index.
As in the case of output, the five categories
of inputs were
aggregated to form a multilateral
input index using the translog multilateral
index procedure
proposed
by Caves, Christeusen
and Diewert (1982) 4.
Price per unit of input was then calculated by dividing the total input cost
by the aggregate input index.
Note that total input cost here includes costs
of labour,
equipment
cost.
since

fuel, materials,
(GPE).

flight

equipment,

and

ground

property

and

Airline profit is calculated by dividing total revenue by total input
This measure reflects economic profit rather than operating profit,
the costs of aircraft and GPE are included in the total input cost.

PROFITABILITY) PRODUCTI'I.qTYAND PRICE RECOVERY

P _TTER/NS

This sectionexamines the changes in airlines'
profitability
in
relationtoproductivity
change ratioand pricerecoveryratio.
North American

Carriers

Exl'dbits 2-9 present the APC ratios for the eight North American
carriers.
Between 1986 and 1995, Northwest (NW), United Airlines (UA),
Air Canada (AC), American Airlines (AA), Delta, and Canadian Airlines
International
(CA.I) increased profitability by 12%, 11%, g%, 5.5%, and
2%, respectively.
In contrast, US Air experienced about 6% decline in its
profitability.
There were some fluctuations in Continental's
profitability
performance
during the sample period, but not significant.
Most North American carriers improved their productivity
during
the period, with Delta achieving the highest pro_iuctivit,) growth at 34%,
followed closely by CAI at 29.8%.
On the other hand, the carriers'
price
recovery ratios generally declined during the period, with the exception of
Continental.
Delta and CAI experienced substantial decline in their price
recovery ratios, both at 21%. Profitability
improvement
from productivity
growth was off-set by the negative impact of falling price recovery ratio. As
a result, only modest profitability
improvement
_
observed at Delta and
CAI during the period. Northwest, United and Air Canada also achieved
considerable
productivity
growth, 21%, 25% and 19%, restx_tively,
but
experienced less decline in price recovery ratio (7%
11% and 9*,
6
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respectively).
Asa result,theywereableto achieve
higherprofitability
improvement,
12%,11%and 8%, respectively,
banerican
Airlines
improved productivity growth by 120/_ and endured 7% decline in its price
recovery
ratio. The net result was a 4.7% increase in profitability.
Continental
is the only North American
carder which experienced
a
negative productivity growth (7%) during the sample period. It is also the
only North American carrier which improved its price recovery ratio ('/%).
As a result, there was little change in Continental's
profitability between
1986 and 1995. US Air achieved a 16% improvement
in productivity, but
suffered a 20*/, loss in its price recovery ratio. Consequently,
it experienced
a 6% decline in its profitability.
It is the only North American carder
which experienced
falling profitability during the sample period.
Overall,
the improvement
in productivity
growth was due to
enhanced efficiency and changes in airlines' network characteristics
(Oum
and Yu, 1995). For example, average stage length of the carders generally
increased during the sample period (Oum and Yu, 1997), leading to higher
observed productivity level. The declining price recovery ability could be
attributed to the fact that input prices have been rising faster than airline
yield (in nominal term) in North America ). Continental
was the only
carrier in North America which saw its yield rose faster than its input
prices, thus improvement
in its price recovery ratio.
European

Carriers
Ex.hibits 10-16

present

the APC ratios

for the seven

European

ca_ers.
Among the European
carriers,
KLM and BA made the most
sigrtificant profitability
improvement
during the period, 15% and 14%,
respectively.
Their profitability
improvement
was achieved
through
sigrdficant productivity improvement
of 43% and 36%, respectively, despite
the considerable
loss of their price recovery
ratio (20% and 17%,
respectively).
The declining price recovery ability was caused mostly by
input prices rising substantially
faster than airline yields.
Swissair and
Lufthansa
also suffered 17% decline in price recovery ratio, same as BA.
Their productivity improvement
(28 O_ and 24 0'/,, respectively), however, was
not as significant as BA's. Consequently,
Swissair and Lufthansa were not
able to achieve as much profitability improvement
as BA. SAS and Iberia
increased their profitability
by 8% and 9%, respectively.
This was a result
of productivity growth of respective 13% and 16%, and a decrease in price
recovery ratio of 8% and 9°/',, respectively.
Air France appears to have
made substantial
improvement
in productivity, but it also experienced
significant decline in its price recovery ratio. The result was a mere 2.5%
increase in its profitability.
While most European carriers suffered loss in
7
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pricerecovery
abilitybecause
ofyieldincreases
notbeingabletokeepup
withincreases
in inputpdces,
Air France's
average
yieldactually declined
in nominal
Asian

term between

1986 and 1995.

Carriers

Exhibits
17-23 presents the APC ratios for the Asian carriers.
Qantas made the most significant profitability
improvement
at 23%. This
is a result of 32% productivity growth and 7% decline in price recovery
ratio, which was due mostly to the fact that input prices were rising faster
than average yields. Singapore Airlines and Thai Airways also improved
profitability
considerably.
Again, this is attributable
to high productivity
growth, 20% and 48% respectively,
after compensating
for losses in price
recovery ratio, 9% and 23%, respectively.
Korean Air achieved the most
significant
productivity
growth during the period at 53%. However, it also
suffered the largest decline in price recovery ratio (34°/,), which was a result
of 65% increase in input prices overpowering
the 10% increase in average
yields.
Consequently,
Korean Air was not able to make any significant
profitability
improvement.
Japan Airlines (JAL) was able to make modest
profitability
improvement
(4%) despite a modest productivity growth (7%),
because it was able to maintain its price recovery ratio during the period.
All Nippon
Airways
(ANA)
and
Cathay
Pacific
suffered
considerable
losses in profitability
despite productivity
growth of 9% and
14%, respectively.
Again, this was caused by input prices rising faster than
yields.
This was particularly
true in the case of Cathay Pacific: 50%
increa._ in input prices versus 13% increase in average yields.
Comparison
among North American,
European and Asian Carriers
To compare across carders in different continents,
average change
ratios for North American,
European and Asian carders are reported in
Exhibits 24, 25 and 26, respectively.
North American carriers, on average,
saw their profitability improved between 1986 and 1988 desvite of a slight
decline in productivity.
This was a result of improved pdoe recovery ratio.
Since 1988, however, North American
carriers'
price recovery ratio has
been consistently
declining.
On the other hand, productivity change ratio
rose monotonically
from 1991 to 1995.
The combined effects of lower
productivity
ratio and lower price recovery ratio led to lower profitability
during
1990-1992.
Between
1992 to 1995,
the positive
impact of
productivity
improvement
was able to over-power
the negative impact of
falling price recovery ratio, resulting in profitability
improvement
for the
carriers.
European

carriers

also experienced
8

improved

profitability between
Oum and Yu

1986 and 1988.
However, this improvement
was a result of improved
productivity
despite of a slight fall in price recovery ratio.
In general,
European carders consistently
achieved significant
productivity growth
during the pe.riod, except for a slight stumble
during the 1990-1991
recession.
At the same time, their price recovery
ratio dropped
substantially.
Profitability
-;,'as at the lowest point in 1990, remained
essentially
unchanged
between 1990 and 1993, then improved noticeably
thereafter.
Asian carriers followed a similar changing
pattern to that of
European
carriers.
They achieved significant
profitability
beo, veen 1986 and 1988, higher than their North American

improvement
and European

counterparts.
Like the European carriers, this was mostly attributed
to
productivity
growth.
Asian carriers
also consistently
improved
their
productivity
during the period, while suffering significant fall in their price
recovery ability. Profitability
peaked in 1988, then dropped considerably
between 1988 and 1990, and had generally improved since 1990.
SUMI'vLARY

AND

CONCLUDING

REMARKS

This paper examines changes in the profitability, productivity
and
price recovery of the world's 22 major airlines over a ten year period. The
increased competition
in the international
air transport markets have put
pressures on carriers'
ability to raise prices. However, input prices have
been increasing continuously,
especially in traditionally low-cost countries.
Cortsequenfly,
the overall results show that airlines have experienced
continuing
significant
drops in their price recovery ratios during the tenyear period. To counter-act
such trends, airlines have made tremendous
efforts to improve efficiency, as borne out by the steady increasing
trend in
productivity
change ratio during the period. As a result, overall profitability
of the airlines have improved in the 1990s.
The results further show that European carriers and Asian carriers
consistently
improved productivity throughout
theperiod
even during the
time of rising profitability.
This is particularly
true for Eiu'opean carriers.
The liberalization
measures undertaken
in Europe via package #2 (1990)
and #3 (1993) appear
to have made significant
impact on carriers'
performance.
As a result, European
carders
have achieved
higher
productivity
growth than Asian and North American. carriers.
North
American
carriers, on the other hand, experienced
a rather "flat" period in
productivity
growth between
1986 and 1991, then started to exhibit
significant
productivity
improvement
after incurring losses in profitability
during the recessions.
This "flat" period may be explained by the fact that
the US carriers achieved
tremendous
productivity
growth immediately
9
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followingtheUS

domestic deregulation
in 1978, then entered a "plateau"
in the late 1980s.
European carriers aod Asian carriers experienced
considerable
losses in price recovery
ratio, much more than North American carders.
This is because their input prices have increased rapidly, while air fares
have declined due to increased competition.
Although overall irfipacts have been positive, the study shows that
different dynamics at work at the finn level. Some c_rriers seem to have
period

:7-i_:.-7 . "

had difficulty adjusting to the deregulated environment
and improving their
profitability
and productivity
in a sustained
manner,
while others are
consistent
in the patterns of improvement
of the various components
of their
performance.
It is important for carriers to achieve high efficiency and
productivity,
thus lower cost.
It is also important
for carders to price
intelligently
and properly manage yields in order to maintain and enhance
their price recovery ability.
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NOTES
1. More discussions

on the airlines

2. CAI earned a modest
(Daniels, 1998).
3. The aircraR
Inc..
4. Revenue

leasing

can be found

C_.$5.4million

shares (cost shares)

in Oum and Yu (1995).

profit in 1997, its first since 1988

price data were kindly

supplied/o
.-,

are used as the weights

us by A_a'nark,
..
in aggregating

outputs (inputs).
As a result, higher weights are given to outputs with
higher fields.
Similarly,
more expensive input factors are given higher
weights in aggregating
inputs.
5. Note that airline

fares in real terms have been consistently.declining

over the last three decades (Boeing,

1997).
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1 GLOBALIZATION

IN TIlE AIR TRANSPORT

INDUSTRY

Much is being made of the growing trend towards globalization
ofthe air transport
industry. Airline officials, economists, policy makers, and others publicly trumpet the
virtues of an air transport industry with fewer trade barriers, less government intervention,
increased levels ofprivatization,
and more efficient airlines (Kaspar 1988; Gialloreto
1988; and OECD 1993 and 1997). For these observers, globalization
is not only a reality,
but a welcome sign of progress in an industry that has been characterized historically as
highly regulated and influenced by politics, instead of market forces. This paper examines
the trend towards globalization
in the air transport industry with special focus on the
behavior of governments
and firms, namely airlines, and the tactics or strategies employed
by these groups in their efforts to shape the industry to meet their preferred outcomes.
The
central issue in this study is whether the liberalization
or regulatory reform that emerges
from the interaction of governments
and airlines actually produces a globalized industry
that is better situated to serve the air transport needs of the global community,
or a
restructured industry that is better situated to serve the interests of the dominant airlines
and the industrialized

economies

from which they operate.

This paper is distilled from a more comprehensive
project on the implications of
globalization
and liberalization in air transport.
It is organized to give the reader with
some background in the political economy of the air transport industry, but perhaps a
limited knowledge
of the concept of globalization,
a sufficient foundation of knowledge

to

make sense of the analysis and arguments about the current trends and probable future of
the industry. Thus, after an initial discussion of the concept of globalization, the second
section of the paper briefly outlines the history of the international
air transport industry.
The third section discusses the American roots of current international
liberalization
efforts and the particular role that American airlines play in the political and economic
transformation
of this industry. This discussion is followed by an update ofthe industry,
which is changing quickly and, in some cases, quite dramatically.
The final two sections
offer some analysis and conclusions
about the ramifications
of the current trends in
liberalization
of the air transport industry with special attention on the impact of these
trends on policy making and economic growth and development in both the industrialized
and developing worlds. Two cases, one focusing narrowly on St. Louis, an American city,
and the other focusing broadly on Africa, help bring the theoretical and abstract discussion
into the real world of policy making and commerce.
1.1 Globalization:

What is it and is it really global?

There is considerable
literature on the phenomenon known commonly as globalization.
This literature is characterized
generally by its inability to carefully define what is meant
by the term "globalization."
In international relations theory, the literature splits along
familiar lines when discussing the concept, with liberal theorists seeing globalization as a
function of increasing, and for the most part welcomed, interdependence;
and realists
seeing globalization
as ephemeral or inconsequential.
For liberal scholars,

globalization

new plane of cooperation

is part of the evolution

and peace that is facilitated

of the international

by increasing

system to a

levels of

communication
and interaction. Not surprisingly, air transport is included among the
various technological
means by which the global community is able to come together to
exchange not only goods and service, but also ideas and mutual interests. Moreover, the
globalization
of air transport has special significance
for liberal theorists who contend that

an efficient global air transport system facilitates economic exchanges that will help foster
further integration of developing world economies into themore successful economic
system of the industrialized
world (Jonsson 1981). These scholars join together with
increasingly influential community of scholars and policy makers who firmly believe that
liberalization of trade in goods and services will serve the needs of the global community
in ways that the state-centered
policies of the past were incapable (Button 1991).
Realists and skeptics of the positive impact of globalization
continue to stress the abiding
relevance of the nation-state and power relationships between nation-states in the
international system. For realists, the transformation
of the air transport industry is not
troubling, since much of what has happened, such as the increasing number of"open
skies" agreements, can be explained as a function of power politics, in which the United
States has been able to forcefully represent the interests of its own airlines (Nayar 1995).
This explanation is not completely satisfying, as will be shown later in this paper, but there
is some merit to the claim that nation-states,
powerful have attempted with some success
their needs and interests.

particularly the economically and political
to shape liberalization and globalization
to fit

A more intriguing position on the issue of globalization,
and the one that is presented in
this paper, is that despite realist claims, the nation-state
is losing its grasp on the political
economy of the air transport industry. This argument has its foundation in the way in
which airlines, especially American carriers, seized on new technologies
and strategies that
allow them to pursue their competitive
advantage in the air transport industry. It is these
technologies
and strategies that fundamentally changed the way in which international air
travel is conducted, and dramatically changed the relationship between governments and
airlines in the development and implementation
of national airline regulations and
policies.
The transformation, which is discussed in detail later, initiated a trend towards
liberalization of the global air transport industry. This liberalization has become
synonymous in the minds of many industry observers, policy makers, and scholars with
globalization.
The widely accepted conclusion is that current liberalization efforts will
effectively

globalize

the industry and the global economy

will reap the benefits

of a more

efficient air transport system. This study questions the theoretical and empirical basis for
this conclusion and argues instead that the character of current liberalization efforts will
lead to a mix of positive and negative economic and political outcomes. The primary
argument is that the globalization of the air transport industry is not really global and will
create problems that are not easily solved.
2 HISTORY

OF AIR TRANSPORT

REGULATORY

REGIMES

It is impossible to understand the current trends and issues in the air transport industry
without some background
in the foundations of aviation regulation. While, early
discussions about sovereignty of the air can be traced to Europe prior to the development
of practical aircraft, most scholars begin their coverage of aviation regulation with the
Chicago Conference
of 1944. The Chicago Conference
established four basic principles
that have been more or less upheld since 1944, but have come under implicit challenge
from current liberalization and globalization efforts. These principles are:
•

Sovereignty
- each state has complete
space above its territory.

and exclusive

sovereignty

over the air

•

Equal opportunities
- all states are given equal fights to participate
regulated through international
agreement.

•

Non-discrimination
- international
on the basis of nationality.

•

Freedom to designate
national carrier.

aviation

regulations

- each state has right and freedom

in aviation

must not discriminate
to designate

its

2.1 ICAO and multilateral
cooperation
These principles were embodied in a newly created international
institution - the
International
Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO).
ICAO has been held out as evidence

of

multilateral
cooperation
in the management
of international
air transport, but this claim is
less compelling when placed in the broader context of aviation regulation.
Despite the
efforts of some nations to develop and implement a multinational
air transport services
agreement at the Chicago Conference,
there was sufficient reluctance on the part of others
so as to leave the negotiations of air traffic rights to individual pairs or dyads of states.
The result was an aviation system regulated by a series of bilateral agreements in which
two sovereign nations decide between themselves the nature of the traffic fights and
standards of operation between and within their airspace. Not surprisingly, there are over
1,200 such bilateral air service agreements (Abeyratne
1996, World Tourism Organization
1994).
2.2 Power politics and bilateral air service agreements
The bilateral agreements typically spell out the nature of the relationship between the
governments and airlines of the two nations. Specifically, the bilaterals stipulate which of
the various "freedoms" will be included in the bilateral. In other words, the bilateral
codifies standards, tariffs, schedules, landing rights, capacity levels, safety regulations,
exemptions, and other operational
issues. The model for most bilateral agreements
is the
so-called Bermuda Agreement,
signed by the United States and the United Kingdom
1946 and renegotiated
as Bermuda II in 1977 (Sochor 1991).

in

The bilateral regime, as it is ot_en called, is held up as evidence for the abiding relevance
of power politics in the air transport industry ('Nayar 1995). According to realists and
critics of the regime, bilateral agreements tend to favor the most powerful state in the
dyad, effectively creating a asymmetrical
distribution of benefits from the trade in air
services between the two countries.
Realists, as theorists of international
relations, are not
unhappy with this conclusion since it seems to confirm their hypotheses about primacy of
national power.
The claims of the critics of the regime are much more interesting in
general and are especially relevant for this study. These critics argue that the bilateral
framework
is an anachronism
in an age in which other sectors ofthe international
economy

are liberalizing

at break neck speed and doing so primarily

through multilateral

agreements and institutions. Bilaterals, they say, are preventing the globalization of an
efficient air transport system that could increase and expand global economic development
(Feldman 1994; Oum et al 1993; and Hulbauer and Findlay 1996).
3 REGULATORY

REFORM

IN THE U.S. AND THE PUSH FOR OPEN SKIES

Not surprisingly,
much of this criticism comes from governments and airlines that would
rather operate under a renegotiated
bilateral system or a more liberal, open skies
arrangement. Momentum
towards open skies began nearly two decades ago, shortly aRer
domestic regulatory reform in the US in 1978. The US government
publicly committed

itselfto an international open skies regime in which the international air transport industry
would undergo regulatory reform much like the domestic reform undertaken in the US.
The international
liberalization effort got off to a slow start, in part because the US
domestic air travel industry began a tumultuous period of competition,
acquisitions,
bankruptcies, and consolidation
which ran through the 1980s and has only recently showed
signs of calming. By 1990, however, it became clear to US airlines and the government
agencies that regulate them, that American carriers were ready to take on the rest of the
world and forge ahead with political efforts to open the skies (USDOT 1994).
Several
United,

major airlines in the United States, especially the so-called
and American) survived the fierce competition
of domestic

Big Three (Delta,
regulatory reform

and

liberalization
to emerge as efficient, competitive
carders ready to do battle with foreign
airlines. An important edge held by the American carriers was their extensive networks

in

the lucrative US domestic air travel market. One of the other important ramifications
of
domestic regulatory reform was the emergence of the hub and spoke system within the US
market. The air travel market is now characterized
by hub airports and spoke or feeder
airports (Doganis 1991).
3.1 The emergence
of the hub and spoke system
The basic structure of the hub and spoke system is quite simple and it reflects airlines'
efforts to consolidate operations and do business more efficiently.
An airline, such as
Trans World Airlines (TWA) which operates a major hub out of St. Louis, Missouri, will
funnel its passengers through its hub instead of offering point-to-point
non-stop service
between numerous city-pairs.
A passenger who wants to fly TWA from Seattle,
Washington to Atlanta, Georgia would have to change planes in St. Louis where she will
join other passengers from around the country
another TWA flight to their final destination.
hubs limit choices, increase travel times, and
mishandled
baggage. The practical effect for

who fly into St. Louis before boarding
The practical effect for passengers is that
increase chances of transfer delays and
the airlines is mixed. The hub carrier

benefits from having considerable
control over originating traffic at their hubs (70-75% is
not uncommon
for so-called fortress hubs) and a cost-effective
means for managing
operations.
Non-hub carriers or carriers operating out of someone else's hub suffer
because the strength
of the hub carriers at their respective hub airports (Doganis 1991 and
GRA, Inc. 1994).
While the hub and spoke system has had considerable impact on the structure of the
American airline industry and the American airport system, it also has implications for the
liberalization of the international air travel market. For some observers, the hub system
conveys even further advantages on already strong American carriers, such that the gains
from more liberal skies will be illusory for those foreign carriers that might operate under
the more open regime.

This issue is taken up in more detail later in the paper.

3.2 The International
Airline Competition
Act
The US government,
acting on behalf of its airlines,

passed

legislation

in 1979 that called

for the liberalization of the global air transport market. Not surprisingly, policy makers
and American carriers believed they could compete effectively against the foreign airlines.
As noted earlier, this initiative got off to a very slow start, in part because the US airlines
were busy trying to kill each other off in fare wars, acquisitions,
and other commercial
battles for supremacy of the lucrative US market. In a rather odd turn of events, the
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carriers that primarily represented
the US in the international
market, Pan Am and TWA,
took severe beatings because they lacked crucial feeder networks within the US domestic
market. The Big Three, relying on their substantial domestic networks turned an eager eye
to the international
market, and asked the government to do something to help.
There is not enough space here to detail all the bargaining, negotiations, and rhetoric
associated with the US government's
efforts to cajole, pressure, or leverage the skies open
to American carriers, but one point is important for this study. The airlines were at a
minimum impatient and unhappy with the lack of progress being made in opening the
skies, and more likely, worried about their relative positions in the global air transport
market once it was eventually liberalized.
The thinking among airline executives was not
if, but when the market would be open, and more importantly,
would they be ready to
compete (Gialloreto
1988; and Oum et al 1993) This lack of patience and the competitive
urge to gain advantage led to a number of important innovations in the way airlines do
business in the international
market. These innovations dramatically
reshaped the
character of the airline business and what a liberalized or open air transport market would
actually

look like.

4 NEW STRATEGIES

AND TECHNOLOGIES

When governments
in North America, Europe, and Asia began to talk about "open skies"
or some other liberalization
or restructuring
of the bilaterals that governed air services
between their various countries, the airlines watched carefully and in most cases actively
lobbied for their various interests to be preserved.
As one might imagine though, the
interest of one US airline may not be the same as the interests of all US airlines. The
introduction
of new technologies
and commercial
strategies exacerbated
these potential
differences
and created new problems for airline competition and government policy
makers

and negotiators.

Among the most intriguing applications
of new technology to the airline business is the
development
and expanded use ofeomputer reservation systems (CRS). On its face, CRS
seems like just another computer-based
information or management
tool by which an
airline can better manage its sales of tickets, its marketing, and its service to its customers.
Upon more critical inspection though, and taking into account the way that CRS has been
used in the airline industry, this technology plays a tremendous role in the way business is
done, the way in which airlines compete, and the way a liberalized market might work. It
is therefore, important to understand how CKS and strategies that develop from its
application have restructured
the relationship between governments
and airlines and
transformed
the market itself.
4.1 Computer Reservation
Systems (CRS)
CRS technology allowed airlines to apply computer-based management and marketing
tools to their operations, with the intention of making the process of reserving seats,
processing tickets, and tracking consumer demand more efficiently.
Frequent air travelers
might wonder at this point whether CRS really makes a difference since it seems that air
travel still involves an endless hassle of exchanging
pieces of paper, confirmation
numbers, and phone calls in order to make a single flight. CRS has made a difference
though in that the booking of flights and itinerary information
is much better managed
whether the consumer uses a travel agent or books his own flight. But this is not really the
important issue when one considers the impact of CRS on the air transport industry.
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The technological

impact of CRS is only understood when one considers

the broader

application of the technology in the form of new strategies, namely code-sharing
and yield
management.
Neither of these commercial strategies would be possible without CRS.
Moreover, the application of CRS technology in code-sharing and yield management
changes the character of competition
in the airline industry in ways that are not yet
completely understood.
The nature of liberalization or giobalization of the industry cannot
be understood then unless CRS, code-sharing, and yield management
are examined
alongside other trends and issues that are shaping the evolution of modern air transport
(Learning 1993; Shenton 1994; GRA Inc. 1994).
4.2 Code sharing
Each airline in the world is assigned a two-character
code that is used to designate that
carrier in all aspects of official airline business. For the purposes of reservations systems,
the code serves as the identification of an airline on a travel agent's computer screen.
Thus, a travel agent will read the two-character
code and the flight number to determine
which airline and which flight is being booked. While seemingly mundane, this is an
important issue in any analysis of the air transport market, because of the development and
application
ofcode-sharing.
Code-sharing

is an agreement

by two carriers to list flights under one carrier's

code so that

a passenger does not know that she is actually booking the various legs of her flight on two
separate airlines. From the airlines perspective, this process is designed to serve the
consumer better, since "seamless"
travel is available to more destinations.
Consider, for
example, a passenger who wants to fly from Carbondale,
Illinois to London, England.
Obviously there are no direct flights from Carbondale
to London, so the passenger realizes
that connecting
flights will be necessary.
Two possibilities emerge that illustrate the codesharing issue.
In the first possible itinerary, the passenger calls a travel agent and books a
flight from Marion, the local airport, to St. Louis to connect with a TWA flight
direct to Gatwick Airport, which serves London. Although the Marion- - St.
Louis portion of the trip will be made on a propeller.driven
aircraft operated by
a commuter airline, code-sharing
shows the trip as seamless travel on TWA.
In the second possibility, the passenger decides she doesn't want to fly TWA
across the Atlantic so she asks her travel agent to determine which other
American carriers offer service to London. Her travel agent says she can get a
USAirways flight from St. Louis to Heathrow with a stop in Pittsburgh.
Because of the code-sharing
arrangement between USAirways and British
Airways (BA), the leg of the flight from Pittsburgh to London will actually be
on BA.
None of this might matter to the passenger, if she is simply concerned about the cheapest
fares or convenient
times. It would matter, however, if she doesn't want to fly on
commuter aircrat_ or does not want to fly a foreign carrier. From the consumer's
perspective,
the lack of transparency
in the CRS can amount to false advertising.
Why then do airlines and governments
seem to find code-sharing so attractive?
sharing is attractive to airlines because it allows them to expand, in some cases

Code-
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dramatically, the destinations that they can market as part of their route network.
Moreover, the airlines who conclude code-sharing agreements with airlines which serve
markets which they cannot serve themselves because of economic or political reasons,
effectively avoid the expense or the regulations that constrain their operations.
It should come as no surprise then that code-sharing has been used aggressively by carriers
who want to gain access to new markets, but cannot afford to do so or are prohibited by
various governmental or capacity restrictions.
Code-sharing between US carriers and
European carriers illustrate the attractiveness of this strategy for solving a variety of
difficulties.
In the case of Northwest Airlines and USAir, both airlines suffered during the
fierce competition after domestic regulatory reform and teetered on the edge of collapse.
In both cases, the airlines were saved by cash-infusions coming from KLM and British
Airways, respectively
(Tarry 1996). A significant part of each deal was the conclusion
of
code-sharing agreements that would give the European carriers substantial access to the
US domestic market without having to jump seemingly insurmountable
political and
economic hurdles that limited their access. At the same time, the US airlines were able to
stave off collapse and market service to new foreign destinations which were actually part
of KLM and BA's existing route structure.
The political importance of these and other code-sharing arrangements is that airlines,
whether explicitly or implicitly, were able to circumvent the governmental
process which
was meeting only limited success in opening the skies between Europe, North America,
and Asia. With CRS and code-sharing, airlines were able to do what government
negotiators were not. Code-sharing
developed quickly into strategic alliances or marketing
alliances in which as many as five airlines around the world jointly market and coordinate
their flights (Shenton 1994, Learning 1993). Airline executives realized that code-sharing
and alliance
the political

strategies were not only critical while they waited for governments
to sort out
problems associated with opening the skies, but would be especially important

in determining
who would dominate the skies once opened. In that vein, American
Airlines and British Airways have proposed a code-sharing alliance which would join the
two dominant carriers' route networks together to create a global giant (Morrocco
1996).
Ironically, American was among the most vociferous opponents of the KLM and BA deals
with Northwest
and USAirways.
4.3 Yield management
A more recent technique in the airline industry is also an off-shoot of the computer
reservation systems technology.
Airline managers recognized that the information
available to them through CRS would not only help them market their product better, but
could also allow them to squeeze profits in ways that were previously unimaginable.
Yield
management
refers simply to the computer-based software that allows airlines to market
each seat on each aircraft in ways that reap the highest profit. Instead of offering simple
fares for each class, airlines can now tailor fares and discounts to increase the probability
that planes will take-off with as many seats filled as possible. Fares axe constantly
adjusted to account for changing demand and more importantly the willingness of the
flying public to pay certain fares. With aggressive yield management,
it is possible that the
person sitting next to you paid over three times the amount you paid. Conversely, so you
don't become too excited, you might have paid three times as much as she did. Most
passengers understand
that fares vary according to advanced purchase criteria, but most
don't consider the disparity in actual fares (Saporito 1995)

Code-sharing, strategic alliances, and yield management techniques are mentioned here
because they have and will continue to shape the competitive environment in the air
transport industry. A better understanding of the extent to which these technologies and
strategies are used to thwart competition is critical to any analysis or forecast of the global
air travel market. In a recent statement by the US Department of Transportation (DOT),
these issues were raised as potentially anti-competitive
(Transcript 1997). The DOT noted
that CRS can be used to effectively exclude smaller and lower-cost carriers from the
choices readily available to the consumer. Larger carriers own CRS and structure them in
ways that are not entirely transparent or fair according to the DOT. The DOT went on to
say that yield management
pricing.

techniques

are raising serious questions about predatory

The inherent flexibility and dynamic pricing that make yield management
techniques
attractive to the airlines also make them effective tools for rapid adjuslraent to low-cost
competition.
It is a difficult question whether this use of the technology is anticompetitive
or merely an appropriate application of business tools that allow for more
efficient operation.
Consumer groups argue the former, claiming that airlines who use
yield management
do not do so transparently.
They point to airline objections over
publication of average fare information
as evidence that the airlines are trying to hide
something.
The DOT expresses similar concern in that fares which decline to meet or beat
new low-cost carriers, almost always go back up when the competition
has been
eliminated.
Again, the question of whether this if fair or not is difficult, but to the extent
that the larger carriers
management
systems,

are more likely not to be able to afford and manage
it seems that low-cost entrants are at a disadvantage.

yield

The successful application of these technologies
in the North American and European
markets raises important questions about the nature of a more liberal international
air
transport market. In both the United States and the European Union it seems that the
technological
and strategic innovations employed by the successful airlines have
outstripped
both the regulatory and policy making communities
in those polities. The US
Department
of Transportation
and the US Department
of Justice seemingly made early
decisions on code-sharing
and strategic alliances with insufficient data and analysis about
the impact of such arrangements.
Similarly, the EU is grappling with the implications
of
the proposed alliance between American Airlines and British Airways. To be fair, the
difficulty of making policies on-the-fly should not be underestimated.
The industry is
changing quickly and policy makers have the difficult task of sorting through the claims
and counterclaims
of the airlines themselves.
How, for example, should a policy maker
who listened to American Airlines rail against the British Airways bailout of USAir
interpret the proposed alliance? The key perhaps is to remember that individual airlines
are best thought of as representatives
of their own interests.
Despite their occasional
claims of representing
what is good for the consumer or their nation, the airlines are most
interested in their own success. One cannot blame them for this, but it is something that
must be remembered
when we consider the effort of the dominant airlines tO further
liberalize the global air transport
and the interests of the dominant
future.

system.
carriers

By keeping the events of the past several years
in mind we can paint a plausible picture of the
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S THE FUTURE

OF GLOBAL

AIR TRANSPORT

The future will most likely be shaped by current trends and ideas about liberalization.
As
of this writing, it is fairly clear that major airlines and governmental actors in the
international system are no longer talking about whether to liberalize or not, but when and
how. Moreover, it seems that discussions about air transport are being shaped by trends in
other industries and sectors, in which liberalization is in full-swing.
In these industries the
concepts of privatization, elimination
of subsidies, elimination of cross-subsidization,
and
the implementation of standards are realities. Air transport seems to be heading in the
same direction.
Liberalization
of air transport has a number of components.
This study examines
of these components with specific attention to their ramifications
for the industry
flying consumer. These components
ownership, subsidies, cross-subsidies,

include reform in the areas ofcabotage,
and privatization.

several
and the

foreign

5.1 Cabotage and foreign ownership
Among the most difficult components of a comprehensive
liberalization package are
foreign ownership and cabotage. It is common for nations to impose limits on foreign
ownership of its airlines. The limits vary, but the general rule is that controlling interest of
carriers must remain in the hands of nationals, or in the case of the EU, citizens of member
states. For some, the limits on foreign ownership are relics of a bygone era in which
nations were fiercely protective of their flag carriers for economic and security reasons, as
well as prestige (WTO 1994; OECD 1997; Button 1991; and Feldman 1995). For others,
foreign control of airlines represents a dangerous loss of sovereignty and autonomy.
Similarly, cabotage is held out as a matter of national security interests, but its impact is
more clearly economic.
Cabotage is the right of a foreign carrier to carry passengers on flights entirely within
another country. In other words, cabotage rights would give British Airways the right to
pick up passengers in New York and fly them to Dallas. A related issue is the granting of
beyond fights, which would allow, for example, United Airlines the right to fly from San
Francisco to Tokyo, pick up Japanese passengers and fly on to Seoul. As one can imagine,
the fear of granting
away from national

such rights is that foreign carriers have the opportunity
carriers (Abeyratne
1996).

to take business

While both are included in official discussions
about open skies, these issues are unlikely
to be resolved soon since cabotage and foreign ownership amount to direct concessions
from national airlines. Airlines, whether they are competitive or not are loath to open
themselves up for more competition.
Some observers believe that change on these issues
will not come until the United States changes its position on limiting foreign ownership of
US carriers and allowing foreign carriers cabotage rights in the lucrative US domestic
market. Put simply, these issues are unlikely to be resolved in the near term, although
concessions
might be made by the Americans in order to secure access to other countries.
5.2 Airport capacity
Perhaps a more intractable issue in the liberalization of the global air transport market is
that issue of capacity or, more simply, places to land and park airplanes. It is easy to think
of the airline industry as simply the firms that fly and maintain the airplanes that ferry

people and cargo from place to place. That this happens efficiently or at all is as much a
function of airport capacity as it is the successful operation of the aircraft themselves.
It
should come as no surprise then that airports are a critical link in the process of
liberalizing the air transport market It will make little difference to the market if the US
government convinces the UK to allow more direct flights of US carriers to London if
Heathrow airport cannot handle any additional landings.
The importance of this issue is evident when one examines airport capacity in the major
cities around the industrialized
world and realizes that most airports are at capacity. More
importantly perhaps, building new airports or expanding old ones is typically not an easy
economic or political task. Enormous financial, environmental, and political hurdles
confront virtually every airport project (Kaput 1995; Thurston 1995). To the extent that
new capacity will only slowly develop, the question shifts back to the trickier issue of
reallocating landing slots and terminal space in such a way that new competition can
actually compete (Hufbauer and Findlay 1996). Again, it should come as no surprise that
incumbent national airlines have the upper hand in protecting their share of landing slots.
Despite American complaints about Heathrow in London and similar difficulties
elsewhere, one sees similar intransigence
at hub airports in the United States where, as
noted earlier, hub carriers can control as much as 75% of the business at a major airport.
There arc a number of proposals circulating in the air transport community which suggest
ways to liberalize the allocation of landing slots, but few seem to satisfy the various
stakeholders
involved in the management and use of the world's airports (Hu_fbaucr and
Findlay, 1996). Ironically perhaps, the airlines themselves arc often opponents of airport
expansion and development because they are forced to shoulder the fmancial burden
through increased landing fees. No airline is interested in paying for the development of
new capacity if it will benefit its competition.
Airlines, like other businesses, would rather
have someone else pay for the expansion and then let the airlines decide who gets to utilize
the new capacity.
political

Needless

to say, the issue ofairport

issues to face local and national

5.3 Privatization
One trend that recognizes

political

capacity

is among the most tricky

leaders.

the difficulty of satisfactory

public policy solutions

to the air

transport issue is to privatiz, both airlines and airports. Given the discussion of airport
capacity above, it is not difficult to understand
why policy makers might be willing to give
up control over airports even though they represent an enormous potential for patronage
contracts and jobs, as well as a certain amount of prestige. For many political leaders in
the United States and Europe, the business of running an airport has lost its luster. The
regulatory reform which liberalized the airline industry in these markets changed the
relationship between the airport managers and their primary customers, the airlines.
Airports cannot rely on business as usual in an environment in which the airlines arc
constantly jockeying for competitive
advantage (Tarry and Fuller 1997). The fierce
competition
between US carriers and the liberalization of European air transport will
necessarily put additional pressure on airports to play some competitive
role in the market.
Airports can no longer operate as public utilities, they must develop commercial strategies
and keep a vigilant eye on the market, which may determine whether the airline they
depend

on will stay in business.
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Just as many airports have new pressures and demands placed on them to operate as
businesses, most airlines in the industrialized
world are being cut off from their public
safety net. Subsidies and government bailouts are increasingly
discouraged, either
formally through regulation or informally through political pressure. Governments,
trade
scholars, and the successful airlines have all joined the chorus calling for an end to
government subsidy for unprofitable and publicly owned carriers (Button 1991; OECD
1997, USDOT 1994). Increasingly, governments are moving to divest themselves of their
airlines - hoping to force the carrier to compete in the open market as a lean, efficient
business, not as a bloated social service. The results are mixed and their interpretation
depends in large part on where you sit. If you are an economist or an executive of a
successful carrier, you are no doubt elated with the ability of the market to cull the weak
from the herd. On the other hand, if you are concerned about evenness of air transport
services or perhaps you had a job with one of the failed carriers, your interpretation
probably ranges from caution to despair, respectively.

5.4 More on subsidies

and cross-subsidies

Of the more difficult aspects of the liberalization trend to deal with politically, is the
limiting or prohibition of subsidies and cross-subsidies.
As noted above, it is often the
case that the interpretation
of the utility of liberalization
in these area depends on your
position in the market. It is also important to note that the nature of the airline industry
suggests that the prohibition of subsidies may have deleterious
long term effects on the
provision of air transport services. This problem has more to do with the structure of the
air transport industry than it does with the operation of any particular airport or airline.
But the problem is critical and provides an exceUem window onto the troubling
possibilities
if liberalization
of air transport continues along its current path.
One of the lasting features of the air transport industry is its cyclical nature (Gialloreto
1988). In addition to being subject to disastrous downtums in business due to war, fuel
price increases, and even weather problems, the airline industry is also susceptible to
booms and busts that airline executives are unable, in many cases, to manage effectively.
While the way in which the airlines operate in boom times is interesting in its own right,
the busts are more interesting for this analysis.
Imagine, for example, a city or region that
depends on a single hub airport which is dominated by a single airline. Imagine further
that the airline is not among the most profitable, but its management is doing what are
perceived to be the right things to get the airline in very good shape. All is well until the
industry experiences a downturn. Now the city or region risks losing its air transport
service and the unenviable task of finding a new hub airline.
Is it not reasonable for the
city or region to subsidize the airline to keep it from complete collapse?
The answer, of course,

from the free-traders and the dominant airlines is that subsidies

only distort the market and that all else equal the weak carrier should be allowed to die,
since the market will eventually adjust to provide air transport services commensurate with
demand. In many ways, this argument is persuasive, but for the community 'and economy
that relies on the failing airline, the prospect of losing it and waiting for the market to
respond is neither comforting nor encouraging.
The obvious difficulty lies in the fact that
if one buys the argument that air transport is critical to economic growth and development
in the modern global economy, then one cannot entertain the risk of losing that service. In
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thismanner,globalizationof

the economy in general makes effective
air transport industry a more onerous task.

liberalization

of the

The other subsidization issues raises similar questions. Cross-subsidization
is best
described as the use of revenues generated from profitable routes to subsidize service
provided on unprofitable routes (OECD 1993 and 1997). Cross-subsidy
schemes are
anachronistic
in a liberalized economy.
If the market is the arbiter of who gets service,
then cross-subsidies are merely a distortion of the market and wasteful policies. Not
surprisingly, airlines are not proponents of cross-subsidization,
but governments
find them
attractive distributive policies in which citizens who use popular and profitable routes and
modes of transportation, subsidize under-utilized
and unprofitable
routes and modes. As
an issue of social policy, cross-subsidization
make good political, and perhaps economic
sense if they are thought of as temporary investments
to foster economic development.
As
an issue of strict economic or financial policy, they are wasteful in that some citizens are
given services below market value. Instead of making these citizens relocate or
encouraging
the development
of alternative modes of transport, the government
redistributes
wealth according to political or social objectives.
The issue of cross-subsidization

raises important

questions

for the globalization

of the air

transport industry. Although good arguments can be made that the economies of North
America, Europe, and parts of Asia are prepared for the kind of liberalization discussed in
this paper, other areas (and perhaps some regions of North America and Europe) are not
ready for liberalization
(Graham 1997). In fact, one might argue that the liberalization of
the air transport industry as conceived by the leading air transport firms and their
governments
will not lead to globalization
of the industry, but create even greater
disparities between the haves and have-nots in the global economy.
6 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION
DECISIONMAKERS

ON LOCAL

AND REGIONAL

Good arguments and substantial evidence can be presented to support the claim that
liberalization
of air transport services makes sense for most of the industrialized
world. It
is worth noting though that there will be some unevenness associated with this
globalization and the political and economic implications should be considered and
monitored carefully. With this in mind, the next section of this study presents some
conclusions from two quite disparate cases. The first case involves the City of St. Louis
and its efforts to at once keep TWA and expand its airport. The second case is a broader
examination of the implications of liberalization for air transport services in Africa. In
both cases, the concerns by policy makers are similar in that there is an overarching focus
on economic development and connections with the global economy.
6.1 Giobalization

in the industrialized

world:

St. Louis and Trans World Airlines

The saga of TWA is well-known
in aviation circles. The carrier was once among the most
successful international
airlines in the world. Along with Pan Am, TWA served America's
foreign travel needs before the dramatic regulatory reforms of the late 1970s. From that
point on, the airline has struggled to stay aloft, fighting what has amounted to a rear-guard
action against better managed and more powerful competitors.
TWA's story and the
ramifications
of its difficulties for the City of St. Louis paint an intriguing story about the
darker side of globalization.
Again, this is not to argue that liberalization
is a bad thing,
but that it is not without cost and pain.
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In the regulated era of American air transport, TWA served as one of the nation's
international airlines. It flew almost exclusively from gateway airports, flying passengers
from the United States to destinations all over the world. At first glance it seems that such
a strong international route structure would give TWA, and airlines such as Pan Am, a leg
up against its competition in a deregulated industry. Unfortunately, the carrier's focus on
international routes left it without feeder networks within the domestic US market. With
deregulation the distinction between domestic and international
carders was blurred. As it
turned out, Delta, United, and American were able to develop international
routes more
easily than TWA was able to develop domestic feeder hubs and networks.
In the fierce competition that followed domestic regulatory reform, TWA floundered,
eventually filing bankruptcy and undergoing reorganization.
Conditions did not improve,
however, since TWA was financially unable to expand and improve its fleet. While other
airlines were integrating newer, more fuel-efficient aircrait into their fleets, TWA was
busy trying to keep an increasingly older, inefficient, and costly fleet in operation. As fare
wars raged in the newly competitive market, TWA, whose cost structure was considerably
higher than its competition, sunk further and further into debt.
TWA's predicament goes well beyond the airline itself and extends to local and regional
politics. The evolution of the hub and spoke system created a hierarchy of airports across
the US. Cities with hub airports were afforded much better air transport services in terms
of quantity and quality of destinations, especially international destinations.
Hub airports
became the new gateways for global air service. Cities with hub airports enjoyed direct air
travel connections to the global economy, whereas non-hub cities had less frequent and
more inconvenient service to foreign destinations.
TWA's hubs at New York's La Guardia
Airport and St. Louis' Lambert International Airport
problems for these cities and regions.

created new and interesting political

Neither city or state wanted to be saddled with TWA and its myriad problems, but they
also did not want to risk the loss of hub status and its economic and political benefits.
Thus, TWA's fate became inextricably intertwined with local and regional political
interests. This relationship has created some unusual circumstances for both the airline
and the local officials.
In 1992, for example, when British Airways proposed to purchase
an equity stake in failing USAir, TWA and its political supporters stepped up to lobby the
US Department of Transportation for special and favorable consideration of the bailout.
Despite wide-spread concern by national political leaders about the prospect of increased
foreign ownership of American carriers, Senate leaders from New York and Missouri
argued that BA should be given the opportunity to save USAir (Newhouse
support had little to do with the Senators' concern for USAir's employees

1993). This
and the cities

they served, but had everything to do with the fact that a revitalized USAir might acquire
failing TWA and secure hub status for La Guardia and St. Louis. Unfortunately for TWA
and its hub cities, the BA-USAir deal was restructured
in ways that left USAir in no
position

to play savior for the trouble carrier.

In 1993, after it became clear that an acquisition was unlikely, the City of St. Louis moved
to prevent TWA from complete collapse. In an unusual move in this era of privatization
and divestiture,
the City purchased TWA's 57 gates and other equipment at St. Louis
International
Airport for $70 million, forgiving the airline's debt of $5.3 million and giving
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the struggling carrier $65 million to meet its operating and other expenses. The city,
desperate to protect its hub status, decided that this scheme would allow St. Louis to avoid
the troubles faced by other hub cities in which airlines failed and bankruptcy proceedings
paralyzed any attempt to attract new airlines (St. Louis Airport Authority 1993).
The City of St. Louis and TWA continue the struggle to maintain and enhance their hub
status. Unfortunately, the efforts of the city combined with the TWA's dire circumstances
make policy success unlikely. In its most recent efforts, the city has proposed an enormous
expansion of its runway and terminal capacity. While the stated goal of this project is to
enhance the airport and help TWA survive in the competitive
global air travel market,
critics of the expansion question the financial, technical, and commercial
assumptions
behind it. It is quite possible, for example, that TWA, which has not been able to make
money
actually
caused
tickets
airline

in recent years while most other major carriers have achieved record profits, will
sink under the burden of much higher landing fees and operational disruptions
by the expansion. Ironically, recent cash infusions of up to $26 million in pre-paid
by the St. Louis business community make the relationship between the city and the
uneven. The airline very existence depended on the cash it received earlier this

year. There is little the airline can do or say to go against the wishes of city decision
makers who are determined to expand the airport. St. Louis is in the unenviable position
of wanting to expand its airport capacity to save its hub cartier, while its efforts might
actually kill the airline and saddle the city with an expensive and infeasible project.
The story of TWA and St. Louis is interesting because it highlights the difficulties
associated with making local and regional policies in a liberalized global economy.
In a
truly liberalized market, TWA would have vanished years ago. Instead, it limped along
through two bankruptcies
and is alive today only because of the cash infusions noted
above. Those interested in efficient markets and industries might hold up TWA as their
case-in-point:
the airline, despite recent efforts, is still inefficient and unprofitable
(although the airline has shown some stability in recent months). Moreover, while
successful carriers are expanding their global route structures, TWA is contracting and
abandoning foreign destinations.
Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this experience is
that the market has indeed changed such that local and regional political leaders can only
stave offthe inevitability of failure for inefficient carriers.
This conclusion begs the critical question though of how the loss or diminution of air
travel services actually affects the economies of cities like St. Louis. If, as many aviation
advocates suggest, air transport links to the global economy arc critical for a city or
region's economic well-being, then perhaps the failure of airlines like TWA represent
larger political and economic problems. This is an empirical question on which little
systematic analysis has been conducted. The question is further clouded by the circulation
of analysis which is motivated more by marketing than by rigorous examination
of the
impact of the acquisition or loss of air transport services. It is possible, however, that in
most cases, cities, regions, and nations that lack quality air transport services will be at a
disadvantage
in competition
with their counterparts who axe well served, but this should
not be interpreted as justification to spend scarce resources to build airports, purchase
aircraft, and operate airlines, without respect for real costs (Caves
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1993).

6.2 Globalization
and the developing world: The African dilemma
Ironically, much of the literature on the globalization
of the air transport industry is
strangely silent on the subject of aviation in Africa (See OECD 1993 and 1997).
Seemingly for many analysts, globalization includes only Asia, Europe, and North
America, leaving South Amedca and Africa out of the mix. A closer analysis oftbe likely
impact of theliberalization
efforts
discussedearlier
on thenationsof Africaprovidesgood
cluesabout why thecontinentisleftoutof otherwiseglowing recitations
about thevirtue
of competitionin airtransport.
Unlike,thecircumstancessurroundingSt.Louisand TWA,
inwhich only a singleregion,
islikelyto be adverselyaffected,
and thenonly temporarily
as themarket adjuststo meet demand, Africalagsbehind theindustrialized
North inways
thatsuggestitsproblemsaremore intractable.
Africa suffers from its internal political and economic difficulties as well as a general lack
of integration with the global economy. More importantly
for the issue of air wansport,
Africa has neither the airport infrastructure or airline industry necessary for participation in
a liberalized air transport market. Thus Africa poses an interesting case for policy makers
and scholars alike who hope to understand the true impact of globalization.
As noted
earlier, liberal theories of international
relations suggest that globalization
of
transportation
links will not only reduce the probability of conflict, but also enhance the
prospects for economic growth the development.
Therefore, Africa emerges as a case in
which the promise of liberalization
and globalization
can be critically examined.
Preliminary
analysis suggests that Africa will not gain from the globalization of the air
transport industry, especially if that globalization is defined primarily by a liberalization
of
the industry. In that context, the differences between Africa and the indus_alized
North
loom ominously.
While observers complain about the lack of airport capacity or the poor
quality of the transportation infrastructure in some industrialized
nations, those problems
pale in comparison
to the general situation in Africa. In some sense, Africa is starting
from nearly ground zero in the development of its airlines and airports (Kaput 1995 and
Woolley 1984). This necessarily places it in a difficult position when the key to enter the
global economy

is a commitment

to liberalization

and its various

requirements.

The infrastructure and airlines that are now being privatized and deregulated in much of
the industrialized
world grew up in an era of careful protection and indulgence from
national governments.
Relying on arguments about national security, economic
deveiopmenL and social justice, governments around the world poured resources into the
development of their aviation infrastructure. To the extent the economies of these states
developed as well, aviation played an interactive role in the enhancement of economic
growth. This is a careful distinction from the simplistic argument ofaviation proponents
who suggest that if one builds airports and develops airlines, his economy will magically
grow and develop in ways that are impossible without air transport. A analogous and
illustrative example of this logic comes from the American National Business Aircraft
Association, who, as part of their "No plane, no gain" marketing promotion,' published
results of a study that purported to show that companies who owned their own business
aircraR were more successful than companies that didn't. An interesting correlation to be
sure, but it says little about causality.
One could easily say that successful businesses are
more Likelyto purchaseand operateplanesthan failing
firms,butthistells
us little
about
theeffectof planeownership on firm performance.
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Similarly, one is tempted to argue that since industrialized and newly industrialized
nations, such as those in Asia, worked hard to develop air transport infrastructure and good
domestic airlines, that such efforts are equally critical for the economic success of those
nations lagging behind. The central question is one of sequence.
It is more plausible that
aviation, like other economic resources, develops simultaneous
with other sectors of a
growing
projects

economy.
Initial government
protection and public support for these aviation
is critical since the private sector is unwilling or unable to take on the burden of

paying for and managing such enormous investments.
develop and is itself developed by a growing, dynamic

A good aviation infrastructure
economy.
In short, aviation

helps

projects and investments are "lumpy."
In other words, you cannot build a quarter of a
runway this year and wait until the resources appear or demand becomes more evident
before adding the next quarter. Airports and airlines are complex and expensive
operations that typically require huge investments and careful management.
To this end,
African nations are poorly situated to develop their aviation resources in any significant
manner. More importantly though, the current trends towards liberalization
place
additional constraints on any efforts that might be made.
Recall that liberalization
efforts include a number of provisions that are aimed at reducing
the role of government,
as either protector or investor.
Proponents of liberalization
tout
the efficiency gained by privatizing state-owned airlines and airports, curtailing subsidies
for otherwise failing airlines, and ending route and slot restrictions that only serve to
protect inefficient domestic airlines. The empirical evidence for the benefits of
liberalization is in most cases preliminary, but seems to lend support to these claims.
Unfortunately, most of this evidence comes from the US and Europe, with some evidence
from nations of the Pacific. These are typically industrialized nations with mature aviation
industries and substantial

infrastructure already in place.

The question then is how liberalization
will affect the poorer, less-developed
Africa and Latin America.
If history is any guide, the results will be dismal.

economies of
This is not to

say that progress in this area is impossible, but that earlier efforts to improve Africa's
aviation resources have produced woeful results. In particular, multilateral development
projects have done little to effectively improve Africa's aviation infrastructure.
Similarly,
private initiatives have also floundered.
The International
Air Transport Association
(IATA), the organization
of the world's airlines, launched a program in 1980 to help
developing countries airlines (WooUey 1984 and IATA 1996). Called the Program for
Developing Airlines (PDNA), the program was designed to give technical and
management
assistance and training to airlines in the developing world. The idea is an
intriguing one because it recognizes that financial assistance to build airports and purchase
aircraft are likely to be wasted if pilots and managers are inadequately trained and poorly
prepared to operate them. The program got off to a slow start since the airline industry
was in dire financial straits generally in the early 1980s, but as that position improved,
airlines from the developed world increasingly offered assistance.
At_er early promises

and raised expectations,

the commitment

to such programs declined

and most developing nations' airlines found themselves virtually alone once more. What
explains the initial interest in assistance and then a significant reversal?
A powerful
explanation, and one that raises additional questions for the future of air transport in the
developing world is the nature of competition.
Recall that in the early 1980s the
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restrictivebilateral

regime was still very much in place and as such emphasized the
primacy of national flag-carriers.
With such protections in place, powerful airlines from
the developed world were unable to tap the markets of the developing world. Helping
these less-fortunate
airlines in this regime implied no competitive
costs to the dominant
carriers. American efforts to open the skies slowly changed this attitude by raising the
possibility of more liberal international
competition.
In simple terms, it no longer made as
much sense for the developed nations' airlines to assist the airlines of the developing
world.
The proponents of liberalization
would likely agree that the incentive to help developing
nations' carriers has declined significantly,
but they would quickly suggest that this is not
all that bad. In fact, they would argue that an open skies regime with no limits on foreign
ownership and cabotage will actually benefit the developing market since efficient airlines
from the North will move in to offer services to meet demand. In turn, the argument goes,
better service will increase economic development
potential and the developing world will
be on its way to more effectively participating in the global economy. Early indicators
suggest that this argument is somewhat accurate, but care must be taken when drawing
conclusions.
Success stories in the developing world can be found in South America where American
carriers have expanded and enhanced service between the US and various Latin American
countries.
By utilizing code-sharing
and equity investments,
domestic carriers have been
improved and service levels increased in many markets. Problems exist, however, and
they will be more difficult to address. The greatest problem is airport capacity.
As noted
earlier in the case study of St. Louis, this is not exclusively a developing world problem,
but resource constraints are more severe in the South and likely to create
obstacles to timely development
of aviation infrastructure.

significant

A more intriguing problem concerns sovereignty and autonomy. Here the lines between
the proponents
and opponents of liberalization will be more clearly drawn. If the
dominant airlines from Europe, Asia, and North America do in fact expand to offer air
transport services in Africa and other parts of the developing world, it will be at the cost of
the sovereignty and autonomy of those developing nations. For liberal theorists, the
answer is a resounding "So what?" but for critics of liberalization
and concerned political
leaders of these nations, the loss of aviation autonomy, even if better services are received
in exchange,
is a risk they are leery of taking. It is difficult to put a value on sovereignty
and autonomy, especially when objective empirical evidence of money saved, routes
served, and safety standards upheld are readily available to counter fuzzy arguments about
these abstract national interests. This is the important and difficult
when one considers the impact ofgiobalization
of air transport.

question

to answer

7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper offers a rather broad stroke examination ofthe trends in air transport that have
been variously labeled as globalization, liberalization, and open skies. The paper does not
offer a definitive conclusion about the utility of liberalization, but raises the equally
important questions of whether the process of liberalization, which seems to be inevitable,
will actually create a more competitive air transport market and whether the liberalization
process will actually create a globalized air transport industry, competitive or otherwise.
The conclusions are preliminary, but suggest caution when reading about the triumph of
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liberalization
and competition.
The relationship between airlines and governments
suggests that dominant carriers will likely play a significant role in shaping the new
regulatory framework, whether that is a reformulated bilateral regime or an
institutionalized multilateral approach. These airlines, like all firms, are expected to
pursue their own interests and call for an air transport market that allows them to
maximize their profits and exploit their competitive advantage. One ramification
of this
trend is that local and regional political leaders will be challenged with the task of
maintaining or enhancing their airport capacity in order to ensure good air transport
services. As the story of TWA and St. Louis shows, this is not an easy task in a rapidly
changing and dynamic market. Similarly, the trend towards liberalization suggests that
political leaders in the developing world will be faced with the choice of fighting the trend
and maintaining support for their flag-carriers or opening their markets and facing the
uncertainties
associated with attracting and maintaining
quality air transport services in a
highly competitive market that rewards only those carriers that contain costs by
abandoning routes and services that are unprofitable. The future is not altogether
troubling, but political leaders will need to proceed carefully, yet aggressively if their
cities, regions, and nations are to benefit from the globalization of the air transport
industry.
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A4
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent tendency of globalization and/or internationalization
stimulates the air-demand more
and more.
In Japan, the 66.9 million passengers used the domestic flights in 1995.
About
56.4 million passengers, 81% of domestic air passengers, used either of Tokyo International
Airport (henceforth
called as TK'y) or Osaka International
Airport (henceforth
called as
OSA) or both.
Only 19 % of domestic air passengers used other local flights.
The flight
number of both airports reaches almost the limit of their capacity, and that of Kansai
International
Airport (henceforth
called as KIX) opened in 1994, is also estimated to be
saturated
in the near future.
Thus, New Chubu International Airport is being planned.
Under these situations, it is needed to develop the suitable and easy tools to analyze
impact on the air passengers'
flow by the construction of the new airport.
There

has been

many researches

in the field of demand

forecast

under

the

a given aviation

network.
Researches by Modchi et al (1993), and Furuichi et al (1993) are the examples of
introducing
the logit type models.
However, these do not consider the strategic behavior
of airlines.
Todorold
et al (1992), Kita et al (1995) and Takase et al (1995) developed
models to consider the behavior of airlines and passengers.
These are quite interesting in
the sense that they include the objective functions of both of airlines and passengers.
However,
they lack the approach
to an "equih'bda"
between airlines and passengers.
Ohashi ¢t al (1996) formulated the equilibrium
between airlines and passengers as the
"general equlh'brium" considering the aviation fee and flight fi'equency.
Their model is very
precise fi'om the theoretical viewpoint.
However, when that model is applied to the real
aviation network, it may be difficult to take the equll_dum
solution because it requires the
quite huge size of computation.
Taking these into account, the present paper aims to
develop an easier analytical tool to obtain the equih'brium flow in the air transportation
network.
In the real air transportation

market,

(1) the flow of passengers

and / or goods

is the

resultant equih'brium in the market through strategic behaviors of transportation agencies
(henceforth
called as carrier) and passengers or shippers (henceforth called as user) under
the governmental
policies which include airport construction and its management,
(2) the
carrier has the perfect information
about the users' behavior, but users have the limited
information provided by the carrier, (3) the relationship between the carriers and users is not
interactive.
This situation of air transportation
market constituted of the government,
the
carrier and the ,user can be regarded as the gaming so called as Stackelberg
Problem.
Under these understandings,
Kuroda and Takebayashi
(1996, 1997) developed a model to
obtain the Stackelberg equilibria among carriers (airlines and railways) and passengers under
given inter-regional
O.D. distn'bution of demand. The present paper analyzes the impact of
the construction
their model.

2 MODEL

of New Chubu International Airport

on the air passengers'

flow based on

FORMULATION

As discu_ed previously, the equilibrium of the behavior of the carders and the users can be
regarded as the Stackelberg
equilibria in the transportation
market.
The Stackelberg
planning problem is characterized as follows;
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1) There are two types of players in the game; the leader and follower.
2) The leader has the perfect information
about the follower's
behavior, while
follower must behave under the constraints of the strategy provided by the leader.

the

The carriers, in this paper, are regarded as the leader, and the users as the follower. It is
notified that in the Japanese domestic transportation
market, the airlines and the railway
company take the role of the carrier, because the long distance bullet train is a competitive
mode to the air transportation.
The structure of the problem is shown in Figure 1.

Carries

IAirline

Companies

(Upper

_l_l_Train

Company

I
I Users

Problem)

(r°ute

Lower

Problem

ch°ice)

Figure 1 The Structure

I

of the Problem

In the real world, Nash-type
equih'brium between the airline company and the railway
company must be explicitly discussed. However,
since the present paper focuses on the
influence of the strategy of the airline company on the domestic air transportation
market,
the railway company is treated as the player who does not change his present
even if it plays a role as an alternative transportation
mode.

2.1 Premises

service

level

and Assumptions

In modeling of the airlines' and the passengers'
behavior, followings are assumed and
premised;
1) Airport locations and its capacities are a priori given as the policy scenario by the
government.
2) The railway network including that of the bullet train (Shin-kan-sen)
and the train
schedule are given, and the railway company does not change its train schedule and fare.
3) The capacity of train is assumed to be large enough to carry all the passengers between
any origin and destination.
4) Railway stations are assumed to locate at the centroid of each zone.
5) The access and the egress to the bullet train station in the zone are limited by the
ordinary train, while those to the airport are available by either of the ordinary train or
the limousine bus.
6) The O.D. distribution of passengers
is a priori given.
This means that the present
paper does not treat the long-term equilibrium of the system, but the short-term
flow
equilibrium.
7) Passengers can choose whichever the railway or the airway.
8) Competition among air carriers
introducing a load factor.

is not explicitly

9) The airlines can decide their airway service

route,

treated,
""

but implicitly considered

the craft capacity,

by

the fair, and the
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scheduledfrequencyunder theconstraints
of theairport's
capacity.
10) The purpose of the airlines
is assumed to maximize theirnet revenue,while the
passengersbehave to minimize the totaltraveltime,totaltravelcost,or the total
generalizcd
cost.
11)At the hub airport,
the connectingtime necessaryfortransit
passengersisassumed
constant. This means theRightscheduleisplannedto satisfy
thisconstraint.
12) The airfare
perpersonforeach airline
servicerouteisassumed constant.
This means
thereisa regulation
on airfare
by thegovernment inJapan.

2.2 Airline's

Behavior

The airlines can decide their strategy to maxir_e
their net revenue under the perfect
information
about the passengers'
behavior,
but their scheduled
flight frequency is
constrained
by theairport
capacity.Theirrevenuecomes from thefareof totalpassengers
of theirflights,
and theyexpend therunningcostssuch as depreciation
of crafts,
fuel,crew
expenditure,
and so forth,and theairport
costssuch as landingcharge,rental
feeof terminal
facilities.
Thus, referringto Figure 2, the objectivefunctionof the airline
and the
constraints
aregivenby

X 2e '-yl
, cae* (for w,eSa)

-

(/or Vl,f eL.,

(2)
Vm)

(3)
(4)

and

(5)

Ipassenger's
behaviorI

where
L: a set of links
La : set of airway links (La eL).
k : a route consisted of a series of links.
l : a link as an element of a route with its direction.
: same .link as the link l with opposite

direction

of I.

i,j: origin and destination zones.
x_,: travelers volume per day from the zone i to the zone j using the route k.
Ad:#: airfare per person for the link I.
e t : Kronecker's

delta defined as

1 : the link I is included

in the route kEKa

el (
0 : others
6ta : Kronecker's

e;

fl

delta defined as

: the link I is an airway
: others

Ka : set of routes including airway links.
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RC,,/: one flight operational
APC_

:one flight airport

y_ : daily service frequency
6_ : Kronecker's

cost of a craft of size m for the link/.
charge

of a craft of size m at the terminal h.

of crafts at the link I.

delta defined as

1 : terminal h is included

in the link 1

6/
_-0 : others
CA./_: capacity of terminal h, expressed
H: a set of terminals.
Ha: a set of airports

by maximum

flight number.

(Ha _H).

The constraint Eq.(2) means that the total flight number at the airport h does not exceed the
capacity of the airport h. The constraint Eq.(3) means that the flight frequency of the link l
is the same number as that of [.
each flight frequency.

The constraint

Eq.(4) means the non-negative

number of

Airport

h_

_J

6
Airport

/

ht

!

i
I

Bullet train

/,
Routeks

Air service ]Jz_
Route
Local Train
Airports

Figure 2 Concept
2.3 Passengers'

Behavior

The passengers

can choose

of Transportation

access or egress

Network

either of the airway or the railway

consulting

their preferences

under the flight schedule and the capacity of flight provided by the air-carriers
railway companies.
The total travel time for aviation passengers considered
figure 3.
The passengers

and those by
is shown in

may prefer to minimize (1) the total travel time, or (2) to minimize the total
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travel cost,
investigated
minimum

or (3) to minimize the generalized
cost.
above three criteria
for air passengers,
total

Access

travel

time was most

time

Ldnehaul

appropriate

IC Kuroda
and M. Takebayashi
and concluded
that the criterion

to explain

the air passengers'

Linehaultravel

travel

)
r,,

Waiting

time

Waiting

at

departure airport;

(1996)
of the

behavior.

Egresstime

Destination

.q

time at transit

airport;

W'I'

average waiting time
3 The

Content

of Aviation

the present

paper

employs

this criterion.

Therefore,

Figure

minT(x_)"

_

_

_

Passengers'

Travel

It is formulated

Time

as follows;

xo.k't_,
OT

t "6 t
2h

"_

IFI

R
+6k

t

t

(t_ 6*'t`+

t

OT

,_hX_'_ 62. "62h" 2"]_y t. )}

(6)
(7)

S.t.

2222 /- k

<y,. cae2,

(8)

ijkm

(9)

xvk _0

where
x_:

passengers'

volume

X#: the volumes
CAP,,::

from zone

of OD passengers

the aircraft's

capacity

i to zone j using
between

of a craft

the zone

route

k.

i and the zone j (person/day).

of size m at the airline

or railway

route
l (person/craft).
WT: waiting

time for transit

6ta :Kronecker's
/
6_

delta

1 : route

L 0 : others

at the airport

defined
k includes

as
airlines

(assumed

as a constant

value).
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6_ :Kronecker's
:

6_

delta defined as

1 : route k includes railway

L 0 : others

tq,: travel time from i to j at route k.
tz_°': the total access and egress time at the route k between

the zone i and the zone j

(min).
tt: the line haul travel time at the link 1 (rain).
OT: the opened time of the terminal (hrs/day).
/(,,t: the load factor of the craft of size m at the link 1.
62tj,:Kronecker's
6alk:

delta defined as

_1 : link l is the first link included

in route k

: others
63t, :Kronecker's

631k

fl

: link l is the second

link included

in route k

L0 :others

62th :Kronecker's

,ht

delta defined as

delta defined as

j" 1 : terminal

h is included

in the link 1

L.
0 : others

The constraint

Eq.(7) means that the total number

of passengers using all routes between

the

zone i andj must be equal to its O.D. volume of passengers, and Eq.(8) gives the constraint
that the air passengers
at any air transportation
link must be less than equal to its total
capacity, and Eq.(9) gives the non-negative constraint for the variable x_,.

3 MODEL

TEST

3.1 Numerical

BY PASSENGERS'

BEHAVIOR

Conditions

Kuroda and Takebayashi (1996) discussed the model performance
by applying it to domestic
transportation
network in Japan, and concluded that the minimum travel time criterion can
well explain the behavior
of passengers.
However,
they suggested
that the constant
waiting time for transit passengers assumed in their model has given a discrepancy for local
line passengers.
Then, in the present paper, the passenger behavior model is appropriately
modified as discussed previously.
Therefore the present paper again discussed the modified
model performance
for estimation of passengers
behavior.
In numerical computations,
following data is used;

3.1.10D

Zones and OD Distribution

of Passengers

7
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Prefecture
governmental

domain is employed as the OD zones (Table 1), and each of the OD
pair of passengers between every two prefectures is used as the data based on the Survey of
Passengers Movement by the Mirdstry of Transport of Japan in 1991 (Ministry of Transport,
1991).
This OD distn'bution is assumed not to be influenced by the charge of the airline
policy, because the OD distn'bution is mainly determined through socio-economic
activities
in the region.
It is, however, noticed that the volume of air passengers, that is, air demand,
is, of course, influenced by the air line policy.
Table 1 OD Zones
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Ibaragi Toy4una Ship
Tottori Tokushima Fukuoka Okinawa
Tochili Ishikawa Kyoto
Shimana Kagawa
Saga
Miyaci
Gunma
Fukui
Osaka Okayama Ehimo
Nagasaki
Akita
Saitama
Gifu
Hyogo Hiroshima Kochi
Kumamoto
Yarnagata Chiba
Shizuoka Nara Yarnaluchi
Oita
Fukushima Tokyo
Aichi Wakayama
Miyazaki
Kanapwa
Mie
Kagoshlma

1
2
Hokkaido Aomori
Iwate
!

i

Niipta
Yarnanashi
Nagano

3.1.2 Airports

and Service

Route Network

Since, in Japan, the airline policy is more or lessrestricted by regulation of the central
government,
the airway routing and service frequency might not be optimal for air carriers.
Thus, the comparing with the existing airway routes and frequency and computation results
by the model

is nonsense.

Therefore,

in the present

paper

only passengers

behavior

is

examined under the existing policy of airlines.. Airports considered in computation are the
first and the second class airports regulated in Japan, those and airline service routes are
shown in Figure 4. It is noticed in the figure that Kansai International Airport (K.IX) was
opened in 1994, and extension of Tokyo International
Airport (TIC_ will be completed in
1997 which will supply more capacity than the present.
Therefore the model test was
carried out for the condition before KIX was opened.
However,
simulation of airport
policy scenario in the succeeding chapter is carried out aster K.IX is opened
TICY is finished.: In Table 2 is listed the capacity of main airports.

3.1.3 AircraR

and extension

of

and Costs

The aircraft type used for the domestic service, their capacity and their operation costs are
listed in Table 3. The airport charge is also listed in the same table.
The operation cost of
aircraft is referred to the Airline Statistics in 1991 (Ministry of Transport,
1991), and it
includes the redemption cost of aircraft as an average value.
The airport charge of all the
airport considered is the same.
This is referred to the Airline Statistics in 1991(Ministry
Transport,
1991).
Load factor of all crafts is assumed as 0.7, which is considered
average

value in all service routes.

3.2 Examination

of Passengers'

Behavior

of
as

A4

As previously
air service
Airline

mentioned,

network

Statistics

model

in 1991.
in 1991

test is carded

The computation

(Ministry

of Transport,

out only
results

2 Capacity
Airport

of Main

OSA

300

NGY

240

SAP

300

(person/craft)

Operational

the

with

the

Airports
(1991)
Capacity
(craft/day)
400

Capacity

under

Routes

TKY

Table 3 Capacity,
Type

behavior
are compared

1991).

Figure 4 Air Service

Table

for passengers'
by the model

Cost and Airport

Operational

Cost

(thousand yen/flight)

B747
DC10

569
318

6.037
4.750

B767
A300

288
308

2,815
3.187

Charge
Airport Charge

(thousand yen/flight)
475
374

:

221
251

A4
The air passengers'
volume of all service
statistics are shown in Figure 5.

routes estimated

by the model

and those by the

30000
(SAP-T__

25000
20000
15000

1oo00
5000

I
0

5000

10000

150(30

20000

25000

Observed

Figure 5 Comparison

of Air Passengers

Volume

The figure shows the model can well explain the behavior of passengers who chose the air
transportation.
The correlation coefficient is 0.984.
However, it can be seen that there
are some local service routes that can not be explained by the model.
Those routes are the
local to local route whose flight service frequency is relatively small than the main routes.
The lower service frequency results in the longer interval time at the airport, which is defined
as the average waiting time in the model.
Therefore, the model estimates that passengers
of the region that has an airport with relatively lower fxequent service choose the railway.
The model should be further improved
to diminish this point in future.
As already
discussed, the model test is carried out under the given air service routes which are more or
less regulated by the government.
Then in order to investigate how much is the difference
of air carrier's behavior between the computed (assumed non-regulated
free market) and the
present is compared.
The results are shown in Figure 6. As can be seen in this figure and
Figure 5, the real service routes in 1991 employed by the airlines were almost optimized in
the sense that they maximized their net revenue.
These results may suggest that ff air
transportation
market is completely deregulated, air carders may withdraw from these local
service routes.

This will be further discussed

in the succeeding

chapter.
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4 SIMULATION

OF AVIATION

POLICY

SCENARIOS

As stated in the previous chapter the extension of Tokyo International
Airport (TKY) is
completed and extension of Kansai International Airport (KIX) is now being extended, and
further a new international
airport is planned to open in 2010 in Chubu Re,on,
central part
of main island of Japan, instead of closing of existing Nagoya International Airport.
This is
temporally called as New Chubu International
Airport (NCB).
KIX and NCB are the
offshore airports and their locations are not so far from existing Osaka and Nagoya
International
Airports, respectively.
Corresponding
to extension of KIX, there is some
opinion of closing of OSA airport, which is located at the urbanized area in Kinki Re,on,
because serious noise problem has been induced in the surrounding area.
Under these circumstances,

this chapter

discusses

the influence

of these plans and opinions

on the air carrier's strategy in the domestic transportation
market and flow of air passengers
by scenario simulation using the proposed model.
In the scenario simulation complete
deregulated air transportation
market is assumed and the crafts' capacity employed and costs
are also assumed as same as the present, but the estimated OD distn'bution of passengers in
2010 is used.
In numerical computations,
the annual growth ratio of the domestic O.D.
passengers from 1991 to 2010 is assumed as 1.0% according to the Air Statistics (Ministry
of Transport,
1991). This leads the total of domestic O.D. passengers in 2010 as 108.83
millions (Figure 7). The O.D. distribution in 2010 is estimated based on this annual growth
ratio and the present OD patterns.
Four cases of scenario for discussion are considered as
listed in Table 4.
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Figure 7 Comparison

of Total Volume

Table 4 Conditions
Case
Case

TKY

of OD Passengers

of Airport

from1970

to 2010

Capacity

OSA

KIX

Chubu

1

800(extended)

300(present)

200(present)

Case 2

800(extended)

300(present)

200(present)

300(oonstructed)

Case 3

800(extended)

None

500(extended)

300(constructed)

Case 4

800(extended)

None

500(extended)
I
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None

None
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The _st

scenario

is Case

1 that assumes

that extension

extension is not finished and others are same as
is Case 2 which assumes that Case 1 plus New
third scenario is Case 3 that assumes that OSA
of KIX is finished.
The last scenario is Case 4
others are same as Case 3.

4.1 Influence

of Open

of New Chubu

Since New Chubu International Airport
island where is not so far from the
influence on other airports is anticipated
present NGY to NCB.
It is true when
cases. In this table, carriers' net revenue

of TKY is finished but KIX's

the present situation.
The second scenario
Chubu International Airport (NCB).
The
is closed and NCB is opened and extension
that assumes that NCB is not opened yet but

International

Airport

(NCB) is planned to be constructed at the offshore
present Nagoya International
Airport (NGY), no
but only change will be shift of the function of the
we see Table 5 that lists the computed results of four
is normalized based on Case 1.

Table 5 Impact of the Construction
of Chubu New International
Airport
Case
Carrier's Net Revenue
Total Aviation Passengers
Average Travel Time
(thousand person/day)
(minJperson)
Case

1

lOO

276.2

222.94

Case 2

100

278.2

222.94

Case 3

1 I0

278.1

219.86

Case 4

110

278.1

219.88

Comparing with Case 1 and Case 2, the influence of NCB on carrier's net revenue, total
volume of air passengers and average travel time of passengers can not be seen.
This can
be also concluded fi'om Figure 8, which shows the total volume of air passengers of each
airport.
Figure 8 teaches us that the construction of NCB and in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 the close of NGY
gives no influence at all on air market.
It is also notable that TICk"will invite much more air
passengers than other airports reflecting the greater increase of OD volume of the hinter
region and transit passengers.
t

This means that airlines proper to take the strategy of Hub-and-Spoke
service route in the free market for more cost-effectiveness.

4.2 Influence

of Close of Osaka International

type network

of their

Airport

InIhence of close of OSA can be examined by comparing with Case 1 and Case 3. From
Table 5 it will be estimated that close of OSA will result in increase of net revenue of airlines
and decrease

of average

travel

time of passengers.

Comparing

with Case 2 and Case 3,

only change induced by close of OSA is the shift of function of OSA to K.IX.
When OSA is
closed passengers using OSA may shift to KIX, and K.IX will be functioned as the Hub
airport more than the present as can be seen in Figure 9. •
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OSA

TKY

Case 1

these

From

NCB

KIX OSA

TKY

that close

it is concluded
the average

travel

Passengers

of OSA

will

but also

K.IX.
routing

This conclusion
may suggest
that the extension
strategy
so as to collect
their network
from

4-3 Influence

of Extension

of Kansai

anticipated

that

International

Airport

because

suggested.
the extension

In fact, the results
of K.IX will invite

type network

convenient

service

accomplished
each

which
for

may

the extension
those

behave

Equilibrium

the net revenue

of

the Hub-function

of

of KIX will invite change of airlines'
OSA to KIX in the regulation
free
to

Airport

of K.IX will

are located

This

are assumed
to maximize

between

not only

by strengthening

International

very

is more cost-effective

profitable
than making
consortium.
at KIX even if KIX is extended.
Nash-type

KIX

at least

influence

closely.

on existing

In the previous

Osaka

section

this is

of Case 4 shown in Table 5, Figure 8 and Figure 9 say that
all airlines to KIX from OSA in order to make the Hub-and-

passengers.

and airlines

of airlines

time of passengers

NaY

Case 4

is better
for both of airlines
and passengers.
In order
4 is carried out.
Results are discussed
in the next section.

It is easily

Spokes

"IXY

at each Airport

improve

airlines

market
because
this change
examine this hypothesis,
Case

NC8 KIX

Case 3

of Transit

:

I
Ul

=

Case 2

Figure 9 Comparison
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for airlines
may

to make

airlines.

This
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true

consortium.

his own

Therefore
Unfortunately

be

net revenue

and consequently
if

regulation
However,

is the future

problem

more

market

in the real

if independent

some airlines may
the present
paper

it gives
free

service

is more

serve at OSA and others
do not analyze so-called
remained

is

market,

in the present

A4
paper.

5 CONCLUSION
The present paper proposes

a tool to analyze so called as Stackglberg

equilibria between

air

carders and passengers in the domestic transportation
market, and examines the model for
passengers'
behavior by comparing with observed volume of passengers and the computed
ones by the model.
behavior.

The

results

say that

the model

can well explain the passengers'

The paper also analyzes the influences of some aviation policy scenarios, which include the
extension of Tokyo and Kansai International
Airports, the construction
of New Chubu
International
Airport, and the close of Osaka International
Airport.
Even the present
model gives much information about future conditions under those policy scenarios, these
are based on some assumptions and premises which must be improved.
One of those is the
assumption
of non-competitive
situation among airlines in the market.
When this is
considered in the model, a special computation algorithm should be developed.
Another
improvement
is about the cost function of airlines.
The present model does not give the
detail cost function, which makes us imposs_le to analyze the change of airport management
policy such as landing cost and terminal rental fee and so forth.
The model also does not consider the international
air passengers'
behavior because the
structure of international
aviation market is supposed not to be the same as the domestic one.
Therefore, a different approach to the international aviation market is needed.
This is the
issue for future analysis of this study.
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Abstract
Spill models

estimate

average

passenger

loads

when demand

occasionally

exceeds

Such models have been in use for over 20 years. The shape of the distribution
discussed
from both theory and observation.
Sources of variance
are identified
Measurement

problems

and techniques

are discussed.

Two alternate

presented
based on Normal distributions
of demand.
to changes in process caused by computer reservations
The concept

that spill losses

spilled
various

demand
sources

demand

from

literature

be valued

is presented
as well as when
of error is included.
Finally,
load is shown

a reference

derivations,

should

for

calibrations,

use.

are

which responds
management.

is discussed.

The recapture

of

such a phenomenon
is relevant.
Comparison
the use of spill models "in reverse" to imply

to have poor accuracy.

basic

fares

of demand is
and calibrated.

spill formulas

A revision is presented
systems and revenue

at discount

capacity.

The paper

It is the result

is meant

of 15 years'

of

to offer to the

involvement

in spill model

and applications.

1. INTRODUCTION
Spill is the average

passengers

sometimes

capacity.

exceeds

or year.

Groupings

to another,
used

per departure
The group

can involve

one leg, a small

or all the legs served

widely

for over 20 years

idea behind

distribution
aircraft.

about

This is shown
demand.

employed

to estimate

The

integral

in Figure

While

group

aircraft

the airline

of flights

can involve

because'

a flight

of legs reassigned

type in a fleet.

industry.

However,

spill

for a group

of flights

of this distribution

1. The integral

there

has been

can be represented

is the "fill"

The discussion
Normal

and why?

distribution
when

below

valuing

is close

has been
no

in spill between

calculated,

a truncating

the model

two possible

as a

rate for seats on an

of the fill rate beyond

is the term usually

the difference

in estimating

season,

from one fleet type

The spill model

capacity

is

is commonly

capacities.

rate for the extra seats. Perhaps
the "spill" model should have been named
Time and tradition prohibit this nomenclature,
but spill model performance
performance

demand

leg for a month,

discussing
its use. This paper attempts to put into the record
and some issues of use for airline analyses.

spill is that demand

a mean.

the spilled

by a single

within

commonly
available
publication
the formulation,
its calibration,
The basic

lost off a group

of flights

This is the fill
the "fill"
is judged

model.
by its

fill.

begins

with the characterization

Development

continues

to Normal.

Discussion

spill are discount

fares.

of the demand

with two formulas
then maintains

Arguments

distribution.

for calculating

that the appropriate

When

spill when

is it
the

fares to apply

are put forth that the complications

of the

recaptureof spill oftencanbe avoided.Finally, discussiondiscouragesof the useof the spill
"in reverse"to estimatedemandsfromobservedloads.

2. UNDERLYING

STATITICAL

MODELS

FOR

The idea behind spill is that the demand for a series
mean. The most central case in the airline business
over

a month.

flight

For example,

from Seattle

The amount
deviation

to Chicago

of variation

to the mean.

during

the month

in the distribution

[DeSylva,

One

of the variation

for the set of 30 executions

of the 9:00

of April.

can be measured

within

DISTRIBUTIONS

of departures has a distribution
about its
is the distribution
of demand for a flight

distribution

The convention

"K-factor"
source

the demand

DEMAND

the airline

by the ratio of the standard

industry

is to refer

to this ratio as the

1976].
in demand

is pure randomness.

of coming up heads. The probability
distribution
for such a series of Bernoulli
have a mean of 100, a K-factor near 0.10, and a shape like a 10 th order Gamma.

demands
might

the size of an airplane,

the shape

is more skewed

be appropriate

management
probability

of heads,

but cannot

for a month

cycles of demand
cyclical variations
would

be higher

variations
random

alone

several

most

naturally

random

with the Normal
Further

cyclic

an aircraft
month,

Data

This one-day

includes

on Friday,

and lower
to create

except

Normal.

in Figure
shape

applies

trials

smaller

demand

case

for revenue

is that one can estimate
in how

many

of heads,

further

With

2. The small

spill model

variations

overwhelming

on Wednesday.
a K-factor

for small demands

or when they capture

Normally

distributed.

the shape
being
variation

in a day.

heads

K-factors

variations.

the

result

from

for a planeload

These

come

from the

For a single

of 0.30.
such

Cyclic

as first class.

uncertainty

When

in the estimate

Since total variation

must in theory

flight

variations

for a month,

cyclic

are larger

than the

cyclic

is a combination

be a compromise

between

variations

of demand,

of cyclic

the Normal

are

they are
and

and Gamma

predominant.
occurs

Still higher

data on demand

has come

is almost

for the probability

when considering
values

from U.S.,

distributions
European,

not one flight

leg but all the legs assigned

apply for all the legs flown

or by a fleet type over the 12 months

Proprietary

as show

avoid the random

are enough

sources,

sources,

shape

for the Gamma

estimate

in

day they flip a coin with a one in 10,000

through the days of the week and throughout
the weeks of the month.
The
correspond
to changing the probability
of heads on the coin day-by-day.
It

variations,

from

and wider,

The motivation

10,000 coin flips. With perfect
of demand
are near 0.10.
The spill model

the Gamma

for first class seats.

planning.

Each

people

chance
would

demands

at 9:00.

that 1 million

are candidates

With

to fly to Chicago

Imagine

Seattle

to

by one fleet type for the

of a year.

has been

and Asian

reviewed

airlines

covering

covering

a large

number

both domestic

and

of cases.

internationalflying.
current.

Most

Data from

data has been

reservation

system

conclusions

seem

conclusion
the multiple

has been

examined,

loads, but analysis

as well as data nearly

has also been

with the data are discussed

done on

below,

but the overall

to Normal

as anything

by most cases.

is that the demand
sources

distribution

of variation,

is as close

the central

limit theorem

would

else.

lead us to

this outcome.

second

widely

most

important

differing

independent.
The

Problems

to be supported

Considering

The

daily onboard

bookings.

The primary
expect

15 years back

random

month

market
Table

assigned

an incremental
among

Furthermore,

aircraft

available.

are surprisingly

the increments
of studies

of 0.30.
from service

This variation

by small

is driven

seem

Table

across

statistically

components

paragraph.

Broadening

raises the value to 0.35.

constant

of variance

of the cyclical

for the subsequent

a K-cyclic

4 legs transferred

becomes

is that K-factors

the results

is reserved

produces

variation
aircraft

types.

1 presents

component

variation

conclusion

of K-factor.

1 says the day-of-

this to the flights

that would

For instance,

this would

aircraft

one additional

when

by changes

in demand

be

be the
large

by time-of-day.

The K-factor
for an entire fleet adds the spectrum
of demands a fleet type is expected
to serve.
Usual circumstances
would see a rise to 0.44 for this effect. The variations
across the months
of a year

would

additional

drive

this K-factor

uncertainty

in the forecast

total cyclic K-factor
observed
variation.

up to 0.52.

Table
case
Aircraft

Finally,

of the mean demand

This addition

1: Typical

planning

K-cyclic

in Table

.Season

Year

Flight Leg
Increment

0.00
0.18

0.30
0.35

0.32
0.37

0.36
0.40

Fleet

0.32

0.44

0.45

0.48

variations

of 100 or so.

add very little to these cyclical
If everyone

root of the demand.

traveled

However,

components.

alone,

Random

the standard

the (root mean

square)

deviation
average

so the standard
deviation
is the square root of twice the demand.
0.30 to a total K-factor
of 0.33 for a demand mean of 100.
For small

demands

such as first class, the random

often

accept

an

This can bring

1, since

the

it is not an

Values

Month

demands

studies

of 20% or more.

is not presented

Day

Random
square

to a total of 0.48.

variance

variance
would

group

size is closer

This increases

is large

is low for

be roughly

the
to 2,

a K-cyclic

of

and the demand

distributions
are not Normal.
For demands below 3, the monthly
K-factor can be above 1.00
and he shape can approach
a simple exponential
distribution.
Monthly
total K-factors
in
Figure

3 show

Figure

3 can be reproduced

Direct

calculation

data points
bookings

a decline

gives

from high values

of variance

using detailed
is difficult.

a poor estimate.

are truncated

by capacity.

at low demands
flight

toward

Even with perfectly

Unfortunately,

a asymptote

at high demand.

leg data.
clean

data, a month's

the data are far from clean.

Low loads are often the result

of flights

Loads

worth
and

with delays

or

of

weathercomplications.Finally, high loadsaresometimesthe resultof thecancellationof
somenear-byflight. Thesedistortionsfocuson the tailsof the distribution. Unfortunately,
thetails of the distributionwouldprovidemuchof the informationaboutthe sizeof
variations,if the datawereclean.
Practicalcalibrationsof K-factorusethe medianto approximatethe mean,andthe distance
from the median to the 25%ileobservationto estimatethe standarddeviation. This givesup
abouthalf the formal statisticalefficiency,but producesbetterresultson realdata. This has
beentestedby simulatingcleandataandsimulatingthe usualdistortionsfrom truncationand
delayedor canceledflights. The simulateddistributionscloselyresembledrealdata.
However,with the simulationsthe"true" underlyingK-factorswereknown. Estimatesusing
the 25%ileand50%ileloadscapturetheK-factorsunderlyingsimulationsoverusefulranges
of K. A practicalfit thatworksusingthestandardspill formulasevenfor smallerfirst class
cabinsis:
K-factor = (Loads0_iie
- Load25_ile
+ 1) /
Calibrations
months

of K-factor

are needed,

are best done in months

even

for clean data.

Under

(0.674*

(1)

Loads0_ile)

with low load factors.
few circumstances

can the K-factor

individual
flight leg be estimated
accurately.
However,
similar markets
factors, and values seem to be constant across a surprisingly
large range
Where

data

is unavailable,

the values

from Table

Averages

over several
for an

have similar Kof market types.

1 are often used.

K-factors
for markets
that are purely local and purely one kind of traffic are up to 20% higher
than indicated
in Table 1. Most data used for calibrations
comes from flight legs with a mix
of business

and pleasure

local city-pair.

There

travel,

and a mix of local demand

is imperfect

correlation

between

business
and pleasure
or in different city-pairs.
factors of Table 1 result. With data that allows
demand,

K-factors

3. SPILL

mean
spilled

of spill model
P(x)

is defined

l.t and standard
passengers

formulas

beyond

of demand

the

for

Over a broad range of mixes, the common
Kseparate analysis of components
of the total

are seen to be higher.

is (x-C)

date at least as early

as the probability

deviation

S(C) = _(x-C)-P(x)

c.

P of demand

P(x) = N(I.t,_;x).

as 1976

_(0,1;B)

[Shlifer

and Vardi,

x. P(x) is Normally

For truncating

capacity

distributed
C, the number

and the total spill S(C) is

dx

= ty.N(0,1;B)

- tr.B.(1-O(0,1;B))

c

Where

connecting

variations

FORMULAS

Presentations
DeSylva].

for the components

and demand

the cyclic

is the cumulative

Normal,

and B = (C-l.t)/_.

(2)

with
of

This formulation provedawkwardin practice.It represented
a smalldifferenceof two larger
numbersandrequiredaccuracyin calculatingN and_. Therewasno explicit formulafor _,
so a 5- or 7-term approximationhadto beused. This madethe formuladifficult for
spreadsheets
andrelegatedspill calculationsto tablelookupsor usewithin largerscientific
languageprograms.
A simplification wasmadeusingthecommonlogit approximationof thecumulativeNormal
[Swan]. This wasnot accurateenoughfor @in calculationsusing(2), but it allowedan
alternativederivation. F(s) wasdefinedasthefill ratefor seats. The fill ratewasthe
probability that demandequaledor exceeds. Forb = (s-ix)It,
F(s) = 1/
The integral

(3)

(1+ exp(1.7.b))

of the fill rate for all seat counts

S(C) = i F(b)db

above

= (cr / 1.7)- Ln(1 + exp(-1.7-

capacity

C gave

the spill value:

(4)

B))

B

A further

extension

for an addition

provides

the displacement

of one customer

rate D. Displacement

a day to the average

demand

is the incremental

(5)

D = S/Ix + (C/Ix) * F
Displacement
show

values

up on a peak

The simpler

are higher
flight,

month,

to studies

critically

of seating

formulations
explored

major
using

Normal

major

or Gamma

the Gamma

may be the most appropriate

always

the Normal
based

incremental
Normal,

and Logit

are overwhelmed
will be discussed

For typical
versions

compared

by uncertainty
later.

by incremental

in the estimate

promotions,

employ

airlines

maintain
various

for a

and most

this formulation,

as

equivalent

distribution

that should
derivations

be

is beyond

research.
distribution
of demand

as the underlying
distributions

and small

In any case,

two capacities.

numerical

This increased
to a schedule

airlines

demands

applications.

of spill between
demands,

assignments

of these

discussion

to

on all flights.

Another

any reasonable
for small

may be best for broader

on the difference
seats.

Other

is more likely

into spreadsheets.

much-needed

Earlier

customer

of marketing

American

Comparison

using

in demand.

be coded

and Asia.

It represents

numerically

equally

from aircraft

distributions.

of variations

while

North

distribution.

description

an added

to the costs

in Europe

of this discussion.

Spill can be calculated

spill could

Use now ranges

Most

carriers

because

seat is added

configurations,

is the Log-Normal

the bounds

an added
meant

of use.

to fleet planning.

well as several

than fill values

while

logit formulation

the ease and frequency

spill

Ix:

differences
fill values

of the K-factor

groups

suggests
of flight

decisions

that
legs

are almost

This is the fill rate for the
between

Gamma,

are small.
or other

Normal,

Such differences

parameters,

which

Log

4.

REVISIONS

K-factors

received

were treated
cyclic

a modest

modification

as independent

of demand

factors.

The random

component

single

K-factor

for all fleet

planning

based

on demand

Recognition

(demand

that there

differences
smaller

factor

between

component

in treatment

very large

This implied

was neglected
applications

divided

was a random

cabins.

size.

aircraft

versions

both cyclic

and random

not depend

on the size of the demand,

components,

that all variation

allowed

component

then,

K-factors

was driven

the spill model

was seen

in Figure

3. For demand

a complication

to variations

explained

and between

total demand

in the earlier

some

of the

and demand

employ

K-factors

section.

Cyclic

but only on the case being

estimates

levels

above

with little numerical

A

to be a table lookup

studied.

100, the random

significance.

variations

Random

component

For smaller

for

including
do

variations

do not depend on the case, but are specific to the value of the mean demand.
Overall
is the sum of the two effects.
This means that K-factors
change slightly with demand.
been

by

and estimation.

alone.

of the spill model

as discussed

Before

in both discussion

by capacity)

and small

Revised

in 1983 [Swan].

variance
This

of K-factor

demands,

has

it has improved

meaningfully.

The second

revision

of the spill model

changed

the spill values

significantly.

It was

recognized
that a flight's "truncating
capacity"
is not the seat count on the aircraft.
A flight
not full at 100% load factor.
It is full when reservations
are no longer accepted.
Thelimited
number

of reservations

then translates

Optimal overbooking
policies
below the aircraft seat count.
averaged

below

spoilage

served

solely

the gate.

With

discount

through

no-show

behavior

to a load at the gate.

[Schlifer and Vardi] mean that the expected
This 5%-10%
is called "spoilage"
in airline

5% in the days of a single
to protect
pricing

against

fare and reliable

excess

and revenue

no-show

overbooking,

management

load is 5%-10%
parlance.
Spoilage

behavior.

preventing
there

is

In those

denied

is a second

times

boardings

reason

at

for

spoilage.
Revenue
management
holds some seats open for late-booking
high-fare
demand.
This demand
does not always materialize,
but airlines are willing to take the chance, since
revenues
run three times the discount fares. When these seats are not called for, they add to
spoilage.
dropped
These

With discounting
toward

issues

function

10% below

are illustrated

representing

approach.

The "actual

load factor

range

were no longer

and revenue

the average

truncating

capacity

seat counts.
in Figure

the 100%

4. The "theoretical

load factor

load distribution"

that represents
accepted.

management,

cases

represent
this "hump" as an impulse
about 90% load factor.

of flights

has a small

the loads

Simulations

load distribution"

hump

being

function

shown

when

discount

that for spill calculations

at the new truncating

7

This is the old spill

of load outcomes

at the gate for cases

have

full.

has an impulse

capacity,

in the 85%-95%
reservations
it is sufficient
in this case at

to

The spill modelwasmodifiedto usethenewlower capacities.Needlessto saythis increased
the estimatesof spill.
Optimalspoilagelevelsinvolve aninteractionof the overbookingandspace-protecting
aspectsof revenuemanagement.Simulationshowsthatthe optimal spoilagelevelsfor a
givenmix of faresanduncertaintyriseswith the squareroot of the aircraftcapacity. Thatis
for seatcountR, spoilages would be:
s=
Studies

showed

above

c. x/-ff

that the factor

1.0 for cases

appropriate
show

when

rates

Average

(6)
c should

with discounts
discount

be as low as 0.5 for a single

similar

to current

US conditions.

fares were low compared

to full fares

Large

c values

spoilage

for an airline

are closed

to high fare levels.

are flights

that are regularly

be because

tops up the loads.
representation

implies

were

or when uncertainty

the value for c. Spoilage

of closed

results

are not overly

C becomes

rates

For most

frequently.

The concept

These

in no-

flights

While

They often

uses,

sensitive

of spoilage

to getting

changes

the seat count

to include

from the

flights

spoilage

the spill formulas

low spoilage.

be because

to calibrate

spoilage

the exact

unusually

or it could

it is appropriate

and not from only from

it is important

be deduced

but they are not representative.

record

are more predictable,

planning

should

fares. When a flight is closed to discount
to measure
spoilage only from flights that

have low spoilage,

full typical.

no-show

closed

stand-by

spoilage

that are closed

in predictions
value

in a simple

Nor
This
demand

from a broad
to full fare or

of fill or spill,

correct.

way.

The capacity

parameter

less the spoilage:

C = R - s

5. REVENUES
The

FOR

spill model

spilled

demand?

discount

rise

was high.

departing
loads of flights that are closed to discount
fares, demand is being spilled.
It is not appropriate

could

fare case and could

demand

spill discount

SPILL

predicts

spilled

as it requests

revenue

is spilled

involves

understanding

is either

a revenue

The simple

will try to motivate
of a revenue

Most

revenue

current

a reservation.
space

Revenue
for higher

management

management

answer

management
fare demand.

place

systems'

function

is to
answer

to do on a detailed

is that spill is at the local market

away

of what

The complicated

is trying

for that

by turning

So the question

simple.

system

discount

level,
fare.

answer.

is to spill discount

systems

is, what is the revenue

that spill takes

or completely

management

the simple

question

recognized

very complicated

what

The purpose

The natural

of spoilage

and maintain

and how well it succeeds.
Discussion

demand.

The discussion

demand

(7)

group

fares

fares

when

in to "buckets"

spill must occur

at all.

and limit sales from

the lowestfare bucket. A typicalflight legis half local traffic, andthe local traffic is usually
well over half at discountfares. Local discountfaresarelower thanconnectingdiscountfares.
So mostrevenuemanagement
systemslimit localdiscountsfirst.
Eventhe bestrevenuemanagement
systemsdo a poorjob of spilling just discountwhenload
factorsarelow andspill is small. However,whensignificantnumbersof passengers
needto
beturnedaway,it is easierto denymostlydiscountdemand.Furthermore,spill applications
valuedifferencesin spill. Thatmeansit is not theaveragefareturnedawaythatcounts,but
the averagefare of onelast incrementof spilleddemandthatcounts. Simulationsof leg-based
revenuemanagement
systemssuggestthatwhenspill is not too small,80%of it is turned
awayat the discountfare,andonly20%atanaveragemix of fares. This split is fairly
consistentfrom modestlevelsof spill up to very high levelsof spill andovera rangeof
discountmarketsharesandprices. Therulebreaksdown at high levelsof spill, whenall the
discountdemandhasbeendeniedandhigherfaresneedto berefused. Thepractical
conclusionis thatspill revenuesarejust abovethe discountlevels.
The mostadvancedrevenuemanagement
systemstry to do better. Origin-Destinationbased
systemstry to turn awaydemandfrom two-legconnectingdiscountsif both legsarelikely to
bespilling. The revenuelost perlegbecomesonly a shareof the connectingdiscountfare.
The valueis well below thelocal discountfare. This line of reasoningmeansaveragespill is
atrevenuesslightly belowthe localdiscount,not slightly above.
Overall, spill is at the local discountfare,or ata valuewithin 10%of this numberfor planning
cases.This is well within the uncertaintyof estimatesfor otherpartsof a plan, Formarkets
suchasdomesticUS hubservices,thevaluerunsabout75%of the averageyield allocatedto
a flight leg.

6.

RECAPTURE

Recapture

OF SPILL

is the idea that spilled

way back on to other flights
basis.

Spill from the 9:00 flight

Tuesday

departure

certainly

needs

Recapture

can arrange

to address

to use space
some

with fewer
spill values,

to seats on the 11:00 flight,

to go on Wednesday.

spill does find space

there

with demand

and fourth

choice

its

and spill on the

For a day or a week,

In fleet planning,

and spill to London
on adjacent

open alternatives.

the smaller

of it finds

on a daily or weekly
spill modeling

the issue of recapture.

in February,

and fewer

For the shorter-run,
studied

will divert

Some

This is easy to visualize

is less of an issue for fleet planning.

expected
While

demand does not fail to take the trip.

by the same airline.

the likelihood

flights,

The broader
of practical

departures

that simulate
for spilled

passenger

passengers.

9

the flight

the last incremental
or longer-run

cannot

be

to Miami.

units of spill are left

the case or the higher

the

recapture.

is still a need for understanding

models

spill in August

does not board

recapture

choices

behavior.

and preserve

It is important

This has been

the second,

to preserve

a list of

third,

alternatives,sinceif a passenger
hasbeenspilledoff his first choice,he is latebooking. Other
flights arelikely to befull with primarydemandor earlierrecaptureddemand.While a short
list is important,preservinga very long list presentsa problem. At somepoint customers
give up andreplantheir trip arounda differentsetof timesor days. Nonetheless,
the list-ofchoiceslogic hasbeenusedin simulationscoveringa monthof flights with day-of-weekand
time-of-daycycles. The resultssuggestthefollowing simplification of recapturebehavior:
spilleddemandfor a city pairloadsitself on flights asif it is seekingemptyseatswith little
attentionto schedule.After a first pass of primary demand and primary spill, the pool of
spilled

demand

market.
truncating

is measured

is a lot less certain
High

the excess

demand

valuable.

Refill

or off other flights

space

in the

load and the

spill.

Modest

popular

load factors

flights

that all available

corollary.

Extra

and

get most of the

capacity

seats

they also have value

of the same

use of extra

spill is lest costly
means

extra

airline.

capacity.

is used,

and

on flights

are not

for accommodating

The

The term

cases

recapture

flight

leg, recapture

some

of its value.

Overall,

to argue

7. ERRORS

is small,

recapture

current

particularly

requires

a great

has leaves

reverse

spill

side of the

suggested

extra

for this

seats are less

The two parts of the recapture
size.

for incremental

It is not correct

changes.

but the phenomenon
increase

For monthly

in complication.

effects

and leave

to

of refill cancels
Unfortunately,

a great deal of uncertainty.

and refill are second-order

Many
them

analyses

out.

IN ESTIMATION

Spill can be estimated,

but how good

number

The mean demand,

of parameters.

and refill

all have

compare

their effect

the fill rate.

value.

can be important,

research

that recapture

This means

out, but they can be of similar

or fleet

is also is an area where

less than it seems.

seats have increased

for a single

parameters

answer

spill from the flight,

flights

cases

variations

about

that the more

has an significant

phenomenon
do not exactly cancel
include one without the other.

passengers

available

the first-pass

is "refill."
means

choose

result

the obvious

coin is this constructive

Recapture

In annual

statements

intuitive

produce

for preventing

phenomenon

on the remaining

is lost entirely.
of recapture

competitors

"recapture"

than earlier

the more

demands

This understanding
only useful

load factors

as the seats between

C.

spill will produce

recapture.

from

itself at equal

space

capacity

This result
small

distributes

Available

uncertainties

will then be multiplied

the separate

is from experience

seat.

uncertainties.

Spill calculations
spoilage,

require

average

by the expected

Estimate

in spill applications.

10

develops

of a

recapture,

estimates

seat on the aircraft.

The table below

estimates

revenues,

The way to test these

of an incremental

to get the value for an extra
reflecting

K-factor,

in their estimates.

on the value

This percentage

is the estimate?

is to

The value of a seat is
fare for spilled
an example

of the uncertainty

with

of individual

Table

2: Errors

in Spill Value
Estimated

Parameter
Capacity
Demand

Value

(base

$)

factor

2 shows

(Seat Value)

+ 0
5- 15

$31
$17-$48

0.30

5- 0.05

$26-$36

0.85

5- 0.15

$29-$33

$150

+ $25

$26-$36

"c"

Spill Fare
Table

Uncertainty

200
150

K-cyclic
spoilage

for a Flight-Leg
Month
Estimate
Range of result

a value of $31 for a typical

case of a spill for a flight

leg for a month.

This

represents
using spill to help decide which aircraft type to assign to flight legs in a published
schedule
3 months before the schedule will be flown.
The $31 is the value of an incremental
seat using

the estimated

values

the spill model.

Demand

demand

not so much

reflects

uncertainty

for the list of parameters.

uncertainty

of allocation

the forecast

both the difficulty

exactly

fare is spilled.

uncertainty,

and doubt

short-run
equal

study,

demand

For fleet

about

recapture

values

planning,

fill values

The spill model
estimate comes
However,

determine
curve.

demand.

ahead

as the

Uncertainties

in the

leg and the controversy
10% of the effect
is under

be relevant.

what the demand

about

of demand

a quarter.

Uncertainties

demand

factor,

than a flight

Averaging

across

For such a

in these would

because

the data for a

leg for a month.

an entire

and recapture

should

have been

spill is an issue, load factors
is little information
demand

for a flight

system

and refill

Although

reduces

are much

fill

the
smaller

in demand.
in reverse,

the spill model

the spill model

This is based

worse,

spoilage

errors
estimates

does not work

is poor at "detruncation."
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high.

in the observed

With

demand

high load factors,
It is very hard to

was from the shape
5. Implied

as little as a 0.5%

Differing

for spill to result

are already

in Figure

To make matters

for a flight. Often, this
were low. An iterative

in the load distribution.

distribution

leg for a month.

85% load factor,

at high demands.
Used

for the same

from its average

way to see this is shown
Above

huge increase

Numerically,

in the mean

spill.

the underlying

load factor

spill formula.
particularly

flight

has only

for K-cyclic

would

months

after month.

starts with an estimate of the unconstrained
demand
from historical
loads. This is fine when load factors
when

what

are higher
are lower.

are full and there

Another

observed

estimate

three

lie outside

Uncertainty

DEMAND

can establish

most flights

for a single

and spill fare estimates,

and fleet

8. ESTIMATING

load.

the proper

variation

the errors

in K-cyclic

for annual

process

demand

leg month

in spoilage

uncertainties

of error.

effects.

are higher,

issues

of forecast

Uncertainty

and refill values

fleet for a year has more
uncertainty

flight

The greatest

source

of industry

for one particular

fare represent
which

is the dominant

of the observed
factor

on numerical

against

inversion

of the

point rise in observed
in the estimated

load

is shown

load implies

spoilage

are likely,

will give large changes

in implied

in practice

at high spill.

a

Two methods

are used

to get around

to look at the leg in question
proportions

typical

this.

at a lower

for similar

Neither

load factor

markets

suffering

are particularly

convenient.

The simplest

time,

the demand

up in

and scale

less truncation.

The second

is

is to collect

information
from the revenue management
system on day-by-day
spilled demand and
establish
the monthly average.
To set its levels, revenue management
must forecast the
unconstrained
are often

demand

estimates.

Forecasting

information
refill

when

within

The overall

AND

Spill estimates

management

systems
have

complicating
system

estimation

the demand

when

by truncating
spilled

demand

in demand.

in excess
line.

of capacity.

The demand

possibility
for fleet

are small,
also adjust

at a capacity

is close

of refilling
planning

levels

Revisions

demand

demand

from

diminished
recapture

and

All these complaints

far and away

with the estimates

The model

distribution

the best

is fine for predicting
of demand

spill

to begin

with.

due to random

somewhat

with recapture

cases

below
fare.

that for all its effectiveness
in estimating
can seldom be employed
with confidence

variations

distribution

and

the physical

The

For a normal

adding

and revenue

Spilled

adds value to extra

and can often be ignored.

normal.

is broadly used within the airline
in the variance
of the demand

for overbooking

to the local discount

uses a demand

is usually

distribution
convenient
formulas exist. Such modeling
industry.
Revisions
to the model recognize
an increase
changes

the issue.

are often

forecasts

very good

Finally,

is that the spill model

at helping

these

CONCLUSION

it with a capacity

distribution

also suffers

been capped.

management

but not good

Unfortunately,

they are not always

loads, further

on demand

is known,

9. SUMMARY

truncates

the revenue

leg.

they are recorded,

revenue

to observed

from

conclusion

demand

When

spill is high and past bookings

add passengers

aside, estimates
available.

when

for each fare class for each flight

used but not recorded.

seat count.

demand
seats.

great

to the usual

management

The revenue

can be recaptured,

However,

frustration

cyclic

behavior

recapture

for

and the
is small

with spill modeling

spill when the unconstrained
demand is known,
to unconstrain
demand from observed
load

is
it

averages.
Overall,
airline

spill modeling
industry.

Future

trend to use pricing
its underlying
and could

practical

understandings

use may be compromised

to fill under-utilized

distribution

become

has produced

over flights,

by rising

capacity.

As pricing

the spill model

less practical.

12

that have
load factors
manipulates

use will require

found

wide use in the

and a developing
demand
further

away from

inventiveness
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Abstract
Most research on airline passenger spill has assumed the normal distribution of
the nominal demand. But, there are plenty of empirical evidences showing that
the normal distribution does not fit very well in many occasions, especially for
the demand for business and first class compartments.
In this paper, we derive
formulae for calculating the expected number of spilled passengers for a group
of flights for the cases where the nominal demand is assumed to follow a
normal, a logistic, a lognormal and a gamma distribution. The spills under the
alternative distributional
assumptions
arc compared numerically.
Finally, the
paper demonstrates
that, for each of the four distributions, one can construct a
generic observed load factor (OLF) table, which does not depend on aircraft
seating capacity.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Spill models predict average lost sales when demand exceeds flight capacity, and has been
used by the airline industry since mid-1970s (see Schlifer and Vardi, 1976). The spill models
• provide critical information
for selecting aircraft size to use for a particular market, how to
assign an airline's existing aircraft fleet to various markets and schedules, and to determine
type of aircraft for meeting future demands. They also form an integral part of dynamic
pricing and yield management
system. The idea behind a spill modelling is that demand for a
group of flights can be represented
by a probability distribution around a mean value. The
group of flight can be defined according to the wishes of the analyst or the airline that wishes
to use the results. For example, the group can involve one flight segment, a small group of
segments served by single or multiple aircraft types or all the segments served by a single
fleet type.
Airline passenger spill analysis has traditionally
relied on the normal distribution
assumption of the nominal demand. But, there are plenty of empirical evidences showing that
the normal distribution
in fact does not fit very well in many occasions, especially
for the
demand
for business
or first class compartment.
In this paper, we derive formulae
for
calculating
the expected number of spilled passengers for a group of flights when the nominal
demand
is assumed
to follow a normal, a truncated
normal, a logistic, or a gamma
distribution.
The spill rates under
various
distributional
assumptions
are compared
numerically.
Finally, the paper demonstrates that, for each of the four distributions,
one can
construct
a generic observed load factor (OLF) table, which does not depend on seating
capacity of the aircraft.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical foundation of the
airline spill analysis by first establishing
an important distribution-free
identity relationship
among the observed load factor, the nominal load factor and the spill. The main focus of this
section is to extend the traditional wisdom of normality assumption of the nominal demand by
deriving the spill calculation
formulas for several other practically probability
distribution
functit_s,
namely, logistic, log-normal, and Gamma distribution.
Section 3 starts with the
discussion
of parameter
conversions
and the role of CV in the shape of the demand
distributions.
We will then present a few numerical comparisons
on spill calculations
under
the four distributions
discussed in Section 2. The last section is the conclusion.

2.

ANALYTICAL

2.1

Definitions

FOUNDATION

OF SPILL

ANALYSIS

and Notation

Let X be the random demand for a flight, or a fare class; and C the seating capacity level
under consideration.
Since X is the true demand for the flight, X is frequently called as the
nominal demand in order to distinguished
it from the observed demand which is the number

of seatsactuallysold)

During the booking

process,

once the number

of booking

requests

exceeds the capacity, the airline refuses any additional booking. These additional passengers
rejected in reservation process are called spilled passengers.
However, since the demand is
random the airline can not be certain about the exact number of spilled passengers.
Also, the
truncation of random demand by capacity limitation makes difficult to examine true empirical
distribution
of the demand.
On the other hand, for airline spill analysis and demand
forecasting
it is important for the airline to identify accurately the true (nominal) demand
distribution
from observable demand data.
Let us first introduce a few relevant concepts
Definition

1: Let Xbe the nominal demand

1. Nominal

load factor

(NLF)

that will standardize

for a flight with capacity

our presentation.

of C. 2 Then

is def'med as E(X) / C;

2.

Observed mean load is the expected value of the nominal demand X truncated at the
capacity level £7, that is, E(min(X, C)); and the mean observed load factor
(OLF) is
defined as E(min(X, C))/C;

3.

The fill rate (FR) for the p-th seat is defined
demand is equal to or greater than p;

4.

The spilled passengers
(SP) is the number of passengers
flight is fully booked. 3 Or mathematically
speaking,

as P(X > p), that is, the probability
turned

away

because

sP = el(X- c0 hx, o],
where I(x • o is the indicator
5

function defined

The spill rate (SR) is defined
nominal demand, that is,

- E[(X-

the

(1)
as I(x • _(x) = 1 ifx > C and 0 ifx < C.

as the ratio of spilled

SR - SP / E(X)

that

passengers

C) l(x >c_] /E(X)

over the mean

of the

(2)

For a standard normal distribution N(0,1), let ¢(x) and ¢a_(x) be the corresponding
probability
density function and the cumulative probability distribution function respectively,
that is,
1
_(x)=--_e

___L
'

x
and

O(x)=I_=_(t)dt.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary for us to establish a simple but useful relationship
between the nominal load factor ('NLF), the observed load factor (OLF), the spill passengers
(SP) in the following lemma.
Lemma

1: It is always true that OLF=NLF-

SP/C.

In this paper, we will use the flight demandand the nominaldemandinterchange.ably.
2 The capacity here is not necessarily the physical capacity of the flight. Nowadays, airlines tend to use the
effbctive capacity for the spill analysis, see Swan (1992).
3 Sometimes, we also call the spilled passengers simply as the spill.

Proof:

First note

capacity

level C:

that the observed

demand Xo is the nominal

demand

truncated

at the

Xo = X ltx < cl + C ltx>cl.
Therefore,

the expected

load is given by,

E(Xo)

:..-

+

,.-

=lax -SP
Therefore,

we have that OLF = (lax - SP) / C = NLF - SP / C, as required.

It follows
universal

2.2

immediately

relationship

Spill Formula

from the above lemma that OLF = (I - SR) x NLF, which

is an

among OLF, NLF and the spill rate (SR).

for Some Common

Distributions

In this subsection,
we derive the basic spill formula for several commonly used distribution
functions. As is well-known,
the traditional spill analysis has mainly been focused on normal
distribution,
and occasionally Gamma distribution.
On the other hand, empirical distributions
for the observed demands are usually more diverse. Therefore, it is interesting and necessary
to explore other types of probability distribution for the demand. According to Swan (1992),
the demand for the first class cabin is usually neither a normal nor a Gamma distribution.
In this section, analytical formulae for the expected spill and the spill rate are to be
derived for four alternative demand distributions.
(A)

Normal

Distribution

Let X follow a normal
The density function

distribution

with the mean la and the variance

N(la, o2).

for X is:
_(_-.I..____'

1
f ( x ) - "_
Then the expected

o 2, or simply,

number

2o- l

a e

of spilled passengers

,

- oo < x < oo.

is given by:

4 This expression in (3), to our knowledge, was first appeared in Shlifer and Vardi (1975) in a different
context. In a more focused paper on airline spill analysis, Swan (1983) derived both of these formulae.

SP = E[ ( X-

C)I( x,¢) ] = _:( x - C) f ( x )dx
t z

= crfTt_b)q_(t)dt=
jb_

=

cr

cr[ ,__ t
Jb 42_

--2dt-crb[_(t)dt
®
_b

(3)

l.__[ e-,',_l"':

t-

,,.b - orb(l- ¢(b)) = cr[¢(b)- b(1- ¢(b))]

where
b = (C - p)/o-, which is often known
normal distribution becomes

as the buffer.

Consequently,

the spill rate for the

SR = SP / p = CV x [¢(b) - b(1- @(b))],
where
CV = a lit is the coefficient
variability of a probability distribution.
(B)

of variation,

which

(4)

is usually

used to measure

the

Logistic Distribution

The logistic distribution has been frequently used in airline spill analysis. The popularity of a
logistic distribution in spill analysis is mainly due to two reasons: (a) logistic distribution
gives a reasonable approximation
to normal distribution;
and (b) a simple formula for spill
calculation can be obtained from the logistic distribution.
Also, the logistic approximation
could be calibrated to fit nicely between the results of a normal distribution
and a Gamma
distribution in the relevant ranges of spill calculation
(Swan,
closed-form
expression for the spill formula when a general
model the nominal demand.
A random variable X is said to have a logistic
if it has the following probability density function:
exp{(x-

1992). This subsection gives a
logistic distribution is used to

distribution

with parameters

0 and p

0) / fl}

f(x)=fl[l+exp{(x_O)/fl}]2

for

-oo < x < oo,

(5)

where 0 is the location parameter such that -00 < 0 < 00 and fl is the scaling parameter such
that 0 < fl < o0. We will denote this distribution by L(O, _. It is easy to check that a L(O, fl)
distribution is symmetric around 0 and also has a bell-shape look as a normal distribution.
But we should bear in mind that the logistic density function has a relatively longer tails and
is more peaked in the center than the normal density function.
The mean and the variance

ofa L(O, [3) distribution

E(X)=

0 and Var(X)=ff_/3

This implies that 13= _13ax/rc. Now note that
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are given by:

SP = E((X

- C)Icx>c_) = _(x-

C) f (x)dx

co

= (x- C)
c

=

i
(c_)_#

]3(1 + e(X_o),a) 2 dx
eY

[/3y+O-C](l+e,)2

co

dy

(bytaking

y=(x-O)//3)

e y

=/3I(Y-C)(l+e,)2

dy

(bylettingc

=(C-0)//3)

¢

=fl

(y-c)(co

=0+/31"

)

_l+e

-y

e"
_l+e-'

dy= /3[-ln(l+e-')]_

=/31n(l+e-C),

i.e.,

SP=/3In(1
Consequently,

(6)

+ e -c) =/31n(l + e-W-°va).

the spill rate is
SR=SP/

E(X)=(/3/

(7)

O)ln(1 +e-W-°va).

To our knowledge,
the above formula is new. Interestingly,
there was an indirect
application of logistic distribution in spill calculation due to the fact that it can be used as an
approximation
for the normal distribution. The original attempt was mainly done by Swan
(1983).
For the purpose of comparison, let us address this issue in more details.
Recall that, in the derivation

of SP formula for the normal distribution,

in (3) we have

(8)

SP = cr[7(t - b)qb(t)dt
_b

where
b = (C-I_)/cr is the buffer, as defined above.
Instead of using the exact normal
distribution function and derive the spill formula, in equation (8) one can use the following
logistic density function

as an approximation

of the normal density function

_t):

we wt

f,,(t)

- (1 + e" )2

where w = 1.7. This leads to the following

formula for SP:

7

(9)

I_ J

SP=_

we

(t-b)(l+e_,)2

: )
1

c_ ®

Then the corresponding

formula

(7) can be rewritten,

dt

at

t=b

cr

_

for the spill rate under this approximation becomes,

SR = °" In(l+ e -_)
w/a
Equation

wt

CV
= --'n'"
+ -t._b.
1.7 I U e
)

(10)

in terms of the buffer b, as follows:

SR=(p / 0)1n(1
+e
_

cr

, c-,
CV
ln(l+e-_Tiw)=_ln(l+e-LS'3sb)
/a x _
1.8138

(I1)

This is different from the spill rate formula (10). The difference between (10) and (11) is
caused mainly by the difference in distributional assumption of the nominal demand. In fact,
according to Johnson et al (1995, p. 119), when w = 1.7017456 the logistic distribution in fact
provides the best approximation
to the standard normal distribution.
(C)

Log-normal

Distribution

Now consider that nominal demand, X, follows a log-normal
exist some constants y, 6 and 0 such that
U = ),+6 In(X-/7)

With this relationship,

t_

For our purpose,
given by

= -_(x

implying

that there

~ N(0, 1).

it can be shown that the probability

f(x)

distribution,

density function

e -(r÷6_tx-O))2/2,

of Xis given by,

X > O.

- O)

let 0 = 0. Then, it is straightforward

to check that the r-th moment of X is

E(X') = cxp { r/a + (r_)2/2

8

}

where p = - Z/S = E(In(X)) and
variance of the Xare given by
E(X)

o _ = I/6 2 = Var(ln(X)).

=eUe ½°: and

"With 0 = 0 and using the parameters
distribution can be rewritten as follows:

Var(X)

/.t and

f(x)=._o.xe

Let us now derive the formula
SP = E[(X= j_e

1

= I:(x-

7 -'c'"')'
" "

C
aX-_le

42zrcr J,
i

_1.

=o

J

7 "("-')'
" "

for a log-normal

distribution:

dx

[®e _,2
"-cMt

.

e ,,-_,.-2,
,

where c = (In C - p)/cr.

(by taking t =lnx-p)

cr
e

-a))-

---

_+0.212

O

o)"

C(1 - @(c))

Consequently,

SR - E(X)

0c

f -"-"'
_d2rr ,

the spill rate will given by,

SP

Gamma

forx>O.

427rcr J,

= e"+°:'2 (1 -@(c

(D)

of the log-normal

C)f(x)dx

,:
f*_e "-rere"÷"dt
- _

=_

,

function

ax

c 42r_ox

-_le

"'

the mean and the

= e2Ue°: (e _'-1).

cr, the density

for spilled passengers

C)I(x,c)]

Consequently,

C
- (1- @(c-

a))

e_,.o,,2 (1- @(c)).

(13)

Distribution

According to Swan (1983), there are three main reasons why Gamma distribution is attractive
for modeling
the nominal demand. First, the guarantee of non-negative
demand is more
realistic than a normal distribution.
Second, Gamma distribution appears to be closer to the
shape of the observed load distribution,
especially for some flights on high demand days since
they generally have fatter positive tails than the normal distributions.
Finally, the Bernoulli
trial component variation is a Gamma distribution.

9

But interestingly,therehasnot been

any formal development of the spill analysis
that the probability density function of a standard two-

using Gamma distribution.
Recall
parameter Gamma distribution is
x a-l e-_

f(x)

= fl*F(a)'

for x _>0 with F(a)

= _:xa-'e-_dx.

In this two-parameter
Gamma distribution,
a is the shape parameter
and fl is the scale
parameter.
It is easy to show that the moment generating function of the Gamma distribution
is given by re(t) = E(e t x) = ( I- fl t) "_. And the corresponding
mean and variance are
E(X)=afl

and Var(X)=afl

2. Hence CV=

I/,la.

SP= E((X-C)I,x,,o)=
**

_2_(x-C)f(x)dx

C xa-_e-"'#

= =[x*e-X_# dx-

)

= a[1 - G(C,

+

where G(x, a, if) is the cumulative
parameters
(a,/5'):

C _"xa-te-_/#

CI1-

probability

GCx,a,#) =
Therefore,

Now let us derive the spilled passengers:

function

f

la-le-tl#

of the Gamma

distribution

with the

dr.

o

the spill rate is given by,
SR = [1- G(C,a

Since exponential

distribution

+ 1,fl)]- _c_[1 - G( C,a,fl)].
a#

is a special case of Gamma distribution

with a = 1, it is each to

check that the spill rate under an exponential distribution is given by SR = e .c/_.
practice, the exponential
distribution is rarely used to model the demand.

But in

It is worth noting that the spill calculation under a general Gamma distribution is far
more numerically
demanding than the other distributions, and direct uses of CV and the buffer
b in the spill calculation are possible, but as natural as under the other distributions.

3.

COMPARING

3.1

Conversion

SPILL

VALUES

of Distributional

Parameters

From the discussions
in the previous section, it is clear that there is no closed-form solution
for the spill calculation
except the case of assuming a logistic distribution
of the nominal
demand.

In

the

initial

stage

of spill

analysis

10

and

application

in the1970s,

logistic

approximation
to thenormaldistributionwasa naturalandconvenient

choice because

of its

simplicity.
Direct application
of the normal or Gamma distribution
would have involved
substantial amount of additional coding and computational
requirements.
Dramatic changes
have occurred in spill analysis as the spreadsheet software has become much sophisticated
since the early 1990s. The purpose of" this section is to use MS Excel to perform a few
numerical calculations and comparisons for the spill analysis.
Over the years, practitioners
in the airline industry have been calculating the spill or
spill rate by directly applying the coefficient of variation (CV) and the expected demand E(X)
(i.e.,/ax).
Table 1 summarizes these parameters of the alternative distributions
discussed in
this paper.
Table

1: Parameterizing

Distributions

by Using CVand

Demand
Distribution

Location/Shape
Parameter

Scale
Parameter

Spill
Formula

Normal

/z = Px

_=

cr[_(b)-b(l-q>(b)],b

Logistic

0=px

a =_hnO+cz:)
I

Gamma

CVx px

ft_¢

= (C-Px)/Cr

x

fl ln(l + e -_c'_' _ )

Log-normal

= CV:x l_x

(Z_m

CV'

3.2

Demand

The Shape of Demand

Distribution

_x(l-*(c-a))-

C(l-*(c)),c

=

InC-/a

,x [1- G(C,a + 1,p)]- C[l - G(C,,',,p)]

and the Value of CV

One of the important
tasks in airline spill analysis is to accurately
model the demand
distribution.
As pointed out earlier, Swan (1992) indicates that the normal distribution does
not fit all situations.
One of key issues is that the shape of the demand distribution is skewed
to left for small cabins, implying a relatively large value of CV. Figure 1 below graphically
illustrates this point, where all of the four distributions
are assumed to have same values for
the mean and CV.
One can make a few general observations from these figures. First, for small values of
CV, all of the three non-normal distributions
are close to a normal distribution, implying that
there may not be any big difference
in spill calculations
under the four distributional
assumptions.
Second, a normal distribution becomes increasingly inappropriate
to model the
nominal demand as the value of CV increases.
The spill calculated by assuming a normal
distribution (or its logistic approximation,
not shown in the figure) will clearly over-estimate
the true spill when the value of CV is large. Third, the difference
normal distribution
and a Gamma distribution will be surprisingly
Fourth, as the value of CV becomes larger, the Gamma distribution
shape of an exponential

distribution,

which is usually
I1

in spill between a logsmall for a large CV.
is getting close to the

not a good shape for demand.

On the

otherhand, thelognormal distribution
behaves much more "robust"forthelower portionof
the demand. Finally,for largevalues of CV, neithera normal nor a logistic
distribution
appears to be appropriateto model nominal demand because these distributions
have
relatively
highprobability
of takinga negativedemand while a negativevalue isimpossible
under a Iognormalor a Gamma distribution.
Figure

1: The Shape of Demand

Distribution

and the CV
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of Spills Values

In this section, the spill values computed using the formulae derived for the four alternative
distributions
are compared numerically.
For each of the four distributions,
we calculate the
spill for three different capacity
capacity) and 30 (small capacity),

levels, namely, C = 300 (large capacity),
and three values ofthe CV: 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8.
12

150 (medium

Tables2, 3, and4, reportsspill valuesfor capacity level 300, 150 and 30 seats per
aircraft, respectively.
Each of these tables are arranged so as to make it easy to compare spill
values for the four alternative
distributions
(A = Normal
distribution;
B = Logistic
distribution;
C = Log-normal
distribution;
D = Gamma distribution)
at different levels of
mean and coefficient of variation (CV) of the nominal demand.
Table 2: Spill Table - Capacity
CV = 0.2

CV

- 300

= 0.5

CV
A

= 0.8

/_x

A

B

C

D

A

B

C

D

220

0.6

0.9]

i.3

1.13

15.0

14.4

18.4

18.2

37.3

35.3

B

38.0

C

41.2

12

230

1.3

1.6 _

2.2

1.9

19.1

18.2

21.9

22.0

43.7

41.2

42.7

46._

240

2.4

2.6

3.4

3.1

23.7

22.4

25.1

26.2

50.3

47.6

47.8

52.3

250

4.2

4.2

5.2

4.9

28.8

27.2

30.0

30.8

57.3

54.2

53.0

58.2!

260

6.6

6.3

7.6

7.3

34.3

32.4

34.6

35.7

64.5

61.2

58.5

64.4

270

9.8

9.3

10.6

10.4

40.2

38.1

39.5

41.0

72.0

68.5

64.2

70.7

280

13.8

13.0

14.2

14.2

46.4

44.1

44.7

46.6

79.7

76.0

70.1

77.2!

290

18.5

17.6

18.6

18.7

53.0

50.6

50.2

52.5

87.6

83.8

76.2

83.9

300

23.9

22.9

23.7

23.9

59.8

57.3

56.13

58.6

95.7

91.7

82.5

90.8

310

30.1

29.1

29.4

29.7

67.0

64.4

62.1

65.0

104.0

99.9

88.9

97.9

320

36.1

35.9

35.7

36.7

74.3

71.7

68.4

71.7

!12.4

108.2

95.6

105.1

330

44.0

43.2

42.7

43.2

81.9

79.3

75.0

78.6

121.0

116.7

102.4

112.4

Note:

A = Normal;

B = Logistic;

Table

C = Lognormal;

D = Gamma.

3: Spill Table - Capacity

CV = 0.2

--- 150
CV

CV = 0.5
12

A

B

cl

D

A

= 0.8
C

D

20.6

21.4

23.3

23.8

23.9

26.2

28.6

27.1

26.5

29.1

17.9

32.3

30.6

29.2

32.2

19.8

20.5

36.0

34.2

32.1

35.3

22.4

23.3

39.9

38.0

35.0

38.6

/z x

A

B

C

115

0.6

0.8

1.1

0.9

9.6

9.1

11.13

11.0

21.8

120

1.2

1.3

1.7

1.6

11.9

11.2

12.g

13.1

25.2

125

2.1

2.1

2.6

2.5

14.4

13.6

15.0

15.4

130

3.3

3.2

3.8

3.7

17.1

16.2

17.3

135

4.9

4.6

5.3

5.2

20.1

19.0

B

140

6.9

6.5

7. I

7.

23.2

22.1

145

9.2

8.8

9.3

9.3

26.5

25.3

25.1

26.2

43.8

41.9

38.1

42.0

150

12.0

11.5

11.8

11.9

29.9

28.7

28.0

29.3

47.9

45.9

41.2

45.4

155

15.(

14.5

14.7

14.9

33.5

32.2

31.0

32.5

52.0

49.9

44.5

48.9

160

18.4

17.9

17.9

18.

37.2

35.9

34.2!

35.8

56.2

54.1

47.8

52.5

165

22.0

21.6

21.3

21.6

41.0

39.6

37.5

39.3

60.5

58.3

51.2

56.2

170

25.8

25.5:

25.0

25.3

44.8

43.5

40.9

42.8

64.8

62.6

54.7

59.9

13

Table 4: Spill Table - Capacity
CV = 0.2

,= 30

CV = 0.5

CV = 0.8

_x
20

A
0.0

B
0.0

C
0.0

D
0.0

A
0.8

B
0.8

C
1.2

D
1.2

A
2.6

B
2.5

C
2.9

D
3.1

22

0.I

0.I

0.I

0.I

1.5

1.4

1.8

1.8

3.7

3.5

3.8

4.1

24

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.3

2.4

2.2

2.6

2.6

5.0

4.8

4.8

5.2

26

0.7

0.6

0.8

0.7

3.4

3.2

3.5

3A

6.5

6.1

5.8

6.4

28

1.4

1.3

1.4

1.4

4.6

4.4

4.5

4.7

8.0

7.6

7.0

7.7

30

2.4

2.3

2.4

2.4

6.0

5.7

5.6

5.9

9.6

9.2

8.2

9.1

32

3.7

3.6

3.6

3.6

7.4

7.2

6.8

7.2

11.2

10.8

9.6

10.5

34

5.2

5.I

5.0

5.I

9.0

8.7

8.2

8.6 13.0 12.5 I0.9 12.0

36

6.8

6.8

6.6

6.'_ 10.6 10.3

38

8.6

8.6

8.4

8.4 12.2 12.0 II.I 11.6 16.5 16.1 13.8 15.1

9.6 10.(3 14.7 14.3 12.4 13.5

40

10.4 10.4 10.2 10.3 14.0 13.7 12.7 13.2 18.4 17.9 15.4 16.7

42

12.3

Note:

12.3

12.1

12._

15.7

15.5

14.3

14.8

20.3

19.8

17.0

18.3

A = Normal;B = Logistic; C = Lognormal; D = Gamma

From the above three tables, it is possible

to make the following

general observations:

•

It is clear that the differences
in spills among the four alternative distributions
are
quite small when CV= 0.2. This indicates that distributional
assumption does not play
a significant role in spill calculation
when the demand is not very volatile, i.e. small
CV value. This observation
is consistent with the fact that, for small CV, all of the
three non-normal distributions
are close to a normal distribution.

•

On the other hand, the differences

in spill values

between

a normal distribution and a

log-normal distribution are quite large for all three capacity levels, and increases with
the value of CV. Therefore, the choice of a demand distribution becomes a far more
serious issue when the demand is quite volatile.
Furthermore,
the capacity level has
virtually no role to play when deciding which distribution should be used to model the
demand.
This is contrary to the findings of other studies on first class or business
class spill analysis.
At this juncture, it is important to reiterate that whenever the spill model is used, the
decision variable usually is not the spilled demand volume itself. It is usually the difference
between the spill volumes for two competing cases. Consider the decision whether to assign
a 130 (Ci) or a 150 (C2) seat aircraft to a flight leg. The relevant question is, how many extra
passengers
will the extra seats accommodate,
and whether or not the extra revenue would
cover the extra cost of using a larger aircraft?
The answer involves evaluating the difference
in spill between the two cases. For a single incremental
seat, this is thefill rate for the flight.
For 5 incremental
seats, it is simplest to take the difference of the two spill calculations,
which is summarized
in Table 5.
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Table

5: Difference

in Spills

CV = 0.2
D
2.9

A
6.7

B
6.3

C
5.2

12
5.7

A
7.9

B
7.6

C
5.3

D
6.G

120

4.2

3.8

3.9

4.0

7.4

7.1

5.8

6.3

8.4

8. i

5.7

6.4

125

5.6

5.2

5.1

5.3

8.1

7.9

6.4

6S

8.8

8.7

6.1

6.8

130

7.1

6.8

6.5

6.7

8.8

8.6

7.0

7.5

9.2

9.1

6.5

7.2

135

8.6

8.4

7.9

8.1

9.4

9.3

7.6

8.

9.6

9.6

6.9

7.5

140

10.0

10.0

9.3

9.5

10.0

10.0

8.2

8.7

10.0

10.0

7.3

7.9

145

11.3

11.5

10.6

10.9

10.5

10.6

8.7

9.2

10.3

10.4

7.6

8.2

150

12.6

12.9

12.0

12.1

11.1

I 1_2

9.3

9.8

10.7

10.8

8.0

8.5

155

13.7

14.0

13.2

13.3

11.5

11.7

9.8

102

11.0

11.1

8.4

8.8

160

14.6

15.0

14.3

14.4

12.0

12.2

10.4

10.'2

! 1.2

! 1.4

8.7

9.1

165

15.4

15.9

15.3

15.3

12.4

12.7

10.9

11.2

11.5

11.7

9.1

9.4

170

16.2

16.6

16.1

16.1

12.8

13.1

11.4

11.6]

11.7

12.0

9.4

9.7

A = Normal; B = Logistic;

level,

For practical

This

it is often

2: If the demand
load

of coefficient

important

follows
factor

of variation

Proof:

By Lemma

suffices

to show

in terms

ofNLF

I, we know
that

the difference

over-estimation

with spill calculations.
establish
the following

the observed

D = Gamma

in spill

becomes

when

used

increasingly

to evaluate

two

serious

CV

as

Table

reasons,

(OLF) associated
OLF, let us first

over-estimate

levels.

OLF

C = Lognormal;

with Tables
2, 3 and 4, suggests
that compared
with the log-normal
use of a normal
distribution
will not only over-estimate
the spill at

but also

capacity

Generic

value

CV = 0.8

C
2.9

alternative
increases.

then

CV = 0.5

C2 =150

B
2.6

capacity

Lemma

and

A
2.9

Table 5, together
and Gamma
distributions,

3.4

CI -- 130

lax
115

Note:

each

Between

the spill

to have

Before
surprising

a normal,

(OLF)

that
rate

( = lax / C) and CV.

a logistic,

depends

(CV)

information

dealing
result.

only

with

on the observed
the

numerical

a log-normal

or a Gamma

on the nominal

load

load

issues

factor

factors

related

to

distribution,
(NLF)

and

the

of the distribution.
OLF

= (1 - SR)xNLF.

(SR) under
This

each

is summarized
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Therefore,

of the four
in Table

to prove

distributions
6.

the lemma,

can be expressed

it

Table

6: Representation

of Spill

Rate

by CV and NLF

Demand
Distribution

Spill Rate
Formula

Normal

cv × [_(b) - b(l - ¢(b)],b = (_--_F - 1)/ CV

Logistic

_ _
ln[l +e _3cn s_
43 ¢.;v

7]

Log-normal
(1 - (I)(c - o')) - _

(1 - ¢(c)), c = _NLF

,(7 = %/ln(l + CV 2)

Gamma
[1 - G(CV2 × NLF ,a + 1, 1)]-

It is clear

from

CV and NLF,
An

Table

6 that

the spill

rate

under

each

result

is that

[1 - G(CV2 × NLF ,a,

of the four distributions

1)]

is a function

important

consequence

of this

Table, which
is not related
to the capacity
This kind of table is of great importance
value of OLF is observable.
Table

CV = 0.2
B
C

NLF

A

0.667

0.666

0.666

0.733

0.731

0.730

0.800

0.792

0.867

it is possible

to generate

a generic

7: A Generic

OLF

CV = 0.5
B
C

Table

D

0.665

0.66¢

0.639

0.639

0.626

0.58(3 0.585

0.569

0.563

0.729

0.730

0.683

0.685

0.672! 0.673

0.609

0.616

0.607

0.596

0.791

0.789

0.790

0.721

0.725

0.714

0.71:

0.632

0.641

0.641

0.626

0.845

0.846

0.841

0.842

0.752

0.759

0.751

0.74',

0.652

0.663

0.672

0.652

0.933

0.887

0.890

0.886

0.886

0.779

0.786

0.784

0.771

0.668

0.680

0.700

0.6761

1.000

0.920

0.924

0.921

0.920

0.801

0.809

0.813

0.805

0.681

0.694

0.725

0.697

1.067

0.944

0.9471 0.948

0.946

0.819

0.828

0.839

0.828

0.692

0.706

0.748

0.716

1.133

0.961

0.963

0.966

0.964

0.834

0.8431 0.861

0.841

0.701

0.716

0.769

0.734

1.200

0.973

0.974

0.979

0.977

0.847

0.856

0.880

0.865

0.709

0.724

0.788

0.75C

!.267

0.981

0.981

0.987

0.985

0.859

0.866

0.896

0.880

0.715

0.7313 0.805

0.764

1.333

0.987

0.986

0.993

0.991

0.868

0.875

0.911

0.894

0.721

0.736

0.821

0.777

1.400

0.9913 0.989

0.996

0.994

0.876

0.883

0.923

0.905

0.725

0.740

0.835

0.789

0.628

C = Lognormal; D = Gamma
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A

CV = 0.8
B
C

A

A = Normal; B = Logistic;

OLF

level.
Table 7 below is such a generic
OLF table.
to practitioners
in airline
industry
since only the

D

Note:

of

as required.

D

This implies that one can quickly obtain value of the unobservable NLF from a generic OLF
table if the distributional
property of the demand is known to be one of the four distributions
treated in this paper. With the information on the values of OLF and NLF, one can easily get
the value of spill rate (SR) by using Lemma 1.

4.

SU1Vh-MARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper,
we re-examined
airline spill problem and went beyond the traditional
assumption
of normal
demand
distribution.
We first established
a distribution-free
multiplicative
relationship
between the observed load factor (OLF), the nominal load factor
(NLF), and the spill rate (SR).
In addition to deriving the spill formula for the normal
distribution
again, new spill formulae were derived under a logistic, a lognormal,
and a
Gamma distribution.
Furthermore,
each of the four spill formulae is rewritten as a function of
the mean demand and the coefficient of variation (CV), which are the common inputs used to
calculate the spill in practice.
In our numerical
example, the spills under three different levels of CV are calculated
at three different
capacity
levels for each of the four distributions.
It is found that for
relatively small value of CV, there is no significant difference in the value of the spills across
the four alternative
distributions.
As the demand become less stable, or equivalently,
more
volatile, the use of a normal distribution becomes problematic
because of the increasing
probability
that the demand will assume a negative value. The numerical examples in fact
show that the normal demand will not only over-estimate
the spill at a given capacity level,
but also over-estimate
the difference in spill when two capacity levels are compared.
This paper also found the possibility of using a generic OLF Table for each of the four
distributions
because the expression
can be very useful to practitioners
nominal load factor from the OLF.

for OLF is not directly related to the capacity. This table
in spill analysis as it allows to infer the value of the

The main goal of this paper is to address some technical issues in airline spill analysis,
especially in deriving the spill formulas. There are still a few areas that need further research.
First, the estimation
issue is non-trivial because of the fact that the observed demand was
truncated at the capacity.
Second, it will be quite interesting to study the
management
system on the spill and vice versa. It is well known
management
model typically uses the nested booking policy, implying
classes were closed before the flight departure time. Whenever a class is

implication of yield
that modem
yield
that many low fare
closed, there will be

spill. It is not clear yet how to integrate these two. Finally, it is important that the demand
based on real booking
data need to be characterized
empirically
so that some useful
guidelines for implementations
can be set.
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1.INTRODUCTION
It is to standard for practice airline companies to allow passengers to cancel
reservations
booked in advance without penalty. In these circumstances, the
likelihood is high that even with a given fight booked solid, seats would
remain empty at take-off because of cancellations or passenger no-shows. In
order to reduce the number of empty seats, airline companies resort to
overbooking.
Through
carefully controlled
overbooking,
the airline
companies can reduce the number of empty seats and at the same time serve
the public interest by accommodating more passengers.

A number of conventional airline overbooking
models have been developed
in the past several decades. Various techniques have been attempted, yielding
different degrees of success in their experiments. These include recognition
approaches,
such as a single overbooking
level of single fare model
developed
by Beckmann (1958), Thompson
(1961), Rothstein and Stone
(1967), Rothstein (1971), Shlifer and Vardi (1975), Gerbracht (1979), Bodily
and Pfeifer
(1992);
a comprehensive
non-nested
seat allocation
and
overbooking
model developed by Chatwin (1993); a comprehensive
nested
seat allocation and overbooking model by Belobaba (1987).

2. A DYNAMIC

MULTIPLE-FARE

OVERBOOKING

MODEL

The model of this paper contains a more comprehensive
and exact treatment
of the airline reservation's process than any of the foregoing. A discrete time
approach is used and the reservation's procedure is viewed as Multiple-stages.
With the aid of non-linear
programming,
solutions to the overbooking
problem are obtained that maximize expected gain (passenger revenue minus
costs of passengers
denied
boarding).
The operating
characteristics
considered
are the probability
of cancellations,
no-shows
and denied
boarding, and constructs multiple-fare penalty cost function that addresses the
practical airline companies" operations under denied boarding situations. The
model also considers the competition of different fare classes with each other
in zero stage. Then overbooking process can include the operation of variable
bookings
of multiple-fare
class. It better addresses
the practical airline
companies' operations under overbooking
situations.
The model relates to a fixed nonstop
The system changes state from time
before departure
at a reservation
described, we construct the following

flight and class of multiple-fare service.
to time according to a request arrival
system. As above phenomena
to be
model:

2

K o_}_

n_Z _./7V_"f,"n_j'.(B"=.,
+PL_.,)1
i=1 j=O

(1)
t,"

o_ _'

-S,

_

f,"(j_osc,(j-(_cc,+Pl&ur.,_)

i=l j=( PL_vsur, i + Bnc,i )+1

subject

to

OV, n >- O

K

_L"=Zov,o
i=[

Where:
o ;'," : integer number ofoverbooking
n=O,l,2
BL"

..... N.

: the integer

number

of booking

level

j) : the cumulate probabilities

fan

level on fare class 1"when decision period n,

when

decision

period

n.

of the number j of survival reserving

passengers on fare class i when decision period n, j = 0,1,2

f,

1=1,2,3

..... K

the fareclass,

f_>f2>

n
B

Oct"

•
.t

in the constrain

..... >fx

" 1"= 1,2,3

of booking

capacity,

..... K
the total booking

who are accepted on board in decision period
when decision period n. It is constructed as

,BC,-

+

...... ;

passengers

zero on fare class

1

r,l ,

P l. "_,.
...... :protection level considered average survival (the average of cancellation
probability and no-shows probability on fare class
period n.
OSC, (.) :oversales cost function on fare class i.
BL"

:is the overbooking

limit when decision period n.

1' when decision

In (1),therearetwo conditions,:(a) oversales
condition,and(b) spoilage
condition,formulated
as

X

O_p

(a)E

Z

i=l

f_n(J')" fi "[Bnacc,i+ PL_°'.i]

'f°r J>(t_r_

+Bn=J +1)'

._
n
J-( PE_wsur,i + _acc,i )+ i

K

OVF

i=1 j=( PLnavsur,i + _acc,i )+I

n
K (PV_s_.i

Cb>Z
i=1

+

n
B_cc,i)

Zf;(J>Y,J

A useful extension
parameters

for j < ( eL"avs_, , + Ba"c¢,i + 1)

j=O

of the analysis

OSC, (o)

(oversales

in the previous
cost function

section is to consider

for class i ) and f_

the

(e) (the

probabilities of the number j of survival booking passengers on fare class i when
decision period n).

(a) Oversales cost function on fare class i ; OSC, (.)
The function

OSC, (*) can be expressed in terms of single Oversales cost OSC

which are often assumed(Beckmann

(1958), Thompson

(1961), Rothstein

Stone (1967), Rothstein (1971), Shlifer and Vardi (1975), Gerbracht
Bodily and Pfeifer (1992)). Rearranging
and rewriting (1) gives

and

(1979),

x o,;"
rmx Z _f'/(j).
/=!j=o

K

-E

f . rrim[j,(B"ox,i + PL2_r,,]

Ol,'n

E

+=tS:( eL_:,_,,+
+ t_,+ )+l
subject to

OV/ >_.O

4

(2)

,

Where:
OSC

" oversales

cost.

(b) the probabilities

of the number

1" when decision

The

ff

function

probability,

which

and rewriting

period

(e)

are often

to

reserving

passengers

on fare class

(e).

can be expressed
assumed(Bodily

in terms

of binomial

and Pfeifer

survival

(1992)).

constant

Rearranging

(1) gives

.
,\
i=]g=(l,C;.s,v_+_acci)+j

subject

/1 ; ffl

j of survival

J

OV,">_O

K

BL"=Zov,"
i=1

Where:
pn
realsur, i : binomial
period

survival

constant

//, i = 1,2,-3

..... K

probability

on fare class

1 when decision

•3. A COMPREHENSIVE
MULTIPLE-FARE
SEAT ALLOCATION
AND OVERBOOKING
DYNAMIC MODEL
We combine the multiple-fare overbooking
dynamic model and multiple-fare
seat allocation dynamic model constructed
by Cheng(1997).
The multiplefare seat allocation dynamic model is given by the following function.
(a) Multiple-fare
and no-shows
The function

without multiple
probabilities

seat bookings,

and with both cancellations

gives :

(

S,-j

for n>O, S" > O,ACC

= _S" - 1
l S" +1

(4)

otherwise

ACC = f, "pL.,

REJ

> RE]

,i = /,2 ........ K

(5)

n-i
=

EMSRavs_,r

( S.

(6)

)

_t'here:

S n :available seats
capacity(B C )

when

decision

period

n.

The

initial

value

is booking

A C C :the expect revenue of accepting the reservation when decision period a.
REJ

Ps"_.,

:the expect revenue of holding a seat from period ( n - 1 ) to period zero after
rejecting the reservation.
:survival
1"=1,2,3

Edk[SR_-v_(*)

probability

on

fare

class

i

when

decision

period

n,

..... K.

. from period ( n - 1 ) to period zero, the expected marginal seat
revenue function considering
probabilities.

(b)Multiple-fare
with multiple seat bookings,
no-shows probability

6

both cancellations

and no-shows

and with both cancellations

and

The function

gives •

s °-yM,"
S

n-I

._

i-I

f

K

for n>O, S" >- _ M," ,ACC >_REJ

K
K

(7)

otherwise

S" + _ CA,,

K

Acc=Z M7"f,•8..i=I

(8)

K

z_
i=1
REJ

=

Z

K

EMSR,n,,u_(sn-Z
n-I

M_n +j)

j=l

(9)

i=1

Where:
M_

:the number of seats per request on fare class 1 when decision period n.

CA_' :the number of seats per cancellation on fare class 1' when decision period n.

To determine
an optimal booking limit (BL")
from the multiple-fare
overbooking dynamic model, we rearrange and rewrite (4)-(6) and (7)_(9).

(a)comprehensive
multiple-fare
multiple seat bookings
The function

seat

allocation

and

overbooking

without

gives •

S,,_,=IS"+(/_-&'Y')-I
lS" +(/_' -BL_')+ I

_a>0, [.9' +(/_' -/L_')] > 0,A__> RBr
(10)

ACC=f_

RE.J

"Psur,i

n-I
= EMSR,_,s.r

,i=1,2

........

K

(S n )

(12)

(b)comprehensive
multiple-fare
multiple seat bookings
The function

seat

allocation

and

overbooking

with

gives •

S°+(BLO-BL
S,,-I = I

(11)

n÷ !

)-_M,
K
,_1

11

^"
Iota>O.[S° +(BL"- BL"÷_)] ->_-'M,".ACC
> REI
I=l

(13)

K

Acc=5-".,w,.""
f, •,%.i

(14)

i=|

K
K

iffil
RE_.J=

Z

EMSRavsu,.(S
n-I

n

- _., M_n + j)

j=i

4.EXPERIMENTAL
This model

(15)

i--1

has been extensively

tested

RESULTS
on Taipei

to Macau

international

airline of TransAsia airways" booking system in Taiwan. 26 fights' data are
used for the comprehensive
multiple-fare
seat allocation and overbooking
strategy models. The results are summarized
in Table 1.
In terms of total revenue, our model increases 6% revenue in comparison with
the rule-of-thumb
approach
of experienced
staff, and increases
30.5%
revenue in comparison
with the model of Belobaba(1987).
With respect to
each flight revenue,
our model increases 22 flights revenue in comparison

with

the

revenue
the

rule-of-thumb

approach

in comparison

with

comprehensive

model

the

the

where

probability

Table

1. Compare

and

Revenue
of
each

flight

and

increases

model

the

probability

multiple-fare

strategy

is

for

reduces

of cancellation.

seat

allocation

models

unit:NT$,

521.976(2)

565.400(I)

512.464(3)

553,984(2)

564.020(I)

518,884(3)

38o,864(3)

562.548(I)

509.564(2)

385.192(3)

554.224(I)

482.692(2)

359,224(3)

552.512(2)

554,224(I)

352.756(3)

502.384(1)

497,056(2)

331.116(3)

547.376(I)
512.704(i)

530.016(2)

445,784(3)
322,460(3)

546,616(1

)

462,860(2)

483,452(3)

542,476(I

)

490,776(2)

497,720(2)

552,5129(1)

439.220(3)

461.812(3)

558.980(1)

529.920(2)

425.192(3)

545.284(I)
547.852( I )

495,772(2)

research

Rule-of

thumb

505,140(2)

476,984(2)

507.O92(2)

525.976(I)
_546.616(I)

496.44O(2)

338.536(3)
134,168(3)

520.316(1)

520,268(2)

367.880(3)

547.376(I)

531,728(2)

442.408(3)

504.808(2)

536.056(I)

211,216(3)

539.292(I)

519.316(2)

541.000(3)

573.960( I)
466,284(2)

541.048(2)

494.252(2)
513.468(I)

497.676(1)

331.212(3)

537,532(t)

518.412(2)

9,724.740

13,988,932

13,159,782

)

is

suitable

which

564.164(1)

153.764(3

that
dynamic

475,652(3)

279.276(3)

of

The

overbooking

This

337,584(3)

the

and

all flights'
reason

Belobaba[1987]

270.240(3)

Percentage

increases
major

is implemented

comprehensive

overbookin

and
One

allocation

process

32O.272(3)

Total

staff

Belobaba.

probability.

confirmation

different

of

seat

cancellation

a strict

of no-shows,

Strategies

model

multiple-fare

consider

situation

of experienced

the

494.536(2)

524.784(1)
457.964(2

0.695

)

0.940

maximum

Note:

(

) is to arrange

each

flight

revenue

in order

5.CONCLUSIONS

Airline
demand
of

empty

controlled
construct

companies

for the
seats,

flight
airline

overbooking,
an optimal

may

still

is higher

fly with
than

companies
the
revenue

airlines

empty

its capacity.
resort
can

management.

9

seats

even

In order

to overbooking.
reduce

the

number

though

the booking

to reduce
Through
of empty

the

number
carefully
seats

and

This research
model. It considers

develops a dynamic
multiple-fare
overbooking strategy
the competition of different fare classes with each other in

zero stage. Then overbooking
process can include the operation of variable
bookings of multiple-fare
class. It constructs
multiple-fare
penalty cost
function that also better addresses the practical airline companies' operations
under deny boarding situations.
It better addresses
the practical airline
companies' operations under overbooking situations. Although this model has
been extensively tested on an airline company booking system in Taiwan, the
underlying approach provides a conceptual framework to handle a multiplefare overbooking
strategy model and a comprehensive
multiple-fare
seat
allocation and overbooking
strategy model.
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BACKGROUND;

THE

PROBLEM

There are many facility operational planning/scheduling
situations for which,
within a given time window, arriving and/or departing transporters
carrying units
originating
at the facility, terminating
at the facility, continuing
through on the
same transporter,
or transferring
to another transporter
over some intra-facility
transfer route, must be assigned physical locations within the facility. The
assignments
may be made as part of an advance plan, or dynamically
,e.g.
shortly preceding
the time window, perhaps while all arriving transporters
are en
route, in the context of a real-time decision support problem. It is proposed that
the assignments
consider
desirable operational
efficiency
criteria
for the facility
and/or the transporters
and/or the units. It is realized the dynamic version may be
ill-advised
if it is felt that repetitively
transferred
units should habitually have the
same transfer route.
Examples
are: (1) at an air/bus terminal, planes/busses
arriving and/or departing
with passenger/luggage
units must be assigned gates between which units
transfer, and (2) at a freight transfer terminal, freight vehicles arriving and/or
departing
with cargo units must be assigned docks between which units must be
transferred.
The assignment
of transporters
to locations
transporter
being serviced at the alternative
recognize transporter
and unit needs such as
different locations and approaches
to them,
access/egress
(e.g. ramps, conveyors),
etc.

must consider the feasibility of each
locations.
Such feasibility should
physical compatibility
with the
maintenance,
restocking,

This paper deals with the assignment
of transporters
to locations
according to a
quantitative
criterion.
Suggested
criteria consider measures for the transfer of
originating
units from the facility entrance(s) to their departing locations, plus the
transfer of all terminating
units from their arriving locations to the facility exit(s),
plus the transfer of all transferring
units over intra-facility
location-to-location
transfer routes. Such measures can be time, distance,
or some combination
thereof. Hereinafter
the measure used is distance.
It is recognized
that the problem may be trivial or worthy of little management
attention in small low-activity
facilities.
It is likely to be more meaningful
for
large high-activity
facilities wherein absence of an objective
criterion for
assignments
may invite very inefficient ones.

2

1.1 Problem

Solution

Criteria

and Key Assumption

Initially
it is assumed
that scheduled
transporter
arrivals
and departures
are such
that, considering
times to traverse
distances
between
all locations
to which
transporters
might be assigned,
within the time window
transfers
can be made
between
all pairs of transporters.
Under this "all-are-time-feasible"
assumption,
there is enough
time for transfers
(i.e. connections)
between
the latest arriving
transporter
and the earliest
departing
transporter.
(See "Relaxing
the All-AreTime-Feasible
Assumption"
in Section 2. below re: ignoring
this assumption.)
A first suggested
criterion
for assigning
transporters
to locations
is that the sum of
all individual
transfer
"costs"
should be minimized.
"Cost"
for any one transfer
is
defined
as number
of units transferred
multiplied
by the distance
between
the
locations
involved
in the transfer.
Stated in this manner
the problem
is completely
analogous
to various
other
location,
layout,
and design problems
which have
been formulated
as quadratic
assignment
models.
The quadratic
assignment
model is in general
known as a mathematical
optimization
(programming)
problem
which can be very difficult
to solve. A number
of approaches
exits,
ranging
from 1) optimally
solving
a nonlinear
integer
programming
problem,
to 2)
linearizing
the model at the expense
of adding
additional
integer
variables/
constraints,
and optimizing,
to 3) using heuristic
methods
that can give good but
perhaps
non-optimal
results for large problems
within reasonable
computer
time.
This paper begins with
preferred
first problem
criteria are formulated,

2.

QUANTITATIVE

As stated
minimize
modeled
Let:
t, u
T

g, m
L

the quadratic
assignment
model as a base formulation
for a
solution
criterion.
Then two different
problem
solution
followed
by relaxing
the all-are-time-feasible
assumption.

FORMULATION

AND EXAMPLE

above, the problem
of assigning
the total cost of making
transfers
as a quadratic
assignment
model.

-- indices

for transporters

= total number
time window;
= indices

= total

of transporters

for locations
number

whether

terminating,

to assign

to which

of locations

transporters
to locations
so as to
between
transporters
can properly
Quantitatively,
the base model is:

to locations

transporters

to which

continuing,

may

transporters

during

or originating;
the planning

be assigned;
may

be assigned;

be

Qtu

= the number

of units

De m

= the transfer

distance

transferring

from

from

location

transporter

t to transporter

g to location

m, with

u ;

symmetric

distances;
At
Tg

= the set of all locations

to which

transporter

=

that may

feasibly

set of all transporters

For making
xtg

assignments,

which

the decision

variables

is to be set to 1 if transporter

otherwise

to be set to 0.

These

t may
be assigned

assigned;

to location

g.

are:

t is assigned

variables

be feasibly

to location

are defined

g and

for t = 1, ..., T and

g_A t .
Given the above
follows:

notation

T

T

t*l
I_u

u=l

the quadratic

assignment

model

is formulated

as

Minimize

subject

(1)

to:

t_A t m_A
d_nl

t

x,t <_1
t_T

x,t _(0,1}
Equation

Vg=l,-..,L

(2)

V t = I, ...,T

(3)

t

(1) calculates

the total

Vt=l,...,TandgeA

t

cost of all transfers

as a function

(4)
of the

assignment
variables.
Each inequality
(2) ensures
that at most one transporter
assigned
to any location.
Each equation
(3) ensures
that each transporter
is
assigned
to exactly
one location.
The constraint
(4) states that the assignment
variables
can take only the values 0 or 1.
It is noted that the model
(1), ..., (4) accommodates
only the transfer
costs for
transferring
units from transporter
to transporter.
To consider
as well transfers
from an initial location
(e.g. entrance)
at the facility
to a transporter,
and from
4

is

a

transporter to a final location (e.g exit) at the facility, it is presumed that the T th
transporter

is a dummy

that

is pre-assigned

also presume
that the L th location
and final locations
in the facility.
by extending

this concept.

The problem

is thus

for t = 1, ..-, T -1 and
model becomes:

modified

to:

the decision

of the sets,

teA I

y' x,, ___
1

entrance

and exit.

It is

t=l

At,

variables
would

are defined

contain

only

L, and the

T-I

__,(.Q,rDtL +Qr, Du)x,t+_-'__,

I=l

subject

as follows:

T-I

£

the

is a dummy location
occupying
both the initial
Multiple
entrances/exits
may be accommodated

g e A t , and none

T-I

Minimize

to both

_._ _-'_Q,.Dt.,xttx.,,,
_=1

teA

(la)

ImCEA t

Vg=I,...,L-1

(2a)

Vt=I,...,T-1

(3a)

leT e

__xtt=l
tea

e

x,t _{0,1}

Vt=l,...,T-landgeA

t

(4a)

The first term in the objective
function
calculates
the cost of all transfers
to all real
transporters
from the dummy
transporter
plus the cost of all transfers
from all real
transfers
to the dummy
transporter.
The rest of the model
is unchanged
except for
the number
of decision
variables
and constraints.
To illustrate
application
of the model,
consider
operations
at an airline
terminal/hub.
Indeed,
airport
passenger
transfers
between
flights
have escalated
noticeably
with air travel growth and since hub airports
were introduced.
Transfer
activity
may inferred
to be heaviest
at "central"
and hub airports
within
a country
or continent.
One airline spokesman
has suggested
that for a central and hub
airport, as many as 85% of enplanements
may be from passengers
transferring
from arriving
connecting
flights.
Suppose
that over a specified
six airliners
are to be assigned

time window
to six gates

(e.g. "bank"
in airline terminology)
at the terminal.
For simplicity
we

suppose
management
is only concerned
about the transfer
distance
of passengers
who must change planes as opposed
to those originating
or terminating
at the
terminal.
The simplification
means we may use the first model
(1), ..., (4). The
data for the problem
are given in the tables below.

TABLE
THE NUMBER,
TRANSFERRING

1

TABLE

Qtu' OF
PASSENGERS

fit
fit
fit
fit
fit
fit
from/to 101 102 103 104 105 106
fit 101
0 40
30 20
0
5
fit 102
10
0
10
5
0 40
fit 103
0
0
0
0
0
0
fit 104
50
0
10
0
0
5
fit 105
10
5 20
5
0 10
fit 106
20 20
20 20
0
0

2

DISTANCES,
D£m (IN YARDS),
BETWEEN
GATES

from/to

gate gate gate gate gate gate
1
2
3
4
5
6

gate
gate
gate
gate
gate
gate

0 80 130 190
80
0
50 110
130
50
0 60
190 110
60
0
230 150 100 40
300 220 170 110

1
2
3
4
5
6

230
150
100
40
0
70

Source: Author-fabricated

Note: Flight 105 is a terminating flight and thus it
receives no transfers while Flight 103 is an
originating flight and thus it offers no transfers.
Source: Author-fabricated
data.

300
220
170
110
70
0
data

Feasible
gate assignments
lead to the set definitions
given below.
These feasible
assignments
are based on a hypothetical
scenario
in which
flights
103 and 106 are
large planes that cannot be accommodated
at gates 2 or 5. Also flight 101 arrives
before gate 5 is cleared
from a previously
departing
flight (not one of the six) so it
cannot be assigned
there and flight 104 cannot be assigned
to gate 2 for a similar
reason.
Given this scenario
the feasible gate sets for each flight is as follows:
Afltl01

= {gate 1, gate 2, gate 3, gate 4, gate 6}

Afltl02

= {gate 1, gate 2, gate 3, gate 4, gate 5, gate 6}

AfltlO 3 = {gate 1, gate 3, gate 4, gate 6}
Afltl04

= {gate 1, gate 3, gate 4, gate 5, gate 6}

AfltlO 5 = {gate 1, gate 2, gate 3, gate 4, gate 5, gate 6}
AfltlO 6 = {gate 1, gate 3, gate 4, gate 6}
The optimal
solution
to this problem
was found using the general
purpose
nonlinear spreadsheet
model solver available
within Microsoft
EXCEL.
The EXCEL
solver allows one to define and solve a quadratic
assignment
model.
Although
details are not given here,
efficient
spreadsheet
implementation
may take
advantage
of matrix multiplication
tools. The solution
was found with some
6

difficulty,

requiring restarts with different values for parameters of by the solver.

As an alternative, the problem was also reformulated and solved using LINDO
Systems Inc.'s LINGO non-linear mathematical programming software package.
As strongly advocated by LINGO proponents and others, the quadratic assignment
model may be converted into an equivalent linear, integer program by introducing a large number of additional 0-1 variables and additional constraints. Such
conversion provided for the LINGO approach to reliably find an optimal solution.
Both the EXCEL and LINGO solutions cost 36400 passenger yards, and assigned:
flight 102 to gate 2
flight 105 to gate 1

flight 101 to gate 4
flight 104 to gate 5

flight 103 to gate 6
flight 106 to gate 3

The largest transfer cost for a single route was 6000 passenger yards, namely, 20
transferring units from flight 105 at gate 1 to flight 106 at gate 3.
2.1 Problem

Formulation

Alternatives

A second
suggested
criterion
recognizes
that a solution
that minimizes
total cost
may use, as one of its transfer
routes,
one with a very large transfer
cost. To avoid
using such an extreme
transfer
cost route, or any of the largest transfer
cost routes,
a different
criterion
would
be to minimize
the maximum
transfer
cost encountered
by any particular
pair of transporters.
Such a criterion
might be appealing
from an
equity point of view.
For example,
in the airport gate problem
this criterion
would produce
solutions
that would not unnecessarily
inconvenience
the
passengers
of one flight in order to improve
the convenience
of the passengers
of
other flights.
To model

and

this

problem

an additional

the following

decision

additional

Qtu

= Max(Otu

K

= any sufficiently
variable,

notation

are introduced:

' Qut )'
large number.

c, the maximum

transfer

cost,

is defined.

To ensure that c actually
equals the maximum
transfer
cost a series of constraints
are added to the problem.
By definition
a maximum
transfer
cost is greater than
equal to all individual
transfer
costs.
This leads to linear constraints
of the
following
type:
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or

Q,. Z Dt.,x,t < c + K(1 - x.,, )
tCA

(5)

t

When assignment
variables satisfy the assignment
constraints
(2), (3), and (4) the
summation
on the left-hand-side
of constraint (5) calculates the distance between
location m and the location to which transporter
t is assigned.
Thus the
hand-side calculates
the highest cost of transfers to or from transporter
u is assigned to location m. If u actually is assigned to m then the factor
removed from the right-hand-side
of the constraint
which in turn causes

entire leftu assuming
K is
the

constraint
to require c to be at least as large as the requisite cost. If u is not
assigned to m then the constraint
is irrelevant for determining
c, and in this case
the factor K is not removed so that the constraint
is satisfied by any non-negative
value of c. For purposes here K may be set equal to the maximum possible
transfer cost.
A constraint
of type (5) is required for every pair of transporters
and every
possible location.
In the case when any transporter
can be assigned to any
location and there are T real transporters
and L locations available for assignment
of transporters,
the number of constraints of this type that are needed is
LT(T + 1)/2.
If not all assignments
are feasible then fewer constraints
are needed.
The minimax model counterpart
to the first problem, (1) through (4) may now be
stated.
Minimize
Subject

c

(6)

to:

Q,_ Z Dt.,x,t <-c+K(1-x_m)

for

t =I,...,T-1;

u = t + 1,..., T;

Vm e A,,

(7)

LIAr

_x,t<-I

Vg=I,-..,L

(8)

_"_x,t = l

V t = I, ...,T

(9)

x,t _ {0, 1}

Vt = 1, ..., T and g _ At

teT

t

2.1.1 Illustrative

Example

Reconsidered

Using

the Minimax

(10)
Criterion:

Considering
the previous problem
it is noted that if any plane could be assigned
to any gate the number of constraints of type (7) is 90, but given the flight-to-gate
feasibilities
in this example only 73 such constraints
are actually needed. For the
8

example
problem
using the EXCEL
flight
flight

the minimax
criterion
version was quickly
solver, giving the following
solution:

101 to gate
104 to gate

4
5

flight
flight

102 to gate
105 to gate

2
6

and reliably

flight
flight

solved

103 to gate
106 to gate

3
1

The minimax
route transfer
cost was 4600 passenger
yards, namely
20
transferring
units from flight 106 at gate 1 to flight 104 gate 5. No minimax
solution
was attempted
using LINGO.
This

maximum

route

transfer

cost is

23%

less than

that

for the

minimum

total

cost criterion
problem
solution.
In general,
the maximum
route
cost for the
minimax
cost criterion
problem
solution
would be expected
to be no more than
that for the minimum
total
cost criterion
problem
solution.
The total transfer
cost for this minimax
transfer
cost problem
solution
was 39212,
7% higher
than that for the minimum
total cost criterion
problem
solution.
In
general the total
cost for the minimax
cost criterion
problem
solution
would be
expected
to no less than that for the minimum
total cost criterion
problem
solution.
A third suggested
criterion
recognizes
that a solution
for the minimum
total cost
criterion
may use the transfer
route with a very large transfer
distance.
It may be
desirable
to avoid using this extreme
distance
route, or possibly
any large
distance
routes.
A solution
for a criterion
of minimizing
the maximum
distance
used by any transfer
route may be obtained
by solving
the problem
under criterion
2 with the number
of transferring
units defined
as 1 for each active transfer.
As
might be intuitively
expected
from problem
data, since there is a transfer
in at
least one direction
between
every pair of flights, the minimized
largest
transfer
distance
is 300 yards.
2.1.2
Consider

Relaxing
a case

the All-Are-Time-Feasible
in which

at least

one unit

Assumption:
must

be transferred

from

transporter

transporter
u. Depending
on the location
assignments
for these two transporters
the time to make the transfer
could be greater than the time between
the arrival

t to
of t

and the departure
of u. This is a situation
in which the assumption
is not true. The
absence
of this assumption
means
that the location
assignments
must be
constrained
further than they have been in any of the preceding
models.
To model
this situation
some additional
data are needed.
In particular,
we suppose
that the
time to make a transfer
is a known function
of the distance
and the number
of
units transferred.

9

Denote the function f(Q,,,,
assigned
amount
respective

is the time

to transfer

Q,_ units

when

t is

to location
g and u is assigned
to location
m. Further,
let S,_ be the
of time available
to transfer
all the units from t to u considering
their
arrival

and

y. f(Q,,,,Dt.,)x,e<_S,,,
ttlA

Dr,,), which

departure

.K(1-x,,,,,)

times.

Then
',g m_Ao

(11)

t

One will note the similarity
of these constraints
with those introduced
for the
minimax
formulation,
and they work in the same way. A sufficient
value for the
factor, K, is the transfer
time between
the locations
that are the greatest
distance
apart.
Any number
of constraints
of type (11) could be added
to any one of the'
three previously
introduced
models
as necessary.
No computerized
solutions
of
this formulation
were attempted.

3.

PREVIOUS

PROBLEM

RECOGNITIION

The above problem
might be called the "Transfer
Location
Assignment
Problem
(TLAP)".
Its quadratic
assignment
model formulation
is believed
to have been
originally
conceived
by the first author
who investigated
it in an airport gates
context
using LINGO
software
in 1991. It was then submitted
to LINGO
developers
for computer
model streamlining,
and has since appeared
in LINGO
problem
sets which contain
sample quadratic-assignment
model
applications.
Previous
recognition/formulation
of the problem,
especially
in an airline gates
context,
was sought
by World-Wide-Web-computer-searching
two bibliographies.
The Annual
Comprehensive
Index of the Institute
for Operations
Research
and
Management
Science
("INFORMS")
was searched
using the following
key word
sequences:
terminal
gate assignments,
airline
gates,
airport
gates,
gate assignments,
quadratic
assignment
problem,
mimmax
assignment
This index references
numerous
publications
from 1982 to 1996. Also
searched
were papers from proceedings
of annual AGIFORS
(Airline
Group
of the
International
Federation
of Operations
Research
Societies)
meetings,
through
AGIFORS'
web site catalogue
of such proceedings.
The search "hits"
revealed
a
few integer
linear programming
formulations
of the problem,
e.g.. Mangoubi
and
Malthaisel
(1985).
However
no quadratic
assignment
formulations
of the problem
were revealed.
Quadratic
assignment
formulations
were not identified
in either of
the comprehensive
references
Teodorovoic(1988)
or Richter
(1989).
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4. CONCLUSIONS

AND

DISCUSSION

Assigning
transporters
to terminal
locations
must address
numerous
managerial
and operational
considerations.
However
in many applications
the assignment
should not neglect
the "costs"
of accomplishing
the transfer.
The problem
formulations
presented
above provide
for applying
different
solution
criteria
for
assignments.
The computerized
approaches
demonstrated
may be sufficient
for
infrequently
solving
small problems.
Frequent
or larger problem
solutions
required
in a (perhaps
intra-day)
Decision
Support
System
context
invite
investigating
choices
from among
specialized
available
quadratic
assignment
model solution
computer
packages.
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1.0
INTRODUCTION
In 1996,Canadabecame the
(ANS).
entity,

Other jurisdictions
but the Canadian

from Transport
a board

had placed their ANS
solution

went further.

Canada (TC) to a non-share

of directors

regulatory

first nation to fully commercialize

role, ensuring

under a government

The assets
groups.

that safety standards

called NAV

Transport

system

controlled

and personnel

corporation

drawn from stakeholder

its air navigational

and owned

were transferred

CANADA,

governed

Canada retained

were maintained.

In the process of negotiating
the transfer, some argued that the nascent ANS corporation
should only be responsible
for the southern airspace, while TC should continue to manage
northern

and remote

recovery

for the system

areas,

entirety.

Northern

where

low traffic

infeasible.

stakeholder

Origins

were alarmed

costs

make full cost

and the ANS transferred

that this might

the

in its

mean that full cost

They lobbied

for exemptions

in the

process, the safeguards
in the ANS Act, and the early issues
ANS in the northern and remote regions. 2

of Commercialization

In the federal
the potential

and high operating

in their fragile economy.
northern interests.

This paper concerns the lobbying
in implementing
a commercialized

1.1

densities

This view was rejected,

groups

recovery
would be implemented
Bill C-20 _ which would protect

by

a purely

budget

tabled

in February

for commercialization

of 1994, the government

of the ANS

in order

stated

to improve

its intention

efficiency

to study

and achieve

long-term
savings for the Crown.
This was part of a comprehensive
rethinking
of government
involvement
in transportation,
which included commercialization
of port facilities or transfer
to provincial

control,

the Canadian

National

1988-89

under

government
Young.

transfer
Railroad

the Progressive

control

of airports

which

was, if anything,

Statutes

represents

of Canada

corporation).

Conservatives,

air carriers,

1996, Chapter

authorities,
Air Canada

but the movement

accelerated

In part, the government
was responding
controllers
union (CATCA),
the airline
(ATAC)

to local operating

(a Crown

under

Liberal

Policy

and the Canadian

20, An Act respecting

Issues.

This paper

and its conclusions

are those

of the Northwest

Minister

Doug

The air traffÉc
Association
of Canada

Aircraft

Association

the commercialization
which

of
in

decreased

Transport

Business

by the Government
of the Northwest
Territories.
Association
of Canada on the federal Transport

represent
the views of the Government
Consumers'
Association
of Canada.

toward

to the views of its stakeholders.
pilots unions, the Air Transport

navigation
services,
(hereafter
C-20 or the ANS Act).
2 The author currently
manages the NWT CARS program,
CANADA
Consumers'

and the privatization
had been privatized

is administered

of civil air
for NAV

In 1997, he also represented
the
Minister's
Committee
on Air

of the author
Territories,

and do not necessarily
NAV

CANADA,

or the

(CBAA), hadlobbiedfor the ANS to berun asa business.The ideahadalsobeenproposed
by a Royal Commissionon NationalPassenger
Transportation,
3anda Ministerialtaskforce.
At the time,the ANS employedover6000people,including2300air traffic controllers,1000
Flight ServiceSpecialists,and1100electronictechnicians.TC maintained105Flight Service
Stationsand55 controltowers,aswellastheradioaidsto navigation(navaids),radar,and
dataprocessingsystemsrequiredfor thework.4 The system provided services for the world's
second largest country,
were $800 million:

and a considerable

portion

The system was funded by an Air Transportation
tickets.
This raised about $550 million in 1994.
generated

another

revenues

$50 million.

(TP 12203E:

The general

The remainder

view of the user community

was a feeling

processes

were

1.2

capital

would

markets

Special
company
privatized

procurement,

and added

was funded

from general

was underfunded,

staffing,

unnecessary

tax

and would

not

training,

and labour

relations

cost to the system.

as is it used by the Canadian

traits than to a specific

and people

technologies,

of the expense

of the Corporation

of desirable

resources

expenditures

Tax (ATT) which was levied on passenger
Revenues
from fees on international
flights

was that the system

that government

The term "commercialization",
series

Annual

Fiscal restraint in the federal government
gave little
would be found as soon as they were required.
At the same

far too cumbersome

Structure

Atlantic.

6).

keep up with future requirements.
comfort that new appropriations
time, there

of the North

efficiently,

Agency

operated

9).

Several

In the end, a not-for-profit
chosen.
NAV CANADA

to user needs

models

refers

more to a

ANS would

and be able to rapidly

principles,

and would

were discussed

a Crown

a mixed enterprise,

(TP 12202E:

government,

A commercialized

on commercial

of govemment,

enterprise,

enterprise

be responsive

make decisions

(TP 12202E:

Operating

structure.

Corporation,
a not-for-profit

have

corporation,

adopt

access

for the new entity,
a government

manage
new

to

including

owned

-

and a fully

20-24).

corporation,
reporting to a stakeholder
was incorporated
as a non-share
capital

Board of Directors
was
corporation.
All profits

generated
must be reinvested
in the corporation,
used to pay down debt, or repaid
in the form of decreased
fees. The Board is composed
of five members nominated

to the users
by the

industry, two by unions, three by the federal government,
and four by the board itself, plus a
Chief Executive
Officer. 6 Directors
are required to be Canadian citizens, but may not be

3 Canada

Communications

4 Transport
Canada
Commercialization"
Air Navigation
-_Costs

"Discussion
TP 12203E,

System

and prices

Commercialir.ation

Group.

Volume

1, pp. 126-127.

Paper Number 1: Principles
and Options for
Appendix A, in The Study of the Commerciali:ation

in Canada,

in this paper

Directions.

p. 5.

are expressed

of the Air Navigation

in Canadian
System,

page

dollars.
8.

of the

a

electedofficialsor civil servantsof anylevelof government,or employeesor directorsof
organizationswhicharemajorsuppliersor customersof NAV CANADA.
TheANS consultationprocessbeganin latesummerof 1994.The ANS Commercialization
StudyTeam toured the country consulting with stakeholders.
A meeting with the Northern
Air Transport
Association
Territory,
on September

(NATA) was scheduled
15 (TPI2203E,
Appendix

organization
the "majors"

aviation operators.
Although not all operators
North, NWTAir, and First Air -- are members,

of northern
-- Canadian

smaller

fixed wing

1.3

Northern

and helicopter

in Whitehorse,
capital of the Yukon
A, p. 26). NATA is the primary
participate
in NATA,
as well as many

operations.

and Remote

Regions

The "northern
and remote regions" referred to in the document
include the Northwest
Territories,
Yukon Territory,
northern Quebec, and the northern parts of several provinces.
The area is very sparsely
separated

by some

populated,

of the most

and consists

inhospitable

of widely

terrain

scattered

on the planet.
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small settlements,

Most

of these settlements

are wholly dependent
on air transport.
There is little substitution
possible with other modes,
since most communities
are not linked by roads, and the short shipping season of the Arctic
restricts

most

coastal

communities

to a single barge

sea-lift

per year.

The harsh operating
environment
produces
a tough breed of aviators, the "bush-pilots".
great distances
mean that few alternate airports are available.
Harsh and unpredictable
weather increases
risks.
The low population
operators.

High

and large
operating

effective

competition

volumes

do not allow

distances

involved

costs are otten

because,
a second

while there
operator

create

a low traffic density

barely covered

by revenues.

may be low barriers
to fly profitably.

for air transport

Otten

to entry,

Demand

The

there

is little

the low traffic

for staples

is inelastic,

but

other items, such as fresh fruit, vegetables
and dairy products
have higher price elasticity
demand.
The typical northern
operator makes profit, if at all, on freight, rather than
passengers.

Fresh

The north
natural
costs

is still economically

resource

extraction

are very high.

energy

food costs are subsidized

costs

dependent

on the southern

and harvesting

Transportation

of wildlife

costs

are very high, both because

by a program

called

"food

tax base.

is not sufficient

are a major

component

of the severe

climate,

of

mail", s

Its economy,

based

to sustain

it. Living

of goods
and because

prices.

on

Fuel and

of transportation

costs.

The future
withdrawal

high potential
of the federal

7 The communities
between

NAV

8 This program
(DIAND).

of the resource
government

are specified

CANADA

base cannot

in Schedule

and Transport

is run by the federal

be exploited

from infrastructure

without

such as airports,

A of the Department

infrastructure.
and deficit-cutting

of Transport

Agreement,

and Northern

Development

Canada.

Department

of Indian

4

Affairs

The

by the territorial
aircra_

which

longer

runways.

in runways

governments

has put a severe

are projected
New

to replace

standards

will be required,

some

strain

on resources.

of the aging

types now

for snow and ice contamination

even to accommodate

At the same time, the

the existing

in service

suggest

will require

that some

investment

fleet.

The discussion
papers which formed the basis for public consultation
contained
a clear
recognition
that a subsidy program of some kind was inevitable and acknowledged
the need to
"insulat[e]

an ANS corporate

managing

1.4

in commercial

from the potentially

costly

and conflicting

simultaneously

roles of

(TP 12204:12).
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Bill C-20

Recognizing
These

entity

and social environments

the unique

were

not added

problems

in the northern

capriciously,

regions,

the ANS

but as a consequence

Act included

of determined

safeguards.

lobbying

on the parts

of territorial
governments
and northern operators.
In addition to the safeguards
in legislation
territorial
governments
felt that they were also given verbal assurances
which went beyond
this.
One source

of comfort

for the northern

stakeholders

was that the NAV

CANADA

Board

of

Directors,
even before its official inception, was headed by John Crichton,
the President of
ATAC. _° Mr. Crichton had many years of association
with First Air, which operates
the most
extensive
volume

route

system

turboprop

The assurances

in the north,

services
contained

provides

guidance

members

of parliament,

including
service

states

that among

process

reductions

assurances

principles),

the legislation

charges

of the document,

of air navigation

a special

The actual

proposed

are more
states

for designated

had prepared

reflected
a working

services

from the south,

in the Summary,

since it is meant

to northern

provincial

and smaller

Territories.
which

presumably

as an executive

summary

of the enactment
and remote

and territorial

for

is:

communities,

governments

for

by NAV CANADA

specific.

With respect

to fees levied

for service

(charging

that:
northern

or remote

utilized

the sentiments
paper

jet routes

the key components

involving

charges for similar services
[C-20: 35. (1) (g)].

9 This concern

long-haul

most of the Northwest

in the Act are encapsulated

to the intent

the preservation

including

throughout

services

... must not be higher

to a similar extent

of the Airways

on the international

elsewhere

Corporation

experience

than

in Canada

of New Zealand,

(TP 12205E),

which

and which

operated
as a State Owned Enterprise
in a much more interventionist
government
structure.
10 On November
18, 1997, Crichton became President
and CEO of NAV CANADA,
replacing
Ken Copeland.
Transport

He resigned

Security

as President

Corporation,

and CEO of ATAC

as these would

conflict

and Chairman

with his new duties.

of the Air

Thisreflectsthe most
operator
costs

would

on many

The complete

central

attempt
routes

concern

to extract

too high for the delicate

dependence

of northern

Northern
and remote services
"Humanitarian
or Emergency
employees

(C-20:73

In addition,
Where
way",

the Act imposed

market

communities

make the

to bear.
on air transport

and consultation

("the Corporation",

was also recognized.
to provide
by NAV CANADA

parties

requirement

on NAV

in the Act) proposes

and this will affect "a significant
affected

was that the ANS
would

74).

a notification

of the ANS

of services,

it must notify

at the time, which

at the site level, which

are guaranteed
as part of the requirement
Flights" in the event of a work stoppage

(1)definitions,

the operator

reduction

of the stakeholders

full cost recovery

of its intent (C-20:

group
18).

of users

CANADA.

a termination

or residents

The Corporation

or

in a material

may only

proceed
with such changes if, within 45 days, it has received no notice of rejection
from the
provincial
government,
t_ In the event that a province does reject the proposal,
or the users
have rejected
Minister
Minister

it, the Corporation

may only implement

The Ministers
of Transport
or Defence
service at northern
or remote locations
compensate
(C-20:31).

NAV

The legislation
date, its Level
although

CANADA

The ANS

for any losses

sustained

from time to time.

LEGISLATION

Act imposed

LOS Policies
which would

Where

subject

with the direction

services

are requested

of users is in favour
(C-20:23
(5)).

a rapid timetable

provincial

governments

to heavy taxation.

in excess

of the

of it, but such services

IN PRACTICE
on NAV

CANADA.

in most cases,

It had to develop

but this is understood

governments
of Yukon and NWT.
pointed out that the tax is not eliminated,

the ability of future
already

in complying

by the first anniversary
date of transfer, as well as announcing
be phased in as the Air Transportation
Tax (ATT) was phased

,1 The Act uses the word
two territorial
_2 Users have

if the

also required the Corporation
to set out, within one year after the transfer
of Service (LOS) Policy (C-20: 23). This must then be applied consistently,

it may be revised

THE

of the federal

to compensation

may also direct the Corporation
to provide new
(C-20:24
(1)), but in this case, the crown must

LOS Policy, these may be provided ifa consensus
will be charged out in addition to existing charges

2.0

it with the approval

of Transport
(C-20: 20). The Corporation
is not entitled
does not approve the change in service (C-20:20
(2)).

to raise it again.

but merely

This remains

to also include

reduced

a concern

and publish

a fee structure
out. _2

to zero,

the

implying

in an industry

2.1

Fees

and

Charges:

The Issues

The first test of the legislation
announced

its proposed

uncontroversial,
airspace

came in early summer of 1997, when NAV

fee structure for phase one.

On the surface,

at least with the major carriers who operated

and internationally.

The proposal

CANADA

the changes

made were

in the southern domestic

shifted the charging

basis

from a tax based

on

passenger tickets (ATT) to a fee based on maximum take offweight
(MTOW) of the aircraft
and distance. _3 At the same time, terminal charges were assessed on aircraft departing
aerodromes

served

by NAV

CANADA

units. _4

The new fees were to be introduced
in two phases.
on 1 November
1997, the large commercial
aircraft
the remaining
place,

costs met by ATT.

and the ATT reduced

charged

By November

to zero.

During phase one, planned to commence
were to be charged onc half the fee, with

of 1998, full fee implementation

In the second

phase,

aircraft

would

would

take

also be

fees.

The Act had recognized
included

a number

discriminatory

the need to switch

of constraints

imposition

from a tax base to a fee structure,

on the nature

of fees, such as safeguards

of costs, while attempting

flexibility as possible in going about its business.
International
Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO)
consistent

with international

One aspect

of the change

only to the passenger
the government
passenger

which

carriers.

__ while

scheduled

aviation

and operators

Northern

operations

to allow the Corporation

was certain
Scheduled

all-cargo

carders

have

period,

objected

certain

to be addressed

or charter
NAV

operators

using aircraft

be in the south,

carry significant

was the fact that ATT applied

carriers

generated

CANADA)

to the "free-riding"

through

structural features

of cargo

which

to
to

were not charged.

operators.

General
from ATT.

made the transition

to MTOW-

generally use aircraft which are larger
Route segments
are generally longer than

lack of alternates

loads northbound,

revenues

the ATT applied

were also exempt

tend to use combi configurations.
of the freight they carry. Third,
freight

significant

using the same type ofaircratt

of less than 8 tonnes

and the relative

northern
operators
is a function largely

all aircraft

as much

NAV CANADA
was also constrained
by
charging principles,
and by the need to be

based fees more complex.
First, northern operators
than would be used on a similar route in the south.
they would

and had

against

practice.

(and in the transition

tickets,

The major

Second,
carriers

smaller

implies

a need for greater

range.

Profitability
for northern
freight is uni-directional.
Almost

but there

is next to no southbound

freight.

13 The proposed

enroute

t4 The proposed

terminal

_ The ATT calculation
cent of the price
are charged

charging
charge

formula

was $0.02174

was $7.74 x MTOW

for a domestic

or transborder

of the air fare, to a maximum

a $55.00

fee.

x Distance

09 in phase

x MTOW

°gin phase

one.

flight is a fixed fee of $6.00,

of $55.00.

one.

International

(other

plus 7 per

than US) flights

A northernoperator,therefore,typicallycarriesa sectionor two of passengers
anda number
of freight palletsnorthbound,andreturnswith a low passenger
load factor,but no freight.
Underthe previousregime,the ATT appliedto the passengers,
but not the freight,andwas
similarwhetherthe aircraftwassouthboundor northbound.
Underthe NAV

CANADA
fee structure,
the reduction of ATT may reduce a southern
total ticket price. The application of the MTOW-based
fees and terminal fees is

operator's

off-set by reductions
to ATT, and total average ticket cost may even decline.
For the
northern operator, since relatively fewer passengers are carried, the ATT reduction does not
come close to off-setting the MTOW-based
fees and, as operators were quick to point out,
are applied equally to aircraft which are southbound,
carrying no freight to off-set costs.
A second
Radio

concern

Stations

and Flight

was raised

(CARS).

Service

by the imposition

While NAV

Stations

are operated
by territorial
service are very different.

(FSS),

of terminal

CANADA

charges

provides

it also funds another

ANS

service

at smaller

ground vehicles, but provide only limited weather services.
an aerodrome
traffic advisory service identifying conflicting

vehicle

movements,

services.

CARS

and also provide

a broad

basic advisories

range

and departing

The CARS

system

traffic,

Some

users

is staffed

to those
levels
ANS.

being

at international

had been dropping
NATA complained

in the south,

where

was unreasonable

2.2

NWTAIr,
increase
consisted

of the CARS is to provide
(TAF), and current weather

who are recruited

low cost,

airports,

where

including

and NAV CANADA

in its initial CBC radio
rates.
B737

in their

and using a northern

that they pay user fees at CARS

of services

of the new fee structure

of several

briefing

information,

ATC terminal

and largely

native

which were identical

units existed.

Service

in the north even while Transport
Canada was still operating the
that while these terminal and enroute charges might be appropriate

a full range

Reaction

in freight

weather

observation
at Aurora College in Fort
The system serves the basic need for

weather

to pay the same fees for the relatively

Carrier

The publishing

at a relatively

to the requirement

charged

The CARS

and weather

and limited

purpose
forecast

by observer/communicators

observations,

objected

airports.

aircraft.

communities,
trained in radio procedure
and weather
Smith, and then return to their communities
to work.
reliable weather
workforce.

ATC towers

Flight Service Stations
air traffic, manage ground

of flight planning

of known

but no weather
or flight planning briefings.
The primary
the weather
observations
necessary to support a terminal
for arriving

Aerodrome

through

governments,
the government
of Quebec.
The three types of ANS
Towers provide separation
between aircraft in the zone, and

control
provide

provide

at Community

services

Certainly,
combi

NWTAir
aircraft

spartan

suggested

services

were available,

provided

from the northern

that this would

was likely to see a large

equipped

radar

for gravel

runways,

result
impact.

it

in the north.

Response

drew a rapid response

interview,

and ATC

flyers.

in a 20 per cent
Their fleet

and a Hercules

transportaircraft. The sizeof theaircraft,andtherelativeimportanceof freightto thebottom
line,madethemparticularlyvulnerable.
Othercarriersandstakeholders
werequickto
always

a political

increasing
NAV

"hot button"

reacted

and politicians

with some degree of surprise

be felt by any carrier

impact

the skirmish.

Transportation

and native

costs

groups

reacted

are
with

alarm.

CANADA

would

in the north,

enter

was generally

for whom

considered

freight

to be low.

to these assertions.

was a major

component

The proposal

While

some

also had the potential

as a percentage

of revenue,

would

this

to reduce

overall ticket prices for the major carriers, as cargo operations
were now required
their share of the burden.
The generally higher operating
costs of smaller carriers
mean that the increases,

impact

of the business,

to carry
would

tend not be significantly

different

than they would be for the majors. Finally, if NAV CANADA
succeeded
in reducing
system
costs, these savings would eventually be passed down to the users. On the whole, the equity
and transparency

of the system

The protections

afforded

were both improved

by the proposal.

under the Act for intervention

by territorial/provincial

Ministers

Transportation
provided
a basis for a concerted
effort led by the Government
of the
Northwest
Territories
(GNWT).
The NWT was clearly the most affected jurisdiction,
government
coordinated
federal

sought support from other provincial transportation
its response with that of NATA, and the individual

Department

of Indian

food mail subsidy
accommodate
would

a large

be borne

The GNWT

program

increase

invited

Consultative

Airports

division

position rather
Transportation

NAV

Committee

and its transportation

was.

CANADA
t6

and came

later attribute

16 NWTAir
became
News,

price

widely

that the impact

analysis

which

data required

increases

quoted

would

not be buffered,

region

of the country.

on its proposals

is a regular

it serves.

meeting

at a meeting

between

The northern

("New

1, 1997, p. 3).

was nearly

of the profitable

to the conclusion

was later quoted

August

a briefing

not
and

of the

the Arctic

carriers

put forth their

group.

in the height

by route

did not have the financial
analyses,

which

developed

The DIAND

and could

and were supported
by the Assistant Deputy Minister of
and members of the department's
operating
arm, Arctic Airports,

planning

The carriers,

(ACC),

(DIAND).

measures,

Any such increase

to present

and the carriers

had doubts

the sort of route

costs.

restraint

and the

ministries.
It also
carriers.
Another ally was the

Development

by budget

in the least economically

CANADA

of GNWT
forcefully,
(GNWT),

and Northern

in freight

by consumers

Airline

NAV

Affairs

was "capped"

of

as high as some

summer

was required.

season,

NAV

for the work.

as estimating

the range

Fees mean 'staggering'

Eventually,
tickets

from 20-30
jump

had limited

CANADA,

that the initial indications

of 3 per cent on passenger

stakeholders

high.

resources

on the other

the parties
were

felt it

shared

to do
hand,

their

First Air would

and 5.5 per cent on freight

per cent, and this range

in air freight

rates",

Nunatsiak

to

the impact
were

of phase one

running

operations
additional

at a loss. _8 By NAV

indicated

CANADA's

that in late

calculations,

1997, its scheduled

the net impact

13th, NAV

CANADA

one fees was deferred

announced

until March

their computer
reservation
systems
charges for the period from March
that this exemption

might

aircraft size to which
again until November
was the impact

changes

to the proposal.

1998 to allow

the carriers

represent

based on the results

of user consultations.

The

phase one fees applied was raised from 5.7 metric tonnes to 8 tonnes,
1, 1998. 20 These changes did not address the main cost issue, which
the charging

user charges

basis from the ATT to user charges

are a more difficult

administration,
and will require
fee structure
applies to smaller

based

matter,

both in terms

on

to First Air,

of equity

and ease of

considerable
consultation
with stakeholders.
The phase two
aircraft of types used by bush operators
and private aviators.

It is to be implemented
in November
1998, at which time NAV CANADA
full cost recovery
basis, and the ATT will be reduced to zero.

will operate

In this case,

charge

operators

NAV

CANADA

on a charging

Practically,
overhead

however,

is faced with a conundrum.

formula

this presents

and complexity,

Ideally,

similar to the one established
the problem

for a relatively

of significantly

small increase

it would

for the larger
increasing

in revenues.

on a

small

aircraft.

bureaucratic

One approach

under

discussion
is some form of fiat fee, but this is not without pitfalls.
Small operators
and private
pilots are very sensitive to the magnitude
of the fees, while the large operators,
who provide
the bulk of the revenues
the system and, to some

(and are heavily represented
extent, their competition.

Another
scenario was a tax/levy
CANADA.
This would provide

'_First Air Prices

Take

Off" in News/North,

may not wish to subsidize

in commercial
operation
are turboprop
still be required.
This method also

24 November

effect on 1 March,

The NAV

increases

announced
1 January,

tariff increases of 3 percent on passenger
fares and 4.5 per cent on cargo,
1998, which it attributed
to overall economic
conditions
in the north.
are Going Up in the New Year. We'd
News/North,
1 December,
1997.

19User Charges:
Presentation
to Northern
Governments,
November
26, 1997.
20NAV

CANADA

News

Release

1998.

1997, p. A23.

CANADA

18"Our Fares
advertisement

were to take

on the board)

on aviation gasoline, which would be paid to NAV
a user charge based on activity without the administrative

complexity
of a per-use charge, but many of the types
aircraft, so some arrangement
such as a fiat fee would

17

of

time to reprogram

for the tax changes.
CARS were exempted
from terminal
1 until November
1, 1998, and NAV CANADA
indicated

later be extended,

of switching

phase

an

The implementation

more

MTOW.
The exemption
of CARS terminal charges was of greatest significance
which has the largest route system of any carrier operating
in the NWT.
The second

services

on First Air's

would be close to 3 per cent of operating revenues,
but this would
cost to northern
consumers
of $2 million per year. 19

On August
phase

fees. t7 The airline

Like You to Know

Air Transportation

No. 17/97.

10

At the same time, the airline

Industry,

Why."
Northern

Paid

also

effective

chargesthe

operator

whether

the NAV CANADA

service

operators
may seek a different formula than fixed-wing,
make little use of NAV CANADA
services.
No matter

what formula

is used, however,

for phase two fees is to be completed
November.

2.3

Levels

of Service

The rapid timetable
to publish
23).

Policy:

Level

a Levels

of Service

levels.

implies

For example,

FSS is justified
criteria,

(LOS)

None

in

to consult

CANADA's

with stakeholders

of ANS

rationalization

transfer

program

and

(C-20:

nationwide,

but

impacted.

an ATC

tower

to be provided

is justified

exceeding

40,000

at Yellowknife,

at a location,

by annual

movements,

the capital

Whitehorse
Yukon's
capital, recorded
had exceeded
50,000. 22 Complexities
retaining

The consultation

the of 1998, for implementation

Policy by the first anniversary

a set of services

by traffic

the tower

all stakeholders.

often

The Issues

vital to NAV

was strongly

of Service

it will not satisfy

by summer

Helicopter

since their bush operations

in the Act also required NAV CANADA

The LOS issues were

again the north

is used or not.

of NWT,

movements

and is linked to traffic
above

60,000,

but less than 60,000.
was barely

viable.

while

a

2t By these

The tower

in

only 42,575 in 1996, though in earlier years this total
in traffic management
were cited as a rationale for

the facility.

of the FSS in the NWT

acknowledged
earmarked

by all parties
the majority

met the movements
for some time.

of the NWT's

criteria.

Transport

Flight

Service

This situation

Canada,
Stations

had been

when it operated
for closure.

the ANS,

In the early

it had closed the FSS at Coppermine
(Kugluktuk)
and Tuktoyaktuk,
replacing
CARS facilities.
Of the remaining
11 FSS, 5 (Cambridge
Bay, 23 Yellowknife,

had

1990s,

them with
Fort Simpson,

Fort Smith, and Hay River) had been identified as candidates
for closure in 1994. The FSS
slated to remain in service were retained for "safety and special considerations".
Traffic at
the Mackenzie

valley

sites slated

The LOS also ignored
were mentioned
the GNWT
is, arguably,
reason
There

the existence

in the policy,

2t The policy
complexity

in 1994 had dropped

of CARS.

no reference

While the NAV

was made to CARS.

marginally

since then.

CANADA-operated
The 32 CARS

facilities
operated

by

greatly outnumbered
the FSS, and only Yellowknife
is served by a tower.
CARS
the standard level of service in the north. NAV CANADA
indicated that the

for this was that CARS
were

for retention

also a number

is actually

were established

on criteria

which

were not activity-based.

of legal issues involved.

more complex,

and the mix of commercial

were occasionally

applied

rigidly

basis for initiating

Aeronautical

recognizing

under Transport
Studies

unique

and non-commercial
(see section

Canada,

characteristics
traffic.
NAV

While
CANADA

2.5).

22 Statistics Canada.
1996. Aircraft Movement
Statistics.
Annual Report.
23 Cambridge
Bay FSS was closed in 1995 and replaced by a CARS.
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such as traffic
the activity
uses these

criteria
as the

2.4

GNWT

Reaction

The difference

in treatment

by the territorial
personnel
airspace,

of the CARS

governments,

rather

program

extends

than by NAV

than to serve

program

any operational

had involved

some social

CARS had, however,
been activity-based,
the term.
CARS was originally conceived
for flight planning

and the conduct

B & C" airports,
populations
Some

Response
beyond

CANADA

which

Corporation

made

and scheduled

its own future

NAV

CANADA

the evolution

motivations

of the

on the part of the GNWT.

though not in the sense that NAV CANADA
uses
as a means of delivering
the basic support necessary

of an instrument

felt that by denying

Some

saddled with the northern
of job creation in their

Certainly,

development

approach.

had, in turn, been established

of 100 or more

stakeholders

requirement.

the fact that it is delivered

itsclf.

openly resented the fact that the Corporation
had been
and felt that some CARS existed more for the purposes

communities,
CARS

and NAV CANADA

They

were located

at communities

which

at "Arctic

had stable

air service.

that CARS

requirements

represented

a level of service,

less stringent.

If there

the

was no CARS

LOS,

then it followed that modifications
in the delivery of CARS services were a purely operational
decision on the part of the Corporation,
and would not require broad public consultation.
CARS

would

observations)
then this could
to replace
technical

be argued

to be merely

no longer

required,

be implemented

manned

weather

shortcomings

despite

repeated

safety

implications

NAV

CANADA

responsibility

of loss of human
tended

method

weather

attempt

was in place

form of delivery,

by Transport

(AWOS)

stakeholders

(such as weather

alternate

Canada

had failed because
on AWOS

of

deployment

were very sensitive

about

but,
the

observers.

to view its provision
by the Act, rather

of meeting

sensors

A moratorium
CANADA,

any part

in some

An earlier

with automated

by NAV

and were

more cheaply

with little difficulty.

stations

of the devices.

assurances

mandated

is one viable

the sum of its parts;

or available

of services

at the northern

and remote

than a part of its core service.

its commitments.

Alternate

options,

sites as a

The CARS

program

such as weather

observations
through private contractors,
or the carriers themselves,
the deficiencies
of AWOS could be corrected,
and this demonstrated

need to be explored.
If
to the satisfaction
of

users,

there

AWOS

might again be a viable option

comprehensive
be deployed

review

The public

consultations

Corporation's
NATA

required

but were unable

at which

be published

of CARS

that it would

with letters

NAV

to present

time it argued

and how best the resources

CANADA

had never

been a

of the ANS

should

the proposed

had presented

the final draft

to NATA

to meet the statutory

indicating

that they believed

a level of service,

and the GNWT

12

requirement.
that CARS

by the Corporation

or the manner

of deliver,

LOS on the

its initial draft

that it was too late for amendments,

LOS may have been addressed

not change

Further,

by the Act were met by publishing

by the end of the month

NATA responded
level of service.
The issue

needed,

cases.

requirements.

web site in September.

in June,

October,

of the services

to meet these

in some

policy
before

since the policy
The GNWT
represented

in public
of a service,

to
late

had to
and

a de facto

statements
without

an

AeronauticalStudy. It hasalsopubliclystatedthatit will not deployAWOS,evenif the
moratoriumis lifted, without consultations
with its customers.

2.5

Aeronautical

The final major
Corporation

Study:

provision

wished

LOS (C-20:18),
reductions
increases

The Q850 Risk Management

of the Act was a prescription

to change

NAV

a LOS.

CANADA

Process

for broad

While the Act required

has indicated

The Aeronautical
management

Study

model.

is an application

The Q850

model

of a Canadian
includes

which

when

the

in the

it will use for

the commissioning

Standards

a process

consultation

this only for reductions

that the process

will be applied for all proposed changes, including
in the LOS, or changes in means of delivery.

public

Association

for identification

of new sites,

risk

of safety

and

economic
risks, public consultation,
and mitigation of risks considered
significant by
stakeholders.
It was developed
by incorporating
some of the best practices in international
risk management.
A study

is divided

conceptually

into six phases

which

aim to identify

needs

issues

and

concerns
of stakeholders
(broadly defined), evaluate the risk associated
with change in
service, identify the mitigation
strategies which may address these issues, and control and
monitor

the changes.

required,

2.6

These

and the process

Fort

Fort Simpson

Simpson

phases

may be repeated

aims to achieve

Aeronautical

where

a high degree

of

information

communication

or analysis

with stakeholders.

of hours of operation

Study

in the NWT.

at Fort Resolution

The process
CARS

proposal

seemed

rather

innocuous

on the surface.

to remove the midnight shill at the FSS so that it could
study ran into difficulties almost immediately,
however,
community
were
lost a considerable
program,

and politicians

were

community.
Any perceived
service reduction
make it more difficult to attract investment.
NAV CANADA
has no mandate
weather the storm on the service
carriers.
hour

process.

be applied

within

CANADA

wished

bolster staffing at another station.
because economic
interests in the

These

Fort Simpson

sensitive

to any reduction

to the community

would

in spending
also,

The
had

in the

it was argued,

to subsidize local economies,
and was likely prepared
to
reduction,
however unexpected
difficulties
were raised in the

were identified

The first was that the maintenance

presence.

by

angered at the potential loss of a person-year
of salary. The community
number of jobs in the previous year as the result ofa GNWT austerity

and merchants

consultation

NAV

had

the previous

year. This LOS change did not represent much of a challenge,
since it was conceded
GNWT that the additional hours were not required by the air carriers.
The Fort Simpson

is

Study

was not the first use of the Aeronautical

been used to justify the reduction

more

has a paved

first by Arctic
of the airfield
runway,

the first half hour to be effective

13

Airports

(GNWT),

is compromised

if there

and in the event of freezing
as an anti-icer,

lfice

and later by the
is no 24-

rain, urea must

is allowed

to form,

it

maybemanydaysbeforethe runwayis fully serviceable.FSSandthe GNWT hada protocol
that the specialistswould notify the airportmanagerimmediatelyof freezingprecipitation
during"the quiethours". Sincethe airportis somedistancefromthe town, somearrangement
would haveto bemadeto avoid"losingtherunway"to freezingrain. Themaintenance
of the
runwayis the GNWT's responsibilityasairportoperator,but therearebothcostandsafety
implicationsto the stakeholders.
Therewould also
hour operation
approach.

setting

before

While
Lake,

departure

the station

finding,

traffic

station

to Yellowknife

has, is commercially

bowsers

at the airport,

effect

to support

IFR alternate,
Without

and current

is no guarantee

altimeter

weather

located

system.

What

some

carriers

maintain

that fuel will be available
where

there

While

to support

a TAF,

This, carrier representatives

argued,

higher

it lacks,

Slave

and Fort

their own
carriers.

For

is the preferred
is no fuel supply

observations

an Area Forecast

are considerably

on Great

for other

from Yellowknife,

to an alternate

(TAF).

minima

observations

in use as an IFR alternate,

Hay River,

in hours was that no weather

forecast

at Fort Simpson.

landing

While

miles distant

of the reduction

less often.

Yellowknife.

jet fuel.

200 nautical

a terminal

to operations

shift is low, it remains

and has an instrument

the legal approach

24 hour

an alternate

airfield in 24-

to be used for an instrument

observation

was almost unrelated

No pilot is likely to divert

The operational

The nearest

for its altimeter
a weather

in the north,

available

there

Fort Simpson,

plan alternate.
aircraft.

available

however,

on the midnight

Simpson

that reason,

would require

for medevacs.

from Yellowknife.

for the busiest

is closer

established

but it is too distant

IFR medevacs

surprising

especially

to be a protocol

is Hay River,

(IFR)

The most

need

flight
for the

would

be

can be used for an

than they are with a TAF.

Fort Simpson
implied

would

significant

be available
increases

as

in

fuel uplift for IFR aircraft, which presented
an unacceptable
financial burden on the operators.
Pilots suggested
that it would reduce safety by increasing the pressure
on the captain to land
in Yellowknife,

2.7

regardless

The "North

of the weather

of 60" Aeronautical

conditions.

Study

The Fort Simpson process reinforced
the point made by many experienced
"Arctic hands",
both inside and outside the Corporation.
The north, because of its limited infrastructure
must
be viewed

as a system,

conclusion
elements

of parts.

A piecemeal

approach

that most of the sites do not require their current level of service.
of a system,

inhospitable

territory

Aeronautical

Study

Successful

rather than as a collection
however,
becomes

the importance

more understandable.

was successful

consultation,

of the web of services

however,

in identifying

The consultative

across
process

tends to the

When

viewed

of the

this issue.

did not solve NAV

CANADA's

problems.

The long

expected
rationalization
of services had reduced its long run training requirements,
and
management
had reacted accordingly.
In the short run, however,
delay in implementing
program

had left NAV

CANADA

with a severe

staff shortage.

14

as

the vast and

As well, the Corporation

the
was

expectedby its stakeholdersto reducecosts.24Therewasclearlya needto reduceservicesin
someareas,andperhapsto redeployresourcesto bettermeetuserrequirements.Cartier
representatives
at the Fort Simpsonconsultations,
for example,hadusedthe occasionto press
the casefor increasedhoursof operationat CambridgeBay,the hubof the centralArctic.
This hadbeenoutsidethe scopethe Fort Simpsonstudy.
Beforethe Fort SimpsonAeronauticalStudywasconcluded,NAV CANADA changedits
approach.At the fall Airline ConsultativeCommittee(ACC) meeting,NAV CANADA
announceda comprehensive
approachto ANS servicesin the north, which wouldbe
conductedasa singleAeronauticalStudyof massiveproportions. TheFort Simpsonstudy,as
well asa similarstudyon ResoluteBayFSS,wouldberolledinto the largerstudy,though
somedecisionson theseparticularsiteswouldbemadeasearlyaspossible,for operational
reasons.
The Terms

of Reference
(TOR), dated 24 September,
on 20 October. 25 The study would encompass

GNWT
would

exclude

northern

northern

sections

Quebec,

these

were discovered

study

itself.
Study

one from Yukon,

a member

divisions

Team

and Service

of NAV

its Quebec

would

operators,

include

(S&SD),
western

Subsequently,

operating

might be examined
but would

and central

and an S&SD
to place

operators

The study team
NAV

would

CANADA

generation

Services

representative

a member

from

on the team.

head
which

office, First
the smaller

not have been able to afford.

be supported

representation.

of cost-benefit

development
public

would

and

as well as members

and Technical

Based just outside Ottawa,
and therefore convenient
to NAV CANADA's
Air also had the potential to devote management
resources
to the project
northern

where

of the NWT

Association,

Services,

regions,

Sites in the

of the "system",

of government

First Air was approached

but

not fall within the scope of the

Air Transport

Air Traffic

features.

as parts

two members

from the Northern

Design

CANADA's

region.

had its own distinct

provinces

to affect northern

The Aeronautical
of the Safety

which

of the prairie

was presented
to NATA and the
Yukon and Northwest
Territories,

This group

analyses

of risk mitigation

by a risk management
would

using complex

strategies

team

with head office

be responsible
economic

for issues raised

for research

modeling

software,

in the Aeronautical

and regional
and the
and for the

Study Team's

consultations.

24 In September

1997, the Corporation

expressed

by the year 2000.

This was to be accomplished

and administrative

overhead

(Shaping

Direction:
overview).
25 NAV CANADA
1997 Aeronautical
Information

Services

were added
20 October,

on the basis of comments
1997.

Provided

its intention
largely
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by $135

million

of management
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Airport

made at the initial consultation
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costs

Advisory

and Flight

of the following
meeting

details

with NATA

on

The initial consultationsto
1997.

The "North

3.0

CONCLUSIONS

The unique
addressed

identify

of 60" study

problems

facing

in the legislation

"needs,

issues and concerns"

is expected

aviation

to be completed

in the northern

which transferred

took

and remote

control

place

in December

in the third quarter

areas of Canada

of the ANS to NAV

of

of 1998.

were

CANADA.

The

dratters of the legislation
were faced with a need to ensure the viability of air transportation,
while allowing NAV CANADA
the flexibility to conduct its business in a commercial
fashion.
The transition
from a ticket tax to a user fee based on aircratt weight impacted the north
disproportionately
because of the operational
characteristics
of northern
aviation, and has
indirect

effects

on other

non-aviation

related

systems

such as nutritional

subsidy

programs.

While consumer
costs may actually decline as a result of transition
in the south, the fragile
northern
economy
will see increases.
The initial impact will be felt in March 1998, with a
second

impact

of similar magnitude

in November

1998.

These

increases

already high transportation
costs. As rationalization
takes place
will benefit from any cost reductions
at the same rate as southern

will compound

in future
users.

years,

northern

Services provided
may well decrease at the same time as costs increase.
Two separate
processes
are at work, and the pricing of services is outside the scope of the team which

users

is

responsible
as related.

for the Aeronautical
Study.
Users, and the consumers
they serve, see these issues
NAV CANADA
will have to communicate
its views well to overcome
stakeholder

resistance.

Initial

overstatement

difficult, but both NAV
the true impacts.

of impacts

CANADA

by carders

and the carriers

It will be difficult for users to make informed
when the costs of the options are not known.

may have made

have

worked

to ascertain

decisions on the services which are required,
While the basic tenet that safety must not be

compromised
is held by all parties, site specific fees are not ruled out.
exemption
of CARS from phase one fees was a concession
to northern
choosing
the appropriate
level of service
options are being considered.

this a issue more

constructively

more difficult

where

The temporary
carders, but it makes

FSS closures

and other

service

The technical nature of the issues at hand makes it difficult for consumers,
who ultimately pay
for the system through ticket prices, to take a meaningful
part in the discussion.
Communities
have concerns
the mandate

about

employment

and development

which

of NAV

CANADA.

The involvement

of the territorial

very important.

Arctic

CARS

so determining

program,

Airports

also operates
the public

the territorial

the airports

interest

Minister

are legitimate,
in the NWT,

is a complex

of Transportation

but are not within

government

and manages

the

task.

The ANS

Act provides

any NAV
decision.

CANADA
reduction
in service to the level of the federal Minister
The political level may not be the most favorable forum for NAV
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is therefore

with a mechanism

to elevate

of Transport
CANADA.

for a
It is

therefore in its interest to make the best use of the Aeronautical
Study
some degree of agreement
among the affected users and communities.

process,

and to achieve
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1. THE INPUT

DATA FOR THE OPTIMIZATION

PROBLEM

Let us assume that index i appears in set I, where I--{ 1,...,i,...I}, where I is the number of
all flight direction change points on a given territory.
It is assumed that index I appears in set L, where L={ 1,...,I,...,L}, where L is the number
ofaerodromes/DCPs
located on a given territory.
Let us assume that the air traffic over a given territory takes place within corridors
determined by the flight corridor axis, i.e. by the lines 'connecting' individual points of
space over the direction change points.
It is assumed that each flight direction change point is assigned a set of numbers of flight
direction change points directly adjacent (contiguous) to it. Let l(i) be a subset of set I
for each i_L i.e., let l(i_._I. Each pair (i,i') such that with i-th number of flight direction
change

point given, number

i'_l(i),

which

means

that the i'-th flight direction change

point is adjacent to the i-th flight direction change point. It is assumed that for each i_l
flight direction change point there is given set I(i).
In a given corridor spreading between two adjacent flight direction change points,
aircraft flights may take place at different flight levels.
Let us assume that for each pair of adjacent flight direction change points (i,i') where i_L
i'El(i) there is given set P(i,i') of the numbers of all flight levels on which there may take
place aircrait flight between two adjacent flight direction change points.
Let P be a set of all flight levels. Flight levels are numbered by means of variable p.
Therefore, we assume that pep and that P={ 1,...,p,...,P}.
It is also assumed that P(i,i')c_P. In exceptional cases the following may be true:
P(i,i')=P, which indicates that air traffic between flight direction change points of
numbers i and i' may be distributed with flexibility.
It is assumed that the change of aircrait flight level or its take-off would be caused by the
necessity to avoid collision with another aircraft. Such a collision may be avoided in a
given corridor by changing either the aircraft's flight level or its take-off moment,
providing the change is admissible (possible), meaning that the level the aircraft is
directed towards is not occupied by another aircraft, or - in the case of take-off moment
change, the altered moments of flights over each DCP retain the separation
times
determined for those DCP. Simultaneously,
in case of flights in the same direction, the
beginning of the time interval when the section between adjacent DCPs is occupied by an
aircraft must, for the sake of safety, be shifted in time in respect to the beginning of the
moment when this section is to be occupied by other aircraft. Ifaircratt
fly over the same
section between adjacent DCPs, but in opposite directions, the moment of entering a
section by the currently co-ordinated
aircrait must be delayed for at least the length of
separation time obligatory in this section, in regard to the moment when previously coordinated aircraft had left this section.
It is assumed that air traffic
For every flight of every
departure, desired take-off
change points characterising

is planned and realised in thus determined flight corridors.
aircraft the following factors are known: aerodrome of
moment and the moments of reaching all flight direction
a given route, as well as the desired flight levels between

adjacent DCPs, and the landing moment at the aerodrome of destination. For each
aircraft there is also known the cost caused by (forced) change of flight level or of
change of the moment oftake-offfrom
the aerodrome of departure.
Therefore, it is assumed that there is given mapping
SxP into a set of real positive numbers R+, i.e.:

o, which maps Cartesian product

o:SxP---------_R+,
where quantity o(s,p)_R+, is interpreted as the cost of an s-th aircraft
on p-th flight level.
Let S be a set of numbers of aircraft that are to perform flights over a given territory. It
is assumed that each aircraft will be numbered by means of variable s so that set S of the
numbers of aircraft has the following form: S={ 1,...,s,...,S},
where S is the number of all
aircraft.
It is assumed that the route of an s-th aircraf_ taking off from an l-th aerodrome
presented in the form of vector w(s,l) of components interpreted as follows:
w(1,s,1)=i,
the number of the aerodrome of departure (io_lo) of an s-th aircraft;

is

w(2,s,I)=pt the number of the flight's level (the number of the 'fast' flight level for
a given route), on which the s-th aircraft taking off from aerodrome 1oought to be
found;
w(3,s,l)=i_ the number of the flight direction change point (the number of the
'first' flight direction change point for a given route), over which the aircraft
ought to change flight direction;
eeo

w(n,s,l)--i, the number of the flight direction change point (the number of the nth flight direction change point for a given route), over which an s-th aircraft
ought to change flight direction;
w(n+l,s,l)=p°
the number of flight level over which an s-th aircraft ought to be
found between flight direction change points i_ and i_+l;
w(n+2,s,l)=i_l
the number of the flight direction change point (the number of
n+ 1-st flight direction change point for a given route), over which an s-th aircraft
ought to change flight direction;
toe

w(N(s,i),s,l)=iN0)
the number
for an s-th aircraft.

of the aerodrome

of destination

(landing;

iN¢s)_k)

As a result the route of an s-th aircraft, taking off flom an l-th aerodrome is characterised
by means of vector w(s,1) as:
w(s_l)=<w(l_s_l)_w(2_s__)_w(3_s__)_____w(n_s__)_w(n+__s__)_w(n+2_s__)_____w(N(s_l)_s_l)
>
where N(s,l) is the number of components of vector w(s,l), and each vector is interpreted
as above.
Flight planning for each aircraft consists in determining
- for a given sequence of
numbers of flight direction change points (that constitute
the aircraft's route) - the
number of flight level (not necessarily consistent with that determined
by the person
placing the flight order) between adjacent flight direction change points whose covering
in a given sequence enables the aircraft to reach the aerodrome of destination.
Moreover, for each flight route there will be determined the moment of aircraft take-off,
taking into account the existing traffic situation, i.e. there will be determined
such a
moment of aircraR take-off that enables non-collision
flight along the route and,
consequently, non-collision arrival at the aerodrome of destination.
It results fi'om the above that the "cheapest" route, from the point of view of the costs of
flight from the aerodrome of departure to the aerodrome of destination, is the route the
aircraft actually covered on its way to its destination. For a given traffic situation there
may arise the necessity to choose another, 'worse' from the point of view of the costs of
flight, route of aircrat_ flight. It is assumed that the cost of aircraft flight according to
route depends on what level between adjacent flight direction change points the aircraft
flies on. It is assumed that the cheapest is flight taking place on the levels determined by
3

the person placing the flight order. Every change of flight level, caused by an existing
traffic situation between any adjacent flight direction change points, increases the costs
of alrcratt flight.
Operative flight route planning is performed assuming the existence of a time horizon.
The duration of the horizon (the horizon's granulation)
is conditioned
by 'constancy'
during the traffic situation. It is assumed that the duration of a given, "constant" traffic
situation is a multiplicity of a given constant quantity that constitutes the length of the
adopted time horizon.
A term of temporal constancy of a given traffic situation is used for "normalising" flight
level changes. It is assumed that time distances between flight direction change points are
large enough. An aircraft covering this distance may simultaneously
perform many
manoeuvres (e.g. change its flight level in order to overtake another aircratt or in order
to let an aircraft flying in the opposite direction, pass). It is thus conventionally
assumed
that the time distance between existing adjacent flight direction change points is divided
into a number of smaller time intervals. A constant temporal length of an interval is
connected with an aircraft's 'temporal capacity' to change its flight level. This means that
the constant temporal length is determined by that time interval length which is necessary
for the aircraft to perform the manoeuvre of flight level change. Thus in practice it is
impossible for an aircraft to change its flight level during two (or more) lengths of time
intervals. After it has changed its flight level, an aircraft may continue its flight on the
new level for many time intervals, until there is a new decision situation, determining a
new type of manoeuvre to be performed by the aircratt. It is thus assumed that between
existing adjacent flight direction change points "additional"
flight direction/flight
level
change points are added. The result is the division of flight time into shorter intervals of
length determined on the basis of an earlier assignation.
The result of previously adopted assumptions is the fact that vector w(s,l) describing the
flight route of an s-th aircraft taking off from an l-th aerodrome,
consists of a greater
number of components.
The number is increased because of an arbitrary division of the
time interval between
existing adjacent
flight direction
change
points, while the
interpretation
of the components remains the same.
The essence of planning each aircraft's flight will also be changed. As previously, it
consists in determining,
for a given sequence
of flight direction
change
points
(constituting the aircraft's flight route), flight levels (not necessarily identical with those
determined by the person placing the flight order) between the flight direction change
points, whose covering in a given sequence allows the aircraft to reach the aerodrome of
destination.
Similarly, for each flight route, there will be determined the aircraft take-off
moment taking into account the existing traffic situation, i.e. such an aircraft take-off
moment that allows a non-collision
flight along the aircraft's route and, consequently,
free from collision arrival of the aircraft at the aerodrome of destination.
2. THE DECISION
Let us introduce

VARIABLES

the following

OF THE OPTIMIZATION

PROBLEM

decision variable:
x(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)),

of its value equal zero or one.
1t2 x(w(n,s,l),p,w(n+2,s,l))=l,
then an s-th aircraft, taking off from an l-th aerodrome is
on p level, between flight direction change points of numbers
determined
by the
numerical value of quantity w(n,s,1), and by the numerical value of quantity w(n+2,s,l).
4
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Otherwise, i.e. when x(w(n,s,l),p,w(n+2,s,l))=0,
then an s-th aircraft, taking off from an
l-th aerodrome,
is not on the level determined
by the numerical value of quantity p,
between flight direction change points of numbers determined by the numerical value of
quantity w(n,s,l) and by the numerical value of quantity w(n+2,s,l).
Let us define the following decision variable:
t(w(n, s, I), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)),
adopting

its values from within a set of real positive numbers,

i.e.:

t(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)) _ R+
The decision variable:
t(w(n, s, 1),p, w(n + 2, s, 1)),
is interpreted as the moment when an aircraft taking off from an l-th aerodrome, enters a
level determined by the p-th numerical value; the aircraft is between flight direction
change points defined by numbers determined by the numerical
and by the numerical value of quantity w(n+2,s,l).
3. OPTIMIZATION

PROBLEM

The numerical values of decision
restrictions are satisfied:
1e - there

variables are to be established

when the following

on a p-th flight level, contained

change points, for aircraft heading

in opposite

_-'_,[x(w(n, s), p, w(n + 2, s)) + x(w(n + 2),p, w(n,s))]
20 - restriction concerning
same direction":

concerning

_" t(w(n,s,l)p,
p_P(w(n_

+ 2,s',l))

> t(w(n,s,

_<1

1),p,w(n

+ 2,s,1))

that the
next - s'

+ 8(s,s')
entering

a given

an s-th aircraft's flight continuity:

w(n + 2, s,1))x(w(n,

s,1), p, w(n + 2,s, 1)) + x(w(n,s,1), w(n + 2,s,1)) =

1).w(n+ 2,s. I))

_ t(w(n + 2,s,1),p, w(n + 4,s,1))x(w(n
p_P(w(n+

on the

s and s' aircraf_ entering p-th level, using the same level "in the

aircraft. The above restriction ought to be apply to every pair of aircraft
flight level and flying on the same level in the same direction;
3 0 - restriction

between

directions

where 8(s,s') is the value of separation between y s and s' aircraft, assuming
aircraft enter the p-th level in the following sequence: first - s-number aircraft,
t(w(n,s',l),p,w(n

w(n,s,1)

RESTRICTIONS

may be no more than one aircraft

selected flight direction
same p-th flight level:

value of quantity

2.s,I ),w(n+4,.s,l

+ 2,s,1),p, w(n + 4,s,1)

))

where x(w(n,s, 1),w(n+2,s,

1)) designates

distance between the flight direction
quantities w(rg s, 1) and w(n+2,s, 1);
4 0- restriction concerning
direction change points:

the time needed for an s-th aircra.q to cover the

change points determined

an s-th aircraft's

selection

of flight level between

_-" x(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)) = 1
t_P(w(n.,s,

1), w(n + 2.s.1 ))

by the numerical

values of

given flight

r

5 0 - aircrat_ flying on the same flight level are not allowed
direction change point;

to "meet"

above

a flight

t(w(n, s, 1), p, w(n + 2, s, 1)) + x(w(n, s, 1), w(n + 2, s, I)) ;_
t(w(n', s', 1'), p, w(n + 2, s', 1')) + x(w(n',s',l'),

w(n + 2,s', 1'))

this restriction ought to apply to every pair s,s' of aircraft that may meet above a flight
direction change point of the following number w(n+2,s,l)--w(n+2,s',l'),
as well as to each
flight direction change point over which aircraft might meet;
60 - restriction concerning
aerodrome:

the selection

T'(s,I)

of an s-th aircraft's take off moment

_<t(w(1,s,l),

where T" (s,l), T"(s,l) designates

p, w(3, s, 1)) _<T" (s,l)

the earliest and the latest moment,

may take off from an 1-th aerodrome

(prescribed

satisfy the following

when an s-th aircraft

quantities);

70 - when given: earliest and latest take-off moment
aerodrome
are not disjoint intervals, each aircraft's
ought to simultaneously

from an l-th

for aircraft taking off from an l-th
selection of the take-off moment

set of restrictions:

T" (s, 1) < t(w(1, s, 1), p, w(3, s, 1)) < T*"(s, 1)
t(w(1, s', 1), p, w(3, s', 1)) > t(w(1, s, 1), p, w(3, s, 1)) + 5(s, s')
when aircraft take off from an l-th aerodrome
aircraft, then s' aircraR;
8o. the formal restriction
following form:

concerning

x(w(n, s, l), p, w(n + 2,s,l))

4. THE CRITERION

the numerical

_ {0,1 },

FUNCTION

in the following

values of decision

L

I=I

variables

OF THE OPTIMIZATION

_R +

PROBLEM
flights

taking

place

5.1. The construction

in a

_

x(w(n,s,

1),p, w(n + 2, s, l))o(s,p)

n=l pEP(w(n,s,l),ikw(n+2,s,l))

The search for optimum, in the sense specified above, solution is to be performed
when all restrictions ensuring flight schedules free from collision are satisfied.
5. THE METHOD

has the

N(_I)

_-_ _-'_ _
s=l

first s-number

t(w(n, s, l), p, w(n + 2,s,l))

The criterion function comprises the total cost of all aircraft
given area. The cost is to be minimised.
Let us assume the following form of the criterion function:
S

sequence:

OF SOLVING

THE OPTIMIZATION

only

PROBLEM

of a flight graph

The suggested method of solving the optimization problem is based on a flight graph
illustrating flight schedules submitted for co-ordination.
6

The first step while generating the above mentioned graph is to define its nodes. In the
suggested method graph nodes correspond to the ordinal indexes of aerodromes declared
in the flight area, as well as flight direction change points.
The second step consists in generating flight graph arcs, representing
the connections
between adjacent aerodromes and/or flight direction change points resulting directly from
the submitted flight plans.
The third and last step of generating a flight graph is to replace graph arcs with new
nodes, while the indexes describing the new nodes are not changed in relation to the arcs
they were generated from. Thus a flight graph is generated with the connections between
neighbouring aerodromes and/or flight direction change points are "reduced" to the form
of a graph node.
The analysis of non-collision aircraft flight co-ordination
on the basis of the above graph
form is restricted to surveying and removing conflicts only in the graph nodes.
5.2. The rule of selecting a priority flight schedule
The rule of selection concerns designating the first, undisturbed flight plan serving as the
standard, in comparison to which other flights would be tested from the point of view of
their being free from the possibility of collision. In this way every new plan would be coordinated with already generated flight plans.
5.3. The mechanism of making flights free from the possibility of collision
The key procedure of the main program - Plan Co-ordination,
verifies the temporal
moments of occupying stable, ground elements of flight area (or the moments of flying
over them), as well as the time intervals of occupying air connections,
by surveying
submitted and correctly arranged flight plans, from the point of view of indexes pointing
to specific flight area elements, repeated in various flight plans
The legend to the block diagram:
P - number of aerodromes/DCPs in a given flight area,
pj - presently analysed aerodrome/DCP,
S - number of aircraft operating in a given flight area,
si - presently analysed aircraft,
to - take-off moment of an I-th aircraft (I-th flight plan),
tj - temporal
moment
of an air event (presence)
aerodrome/DCP,

of

an

aircraft

over

an

p_ - consecutive aerodrome/DCP
along the flight route of an i-th aircraft,
S,+l - consecutive flight plan (aircraft) according to flight graph load,
Opj - total value ofj-th aerodrome/DCP
load by all aircraft (concerns the number
events),
O,i -value of flight graph load (network) by an i-th aircraft (flight plan).
- separation
time suggested
for currently
analysed
element
(aerodrome/DCP
or air corridor).

5.4. The block diagram

of an algorithm

of ensuring

non-collision

of

flight

of flights

j-th

of air

area

mm
<

5>N

EB

E
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5.5. Computer
collision

implementation

of an algorithm

of ensuring

flights

free

from

5.5.1. Input data form
The executive program uses the following input data:
a) aerodromeJl)CP
data specifying:
•
•

aerodrome/DCP
aerodrome/DCP
•

aerodromeJDCP

number,
parameters,

such as:

availability

• separation time between
b) flight area data specifying:
•

possible

•
•

the availability of air connections between suggested aerodromes/DCPs,
separation time between air events operative for a given air connection
suggested aerodromes/DCPs,

c) flight
•

air connections

(logical variable),

air events,

between suggested

plans (introductory)
specifying:
aircraft flight route submitted
account:

for

aerodromes/DCPs,

co-ordination,
suggested

particularly

between

taking

into

•

the numbers of aerodromes/DCPs

•

assumed time moments
(hours,
minutes)
of aircraft flights over
subsequent aerodromes or flight dire_on
change points (DCP) located
along the flight route. This concerns every individual aircrafL

for a given flight area,

The form of input data has been defined globally (for all data types) as two-dimensional
record tables. Depending on whether the description concerns area data or flight plans,
records indexed by means of the above mentioned tables may consist of 5 (in the first
case) or 2 (in the second case) areas.
Source code notations are as follows:
type
//Tablica Plan6w Lotu
Times = packed record
DCP
: integer;
moment: integer,
end;
TTimes = array[1..MaxS,1 ..MaxL] of Times;
type

I/Obszar Iot6w (pierwotny)
Dane = packed record
link
: string[I];
nazwa_lot
: string[20];
TSep
:integer,
new_DCP
:integer;,
dir
: string[2];
end;
TDane = array[1..MaxL,1 ..MaxL] of Dane;

Some of the areas of the record describing area data are suggested together with the first
referral to them and then re-suggested
automatically by the program depending on what
component
has been selected by the user (using the mouse). Any edition of records
corresponding
to input data, stored in the computers
memory, ought to be concluded
with pressing the right button - usually 'Apply'. The use of the button initiates an internal

procedure, whose aim is to optimise data stored in the computer's operational memory,
regarding the indexes describing the data (from the point of view of their value). For
example if a user promises 15 new air connections between aerodrome/DCPs
in a given
flight area, corresponding
to indexes 11..25 (indexes 1.. 10 by pre-arrangement
describe
aerodromes/DCPs)
and then establishes
the availability
parameter
as false for
connections
19..21, then after the opposite operation is performed, i.e. after the above
mentioned parameters
(of the same connections)
are changed to logical truth, the
previous indexes do not necessarily appear in the records. Why? The main program
continually supervises the assignment of successive indexes, and its main priority is to
preserve the continuity of all available air connections.
5.5.2. Computational
Suggested
Flight
Plans

example

flight plans:
Area elements - index
Separation

time

Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation

time

Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment

I
lOmin

2
10 min

10:20
5
lOmin
09:40

11:30
6
10 rain
10:25

3
lOmin
12:30
3
lOmin
11:10

1
10 min
11"10

2
10 min
12:10

4
10 rain
12:50

5
lOmin
13:20
2
lOmin
12:05

4
lOmin
12:45

Table
Illustration of suggested

flight plans:

11:10
12:50
10:20
12:10
12:45
11:30

12:05

12:30
11:10

13:20
10:25
9:40
Fig. 1
10

Forsubmitted
flightplanstherearedefinedloadindexes-essential
plan priorities.

For each flight area element

for determining flight
the connections between

(aerodrome/DCP,

neighbouring
aerodromes/DCPs)
the load index defines: how many times a flight area
element is mentioned in the description of all submitted for co-ordination
flight plans. A
flight plan load index is the total sum of those flight area element loads that appear in the
description of the flight route.
Flight plan number

Flight

plan load index

1
2

7
8

3

4
Table 2

A new sequence

of flight plans (conflict situations

Area elements

Flight
Plans

- index

Separation

time

Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
3

Separation

time

Entry moment

have been highlighted)-

5
10 rain
09:40

6
10 min
10:25

1
10 rain
10:20
1
10 rain
11"10

2
lOmin
11:30

3
lOmin
11:10
3
lOmin
12:30

2
10 min
12:10

4
10 rain
12:50

2
10min
12:05

4
10min
12:45

5
10 rain
13:20

Table 3
The methods

of determining

the take-off moment delay for a co-ordinated

aircraft:

(1)
(2)

t,..mov = tpp - tp + tsep
ts_mov= tkp " tp + tsep
where:

tpp - initial moment when an aircraft performing a flight plan of higher priority in
comparison to the previously co-ordinated
flight plan (lower priority), enters an area
element,
t_ - moment when an area element is left by an aircraft performing
a flight
according to a higher priority plan in comparison
with the flight plan currently coordinated (lower priority),
tp - initial moment when a currently co-ordinated aircraft enters an area element,
tin, - separation
time between air events suggested
for a given flight area
element.
(1) - used for eliminating collision situations
a) over aerodromes/DCPs,

(between

b) within air connections
between
heading in the same direction,

adjacent

11

aircraft)

located:

aerodromes/DCPs,

for

aircraft

c) (2) - used for eliminating collision situations (between aircraft) located within
air connections between
in opposite directions.
The take-off
min.
Flight
Plans

moment

aerodromes/DCPs,

of plan number 1 - according

Area elements - index
Separation

time

Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
3

adjacent

Separation

time

Entry moment

for aircraft

heading

to formula (2), is to be shiRed by 45

5
10min

6
10min

3
lOmin

2
10min

09:40

10:25

1
10 min
11:05
1

2
10 rain
12:15
2

11:10
3

12:05
5
10 rain

10 rnin
11:10

10min
12:10

10 rain
13:15
4
10min

4
10rain
12:45

14:05

12:50
Table 4

The take-off.moment
rain.

of plan number 3 - according to formula

Area elements - index
Separation
2

time

Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index

3

5
10 rain

6
10 rain

(1), is to be shifted by 5

3
10 min

09:40

10:25

11:10

2
10min
12:05

1
10 min
11:05

2
10 min
12:15

3
10 rain
13:15

5
10 rain
14:05

2
10min
12:15

4
10min
12:55

I
10 min
Separation time
Entry moment _ 11:15

4
10min
12:45

Table 5
The take-off
rain.
Hight
Plans

moment

of plan number 3 - according

Area elements - index
Separation

time

Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation time
Entry moment
Area elements - index
Separation

time

Entry moment

to formula

(1), is to be shifted by 10

5
10rain
09:40

6
10rain
10:25

3
lOmin
11:10

1
10min
11:05

2
10 rain
12:15

3
10rain

1
10 min
11:25

2
10min
12:25

13:15
4
10 rain
13:05

2
10 min
12:05
5
10 rain
14:05

Table 6 (The result: co-ordinated

12

4
lOmin
12:45

flight plans)

Illustrationof co-ordinatedflight plans:
11:25
11:10

13:05
12:50

10:20

12:25.

11:05

12:10
12:45
12:05

12:30
11:10

13:15

13:20
14:05
10:25
9:40

6. CONCLUSIONS
1. Algorithm was created in DELPHI environment, version 3.0.
2. Sugested algorithm may be use for any set of fligth plans.
3. Algoritm is limitated by available PC's memory for data storage/input.
4. Results achived so far has taken a direct impact for continue and improvment
presented algoritm.
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1.

GENERAL

CHARACTERISTICS

OF MOVEMENT

The study of aircraft movement in a curve is particularly
complex. In fact, the main landing
gear not having a differential,
the aircraft approaching the curve occurs with a series of
characteristic drags in the driven wheel.
The aircraft, on having entered the curve at the connecting points between the runway and the
taxi path, it follows the guide line, which is traced on the surface, with the nose-wheel following the
entry and exit paths. These paths are based on straight traits, on circular, polycentric
or
clotohydrical
type curves.
Yet, while the nose-wheel
follows the trajectory, the main landing gear has a different path
which takes the wheel or the entire group of back wheels to follow an inside curve towards the
margin of the paved surface, reducing the safety especially during high speed.
Therefore, the problem of studying a geometry of exit paths has occurred so that the security of
the aircraft trajectory increases, and at the same time the traffic capacity of the runway can increase.

2.

THE MANOEUVRE

OF AN AIRCRAFT

IN A CURVE

The distance between the external principal landing wheel and the margin of the runway must
conform to the minimum requirements
set out by the I.C.A.O. The conformity to such requirements
requires the creation of enlargement
strips at the intersections
between the taxiway and the runway.
The possible manoeuwe methods of an aircraft, so that it can face such a curve are as follows: a) to follow a central line on the runway with the nose wheel, while the wheels of the main
landing gear delineate a trajectory nearing that of the margins of the same runway.
b) to follow a mixtilinear guideline external to the central line while the entire main landing
gear remains on axis to the same line.
The b) method could be advantageous
because it seems to be the most economical solution as it
eliminates the necessity to build extension strips. But all in all, the advantages are not as good as
they seem. In fact, we must separate the guidelines for every type of aircraft for both directions of
circulation. Such solution therefore, becomes impractical due to the multiple lines that would be on
the surface of the runway. In particular,
at night time or during scarce visibility it would be
extremely difficult for an aircraft to follow the correct guide line. Thus it is preferable to adopt the
turning method a) as it permits tracing only one guideline on the surface which would be followed
by all aircraft, and the strips of extension would be based on that of the largest aircraft considered
capable of using the curve.
The first step in designing extension strips is to determine the theoretical trajectory
of the
centre of the main landing gear. Two different techniques exist [2], below there is one technique
briefly explained based on a mathematical
model developed by the I.C.A.O.
A few fundamental definitions are reported so that the problem can be examined more closely.
Terms relative
•
•
•
•

to the aircraft.

Aircraft reference point "S". It is the ideal point on the longitudinal axis of the aircraft that
follows the guideline of the traced surface signals, and is positioned vertical to the cockpit.
Pivot. "P" point, the centre of instant rotation.
Theoretical axis of the mare landing gear. It is perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the
aircraft, passing through point P.
Theoretical length of reference "d". It is the distance, which lies between reference point S and
the theoretical axis of the main landing gear.

•
•

Centre of the main landing gear "U". It is the intersection point between the longitudinal axis
and the theoretical axis of the main landing gear.
Carriage way of the main landing gear "T". It is the distance, which runs between the external
wheels.

•

Guiding angle or visual "fl'" It is the angle formed
longitudinal axis of the aircratt.

•

Steering cvigle. It is the angle formed by the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the direction of
the axis of the fore steering landing gear.
Guide line. Trajectory of reference point S, traced on the runway with horizontal signals and/or
lights.
Centre of guide line "0". It is the camber centre of the guide line in its circular part and is the

•
•

by the tangent

origin of the fixed system of polar co-ordinates.
Deviation
of the main landing gear "2". It is the distance
landing gear U and the guide line measured perpendicularly
to
Glossary of symbols.
The following symbols will be used from now on, to describe
main landing gear and in the planning of the curve extensions.
• d = theoretical reference length of aircraft.
• M = minimum distance existing between the external wheel
•

of the guide line S with the

between the centre
the guide line.
the trajectory

of the centre of the

of the main landing

•
•

margin of the paved surface.
O = camber centre of the guide line.
P = centre of instant rotation.

•

r = radius of the extension

•

R = bending

•
•

S = reference point of aircraft,
T = track of main landing gear.

•

U = centre of main landing gear.

•

ot = angle between

•
•
•

13= guiding angle.
Z, = deviation of main landing gear.
P, 0 = polar co-ordinates of a point (S or U) in the system of polar co-ordinates

•

L = width oftaxiway.

of the main

gear and the

strip arch.

radius of the guide line of point S.

the radial OU and the tangent

3.
THE TRAJECTORY
TURNS

of the trajectory

OF THE MAIN LANDING

of point U.

with origin in O.

GEAR IN CASE OF CIRCULAR

Generally the connections between the taxiways and the runways, with the parking areas and
other taxiways, are established by circumference
arches and straight traits. The calculation method
described below refers to an aircraft in taxiing on a horizontal surface. It is of general validity and
allows for sufficient precision to study for extension strips in a curve.
When taxiing the aircraft follows the guide line with the S point, passing from a straight line to
a curve. During the course point S continues to follow the trajectory axis of the taxiway, while the
main landing gear follows a different course, tending to near the internal margin of the curve with
consequent reduction of safety.
Such behaviour
on behalf of the aircraft can be more or less accentuated
according
to the
distance of reference, more or less wide, that passes from the centre of the theoretical axis of the
main landing gear and point (reference S) situated vertical to the cockpit.
During movement in curve reference point S follows a circumference
arch of centre O and
radius R. To study the movement of the aircraft it is necessary to have a system of reference co3

ordinates. Both OX and even more p and 0. are the polar co-ordinates

of point U. In the entry of the

curve the straight line US remains tangent in U in trajectory.

•_

x-.A._.dl.d..._

XA.LI_I
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Fig. 1: Explanation

Under these conditions

we obtain the differential

of symbols

equation

of the points U:

dO.

(1)

tana = p'_p
Expressing

p as d, R and ct we obtain the following

differential

equation:
(2)

p = d. cosa + _]d 2. cos 2a - d _ + R 2
where the positive sign has the value ofa
Separating the variables the equation
dp

> 90 ° and the negative sign ct < 90 °.
(1) can be written as follows:

(3)

d . sen a .tan a

.da
P - ,/R2+ d_(co.,
_,,- I)

The solution

of the differential

ot for the initial conditions

Ou- O0 = r'I

equation

(3) provides a bi-univocal

relationship

between

0u and

given.

ioo

sena. tana

]

o_l)

(4)

The integration
of thisexpressionis simpleonly in the particular
ease in which the bending
radiusR oftheguidelineisequaltothereference
distance
d of theaircraR.
In thiscase,infact,assumingtheinitial
conditions
are0o = 0,ao = 0 and p = 2d we obtain:

Ou= tana- a

(5)

with the angles expressed in radiants.
The polar angle, which defines the position of the reference
a_ = tan a
and the corresponding

point S therefore, has the value
(6)

guide angle yields
fl=2.a-rc/2

The deviation

of the main landing gear is therefore

7 = 2.d.cosct-d

= d.(2.cosa-

equal to:

(7)

1)

The general case R _ d is solved with complex calculations,
which does not justify the
construction of a fillet or a simple widening of the curve.
In practice, it is convenient to apply to the extension zone the approximate
method explained
below. The knowledge of guide angle 13 in all the trajectory points of reference S of the aircraft,
allows to construct the points of centre U of the main landing gear and to specify the trajectory of
this when veering on the ground.
Supposing, that for small movements of the aeroplane the guide angle 13 does not change, the
centre of instant rotation becomes P point, the so-called "pivot" and not point O. Consequently
the
aircraft reference point in following the guide line describes a small circumference
arch equal to:
R
ds = -- x sen 13x d x 0s
d

(8)

where d is the theoretical reference length of the aeroplane and R and 0s the polar co-ordinates
of
point S with respect to axis OX. We can suppose with approximation,
that while reference point S
of the aircraft

follows the guide line, the variation

of guide angle 13has the value of
(9)

dp= 1- dR--.senfl-d. 6_
therefore establishing a bi-univocal relationship
given, in analogy as to what was given before:

between

0s and 13according

a
e_R.senp"dP
The integration of (10) is obtained
furthermore that by:
R
d
solving

considering

simple passages

(lo)

only the case in which both R>d and presuming

X

K = x/"_-

(10) for 13/2 and finally introducing
the following

expression

the initial conditions
of 13:

to the initial conditions

1

0o = 0 and 13o= 0 we obtain after

ti= 2"arctan'[ X-Kwith Os expressed

4.

l-eX_x_ - K.e x_ 1
X.e

(11)

R>d

in radiants.

THE SWERVE

OF THE MAIN LANDING

GEAR.

On the carriage way, according to the initial conditions the swerve of U centre of the main landing
gear can occur externally or internally to the curve of the guide line traced on the paved surface and
follows in sequence reference point S of the aircraft.

Fi

Fig. 2:Explanation

of symbols

Along the carriage way or slip path, at the moment in which point S faces the curve, the
swerve, initially, of the U centre of the main landing gear is external to the circular curve, and it
becomes internal during the completion of the trajectory. With reference to fig. 2 we have the
following:
lr
(12)

vso: 7 +-ti
(R+ 2): : R2 +d :- 2.d.R.

The solution &this

equation

gives the internal

Aint = _]R: +d 2-2.d.R

and external values

of the swerve.
(13)

.senti-R

;test : _R _ +d 2 +2 .d.R.senfl

cos. (if__. p)

- R

If we express the swerve values as percentages
obtain, with the previous positions:

of the length of the aircraft reference

d we

(14)

2.
_/1+X2+2 X.senp-X
d

--_..

•

with the sign + or - in the case of external or internal swerve.
At the end of the ground trajectory curve, aircraft reference point S reaches the straight trait of
the taxiway before the main landing gear. During this manoeuvre 13 guide angle diminishes
progressively as indicated in fig. 2.
With the previous positions we have:

log. tan _ =l°g" tan fl max2 Fd

the (15) allows calculating the guide angle 13so that reference
distance F on a straight stretch of the carriage way.
(
fl= 2.arctan.exp_log.tan

flmax
-_

(15)

point S of the aircraft

follows

(16)
F].

At the end of a straight trait, the residual swerve of U centre of the main landing
the value of:
2
d

--

4.

BROADENING

a

gear, assumes

(17)
= sen

p

IN CURVE.

The geometry of a curve should be that, when the cockpit is positioned
on the axis of the
taxiway, the safety distance between the external margin of the main landing gear and the limit of
the taxiway, should not be less than that specified by the I.C.A.O. rules.
Up to now, it has been possible to know the exact position of point U and consequently
also the
internal point of the landing gear of the aircraft, in any manoeuvrable
sequence in which reference
point S follows the guide line consisting of circumference
arches and straight tracts. From this
knowledge it can, considering
the minimum safety margin, determine the internal limit of the fillet.
If the taxiway is used in both directions, the calculations
must be done for both directions and then
the internal envelopment
chosen.
Rigorous
calculations
would be long and useless, as previously
explained,
and only the
utilisation of calculus programmes
could make them acceptable.
Furthermore,
the layout of the
slipway likewise obtained could be difficult to execute on the ground. A simple way to face the
problem is to follow a fillet built with a circumference
concentric arch with a guide line, two tracts,
which are the initial and final tracts, and rectilinears which join the edge of the runway at the points
and acknowledge
the position taken by the aircraft and that they are furthermore
tangent to the
circular tract.
In these conditions, it is sufficient to calculate the radius r from the central pan of the slipway
and the distance between the tangential point of trajectory S of the terminal points of the rectilinear
slipway.
Referring

to the previous

definitions,

r = R +_,._

-

it is easy to realise that it is sufficient

safety dist. +

to take:
(18)

where_,minis theminimumdeviation,with asignobserved
duringthechangeof direction.
Moreover:
(19)

f = F min- d. cosfl
where:
•
•
•

fis the co-ordinate for specification
of the final point of the linear slipway.
13is the guide angle when F = Fmin;
Fmin is the minimum distance travelled from reference point S on the rectilinear

(2O)

_,=L__2 ( safety dist' +T]

Starting

from the initial condition

axis, so that:

0 = 0° 13= 0°, fixing the comer 0 an interval

of variation

Aq,

it is possible to cross (11) and (14), know (_i,_,i/d)
for every 0i=0i.l+Aq,
which determines
the
position of point U, the centre of the main landing gear. For this purpose, reference point S is
positioned on the guide line based on its polar co-ordinates
0_i and R and thus the direction of the
longitudinal
axis of the aircraft is traced, based on the noted value of the guide angle 13 of the
aircraft. Subsequently to the distance equal to the theoretical reference length, starting from S, along
the axis of the aircraft, position of point U can be identified.
For every position obtained for U, starting from this point towards the internal part of the curve
and perpendicular
to the aircraft longitudinal
axis, this leads to a distance equal to T/2 and the
existing safety distance is verified between the rim of the main landing gear and the margin of the
paved surface, and be not less than that indicated in the I.CA.O. rules.
In the rectilinear
tract, starting from the initial conditions F = 0, 13 = 13m_x,3. = _,_x, which
corresponds
to the position in which the reference point of the aircraft can be found between the
source of the circumference
arch and the beginning of the rectilinear trajectory fixing the distance F
an interval of variation AF, it is possible through (16) and (17) to know (13i, Z,i/d) for every Fi = Fi-i +
AF, which determines the position of the landing gear. Based on the data, obtained in the same way,
the safety distance can be verified. A further check to be made is the steering angle. In fact, the
device, which regulates the direction of the nose-wheel,
is built so that it works within a certain
steering angle. Therefore, it is necessary to verify the steering angle of the nose-wheel,
in order to
follow the guide line, so that it is maintained within the limited values allowed and ratified for the
considered type of aircraft. To calculate the steering angle, it is possible to apply to the owners
manuals, or to use the appropriate
tables, prepared by the ICA.O.,
which provide
its value
expressed in degrees, considering
the value of 13 of the guide angle and the relationship
of X
between the theoretical
reference length d and the effective distance inclusive of the nose-wheel
axis and the centre of the main landing gear.

7. IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE MATHEMATICAL

MODEL.

The mathematical
model described in the previous paragraphs was studied and implemented
using computer software in order to determine the trajectory of aircraft on carriage ways of Naples
- Capodichino
airport and the effect that the jet motors can have on the location of the hard
standings and on the vicinity of other infrastructures.
This study was done in order to examine and
execute the tracing of fillets planned in the Master Plan of the airport which has been prepared by
the British Airport Authority
and is based on previous studies done in Italy, mainly at the
"Fondazione Politecnica per il Mezzogiomo
d'Italia".

To study

the trajectory

geometry

of an aircraft

of the project

on a generic

of the guide

fillet,

line and the theoretical

be manoeuvred,
it is possible
to obtain the guide
trajectory
of the centre of the main landing
gear.
inside the curve, the aircraft has been geometrically
main

landing

(point
thus

S) follows
that

and the

the

(11)

good approximation
inserted
as a slide.
Capodichino

simulation

analytical

other
have

model-sized

aircraft
results

reference

surface.

is seen

movement

values

the

of 13 and

have at this stage.

reported,

the

type

where

broadening

various

of aircraft.
The MDI 1 is a medium-long

naming

the characteristics

Naples

bending

is evidenced,

distance

the

that

the

will

Z,. With

radii

these

4 and
which

This

commercial

freight

5 studies
is necessary
aircraft.

0s.

results,

with

where this is
for Naples Such

analysis

as we can see later

can be considered

of the guide

and

13 and

by automating

can be obtained.

airport.

extremity

of the aircraft,

spreadsheet,

of conflict,

as this

at the

(See fig. 6) In figures

in curve

in which
by parameters

without

aircraft,
the correct
considering

to the
time

position
on
the effects

on the trajectory
when

on,

doubt,

thanks

lines and at the same

the 2, swerves
from the centre of the main gear, it was possible
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of the aeroplane.
Table

1: MD

11 characteristics

Passenger capacity ....................................................................
Max air travel distance ................................................................

323
12,987 Km

External dimensions
61.21m
Total length ............................................................................
51.66m
Wing span .........................................................................
17.60m
Total height ............................................................................
Weight and load capacity
Max.
Max.
Max.
Max.

landing weight ...................................................................
take-off weight .................................................................
weight without fuel .............................................................
fuel capacity ....................................................................

195,044
273,289
181,437
117,480

Landing gear
Main gear inter-axis
....................................................................
Nose gear - main gear inter-axis ....................................................
Max. turn angle of nose gear .........................................................
Nose wheel tyre width ................................................................
Rear wheel tyre width .................................................................
External rear landing wheel inter-axis ...............................................
Central rear landing wheel rater-axis ................................................
Nose wheel inter-axis .................................................................

10.57 m
24.61 m
+ 70 °
40 cm
54 cm
140 cm
100 cm
46 cm

Kg
Kg
Kg
Kg

The wake effect is considered of three distinct categories:
gust effect, in which air turbulence
caused by the rotation of rotor blades (prop wash), by
helicopter motors (down wash) and by jet motors (jet wash) are indicated.
b. flood effect, in which the effects of air turbulence in the form of gusts and heat are indicated;
c. vortex effect, in which the effects of the air vortexes generated
by an aircraft in flight are
indicated (wake vortex).
The combination of these three effects is called "wake effect".
a.

As a general rule, winds at a speed superior to 56 Km/h are to be considered disturbing to both
people on the ground as to the aircraft in flight operations. The flow of motor jet discharge can
provoke air gusts with speeds many times superior to this limit, even at significant distances from
the aircraft.
The intensity of the gusts depends on the thrust of the motors, which in turn depend on the
operating conditions of the aircraft. On an aerodrome, critical conditions can be found at parking
areas and in correspondence
to the beginning of the take-off points and at the end of the runway.
Considering the weight of the aircraft, its configuration
and environment
factors, the maximum
thrust movement from the parking area varies from 50% to 60% of the max. continual thrust
(MCT), while the max. taxi force varies from 15% to 25% MCT. In relationship to such thrust
values, the MD11 generates a flow that at approx.30 metres distance the aircraft reaches a speed of
180 Km/h when taxiing and 420 Km/h on take-off Instead, a B747 at the same distance reaches a
speed of 143 Km/h when taxiing and 260 Km/h on take-off This is due to the different motor
configurations.

Figure

3: Speed behaviour

of the air jets of the motors when taxiing and on take of.

Therefore the aircraft, fi'om the wake point of view, that creates
Capodichino airport at least at the heading of the runway, is the MD11.
Table 2: Distance from the tail of the aircraft when the air jets acquire

1o

the greatest

problems

the speed of 56 Km/h.

at

Parked

aeroplane
64 m

Taxiing

aeroplane
180 m

/
.[

Aeroplane in take-off
480 m

The behaviour of air jets of three jet motor planes, such as the MDI 1, is distant from those
produced by aircraft with motors positioned under the wings. This is due to the presence of central
tail motors that on the MD11 are 10.00 m from the ground, with respects to wing motors which
only have a distance of approx. 2.50 m. from the ground. This motor configuration
produces in a
•vertical plan of the aeroplane, a very high area of turbulence.
Substituting in the previous slide on the measurement
of T of the MD 11, with the behaviour of
air jets referred to in figure 3, the state of the jet motors of this aircraft in the taxi phase and when in
take-off have been studied. Such study has bought about interventions not only to the apron area, by
moving the stands reserved for non wide body aircraft, but also interventions
in proximity to the
runway heading, by adopting suitable anti-flow barriers.
In diagrams 7 and 8 we can see the graphic analysis of the effects that the MD11 jet motors
have during exit and entering the runway, heading 24, after using the first right fillet, as positioned
in the Master Plan of the B.A.A. of Naples Capodichino
airport. By studying the fan shaped
envelope at the various jet speeds, it has been observed that during the manoeuvre
towards the
entrance of the runway, the effects produced by the high speed of jets, are not compatible with the
standards of comfort and safety for vehicles in circulation on the nearby motorway. Furthermore,
by
analysing the behaviour of jet speeds on a vertical plan, such study has allowed anti-flow barriers to
be placed on the banks of the roadway compatible with the regulations set out by the I.C.A.O. on
aeronautical obstacle limits.
By substituting again the T on the MDI 1 with the effective outline of the aircraft, the analysis
of the movement that we obtain, as illustrated in figures 9 and 10, has allowed a study on the course
of the wing tips to be done, This has been determining when planning the circulation trajectories
of
the parking area, the distance required when entering the runway, when positioning waiting lines on
the slipways and distancing the various hard standings especially for "nose-In" type of aircraft.
Finally, it must be stressed how this study can be implemented,
and not only the study on jets,
but also that of the behaviour of the isophonic curves produced by motors and, therefore, the effects
they have on personnel working not only in the parking areas, but also on the surrounding
airport
areas and on the urban environment.
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12

on leaving

the rumcay

heading

24

\

Fig. 5: Course of MD l l undercarriage

13

on entering

runway

heading

24

I
I
I
I
I
I
f

Fig.

6:

MDI

I in take.-off

14

heading

06

I
I
I
I
I
i
I
/

/
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
!

I

I
I
I
1

I
....

i

1

1

Fig. 7: Course of jet motors of the MD11 on exit of runway heading 24
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Fig. 9: Course of wing extremities

Fig 10: Course of the wing extremities

of the MDl l on exit of rulnuay heading

of the MD11 on entering
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1 INTRODUCTION
The air traffic, especially
growth rate is about 20%.
totally sixteen commercial
routes. Most of domestic
domestic

domestic

flights, increase

significantly

in Taiwan.

Average

annual

Taiwan is a small island, approximately
210 by 75 nm. There are
airports in this island. Nine domestic carriers provide 36 service
traffic is heavily distributed in the west coastal corridor.
These

flights operate in city-pair

shuttle services.

Sung Shan Airport (RCSS), located in Taipei, is the largest and busiest domestic airport in
Taiwan.
Currently, RCSS provides more than 500 flight operations daily and the annual
passenger

trips have exceeded

15,000,000.

RCSS has only one single runway.

The official

runway capacity is 40 operations per hour. It can only offer 16 hours service due to curfew.
The average annual V/C ratio is greater than 0.8. It suffers serious delays due to limited
runway capacity. However, it is very unlikely to add another runway because this airport is
surrounded
by dense residential
area.
The situation
gets even worse whenever
the
meteorological
condition changes in RCSS. A 40% reduction in capacity could be resulted.
The whole flight schedule could be seriously disturbed, and thus, traffic flow management
(TFM) is required.
Four general procedures of TFM implemented in Taiwan include airborne holding, ground
holding, en route re-routing, and restriction of metering rate. Ground holding is the most
effective one since Taiwan has very limited airspace and the domestic flight times are quite
short (one hour for longest).
There won't be too many TFM options after the aircraft is
airborne.
Therefore, the coordination
of ground holding and restriction of metering rate
provides the backbone of TFM.
Effectiveness
involves

of ground

the recognition

holding

policy

of congestion

depends
occurrence,

on the

implementation

its duration

timing.

and seriousness.

This
Early

implementation
or late release of ground holding policy or too small metering rate will cause
loss of capacity and unnecessary delays; on the other hand, the airspace may be overloaded
with airborne holding aircraft and extra fuel consumption is resulted.
This study develops a real time operation system to help the air traffic
determine when and how to implement the strategies of ground holding

controllers
to
policy.
This

operation system will be displayed by a personal computer at the air route traffic control
center of Taipei FIR. It is expected to upgrade this system to a workstation
and provide
information to all important air traffic control facilities.

2 SYSTEM

STRUCTURE

Air traffic flow management
has obtained more and more attention in the world. Many
countries have established their own flow management
systems. For example, Europe has
the flow management
handled by the Central Flow Management
Unit (CFMU) in Brussels.
CFMU estimates

the demand

according

to the flight plans.

The supply is obtained

from the

capacity reports provided by each individual
air traffic control center.
CFMU, then,
computes the slot times based on the demand and supply and automatically
sends the result
to each airlines[15].
The United States has the Air Traffic Control System Command Center
(ATCSCC)

in Herdon

for handling

flow management

decisions.

ATCSCC

collects real time

informationregardingweathercondition,weatherforecast,andtrafficcondition,andthen
estimates
futuretrafficbasedontheaboveinformation[
11]. Japanalsoestablished
its flow
management
centerin Fukuokain 1994115].
Thecontrolphilosophyof theabovesystems
maynotbethesame.TheATCSCCconcerns
with themanagement
of airportcapacity.Japanese
systemworkswith theairspaceflow
management.
However,themainprincipleof thesesystems
isto matchthedemandandthe
supply.
A system structure for flow management
other flow management
systems and

in Taiwan is proposed as Figure 1 after studying
discussing
with the Taiwan CAA. The main

components of the flow management system are input data, static flow distribution database,
flight time estimation module, dynamic flow distribution
module, capacity database and
decision supporting system. This system also provides friendly interactive user interface.
The Windows

NT is selected as the operating

environment.

The functions
of this flow management
system include (1)dynamically
predicting
the
arrivals and departures
in selected airports during next two hours, (2)providing
the
associated capacity information, (3)proposing the suggestions for ground holding strategies,
(4)evaluating
the impacts of each proposed suggestions,
and (4)allowing the flexibility for
controllers to modify the strategies and also evaluating the associated impacts.
It is noted that the Taiwan CAA currently uses the Loral system for the air traffic control
automation system. Although the Loral system also has some flow management
functions,
the Taiwan CAA prefers

developing

a new system from the very beginning.

3INPUTDATA
This flow management system needs four types of input data: (1) repetitive flight plan (RPL),
(2) filed flight plan (FPL), (3) updated messages regarding flight plan, and (4) weather
information.
The input data provides
demand and capacity supply.

the necessary

information

for predicting

the flow

RPL lists flight plan data associated with scheduled flights which are operated regularly.
The information
in the repetitive flight plan includes its applicable time period, days of
operation, aircraft identification,
type of aircraft and wake turbulence category, departure
aerodrome and time, cruising speed, cruising level, route, and destination
aerodrome and
total estimated elapsed time.
When a flight is operated
FPL has the information,

temporarily, it must obtain its air traffic control clearance by FPL.
such as aircraft identification,
flight rules, type of flight, number

and type of aircraft, wake turbulence category,
cruising level, route, destination
aerodrome
aerodrome(s),

etc..

The updated
modification,

information
cancellation,

departure aerodrome
and total estimated

and time, cruising speed,
elapsed time, alternate

regarding
flight plan includes
messages
associated
with
delay, and departure.
The airlines do be required to submit

updated messages whenever they want to change their flight plans, but they are not required
to do that immediately.
For example, the delay message should be submitted when flights

wouldbedelayedformorethanone

hour. Such a rule adds relatively
estimating departure time. The error could be as large as 59 minutes.
short domestic flight times in Taiwan, the error seems very intolerable.
The

important

information

about

weather

condition

includes

visibility,

direction/speed.
To predict the available capacity, it is very important
weather status and its duration.
Although the weather information
minutes, it does not provide any information beyond next 30 minutes.
The above data except the repetitive
This study develops

flight plan are transmitted

large uncertainty for
Compared with the

ceiling,

by teletypewriter

an expert system to screen, correct, and analyze

wind

to know the predicted
is updated every 30

channels.

the above data received

from teletypewriter
channels. Although ICAO has certain format requirements
for filing the
above data, it is observed that some entry of data may contain errors and need to be corrected.
In addition,

more types of data than needed are transmitted

by teletypewriter

channels.

An

expert system is developed to distinguish the useful data, not to miss any one, for updating
system status. It is noted that even missing one single needed data could cause inaccurate
prediction results.

4 FLOW

DEMAND

To dynamically

DISTRIBUTION

represent

the flow demand distribution,

this study first establishes

a static

flow distribution
database, and then, updates the (estimated)
departure times with the
updated messages.
This study also develops a flight time estimation module.
Therefore,
whenever
estimated

the departure
flight time.

The static

time is known,

flow distribution

the arrival

database is established

time can be projected

based

on RPL data.

based

on the

The static flow

distribution database has the total number of arrivals and departures for every fifteen minute
time interval at each individual airport. Most of domestic flights are included in RPL data.
Basically, the static flow distribution database can roughly represent the demand distribution
pattern. However, some flights may be operated temporarily and some may be delayed, or
canceled, and thus, the flow distribution pattern changes accordingly.
Such a problem gets
even serious when the capacity is reduced.
In stead of estimating the flight times by trajectory analysis, this study develops a flight time
database using the empirical SAR tape data to reflect the local characteristics.
It is noted that
the flight time function
enough precision.
It is observed

should

be simple

that the origin-destination

enough

pair, aircraft

for easy application

type, airlines

but still provide

and cruising

level may

affect the flight times. These factors may have some correlation.
For example, the cruising
level is usually related to the origin-destination
pair and aircraft type.
To avoid the
homoscedasticity
problem
as few factors as possible.

and to keep the flight time function simple, this study tries to use
The flight times are grouped by O-D pair first. The minimum,

maximum, average, and standard deviation
deviation of each group is not small enough,
factor.

The results

are computed for each group. If the standard
each group would be further divided by another

show that the origin-destination

pair and aircraft

type are two major

influentialfactorsfor flighttimes.AftergroupingbyO-Dpairandaircrafttype,mostgroups
havestandard
deviation less than one minutes.
5 CAPACITY

DATABASE

The major weather factors affecting airport capacity are visibility,
ceiling, and wind
direction/speed.
It is well known that the capacity under IMC operation may be significantly
reduced compared with that under VMC operation. The choice for IMC or VMC operation
depends on the visibility and ceiling. Most of domestic airports have only one runway in
Taiwan. The runway direction under operation may be switched when wind direction/speed
changes.
visibility,

Different runway direction has different requirements
regarding
and ceiling, and thus, has different capacity.
The capacity database

separation,
establishes

various capacity values associated with visibility, ceiling, and wind direction/speed
for each
airport. Table 1 shows the available capacity under various weather situations for Sung Shan
Airport.
Therefore, whenever the weather condition is known or forecast, the available
capacity for each airport can be determined or predicted.
To determine which strategy should be implemented for air traffic flow management, the key
information includes current capacity and predicted capacity for the entire flow management
time horizon. Therefore, it is necessary to obtain not only the weather status, but also how
long the weather status
teletypewriter
channels
minutes and it doesn't
Such a deficiency cause
minutes,

will last. It is noted that the weather information obtained from the
does not provide the predicted weather status beyond the next 30
specify the effective time period of provided weather status either.
a problem in determining the available capacity beyond the next 30

and thus affect the stability of predicted

6 DECISION
The decision

SUPPORTING
supporting

capacity.

SYSTEM

system is to help air traffic flow management

commander

to decide

when to impose the flow control and how to do it. To determine the timing for implementing
flow control, it is necessary to know when the congestion occurs and how serious it is.
Several indices are computed to indicate the occurrence and seriousness of the congestion.
These indices include the congestion occurring time period, its duration, the maximum
queue length, and the total waiting time. The notations used to compute these indices are
defined in the following:
number

of flights which are scheduled

to depart at Airport K in Time period t and has

already airborne.

DpKt• number of flights which are scheduled

to depart at Airport K in Time period

t but has

not taken off yet.

A_

number of flights which are scheduled

already airborne.

to arrive at Airport

K in Time period t and has

K

A_

.

number

of flights which are scheduled

to arrive at Airport K in Time period

t and has

not taken off yet.
Ct x : the available

capacity

of Airport

m: the time period with the maximum

K in Time period t.
queue length

W: the total waiting time
TU: the length of a time period.
These indices are computed

1.

The congestion

The congestion
K

K

This study let TU = 15 minutes.

as follows:

occurring

time period,

occurs when the demand
K

K

T:
exceeds the supply.

K

D., + DpT+A., + Ap, > C,
2.

The congestion

duration,

T÷a

n time periods:
T÷n

K

EA2 +A_, + D2 + D,_-<EC, _
t-T+l

I-T+I

3.

The maximum

queue length:

T÷m

max[ E(A._ +A_ + D_ + D_- C,':)] m=1.2,
m

4.

t=T+l

The total waiting time:
n-I

w=_
j=l

T+j

_(A_+A_+D_+D_-C_)xTU
t=T+l

This study suggests to implement flow control only when the congestion is expected to last
more than certain time periods. It is noted that the capacity is not a rigid value. The official
capacity just represents a conceptual number. The air traffic controllers have the capability
to smooth the traffic if the congestion is not very serious. Therefore, it is not necessary to
implement flow control immediately when the congestion just occurs. Currently, this study
recommends
that flow control is needed when the congestion duration n is greater than 2.
Further evaluation is helpful for validating such a recommendation.
At first, this decision

support system tries to develop

an algorithm

to suggest

which aircraft

should be delayed on the ground and for how long. This algorithm will be developed based
on the analysis of ground holding policy. The ground holding policy problem has been well
discussed in [2,3,5-14].
However, it is necessary
ground holding theory in real time situation.

to take some modifications

to apply the

The problemsinvolvedin on-lineapplicationarethe dataavailability,its accuracy,and
precision.Thetime readyandintendedfor take-offis therequiredinputdatafor ground
holdingpolicyproblem.However,it is verydifficultfor theoperation
systemtoobtainthis
inputdata.Althoughtheoperationsystemcanobtainthescheduled
departure
timefromthe
flight plan,theflight maynot bereadyandintendedfor take-offby thattime. Thatis,the
scheduled
departuretime only provideroughestimationfor the readyandintendedfor
take-offtime. Theerrorbetweenthescheduled
departure
time andthereadyandintended
fortake-offtimecouldbeaslargeas59minutessincetheairlineisrequiredtosubmitadelay
message
onlywhentheflightwill bedelayedformorethanonehour. Suchanerrorcauses
a
problemfor managing
air trafficflow in Taiwanduetorelativeshortflight times.
Suchaproblemprohibitthisstudyfromdeveloping
analgorithmformanaging
thedeparture
sequence
andtiming. To improvethisproblem,it is suggested
thattheflight shouldapply
andobtainitsairtrafficcontrolclearance
viadatalinkinsteadof voice.Theairtrafficcontrol
clearance
is thepermission
for a flight tojoin the queuefor take-off. Thetime of filing
applicationfor clearancecanbe treatedas the time readyand intendedfor take-off.
Currently,theapplication
is filedviathevoicecommunication
channels,
whichprohibitsthe
flowmanagement
systemfromacquiringsuchinformation.Datalinkmaybehelpfultopass
informationto theflow management
system.
Thegroundholdingdecisionwill beaffectedby theairbornecost,groundcostandchain
effect.Thesecostcomponents
areaircrafttyperelatedandalsoaffectedby flightloadfactor.
Thechaineffectdepends
on airlines'ownflight routingandscheduling
plan. Thesedata
maynotbeavailableormaynotbeaccurate
whileoperatingin realtimesituation.
Dueto thelimitationsmentioned
above,thisstudycurrentlydecidesto providetherough
departureratefor flow management
. It is notedthatwheneverthe precisereadyand
intended
fortake-offtimeis available,thedecisionsupportsystemcanbeeasilymodifiedto
providethesuggested
departure
sequence
andtiming,. Althoughthissystemwill provide
someflow controlsuggestions,
theflow management
commander
canalwaysoverwritethe
systemsuggestions.Theflow management
commander
canproposevariousflow control
strategies.
Thissystemcanevenevaluatetheimpactofeachstrategy
7 FIELD

TEST

Currently, the main part of this system has been completed and is under field test. Some
problems are observed about the quality of input data. These problems are listed as follows:

1. The input data may not provide correct information.
Sometimes, the airlines do not
submit updated messages, as required. Thus, the decision support system cannot present the
real condition correctly.
It is observed that some flights has taken off without sending any
departure

message

or some

flights

has been canceled

without

sending

any cancellation

message.

2.

The input data is not precise enough for estimating the departure time and the arrival
time. The airlines do not need to submit any delay message unless the flight is expected to be
delayed

more than one hour.

That is, the possible

error of estimated

flight times can be as

largeas59minutes.Sucha problemis especiallyseriousin Taiwan

because

the domestic

flight time is less than one hour.
3. The input data does not provide enough information for predicting
input data only provides weather information
for the next 30 minutes.
system to use some default values
thus, may generate some prediction
To avoid the incorrect

for predicted
errors.

input data (problem

capacity

1) affects

beyond

the capacity. The
This enforces the

the next 30 minutes,

the system performance

seriously,

and

this

study decides to automatically
cancel a flight when its delay exceeds certain limit. Currently
this study suggests to use 60 minutes as the limit. However, the user is allowed to specify
any number for this limit. Theoretically,
the predicted flow pattern won't be accurate when
the limit is too small or too large. The appropriate number could be determined based on the
empirical

delay distribution

Most of functions of the flow management system has been tested comprehensively,
and the
results show that it works quite well. The decision support system is also tested. However, it
is suggested to develop a simulation model to evaluate the performance of ground holding
algorithm since the real world cannot provide a good environment
for conduct a
comprehensive test.

8 CONCLUSIONS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study tries to develop a real time decision

support

system to decide when and how to do

flow control. This system can dynamically
display the flow demand and capacity of certain
airport for any selected time period. Based on the information of demand and capacity, this
system determines whether
expected to last more than
also give a suggestion about
to implement the suggested

the congestion occurs or not and its impact. If the congestion is
certain time periods, the system will send a warning signal and
ground holding strategy. However, this system does not enforce
strategy. The flow management commander can always modify

the strategy or propose a new one. This system will evaluate
strategy and let the commander
make the final decision.
This system
reasonable.
significantly

the performance

of each

is under field test currently.
The results show that this system works quite
However,
the quality of input data will affect the system performance
and needs to be further improved.

It is recommended

to incorporate

the input

data

from the radar

data

processor

(RDP).

Currently, to obtain a workable system, this study does not intend to integrate the data from
the complicated RDP system. The RDP can provide information
about in-aviation aircraft
status, including its real time position, cruising speed and cruising
helpful for obtaining precise estimated arrival time.

level.

These data are very

This system could be extended to have interaction with the airline operation center (AOC).
This can provide the AOC with the real time information
about demand and capacity
distribution.
scheduling.
system.

It is helpful for the AOC in making decision regarding flight dispatching and
The AOC can also provide the newly changed flight plan information
to this

Therefore,

the system can update

its status efficiently.

In addition,

this system can

be modifiedto providepassengers
with the updatedflight estimateddepartureor m-rival
times.
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